Nietzsche, Religion, and Mood by Saarinen, Sampsa
Sampsa Saarinen
Nietzsche, Religion, and Mood
Monographien und Texte 
zur Nietzsche-Forschung
Herausgegeben von 
Christian J. Emden 
Helmut Heit 
Vanessa Lemm 
Claus Zittel
Begründet von 
Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Heinz Wenzel
Advisory Board:  
Günter Abel, R. Lanier Anderson, Keith Ansell-Pearson, Sarah Rebecca Bamford, 
Christian Benne, Jessica Berry, Marco Brusotti, João Constâncio, Daniel Conway, 
Carlo Gentili, Oswaldo Giacoia Junior, Wolfram Groddeck, Anthony Jensen,  
Scarlett Marton, John Richardson, Martin Saar, Herman Siemens,  
Andreas Urs Sommer, Werner Stegmaier, Sigridur Thorgeirsdottir,  
Paul van Tongeren, Aldo Venturelli, Isabelle Wienand, Patrick Wotling
Band 71
Sampsa Saarinen
Nietzsche, 
Religion,  
and Mood
ISBN 978-3-11-062032-0 
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-062107-5 
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062035-1
ISSN 1862-1260
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: 2019933625
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;  
detailed  bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2019 Sampsa Andrei Saarinen, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
www.degruyter.com
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. 
 For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Open Access funding provided by the University of Helsinki 
Preface and acknowledgements
This study is based on a doctoral dissertation defended at the University of Vienna in
autumn 2017. Although the work has been revised, no efforts have been made to
cover up its origin. Quite to the contrary, I have sought to retain as much of its
form and content as reasonably possible, including some rough edges, to highlight
the experimental nature of the work.
Thanks to the generous financial support of the Osk. Huttunen Foundation, I was
able to concentrate on the dissertation for three entire years in a location of my own
choice; in a city of dreams and nightmares. I would like to thank all those who help-
ed create a productive research environment at the Department of Religious Studies
in Vienna, Austria. Specifically, I want to thank my supervisor Hans Gerald Hödl for
encouraging independent thinking. A great thanks also to Sandra Freregger for help-
ful advice; not least about opportunities open to scholars working on Nietzsche. In
this regard, the Werner-Ross-Stipendium of the Nietzsche-Forum Munich is in a lea-
gue of its own. The stipend gave me the opportunity to spend September 2016 at the
Nietzsche-Haus in Sils-Maria, to wander in the alpine landscapes, and to reflect on
questions timely and untimely. To all those who made this experience possible,
I am forever grateful.
This study owes much to the work of a large number of scholars and thinkers.
A great thanks to Matthew Ratcliffe, Peter Villwock, Graham Parkes and Martin Hägg-
lund for taking the time to engage with my work, for encouragement and for help in
advancing my scholarship.
I revised the dissertation and transformed it into this study as a Visiting Re-
searcher at the University of Helsinki. Thanks are due to the Jenny and Antti Wihuri
Foundation for providing financial support.
Finally, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my family for encouraging and
supporting me. Heartfelt thanks to Laura Henderson for being there for me through-
out these years.
DOI 10.1515/9783110621075, © 2020 Sampsa Andrei Saarinen, published by De Gruyter.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
 

Contents
 Introduction 1
. Introduction to Nietzsche’s communication of mood 5
. The research questions and their sources in traditions
of scholarship 11
. Introduction to and summary of chapters 19
 Nietzsche and the inadequate secularization of the “heart” in the
19th century 20
. The role of doubt in the 19th century crisis of faith 20
. The intellectual sources of Nietzsche’s understanding
of religion 24
. The general trajectory of Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion 27
 Nietzsche’s psychology and the tension between body and spirit 29
. A short history of research on Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking 31
. Drives in Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology 39
. Beyond Nietzsche’s purported epiphenomenalism 41
. Robert Solomon on the tension in Nietzsche’s understanding of the
emotions 46
. The history of emotions and the tension in question 50
. Conclusion 53
 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in Human, All Too Human and
Daybreak 55
. Schopenhauer’s shadow and the independence of HH 55
.. A turn against feeling? 56
.. The foundations of Nietzsche’s psychological criticism 58
.. Approaching Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion as the model for
and target of Nietzsche’s psychological criticism 61
.. Nietzsche’s appropriation of the “metaphysical need” 63
.. Nietzsche’s psychology of religion and salvation 66
.. The history of emotions and Nietzsche’s diagnosis of his time 69
.. The history of emotions in chapters four and five: From art to higher
culture 71
.. Conclusion: Nietzsche’s attack on religion and metaphysics in
HH 74
. Nietzsche’s use of mood in HH 75
.. Jacob Golomb’s thesis on Nietzsche’s use of mood 75
.. Aphorism 38 and the temperature of HH 77
.. Textual evidence about Nietzsche’s use of mood 78
.. A general characterization of the tone of HH 84
.. The unbalanced tone of chapter three: The trouble with the
ascetic 85
.. The ideal of calm and the mood of HH 88
.. Evidence about Nietzsche’s use of mood in HH from his notes and
letters 89
.. Conclusion 94
. Religion and emotion in Daybreak 95
.. The problem of religious decline 96
.. Reinterpreting and transforming feeling 97
.. Religion and the new dawn 99
. Nietzsche’s use of mood in D 103
.. Rebecca Bamford’s thesis about Nietzsche’s use of mood 105
.. The presuppositions of Bamford’s thesis 107
.. Interruptions and expectations? Nietzsche’s techniques of communica-
ting mood in D 109
.. Aphorisms for manipulation? 111
.. Ideal moods in D 113
.. Conclusion 114
 On the communication of mood in Nietzsche’s Gay Science 116
. The need for a contextual reading of GS 117
.. The two editions of GS 118
.. Coherence and unity in GS in the light of previous scholarship 120
. Authorial intentions 125
.. A deceptive letter 126
.. Nietzsche’s writing: A golden chain? 129
.. Nietzsche’s desire to communicate and the question of mood 131
. Towards a contextual interpretation of GS 134
.. The title “Gay Science” 135
.. The Emersonian motto 139
.. “Joke, Cunning and Revenge” 142
. On incorporation and joyful science 145
. Book three and the Madman 152
.. Introduction to GS 125, The Madman 155
.. Nietzsche, the Madman and desire for God 157
... A story of loss and grief? 159
... A non-melancholic response? 162
... Metaphysical need, aesthetic taste and desire for God 164
.. Nietzsche, the Madman and desire to be God 168
.. GS 125 as a test 170
. Book four and heightened mood 172
VIII Contents
. Conclusion and concluding excursus on the 1887 edition 180
.. The character of Nietzsche’s communication of mood in the second
edition of GS 180
.. The death of God and the joy of the free spirit 182
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Communication of mood or nihilistic self-
parody? 185
. The place of Z within Nietzsche’s works 186
. Giorgio Colli on Z as communication 188
. The tone of Z 191
. Upon the Isles of the Blest 193
. The question concerning self-parody in Z 195
. Claus Zittel’s challenge: Nihilistic self-parody? 196
. Deconstructive parody in the Ass Festival 199
. Zarathustra, the Ass and nihilism 203
. Conclusion 207
 Nietzsche’s final ideal 210
. Young’s thesis about Nietzsche’s religiosity 210
. The type of Jesus and the type of Zarathustra 212
. Nietzsche’s late psychology of power and the interpretation of ex-
traordinary experiences 216
. Nietzsche’s late psychology of power and his Dionysian ideal of
independence 219
.. The philosopher’s independence and Dionysus 220
.. Interpreting Nietzsche’s late Dionysian statements 222
. The end: Nietzsche’s final letters 224
. Conclusion 227
 Nietzsche’s radical atheism? 228
. Traditional and radical atheism 229
. Hägglund’s argument: The logic of radical atheism 232
. Nietzsche’s ideal mood: Escape from time or heightening of expe-
rience in time? 235
 Conclusions 239
. The big picture: Nietzsche on the death of God and the moods of the
future 239
.. A reconstruction of Nietzsche’s psychology of faith 240
.. Nietzsche’s communication of a mood of joyful doubt 241
.. Nietzsche’s communication of mood is anti-religious 243
.. Concluding remarks on the role of mood in Nietzsche’s
thinking 244
Contents IX
. On the significance of the study for research on
secularization 245
.. The crisis in the discourse on secularization 246
.. Nietzsche in contemporary research on religiosity 247
.. The dialogue between philosophy and sociology 248
.. Charles Taylor, metaphysical need, and the nature of
experience 250
.. The existential security thesis and the need for religion 252
.. The 19th-century crisis of faith and the question of mood
revisited 254
 Literature 257
. Works by Nietzsche, translations and abbreviations 257
. Secondary literature on Nietzsche and other cited literature 258
Index of Names 267
Index of Subjects 268
X Contents
1 Introduction
Visions of an accelerating, perhaps even irreversible decline of religion both haunted
and inspired the imagination of some of the most prominent intellectuals and artists
in 19th-century Europe.While historians have rightly stressed that the experience of a
crisis of faith was anything but common, if one looks at society as a whole,¹ and that
any major crisis in Christian religion was still a distant prospect, these prophetic voi-
ces deserve all the attention that they have received. Far more important than any
rapid and general decline in religiosity, is the fact that those who reflected on the
spiritual situation of the times transformed their hopes and fears into compelling
narratives; and thus bequeathed later scholars and thinkers a language that reso-
nates to this day. On the one hand there were narratives of emancipation that inter-
preted the declining grip of religious ideas as a sign of progress and in terms of a
recovery of natural human life and a natural humanistic morality. On the other
hand there were narratives that instead emphasized the loss in loss of faith and fore-
saw a bleak future bereft of hope. While the humanist narratives of the past appear
more questionable than ever after the horrors of the 20th century,² narratives that em-
phasized loss have proven remarkably resilient to criticism; at least insofar as their
language provides the archetype for all narratives of modernization as loss. A strik-
ing and oft-quoted example of this vague sense of loss can be found in Matthew Ar-
nold’s poem Dover Beach, in the vision of a receding sea of faith, which only leaves
melancholy behind (cf. Taylor 2007, 570).³ Yet no words from that era have left such a
 Instead of implying that there was no basis for the intellectual discussion, this conforms with Max
Weber’s classical understanding of intellectuals as defined besides by their social position especially
by their particular sensitivity to questions of “meaning”, and specifically crises of meaning (Weber
1978, 506). There is also evidence that in the latter half of the century the discussions that had
been confined to intellectual circles started to have a wider impact, though one can still not talk
of a general crisis of the Christian religion (e.g. Chadwick 1975; cf. McLeod 2000).
 Thus, it is more than a coincidence that one can after the first World War observe a turn to anti-
humanist alternatives in atheistic thinking; with the emergence of a number of positions that can only
be grouped together due to a shared rejection of the most important presuppositions of 19th-century
humanistic atheism; namely the ideas of the progress of reason, of a common human nature and
common ethical ideals (cf. Geroulanos 2010). However, it needs specifically to be pointed out that
this was not as radical a break with 19th-century thought as Geroulanos in his French case initially
presents it to be (Geroulanos 2010, 1 and 4), but rather a shift to more complex and prescient 19th-
century sources, above all to Nietzsche, as the case of Georges Bataille testifies (cf. Geroulanos
2010, 8), not to mention the later influence of Nietzsche on post-structuralist thinking. This influence
e.g. on the radically atheistic (cf. Hägglund 2008) thinking of Jacques Derrida was pervasive, and one
does not do justice to it by mentioning that he wrote about Nietzsche (Derrida 1979). The same applies
to the atheism of Gilles Deleuze (cf. Deleuze 1983).
 It is here beside the point, whether a focus on this image is the best possible interpretation of the
poem.What matters is that the metaphors are apt to describe a common view of modernity as an era
of necessarily melancholic unbelief, “the view from Dover Beach”, which Charles Taylor criticizes for
rejecting humanism altogether and denying the possibility of living a life of faith in modernity (Taylor
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legacy as the words that God is dead, and no single thinker has been identified with
the crisis in question, and with those particular words, in quite the same way as
Friedrich Nietzsche. Indeed, this distinctively European philosopher is widely cele-
brated⁴ as the pre-eminent diagnostician of what is at stake, and perhaps not entirely
without cause.
Unfortunately, Nietzsche’s enigmatic words that God is dead are all too often
simply assumed to express the assumed horror of his own crisis of faith, as well
as his lament for the fate of a culture that as a whole is about to lose faith, and
these presuppositions consequently cast a cloud over the interpretation of the philos-
opher’s thinking, not least when it concerns the future. In this sense, paragraph 125
of The Gay Science (GS 125, KSA 3, 480–482),⁵ the famous parable in which a Mad-
man announces that God is dead, is then read as an “archetypal Nietzschean expres-
sion of this notion of modernization as loss” (Pippin 1999, 147). Thus, as Robert Pip-
pin notes, Nietzsche’s diagnosis of a melancholic mood in modernity is read as the
philosopher’s own view of the truth about modernity; the truth that beneath all su-
perficial joy a melancholic mood deriving from the absence of belief in an absolute
value holds each and every one of us captive (cf. Pippin 1999, 148). Nietzsche certain-
ly had little patience with the idea of an inevitable progress of reason or the idea that
a natural morality must be humanistic and egalitarian (cf. A 4, KSA 6, 171) but it is
nevertheless worth following up on Pippin’s suggestion that Nietzsche can even less
be fitted into the opposite camp and all its gloom.
Indeed, there are good reasons to provisionally start from the assumption that
Nietzsche is sceptical of both narratives. Instead of seeking to provide a synthesis
of the narratives, he seems to play with them and their respective metaphorical lan-
guages in his writings. Characteristically, he gives a variety of meanings to the words
that God is dead, which has to quite a few scholars suggested that he sceptically con-
ceives the spiritual crisis of his time as an unprecedented opening of possibilities (cf.
Hödl 2009). Perhaps it is precisely this scepticism that makes him the preeminent
2007, 570–571). Taylor’s monumental tome A Secular Age serves as a magnificent illustration of the
enduring power of the major 19th-century narratives: Despite seeking to strike a balance between nar-
ratives of emancipation and narratives of loss, he ends up reinforcing the apologetic idea that life
without reference to transcendence is diminished life (cf. Gordon 2008 and Lockwood 2015).
 Precisely therefore, it is a futile task to try to “prove” the influence of Nietzsche’s words. Put differ-
ently, Nietzsche’s words have become a cliché, and repeating them or invoking the philosopher’s
name doesn’t imply that one has acquainted oneself with his philosophy. On a positive note and
to mention but one recent example of the scholarly reception of Nietzsche’s words beyond academic
philosophy, the editors of the Oxford Handbook of Atheism justify their volume by referring to the
words of “the great nineteenth-century German philosopher” (sic!) in the following way: “Whether
Nietzsche was right about the death of God, he was surely right about the importance and signifi-
cance of the death of God.” (Bullivant and Ruse 2013, 2) It is hard to disagree with this perceptive
statement, as the value of Nietzsche’s thinking on the matter is arguably to be found precisely in
his reflections of the significance, nature and possibilities of atheism.
 Consult section 10.1 for a list of abbreviations.
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diagnostician of the crisis in question, as he turns melancholic and humanistic inter-
pretations into objects of his psychological questioning. The decisive question, which
remains to be answered, is whether he does not aim to be more than merely a diag-
nostician, whether his scepticism does not reach further.What is therefore called for
is a study that revisits Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, his thinking on the death of
God, through the lens of his psychological thinking, but above all with a focus on the
question of mood. Of course, there have been a number of studies of Nietzsche’s psy-
chology that have had a lot to say about religion, many of which are discussed in
detail in this work, but none put mood at the centre of the investigation and quite
a few of those that do discuss mood are methodologically flawed. Above all, it
makes quite a difference whether one writes about Nietzsche’s psychology with a
focus on his psychological thinking or with a focus on his psyche. I will therefore
now specify what kind of study I propose through a critical sketch of the scholarly
position I argue against, the anti-thesis to my thesis.
A typical formulation of the view I argue against is that Nietzsche counts with a
necessary progression from the recognition that God is dead to nihilism and to mel-
ancholy, the overcoming of which finally requires a return to religion in one form or
another (e.g. Düsing 2010).Without exception, scholars who defend such a thesis rely
heavily on psychological interpretations of biographical details. In doing so they fol-
low the model provided by Lou von Salomé, that femme fatale, who besides manag-
ing to create quite a bit of havoc in the life of our philosopher, despite their fairly brief
acquaintance, advocated the view that any serious study of Nietzsche’s philosophy
would essentially have to be a study in the psychology of religion [religionspsycholo-
gische Studie] (Andreas-Salomé 1894, 38). There has certainly been no lack of bio-
graphical studies that have treated Nietzsche as if he really aspired to be the founder
of a religion [Religionsstifter] (Ross 1980, 584), and this despite his express wish not to
be interpreted as such (KSA 6, 365).⁶ More recently, this line of reasoning has also
found both champions and adherents in Anglophone scholarship, in the context of
which it is explicitly promoted as a revision of the scholarly consensus that Nietzsche
was an atheist and that his thinking is atheistic to the core. It is, however, worth not-
ing that discounting one notable exception (Young 2010) the emphasis has been more
on philosophical speculation based on assumptions about Nietzsche’s inmost desires
than on serious biographical scholarship (e.g. Young 2006; cf. Fraser 2002 and Ben-
son 2008). To be absolutely clear, I do not mean to deny that the philosophical and
biographical are intertwined in Nietzsche’s thinking; even to an unusual degree. Nor
do I mean to deny that much can in fact be gained by devoting careful attention to
such studies. Despite employing rather questionable hermeneutic practices in trying
to prove that the driving force behind Nietzsche’s philosophy is a religious impulse,
 Nietzsche’s wish, which is best read in connection with his fear of being mistaken for something he
is not (KSA 6, 257), is of course no objection in itself but worth mentioning as it points to the limits of
biographical scholarship.
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they at the very least raise awareness of an important question that should always be
asked when interpreting his texts but which is all too often forgotten in more specific
philosophical debates, namely: what does Nietzsche seek to achieve through his writ-
ings? Nevertheless, I propose a different approach to Nietzsche’s psychology of reli-
gion; one that focuses primarily on his psychological thinking, instead of on his psy-
che. It is remarkable, that despite there being no lack of “psychological” studies of
Nietzsche’s relation to religion a thorough study of how Nietzsche’s own thinking
on mood relates to his critical project is still lacking.⁷ In fact, so little attention has
been paid to Nietzsche’s own psychological thinking in the context of this particular
debate that not even the most accomplished scholars of Nietzsche’s criticism of reli-
gion, including those critical of biographical interpretations, explicitly mention it as a
foundation of his criticism of religion.
In his erudite study Der letzte Jünger des Philosophen Dionysos Hans Gerald Hödl
identifies historical criticism and language criticism as the foundations of both
Nietzsche’s early and late criticism of religion (Hödl 2009, 341). Undoubtedly, Hödl
is correct, but he downplays how intricately these forms of criticism are intertwined
with psychological thinking precisely when Nietzsche reinvented himself as an inde-
pendent philosophical thinker in the 1870s, and how this heightened interest in psy-
chology shaped the path of his later thinking. Perhaps it is even more correct to say
that Hödl recognizes the problem but is reluctant to draw the required conclusions.
When discussing Nietzsche’s reception of historical thinking in this decisive period,
he does note that Nietzsche’s interest in historical criticism was to no small extent
of a psychological character: on the one hand it concerned psychological analyses
of the past and on the other the question whether the emergence of historical criticism
itself should not be treated as a psychological problem (cf. Hödl 2009, 343–345). Like-
wise, Hödl himself mentions but does not reflect further on the fact that Nietzsche in
the most important early expression of his criticism of language, in a text not intend-
ed for publication entitled On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, bases his criti-
cism on the assumption of a drive to form metaphors (Hödl 2009, 345; TL 2, KSA 1,
887). In fact, the text is teeming with physiological (e.g. nerves) and psychological
(feelings etc.) terms. Most importantly, when Nietzsche’s criticism of religion appears
in full force in Human, All Too Human (1878) it is primarily of a psychological charac-
ter and this is all the more true of his later yet more radical criticism.
By pointing this out I do not here mean to challenge the consensus about the
intellectual genealogy of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion nor do I suggest that histor-
ical criticism and language criticism are unimportant in his mature thinking. I merely
wish to add to this picture a dimension without which it would be incomplete; name-
ly the fundamental importance that the development of Nietzsche’s psychological
 As I have already suggested, Robert Pippin’s works (Pippin 1999 and 2010) contain valuable sugges-
tions, but his discussion on Nietzsche in these works is essayistic and quite speculative in character,
and his focus is not on Nietzsche’s criticism of religion. In other words, a more comprehensive treat-
ment is lacking, and such a treatment can arguably cast much light on the philosopher’s thinking.
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thinking has for his criticism of religion, which is such that it cannot simply be said
to build on the other foundations.⁸ In this sense, I take as my starting point Hödl’s
conclusion that one cannot understand Nietzsche’s critical engagement with Christi-
anity and atheism without taking account of his understanding of human possibili-
ties.⁹ The scholarly literature, including Hödl’s account, has to be expanded, because
the intimate connection between Nietzsche’s thinking on human possibilities and his
psychological thinking has not been explored thoroughly, and because exploring it
might help solve central problems in scholarship about Nietzsche’s critical thinking
on religion, not least how to understand his words that God is dead.
In this study, I will explore Nietzsche’s criticism of religion in the light of his
communication of mood. I speak of Nietzsche’s communication of mood, because
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking about mood is arguably not only present in his
statements but also manifests itself in his strategies of writing (see esp. chapter 3
on why taking account of statements is not enough). Specifically, I argue that the phi-
losopher aims through his writings to make possible what one scholar has called af-
fective reorientation;¹⁰ i.e. a transformation of feeling, specifically towards post-reli-
gious modes of experience. This is the provisional starting point of the investigation,
the adequacy of which will be measured against the best available evidence through-
out this study. Needless to say, this assumption allows for a variety of more or less
controversial interpretations, wherefore I will now specify exactly how it is to be un-
derstood and how it should inform the way one reads the texts, before moving on to
present the central questions that I seek to answer through this work.
1.1 Introduction to Nietzsche’s communication of mood
In his lectures on Nietzsche’s aristocratic radicalism,which were held in Copenhagen
in 1888 and soon thereafter published as an article, Georg Brandes right at the outset
made a case as to why one should read the philosopher. Put in plain English,
Brandes ascribes to Nietzsche many talents, among which however he singles out
 One likely reason why scholars working within philological traditions have not emphasized
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking is because it is practically impossible to establish precisely
where his psychological ideas came from, except perhaps for his terminology. Nietzsche’s psycholog-
ical thinking seems to a large part to stem from Nietzsche himself and that might be bewildering to
those who only have eyes for texts, i.e. to scholars trained to always look for a source in a text instead
of in life (see chapter 3 and chapter 4, especially 4.1.1).
 Hödl ends up arguing forcefully for the significance of what he, in lack of a better word, calls the
anthropological function of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, i.e. its preoccupation with human pos-
sibilities [Möglichkeiten des Menschseins] (Hödl 2009, 361–362).
 I borrow the term from Christopher Janaway, who uses it to describe what he interprets as
Nietzsche’s attempts to influence the reader’s emotions in GM (Janaway 2007). My use of the term
differs only insofar as my focus is more on the big picture of moving from religiously conditioned
feelings to post-religious feeling.
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the rare talent to communicate mood and so to set thoughts in motion.¹¹ The word
communicate is here of utmost importance, since it implies that Nietzsche’s writings
not only evoke mood or elicit any other affective responses in the reader, but that
Nietzsche sought to communicate mood. Many intriguing questions can be asked
about what I here also call Nietzsche’s affective communication. How does it relate
to Nietzsche’s philosophical projects? Is it a vital part of his projects or a mere rhet-
orical addition to a philosophy that could as well be communicated as pure theory?
While the lectures of Brandes are generally recognized as having been decisive for
the international reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the scholarly literature has sur-
prisingly little to offer in form of answers to such questions. A quick glance at the
history of the reception of Nietzsche’s writings reveals that readers have almost with-
out exception felt themselves to be emotionally moved and challenged by Nietzsche’s
words, but it is far more rare to find perceptive reflection on the meaning of this phe-
nomenon. In this regard, the Austrian author Stefan Zweig must be honoured, what-
ever else one might think of his oeuvre in general, or specifically his understanding
of Nietzsche, as he gave an intriguing description of the philosopher’s communica-
tion of mood. Zweig finds in Nietzsche’s writings no explicit teaching but the trans-
mission of a specific atmosphere, meant to spur the recipient towards ever greater
independence.¹² If Zweig’s intuition captures something important in Nietzsche’s
writings, or if it is of any value at all, one can ask why then there has been such
a silence on the matter in academic scholarship, as the consequences of accepting
that there is some truth to it are not negligible.
Most likely as a result of the pervasive influence of the linguistic turn on 20th-cen-
tury philosophy and scholarship in the humanities, the question concerning the
manner of Nietzsche’s communication, and its relation to his philosophical projects,
has all too often been reduced to one concerning Nietzsche’s style in a very narrow
sense. Specifically, it has been reduced to the thesis that Nietzsche’s style, or more
properly his use of a wide variety of styles, is designed to resist systematic interpre-
tation (e.g. Derrida 1979, Kofman 1993 and Nehamas 1985; cf.Westerdale 2013). From
this starting point, which to some extent is indisputable, one can either move in the
direction of a deconstructive philosophical approach or towards a strictly philologi-
cal approach, both of which have resulted in invaluable contributions to the under-
standing of Nietzsche’s thinking. Although such philosophical exercises and philolo-
 “Han har blandt flere gode Egenskaber den at meddele Stemning og sætte Tanker i Bevægelse.”
(Brandes 1889, 565)
 “Nietzsches großartige Unabhängigkeit schenkt … keine Lehre (wie die Schulhaften meinen), son-
dern eine Atmosphäre, die unendlich klare, überhelle, von Leidenschaft durchströmte Atmosphäre
einer dämonischen Natur, die sich in Gewitter und Zerstörung erlöst. Tritt man in seine Bücher, so
fühlt man Ozon, elemenatrische, von aller Dumpfheit, Vernebelung und Schwüle entschwängerte Luft:
man sieht frei in dieser heroischen Landschaft bis in alle Himmel hinauf und atmet eine einzig dursich-
tige, messerscharfe Luft, eine Luft für starke Herzen und freie Geister. Immer ist Freiheit Nietzsches letz-
ter Sinn…” (Zweig 1925, 322)
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gical scholarship have rightly stressed that Nietzsche’s manner of communication re-
flects his philosophical projects, there is no denying that the affective dimension of
his writing has been marginalized in the process. This has come to pass despite the
fact that Nietzsche himself emphasized the emotional dimension of his texts.¹³ The
strongest expression is to be found in EH, where looking back at his own work
right before his descent into madness he writes: “Communicating a state, an inner
tension of pathos through signs, including the tempo of these signs – that is the
point of every style”, and consequently adds that, “Every style is good that really
communicates an inner state” (Large 2007, 40–41; KSA 6, 304). Nietzsche thus insists
that there is no good style in itself; that the value of a style is measured by its ability
to communicate a felt state. That he here indeed speaks primarily about what style
means for him, instead of the goals of style in general, is apparent when one
takes into account that he then goes on to speak of his own work. Importantly,
and perhaps rather alarmingly, Nietzsche adds that his understanding of style pre-
supposes readers who are capable of experiencing such states as his style expresses.
Specifically, he claims that until there are readers with the right “ears to hear” no one
will comprehend his Zarathustra (KSA 6, 304). Rather than discarding this discussion
as a sign of his approaching madness, there are reasons to regard it as an extreme
statement of what he had been trying to do since his first frontal attack on religion
in HH (cf. chapter 4). Such or similar understandings present serious problems to the
task of interpretation. Indeed, it is worth asking, if an acknowledgement of an affec-
tive dimension to the texts does not place impossible demands on the interpreter and
consequently render interpretation next to impossible.
Perhaps the reluctance to pay more attention to Nietzsche’s affective communi-
cation has to do with an understandable fear that doing so would restrict the possi-
bilities open to interpretation. It seems to me as if the choice has been between ac-
cepting Nietzsche’s extreme statements as they are, or ignoring the affective
dimension altogether. Be that as it may, it is notable that of major 20th-century inter-
preters only the philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers understood the question of
style as one concerning experiences and gave it a central role in his investigations.
His intervention is, however, deeply unsatisfactory. Jaspers essentially claims that
in order to understand any thought that the reader encounters in Nietzsche’s texts,
the reader would have to enter the state that gave rise to the thought in Nietzsche.¹⁴
This is an extreme demand to place on the interpreter, unless of course one assumes
that Nietzsche’s text is somehow able to attune or transport the reader to that state of
mind in which the thinker originally had his thoughts. Perhaps Nietzsche at some
 There are certainly a few exceptions, mostly among philosophically inclined scholars, and they
will be discussed and critiqued throughout the study. What is evident is that these discussions
have been marginal and have had no significant impact on the dominant trends in scholarship.
 “Nietzsche spricht aus seinen Zuständen heraus und kein Gedanke von ihm kommt einem Leser nah,
der nicht unmerklich mit eintritt in den Zustand, aus dem er bei Nietzsche gedacht war.” (Jaspers 1981,
338)
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point really thought that was what his style did instead of only playing with the idea
that the perfect style could have such an effect on the reader (cf. HH II,WS 88, KSA 2,
593). Nevertheless, this latter way of understanding Jaspers’ statement is unhelpful
and utterly implausible, as not only countless ordinary readers fail to grasp what
Nietzsche really had in mind and experience only frustrated irritation when confront-
ed with his texts. Even experienced scholars have fundamental disagreements about
the best interpretations of central issues such as the words that God is dead. In other
words, Nietzsche’s texts are demanding,which leads us back to the first and simplest
reading of Jaspers’ contention as a prohibitively demanding precondition for under-
standing. As such, Jaspers’ claim opens the door to esoteric interpretations of
Nietzsche’s writings by which I refer to interpretations that stress the supposed affin-
ity between Nietzsche and the interpreter. Ultimately, such interpretations of which
there is no lack rely more on the authority of the interpreter than on the evidence
of the text, and therefore they should be granted no place in scholarship. How
should one then proceed? For now it is enough to note that the specific way that Jas-
pers formulates his demand is problematic for any interpretation, whether it rests on
esoteric claims of natural affinity or careful and transparent use of the evidence at
hand. This becomes clear when one takes Nietzsche’s troubles with his health into
account. To step into the state from out of which some thought of Nietzsche sprung,
would require the ability to experience his pains, and there is not even agreement
about what caused his various ailments, nor is it likely that there ever will be.
Jaspers does not mention the source that his claim rests on; it is rather based on
a comprehensive intuition. Nevertheless, textual support for it is not hard to find.
However, Nietzsche also makes the connection to disease. The foreword to the
1887 edition of GS is most explicit in this regard. There Nietzsche writes specifically
of the health of the philosopher: “he simply cannot keep from transposing his states
every time into the most spiritual form and distance: this art of transfiguration is phi-
losophy” (Kaufmann 1974, 35; GS Preface 3, KSA 3, 349). Have we then not already
reached a dead-end? To the contrary, it can be shown that Jaspers’ intuition is mis-
guided, though obviously not entirely unfounded, and that Nietzsche’s self-presenta-
tion in that foreword is deceptive. The reason is fairly simple. Jaspers fails to distin-
guish between the states and moods of Nietzsche’s thinking and the expression of
his thoughts in his published writings. This is a problematic hermeneutic when ap-
plied to any writer, but in the case of Nietzsche, it is a fatal mistake. The evidence
speaks a clear language. One can often follow how a thought that Nietzsche has
scribbled down in his notebook develops and takes a rather different form in the
published writings. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that Nietzsche actively sought
to shape his writings according to aesthetic ideals, and that they can in no way be
treated as the pure expression of an existential state (see especially chapter 6). I
therefore here propose a different approach to the question of style, centred on
the idea of communication of mood, the presuppositions of which I will outline next.
In order to be able to have a meaningful scholarly discussion about mood in
Nietzsche’s writings, one must (1) assume that whatever configurations of feeling
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are expressed in his texts are at least in principle accessible to the interpreter. I main-
tain that this statement must not itself be qualified, but that one should note the
words “in principle”. For the interpreter this means nothing more than that a general
openness toward affective phenomena is required. One can recognize and to a cer-
tain extent understand a mood without fully inhabiting it. Basically, and I stress
the word “basically”, this is no more mysterious when it comes to texts as when
we are dealing with intersubjective understanding. Admittedly, openness towards
moods can be impaired, and in this regard there are degrees from mild mood disor-
ders to more pronounced psychic pathology, though it is generally recognized that
only in certain severe psychiatric diagnoses is the horizon of mood altogether locked
(cf. Ratcliffe 2008 and Ratcliffe 2014).¹⁵ One could, however, argue that texts require
more than a general openness towards mood, but this I maintain is only true in the
rather trivial sense that the interpretation of text is an art that requires a certain set of
skills and practice, perhaps even a certain predisposition. Arguably, Nietzsche’s texts
are especially demanding in this sense so the rather elitist intuition that one finds in
Nietzsche’s own comments and which I see at work in esoteric interpretations need
not be totally abandoned, as long as one recognizes its limits. This, in short, might be
called the accessibility criterion.
One must also (2) assume that whatever feelings one finds expressed in Nietz-
sche’s texts, they are at least to a significant degree best understood as intentional
communication. In other words, one must assume that Nietzsche sought to commu-
nicate specific feelings and by extension a specific configuration of mood, which in
turn presupposes that Nietzsche did not write only for himself, but wanted to be un-
derstood. This might be called the intentionality criterion.
Last but not least, we must (3) assume that the affective dimension of Nietzsche’s
texts is philosophically significant, at the very least in the minimal sense that it is
significant for understanding the aims of his philosophy. Against this background,
it is worth pointing out that one can find many distinct feelings in the texts we
are concerned with, and that it is impossible to take account of all of them. This is
no problem at all, since I take it as a fairly uncontroversial assumption that some
aspects of Nietzsche’s communication are more significant than others, and that it
is the big picture that matters. That means that the focus of scholarly work should
not primarily be on a single affect or affects in a specific passage in the following
sense: “in this passage Nietzsche is trying to evoke affect X”. That would be fairly
pointless. Instead, the focus should be on a contextual reading of the communica-
tion of the kind of mood(s) that he considers to be of particular, perhaps lasting
value. Put differently, the focus should be on those feelings that contribute to affec-
tive reorientation. This might be called the relevance criterion.
 The work of Matthew Ratcliffe is apt to illustrate the importance of mood in life. What interests
Ratcliffe specifically is how feelings and moods, or what he terms existential feelings, open up and
close horizons of possibility. E.g. in depression the experience of moods is limited and one loses
much of the sense for possibilities that elated moods open up (see Ratcliffe 2008 and Ratcliffe 2014).
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These basic, interconnected criteria make a meaningful discussion of the affec-
tive dimension of Nietzsche’s texts possible, not least because they provide a foun-
dation for intersubjective verification of the results of research. Needless to say, the
assumptions of course have to be made plausible in the sense that one cannot for
example simply assume purely on the basis of subjective experiences of reading
that Nietzsche intended to communicate some specific feeling which one experiences
when reading the text. This merely points to the necessity of a transparent use of evi-
dence. Now, if one puts the three points together, one can come to the following con-
clusion: That Nietzsche wrote in a manner designed to provoke an affective response
suggests that he might have had,when composing any specific text, an ideal mood in
mind, the possibility of which his text is meant to communicate. This is a contentious
issue. Jaspers for one did not think that Nietzsche had any such ideal, and that he
instead only described various distinct ideals. However, his evidence is problematic.
Jaspers incomprehensibly takes as guide a statement that the philosopher wrote in a
notebook in the year 1881: “one should not strive for any state at all”.¹⁶ If one ran-
domly scours the Nachlass for support of one’s own view, another note, from
1884, in which Nietzsche defines for himself the meaning of the philosophical life
as a love of a high feeling,¹⁷ could with equal or more reason be taken as symptomat-
ic for his way of life as well as of his writings. One should in any case rather consult
the published work and consider the greater trajectory of Nietzsche’s writing. Thus,
for example, Manfred Kaempfert notes that Nietzsche’s entire conception of philos-
ophy is guided by the vision of a sublime state.¹⁸ There has been a tendency
among some scholars to interpret this eminently desirable state as a religious
state. Kaempfert himself labels it quasi-religious [religioid], but more recently there
have been less ambiguous judgements. Julian Young bluntly identifies it as a reli-
gious state, specifically as an ecstatic state, in which one feels as if one were “in
heaven … eternal” (Young 1992, 115; cf. Young 2006, 110– 111 and Young 2010,
562). Young’s judgement is insofar understandable, as Nietzsche describes his
 Own translation of: “Erster Satz meiner Moral: man soll keine Zustände erstreben, weder sein
Glück, noch seine Ruhe, noch seine Herrschaft über sich.” (Jaspers 1981, 338; cf. NL 1881, 12[89],
KSA 9, 592) The problem here is that Nietzsche’s published writings do not contain any significant
expressions of this sentiment; to the contrary. Jaspers also cuts short another note that he uses to
justify his approach: “wir dürfen nicht einen Zustand wollen” (Jaspers 1981, 336, cf. NL1882, 1[70],
KSA 10, 28). This note, if indeed it should be considered significant, is arguably best interpreted
only as a rejection of such states that close off access to other moods, and has otherwise not
much to do with the question whether specific moods are more desirable than others. In other
words, it is in itself a sign of at least an ideal about moods: a rejection of end-states.
 “Philosophie als Liebe zur Weisheit. Hinauf zu dem Weisen als dem Beglücktesten, Mächtigsten, der
alles Werden rechtfertigt und wieder will. – nicht Liebe zu den Menschen oder zu Göttern, oder zur
Wahrheit, sondern Liebe zu einem Zustand, einem geistigen und sinnlichen Vollendungs-Gefühl: ein Be-
jahen und Gutheißen aus einem überströmenden Gefühle von gestaltender Macht. Die große Auszeich-
nung. Wirkliche Liebe!” (NL 1884, 25[451])
 “Zielvorstellung eines höchst erhabenen Seelenzustandes” (Kaempfert 1971, 134)
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ideal with metaphors of heights. Interpreters have certainly had a hard time with
these metaphors. To mention but one example, Eugen Biser righty noted the central-
ity of these metaphors but practically admitted being at a loss how to interpret them
(cf. Biser 1962, 249–256). Perhaps this study of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, the
central questions of which I present next, can through its emphasis on Nietzsche’s
psychological thinking on mood cast light on this problem and bring much needed
precision to the scholarly discussion.
1.2 The research questions and their sources in traditions
of scholarship
As I explore Nietzsche’s criticism of religion in the light of his communication of
mood, the following are the guiding questions. What role, if any significant role at
all, does communication of mood play in the context of Nietzsche’s criticism of reli-
gion? How and why does Nietzsche criticize religion and how and why does he seek
to communicate mood? If indeed there is evidence that Nietzsche seeks to communi-
cate mood in his first major attack on religion in HH (1878), how does the nature of
his communication change over the years? Does Nietzsche seek to communicate an
ideal mood, and if yes, how should this mood be characterized? Is it perhaps best
described as a religious state of mind? If it is best described as a religious state,
should the goals of Nietzsche’s philosophy be described as religious?
Needless to say these questions arise primarily from an engagement with
Nietzsche’s philosophy, and secondarily from an engagement with scholarly com-
mentary, as should be evident from the discussion thus far. Yet their precise articu-
lation, the way the questions are framed, follows from the perspective of this study,
which grows out of a scholarly tradition that is if not entirely foreign to the discourse
still foreign enough to enable a certain distancing from most of the secondary liter-
ature on Nietzsche’s thinking on religion. Since this perspective guides the study, but
remains in the background throughout the work, it is here necessary to clarify its
character. The perspective in question is fundamentally not that of a philosopher
but that of a scholar of the history of religions.¹⁹ What this practically means here
is not only that the focus is squarely on Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, but more
importantly that it is in this context on questions about desire, about extraordinary
experiences, and above all about mood. In other words, the focus is on aspects of
reality and of Nietzsche’s thinking that philosophers all too often eschew. As a con-
trast, reflection on such questions has traditionally been at the centre of the history
of religions. In order to avoid misunderstandings it is worth noting straight at the
 In this regard, my work grows out of a specifically Viennese tradition of seeking to make advances
in Religionswissenschaft fruitful for research on Nietzsche and vice versa (cf. Figl 2007 and Hödl
2007), and of sceptically questioning the value of viewing Nietzsche as a religious “Gottsucher”
(Figl 2000, 99; cf. Hödl 2009).
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outset that the focus of scholarship in this discipline was never exclusively and def-
initely no longer is on defining the human as essentially homo religiosus (cf. Lang
1993, 164– 172), and then approaching experience through this prejudice, but rather
on examining how experience turns into religious experience through interpretation
(cf. Geertz 1973, 97).²⁰ From this perspective, it therefore does not follow that I would
a priori treat Nietzsche as an essentially religious thinker. To the contrary, precisely
this perspective, and specifically the sceptical spirit that is prominent if not domi-
nant within the contemporary study of religions, can guard against too hasty classi-
fications and comparisons, which arguably obscure rather than cast light on the
goals of Nietzsche’s philosophy. That this indeed is the case can be shown through
a short digression into the debate about the concept of religion within the discipline.
The classical traditions of this discipline already emphasize the variety of human
experience; an emphasis which sooner or later leads to the recognition that not only
is there a wide variety of ways of being religious but also of being non-religious and
that just as experiences that seem ordinary can take on religious meaning experien-
ces that seem extraordinary should not necessarily be classified as religious.²¹ Al-
though there will always be debate about the definition of religion within the
field, it is generally agreed that broad definitions that fail to demarcate religion prop-
erly and at worst end up finding religiosity in all articulations of the experience of
being in the world must be rejected as useless and meaningless. For example, defin-
ing religion in a way that is bound to make all of us religious and then declaring that
Nietzsche should be approached as a religious thinker is hardly helpful.²² According-
 To be absolutely clear, I am here not claiming that Geertz worked within the discipline I am de-
scribing. Although Geertz was an anthropologist writing primarily for anthropologists, his emphasis
on the “interpretation of culture” (Geertz 1973), in the sense of highlighting the role of interpretation
in shaping culture, influenced academic discourse far beyond anthropology. Indeed, his understand-
ing of religion has been “extraordinarily influential” (Arnal 2000, 26) in almost all academic research
on religion, including the discipline known as history of religions.
 This recognition already played an important role in William James’ classic work on the Varieties
of Religious Experience (James 2012 [1902]), which has just like the work of Geertz been immensely
influential in the study of religion. It is nevertheless worth noting that, as a philosopher in his
own right, James seems to have thought that the “strenuous mood”, the mood he considers the high-
est and most noble, requires a religious interpretation of the world in order to be experienced and
maintained. James specifically denied that anything finite such as humanistic visions of future prog-
ress could motivate the kind of striving that allows one to be indifferent to the hardship of one’s own
life in the present and to work for a greater future. Instead, he thought only the vision of infinite
value, i.e. of God, can open the highest possible mood (cf. Slater 2009, 86–88). This matter is no
mere curiosity: not only does feeling play a central role in pragmatist philosophy, and in the thinking
of James in particular (cf. Shusterman 2012), but the question of mood should, as I here seek to show,
be considered central to serious thinking on life without religion and to Nietzsche’s concerns, where-
fore it is of great interest to clarify his quite different answer.
 There has certainly been no lack of attempts to stretch the definition of religion in order to be able
to treat Nietzsche as an essentially religious thinker.While I fully agree with Johann Figl that it can be
very fruitful to take a specifically religionswissenschaftlich perspective when approaching the ques-
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ly, more recent reflection on the concept of religion has underscored the necessity of
limiting the use of the term since that is a presupposition for meaningful scholar-
ship. On the grounds that the concept of religion evidently is a social construction
it has been forcefully argued that scholars should take a minimalist position, and al-
together refrain from thinking that there is an essence of religion to be found either
in human nature, i.e. “deep within” the psyche, or in a specific category of experi-
ence that is sui generis (e.g. McCutcheon 1997, Arnal 2000 and Stuckrad 2003; cf. Lin-
coln 2012, 1–3). While such a position can be presented as a radical turn away from
the kind of essentialist reflection on experience that has traditionally dominated the
discipline (e.g. Fitzgerald 2000b), the basic constructionist proposition that no expe-
rience should in itself be defined as religious, as it is interpretation that makes an
experience religious, might just as well be read as a fruitful radicalization of the
basic insight that not all extraordinary experience should be classified as religious
and therefore as calling for a shift to questions concerning interpretations of experi-
ence and the communication of interpretations (cf. Stuckrad 2003). I mention this
possibility, because I think the most radical proponents of constructionism fail to
fully recognize that the interpretation of experience is not merely a matter of putting
experience into words but that interpretation can fundamentally shape experience
(Geertz 1973, 95 and 124). That radical constructionists fail to recognize this is evident
when they go on to advance the claim that one cannot distinguish the experiences of
religious persons from the experiences of the non-religious in any meaningful sense
and that therefore not only notions of religious experience but the entire concept of
religion should be abandoned as an analytic tool (e.g. Fitzgerald 2000a and 2000b).
Once the minimalist position has morphed into an eliminativistic program, the only
questions that remain for the scholar to pursue concern the use of language (cf. Fitz-
gerald 2000a, 4–5); e.g. who uses the term religion and related terms, to what terms
is religion opposed in discourse, and whose interests does such discourse serve. Al-
tion of Nietzsche’s relation to religion, and admire much of his work in the field, his suggestion in one
paper that it might be beneficial to operate with a definition of religiosity as the capacity to answer to
the suffering of existence (Figl 2002, 160) shall here be made to serve as a warning example. Such a
definition should be rejected precisely from within the history of religions, as everyone is bound to
come to terms with suffering in one way or another, which means that the history of religion loses
all focus. It does not even help much to specify that one means coming to terms with suffering psy-
chologically through the construction and maintenance of a worldview. Indeed, it will still be hard
not to think of the therapist’s couch if not the hospital as the religious institution par excellence, un-
less one specifies that the answer to suffering has to have something to do with a transcendent reality
or incorruptible value in order to be classified as religious. Figl, however, explicitly rejects such an
understanding of religion as unfruitful in the context of his paper, in which he argues that it hinders
the dialogue between Nietzsche’s position and Christianity (Figl 2002, 160–161). This is not only a
questionable idea, as it implies that religious persons can only engage in fruitful dialogue with per-
sons that can be defined as religious, but also an unmistakably ecumenical if not explicitly theolog-
ical one. To Figl’s credit, he only suggests the possibility of such an approach for the purpose of dia-
logue and in no way seeks to downplay Nietzsche’s hostility towards Christianity or his atheism
following stricter definitions of religion (cf. Figl 2002).
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though it certainly is an important task to always keep such questions in mind, and
in this regard even critics acknowledge that the challenge of radical constructionism
has without a doubt heightened reflexive awareness in the discipline (cf. Schilbrack
2012, 113– 115), the consequences of rigidly adhering to a rule so restrictive would be
just as devastating for scholarship as operating with a too broad definition. This can
again be illustrated by the case of scholarship on Nietzsche, which would have to re-
frain from making any judgements about whether the philosopher’s writings express
a desire for an experience or ideal that can only be described as religious, since it
purportedly is impossible to distinguish a religious ideal from a non-religious
ideal in a way that makes sense. While I have expressed scepticism regarding
some ways of approaching the issue, for instance through biographical speculation,
declaring that central question completely meaningless is hardly satisfying.
Fortunately, it can be shown that it does not follow from the fact that the concept
of religion is a social construct that the term is not analytically useful in the sense
that it would in no case refer to anything that can be observed and intersubjectively
verified (cf. Schilbrack 2012, 100– 101 and 103– 106). First of all, it is worth noting
that power, politics and the state are also social constructs in the specific sense
that religion can be said to be, but none of the scholars who would eliminate “reli-
gion” from the analytic vocabulary of scholars argue that the concepts “power”, “pol-
itics” and “state” do not refer to anything that can be observed and are entirely use-
less or that one could not discriminate between more and less fitting uses of the
terms within and beyond academia; to the contrary they rightly recognize that it is
hard to make sense of the world without them (cf. Schilbrack 2012, 100– 101). Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, it simply makes no sense to claim that one could alto-
gether blend out the psychological dimension in the social construction of religion,
i.e. that the construction of religion fundamentally is a matter of the interpretation of
experience in more than some trivial sense of using words. In this regard, it is of
course crucial to distinguish between the construction of religious discourse,
which is primary, and the construction of discourse about religion, which is second-
ary; something radical constructionists fail to do. If one can associate the construc-
tion of religious discourse with a specific way of interpreting experience, perhaps
best conceptualized as a “religious perspective” (Geertz 1973, 110), the claim that
one could not distinguish between what kind of discourse is best classified as reli-
gious and what kind is not can be refuted. Thus, Bruce Lincoln, who advocates a
moderate constructionism and whose theses on method provide a telling example
of the sceptical spirit that is so prominent in the field today (Lincoln 2012, 1–3),
holds that one can very well distinguish religious discourse from other forms of dis-
course as the kind of discourse that relies on the notion of a reality which is immune
to the corruption of time. That which in Lincoln’s words defines religion is a “desire
to speak of things eternal and transcendent with an authority equally transcendent
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and eternal” (Lincoln 2012, 1).²³ It is in this view then the task of the historian of re-
ligion to identify and critically examine such discourse as well as the desires that
produce it, which makes this a particularly fruitful framework for approaching the
question about religiosity in Nietzsche’s writings. After all, the key question in the
controversy surrounding Nietzsche’s relation to religion is whether his texts only
counter and criticize the discourse of transcendence or also contain expressions of
a desire for transcendence significant enough to define the goals of his philosophy
as religious. More specifically, the question is whether Nietzsche’s writings speak
of a striving for an experience of a transcendent state of being (see section 1.1)
that can only be defined as religious.²⁴ Because Nietzsche himself “constructs” reli-
gion in similar terms (see esp. chapter 2 and chapter 4, section 4.1), even the most
radical constructionist will agree that one cannot simply bypass the metaphysical
idea of transcendence and operate with a completely different concept of religion
when approaching his work. Of course, the radical constructionist will demand
that one also asks what purpose speaking of religion in such terms serves in
Nietzsche’s writings. This is certainly a crucial question and it might just turn out
that precisely a perspective informed by this question and the sceptical spirit of
the contemporary academic study of religions allows one to describe Nietzsche’s re-
lation to religion with greater nuance. This is arguably not only the case because a
healthy scepticism concerning the concept of religion allows one to view scholarly
ideas about Nietzsche’s religiosity with a critical distance, but also because the ques-
tion about the ends of Nietzsche’s discourse on religion points directly to an impor-
tant aspect regarding the construction of religion in the philosopher’s writings;
namely the question of mood.
Arguably, Nietzsche constructs religion in a way that inevitably leads him to ask
questions about mood, if he indeed constructs religion in terms of a desire for anoth-
er world (see esp. chapter 2 and chapter 4, section 4.1). That it is at least worth asking
about the role of mood in his work is strongly suggested by those traditions in the
 This definition avoids problematic assumptions about humans being essentially homo religiosus,
but does not go to the other extreme to deny the psychological roots of religion, i.e. that religious
interpretations arise from human desires. In other words, one can and should recognize that humans
often express a desire for transcendence without assuming that one would be dealing with a by its
nature perennial “religious desire”. The most obvious practical benefit of such a definition of religion
in terms of discourse is that it is strict enough to limit the use of the term but wide enough to cover
the central discourses of all those social constructions commonly labelled religious. To be precise, the
definition prevents viewing football as by its nature religious, and instead allows one to compare the
classical writings about the deeds and teachings of Jesus Christ with those about the Buddha as ex-
pressions of a desire to speak about things eternal and transcendent.
 For the work done here it is consequently not decisive that other leading scholars of religion (e.g.
Bruce 2011, 1), not to speak of philosophers (e.g. Taylor 2007 and Hägglund 2008, 8), also do not shy
away from defining religion as bound to notions of transcendent reality, since this is often done in an
unreflective manner. It is here rather the case that a heuristic definition such as Lincoln’s seems to be
the best one available for approaching the task at hand.
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study of religion that emphasize that religious interpretation shapes experience. In
this regard, it is impossible to overlook Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion as
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods
and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4)
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic. (Geertz 1973, 90)
While Geertz’s definition has been criticized for being too vague and potentially mis-
leading,²⁵ it is nevertheless useful in order to raise the question about secularization
and moods. Given that establishing specific moods that are connected to the idea of
transcendence arguably is characteristic of at least the dominant forms of the Chris-
tian religion,²⁶ questions about mood can be assumed to arise in thinking that seeks
to move beyond religion in a context shaped by that religious tradition. One should
already therefore raise the question about mood when investigating European criti-
cism of religion. In this sense, Geertz’ work provides the background for my attempt
to describe Nietzsche’s criticism of religion in the light of his communication of mood.
Geertz’ does not provide even a rudimentary phenomenology of mood, as that
would be an unnecessary distraction from his main concerns, but it is evident that
his understanding of mood is intimately related to philosophical attempts to grasp
in words the intuition that all experience is felt and that the way it is felt is indisso-
ciable from time and place. The name of Martin Heidegger is perhaps most widely
associated with the notion that being is always already attuned, i.e. that we ap-
proach the world in and through moods (cf. Heidegger 2006). However, it is worth
emphasizing that strikingly similar ideas can be found in thinkers preceding him
(cf. Emerson 1983, 30) as well as among later philosophers who explicitly relate
their views to psychological and neuroscientific research (e.g. Bollnow 1941, Ratcliffe
2008 and Colombetti 2014).While acquaintance with the works of such thinkers can
certainly be helpful when approaching Nietzsche’s thinking on mood, Nietzsche’s
 One should of course not forget that the definition was meant to spur more anthropological field-
work (cf. Arnal 2000, 26), and definitely not to reveal the truth about the essence of religion, though it
has certainly been misused in this way (cf. McCutcheon 1997, 9– 10). In other words, its vagueness
need not be interpreted as a weakness as is often argued (e.g. Arnal 2000, 29), since it was meant
to provide initial orientation and for this reason leaves room for the scholar to specify the key
terms (e.g. “system of symbols”) in a culturally sensitive way. Just as Geertz intended, I have used
the definition as orientation, and in this sense it has inspired my work. While Geertz was also ada-
mant that one can and should distinguish religious from other ways of viewing the world (cf. Geertz
1973, 110), I here specify that the “system of symbols” is the discourse of transcendence. This is a jus-
tified addition that is helpful for understanding the specifics of European religious history, and which
is supported by Geertz’s own example that: “A man can indeed be said to be ‘religious’ about golf,
but not merely if he pursues it with passion and plays it on Sundays: he must also see it as symbolic
of some transcendent truths.” (Geertz 1973, 98)
 As Geertz cursorily notes: “In the doctrine of original sin is embedded also a recommended atti-
tude toward life, a recurring mood, and a persisting set of motivations.” (Geertz 1973, 124)
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thinking deserves to be considered in its own right. Therefore, I here refrain from en-
gaging in a detailed discussion of their works. For the main purpose of this study, it
is in any case quite inconsequential whether this understanding of mood as “always
there” is true in the sense of being the best possible articulation of the matter
(though I take it as fairly uncontroversial that it is). What matters is showing that
Nietzsche operates with a similar understanding of mood and showing how this in-
fluences his writings. So the point is primarily to take account of a dimension of the
philosopher’s thinking that aids the understanding of his texts, not to examine or to
promote a specific understanding of mood for its own sake. Consequently, it is up to
the reader of this study, just as it is up to the reader of Nietzsche, to ask to what ex-
tent the matters dealt with reflect his or her own experience. In other words, return-
ing to Geertz, it is up to the reader to ask why it is the case, if it is the case, that the
moods and motivations at stake seem uniquely realistic.
The word describe is indeed quite significant to distinguish the project undertak-
en here from certain kinds of normative philosophical approaches. This means above
all that my aim is neither to promote nor to refute Nietzsche’s criticism of religion.
While I do present philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche’s writings, the aim is
always clarification, though admittedly such clarification also does much to clarify
on what grounds one can form an opinion of the value of his writings. The scholar
of religion is also not blind to the value that the research object might have for
the understanding of religion and atheism. Indeed, the guiding intuition behind
this study is that by taking account of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, much can
be gained for a better understanding of contemporary philosophical atheism (See
chapter 8 and Conclusions) as well as of the philosophical background shaping de-
bates about secularization (see Conclusions). While one might question the value of
purely philosophical readings of Nietzsche’s thinking as well as that of strict
Nietzsche-scholarship, not least in a situation where the secondary literature
seems to grow at a faster pace year by year, the research interest that lies behind
this study is arguably of broader concern. That remains to be demonstrated, and
for now we turn our attention to Nietzsche and scholarship on Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy. In this regard, there are of course traditions of scholarship that refrain from ex-
plicit value judgements and instead focus on clarification. Therefore, I will briefly
name and describe the traditions I mostly draw on in this study.
A veritable industry of Anglophone scholarship has during the last decades
grown to complement the already venerable continental tradition of Nietzsche-schol-
arship, of which the German, French and Italian variants are the most vibrant. This
study is an attempt to marry the respective virtues of these two traditions.²⁷ There-
fore, the reader of this volume should find a strong emphasis on clarity and argu-
mentation familiar from analytic Anglophone approaches (e.g. Leiter 2002), as
 I regret that I am here unable to draw much on the French and Italian traditions, so it might be
said that I specifically seek to bring the German and the Anglophone traditions into dialogue.
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well as a careful attention to the evidence of the texts from the more philological
continental tradition (e.g. Zittel 2011). This should result in what is best termed a
contextual interpretation; an interpretation that takes into account the most relevant
evidence in clarifying the philosophical intentions of Nietzsche’s major writings.
Closely related understandings of contextual interpretation can in fact be found
within the continental tradition (e.g. Hödl 2009), but it needs to be explicitly pointed
out that the approach taken here is not to be confused with a method of interpreta-
tion that takes as its primary task the reading of a philosophical text in its historical
context. Interpreted narrowly, such a strategy would mean focusing exclusively on
the texts that the philosopher can be assumed to have read and on his documented
interactions with his contemporaries, and using this knowledge as a key to the text.
Just as secondary literature in general is drawn upon to aid interpretation, not for its
own sake, such historical contextualization can be useful but has no value in itself
and, if taken to an extreme, might distract from or even distort what matters most in
the text, i.e. that which is worth clarifying: namely, the philosophical intention. In
the case of Nietzsche, this is arguably particularly evident, since one has to operate
with a broader notion of context in order to take account of the emotional dimension
of his writings. In other words, the decisive evidence for interpretation is simply not
be found in potential textual sources but within the play of Nietzsche’s own texts
that themselves form a context; the primary context from within which any interpre-
tation that wants to do justice to Nietzsche’s efforts should arise. A final note on the
emphasis I place on evidence is still required. This emphasis means that there will
out of necessity be quite a lot of paraphrase as well as direct quotes from Nietzsche’s
writings. As much as there is reason to avoid unnecessary paraphrasing of Nietz-
sche’s text, the nature of this study makes a fair amount unavoidable. Besides, it
is worth bearing in mind that any rigid distinction between paraphrase and clarify-
ing interpretation is hard to uphold, and especially so when translation is involved.
Finally, it has to be pointed out that, irrespective of tradition, there is general
agreement about a central question about approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy.
This is the question concerning the value of the published works compared to that
of the Nachlass. I follow the established practice of focusing on the published
work, and occasionally drawing support for interpretations of the works from the “un-
published” works and the notes. Or as Graham Parkes put it: “adducing the notes
only when they serve to amplify some theme already found in the published
works” (Parkes 1994, 15). Additionally, I also follow established practice in treating
the final works, Antichrist and Ecce Homo, as if they were comparable to those
works whose publication Nietzsche could himself witness. Last but not least, I follow
the general practice in scholarship of presupposing some knowledge of the biograph-
ical details of Nietzsche’s life, in the sense that I will not provide detailed biograph-
ical excursions that distract from the argument of the study. Instead, I will occasion-
ally, when it is relevant, refer to biographical works (e.g. Janz 1978 and Young 2010).
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1.3 Introduction to and summary of chapters
Chapter 2 presents a brief historical contextualization of Nietzsche’s criticism of re-
ligion. On the one hand it provides a general introduction to the discourse on reli-
gious decline in the 19th century as well as a short sketch of the formative intellectual
influences on Nietzsche’s understanding of religion (specifically in the crucial period
when he was developing into an independent thinker), and on the other a brief pre-
sentation of the general trajectory of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion.
Chapter 3 is an analytic chapter that questions attempts to systematize Nietz-
sche’s psychological thinking and argues in favour of the necessity of contextual in-
terpretation, and consequently the need for taking account both of Nietzsche’s psy-
chological statements and how his psychological thinking is reflected in his writings.
Importantly, the chapter also clarifies Nietzsche’s vocabulary on the life of feeling as
well as that used in this study.
Chapter 4 presents readings of HH and D with special focus on questions concern-
ing mood. Nietzsche had already in 1875 planned an “untimely meditation” on religion
with a strong psychological streak (Figl 2007, 285). However, the first time Nietzsche
takes a psychological approach to religion in his published work is in Human, All
Too Human (HH), published in the year 1878. I therefore start the contextual investiga-
tion of Nietzsche’s texts here, whereafter I turn to Daybreak (D) from 1881.
Chapter 5 presents a comprehensive reinterpretation of the central issues of The
Gay Science (GS), the work in which Nietzsche for the first time explicitly presents the
words that God is dead, in the light of his communication of mood.
Chapter 6 presents an intervention into the scholarly debate about the role of
mood in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z) and asks to what extent Z can be used to chal-
lenge the interpretation advanced in the previous chapters.
Chapter 7 focuses more explicitly on the question of Nietzsche’s ideal mood, par-
ticularly in the context of his late works, and challenges the claim that the philoso-
pher’s last works are evidence of a return to religion.
Chapter 8 finally seeks to specify Nietzsche’s position as a form of atheism by
drawing on Martin Hägglund’s thinking about radical atheism (e.g. Hägglund
2008), which is arguably particularly fruitful for the task.
Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the results of the study, reflects on the broader
significance of the work done, and outlines possibilities for further research related
to the concerns of Nietzsche and to secularization. Thereafter one finds the literature
cited in the study.
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2 Nietzsche and the inadequate secularization of
the “heart” in the 19th century
Despite the criticism that has rightly been directed at certain rigid formulations of
sociological secularization theory,¹ the idea of secularization, understood as a de-
cline of religion in one form or another, remains indispensable for a proper under-
standing of European religious history. This is the case irrespective of whether one
uses that specific term or not. Evidence of changes in the significance of religion
in Europe, of changes that can hardly be interpreted as anything else than seculari-
zation, is abundant as recognized by historians (e.g. McLeod 2000), philosophers
(e.g. Taylor 2007) and sociologists (e.g. Bruce 2011), but for most of the work done
here even that is beside the point. At the very least, even the staunchest critic
must concede that the idea of a decline of religion is of utmost importance to the in-
tellectual historian. Taking account of the 19th century discourse about a crisis of faith
is indispensable for the work done here, as it forms the general background of
Nietzsche’s thinking on atheism and religion. Therefore, I will begin by presenting
a general picture of the nature of secularization among intellectuals in that century,
before moving on to the more specific sources of Nietzsche’s understanding of reli-
gion,² after which I will finally present a provisional picture of the general trajectory
of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion.
2.1 The role of doubt in the 19th century crisis of faith
While sociologists doing research on secularization have focused primarily on de-
cline in the social significance of religion (Wilson 1966, xiv; cf. Bruce 2002, 30 and
2011, 2; cf. Berger 1967, 107; Norris and Inglehart 2004, 24–25), that which has inter-
ested the intellectual historian most is decline in the credibility of religion among
prominent thinkers, the “Secularization of the European mind” (Chadwick 1975).
How the two relate in the eyes of the sociologist is a question that need not concern
 The suggestion that modernization and secularization necessarily go together can justly be criti-
cized if and when secularization is treated as a unidirectional process that will eventually result in
the complete insignificance of religion. Critics are certainly right when they claim to find echoes of
humanist narratives of progress in the scholarly literature on the topic, although such charges can
also miss the mark (cf. Bruce 2011, 59). To deny that secularization theory does capture something
important about modernity or even more radically to discard the entire concept of secularization
on account of supposed ideological bias is nevertheless short-sighted. In this respect, it needs to
be pointed out that the concept of secularization is not the sole property of social scientists, but is
employed in a variety of ways in historical research.
 To be precise, I will not give a full picture of all of Nietzsche’s sources and readings concerning
different religions. Instead, I focus on what really matters, namely the most important sources for
his philosophical understanding.
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us here. For the intellectual historian, the two are insofar intertwined as there is only
a small step from personal reflections on the absence or insignificance of religious
faith in one’s own life to reflections on what would happen were one’s own experi-
ence to spread; if the condition of doubt were to become the rule rather than the ex-
ception. This is all the more true in the case of the century that is perhaps more than
any other associated with the concept of secularization, namely the 19th century. As
already suggested in the introduction, this association has arguably at least as much
if not more to do with the intellectual discourses of the era than with any dramatic
decline in general religiosity. So despite there being no sudden decline, it is therefore
hard to find a work on 19th century intellectual culture in Europe, or even 19th century
religion in general, that contains no mention of a crisis of faith. Even revisionist his-
torians who have sought to balance the narrative by reminding of the general reli-
giosity of the era and by introducing the notion of a corresponding crisis of doubt,
i.e. of secular activists finding their way back to religion, concede that there really
was a crisis of faith and that it should be taken account of (Larsen 2006, 1). In
other words, the general picture of a crisis of faith among the intellectual strata re-
mains as solid as ever. What is more contentious is whether research in general has
focused on the secularization of the mind in a too narrow sense and consequently
ignored the enduring power of religious ideals on those who sought to leave religion
behind. In this regard, it is worth reflecting on the role of doubt, and this I think is
best done with the help of a heuristic tool, an ideal type, of its opposite: religious
faith.
Let’s call this ideal type the Man of Faith.³ To be absolutely clear, the following is
not the description of a particular religious ideal: it is not the ideal believer of any
specific Christian denomination. I rather follow a Weberian strategy of isolating
and rationalizing a tendency inherent in the Christian tradition, thus constructing
a rational model in order to better understand historical reality, especially by paying
attention to deviation from this model (cf.Weber 1978, 6–7). This strategy is already
justified because the crisis of faith cannot be understood without some minimal un-
derstanding of faith, but even more so because it can arguably cast light on an under-
standing of doubt that shaped the emotional dimension of the crisis. The Man of
Faith interprets reality through his faith. As his name suggests, his faith is strong
 This designation is meant to give historical colour to the discussion, not to deny the important role
of women. Needless to say, men (of class) dominated 19th century discussions on religion and doubt.
There were of course exceptions; influential women such as Mary Ann Evans a.k.a George Eliot, of
whom Nietzsche took notice and whom he allowed to serve as a typical example of what he took
to be an English tendency not to go far enough in the criticism of religion: “G. Eliot. – Sie sind
den Christlichen Gott los und glauben nun um so mehr die christliche Moral festhalten zu müssen…”
(KSA 6, 113) This is insofar ironic as Eliot’s thinking on the matter derived in no small part from Ger-
man thinking; after all, she translated Ludwig Feuerbach and other German critics of religion into
English (cf. Young 2010, 36). To this can be added that the young Nietzsche himself probably held
similar views (Young 2010, 36–37), before becoming more radical in his criticism.
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as a rock, he feels the truth of his faith and his heart longs for nothing as much as
the fruits of faith in this life and the next. He is consequently unmoved by interpre-
tations that oppose the latest findings of science and historical research to the truth
of faith. He trusts the providence of God; that all comes to pass according to a greater
design, a divine plan. He will therefore also not despair if there is a crisis of faith
around him. Such a Man of Faith might of course consider loss of faith something
dreadful. It is also understandable, that he should tend to think that the atheist
must be miserable deep down irrespective of his worldly success; as he might imag-
ine his life as lacking that which is most valuable, namely faith. Be that as it may, he
will respond to the crisis around him only through his faith. He will not fall into mel-
ancholy and neither can he imagine a truly godless future.
By contrast, the vast majority of real individuals, whether believing or unbeliev-
ing, are not as certain about any of their beliefs, not even of their most cherished
ones. No insignificant number specifically feel a conflict between religious and
non-religious interpretations of existence. In this respect, Charles Taylor speaks of
cross-pressures which he sees as a characteristic and almost essential ingredient
of secular modernity (Taylor 2007, 594–595). While Taylor is perhaps generalizing
too much from the experience of thinkers, his idea can be applied fruitfully to the
19th century situation.⁴ The thinking person found his faith, if he had one, which
was highly likely, put to a test, if he was acquainted with the latest intellectual
trends, of which the most important ones were expressions of historical thinking.
More than the rationalistic criticism of earlier ages, the emerging historical narratives
challenged the religious imagination. On the one hand were advances in the science
of natural history that culminated in Darwinism, which among other things had the
effect of casting doubt on traditional biblical accounts of creation (cf. Chadwick 1975,
161– 188), and on the other advances in historical scholarship and methodology,
which for example in the case of biblical criticism had the effect of casting doubt
on religious narratives of the past and especially of the life of Jesus (cf. Chadwick
1975, 189–228). Besides having a secularizing effect, all these advances had the ef-
fect of expanding the historical imagination, which two tendencies combined result-
ed in grand visions of historical development and religious decline, perhaps most
notably in positivist narratives of progress. What is noteworthy, however, is that de-
 I specifically refer to intellectuals here and do not touch upon the question of the general nature of
religious faith in the 19th century, but I do think there are reasons to be sceptical of viewing the era as
an “age of faith”. Arguably, this is one weakness in Chadwick’s otherwise brilliant work, as he pres-
ents the vast majority of believers as immune to scepticism in the sense that I have presented the
ideal type of the Man of Faith to be. This is especially clear from what he writes in his concluding
chapter “On a sense of providence”: “Still, religious men knew what they knew. Whatever philoso-
phers might contend, or scientific historians, or anthropologists, or psychologists, religious men
and women had God, knew God, obeyed God, felt joy in God, had an experience, an experience of
simplicity, surrounded by darkness but still experience. Amid all the perplexing questions they
seemed to themselves to do best to have the single eye, or simple regard.” (Chadwick 1975, 250)
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spite this clearly creative role of doubt, quite a few of those who could no longer hold
onto their faith found their lack of faith disturbing, and the visions of the future less
than cheerful.⁵ Specifically, it seems as if they found their doubt a negative condi-
tion. In this sense, the ideal type of the Man of Faith can illuminate a precondition
for narratives of modernity as defined by a necessarily melancholic lack of faith.
Such narratives do not arise from within faith, but from within a doubt that finds it-
self problematic. Faith was and is not only a matter of the mind, but also of the heart,
and this is perhaps the best reason why one speaks of a crisis of faith in the first
place, instead of simply a discarding of errors.
One could perhaps write a very strict history of 19th century intellectual secula-
rization that would only concentrate on the transmission of ideas, but that could
only be done at the expense of ignoring the moral and emotional dimensions of
what happened, which are arguably of at least as great interest. D.G. Charlton criti-
cally points to this tendency to limit the focus of research in his classic survey of
French secular thought from 1815 to 1870:
Although many historians have given greater stress to the scientific, philological, and philosoph-
ical grounds for unbelief, moral rejection of Christianity appears to have been in fact primary for
all but professional philosophers. (Charlton 1963, 18)
Charlton is here referring primarily to the moral force of narratives of progress and
the associated idea of human rights, but he goes further than this to emphasize
the emotional consequences of the secularization of the mind. He goes on to assert
that the most important secular French thinkers, among them Auguste Comte and
Ernest Renan, experienced a “conflict of mind and heart” (Charlton 1963, 25) in
which the heart most often was for religion. According to Charlton, this made “regret
for lost faith” so common a theme in 19th century writings that one can speak of a
“widely shared nineteenth-century mood” (Charlton 1963, 27).⁶ There were certainly
humanists who would not recognize themselves in the picture, but the mood was
widely shared even across borders.⁷ This is the melancholic mood that Nietzsche ar-
 Chadwick notes that though some found a “new faith” in Progress and Humanity, this was far from
common and that a loss of all faith was perhaps a more typical experience (Chadwick 1975, 255).
 I basically see no reasons to challenge the historical veracity of this account. Arguably, historians
such as Owen Chadwick, D.G. Charlton and Charles Taylor are a bit too eager to reduce the emotional
aspects of the story to fit a loss-replacement schema, the idea being that loss of faith always must
lead to finding another faith to serve the same function as the old or else one will fall into despair.
I have intentionally drawn on the works of these three Gifford-lecturers, because historians with hu-
manist sympathies rarely if ever draw attention to those aspects of the story that are of interest to us
here, above all the question of mood.
 The fact that this mood was widely shared has made a particular genre of popular history possible,
in which the focus is almost exclusively on loss, and to a lesser extent on replacement. To mention
but one example, this is the case in A.N.Wilson’s work “God’s Funeral: the Decline of Faith in West-
ern civilization”, which despite what its title says is really focused on the British experience (cf. Wil-
son 1999).
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guably finds as questionable as the joy of the humanist, and now we can see that it
results from a kind of unbelief, in which the existence of God is denied, but the ex-
istence of God or a higher reality still thought of as desirable. It stems from a situa-
tion in which the mind was secularized, even as the heart remained attached to re-
ligion.
That a thinker like Nietzsche through his writings on religion comments as much
if not more on this general mood than on any specific interpretation of religious de-
cline might at first sight suggest that it is hard to determine the specific sources of his
thinking on the matter. This is true, but it is nevertheless worth considering if there
were some peculiarities in the German situation or the traditions of thought closest
to Nietzsche that can account for the specific direction of his criticism. In other
words, one must consider the intellectual background, against which the break-
through to a different kind of atheism took place. After all, a specific intellectual tra-
dition played an important role for Nietzsche even though he tried to shake off as
much of it as he could.
2.2 The intellectual sources of Nietzsche’s understanding
of religion
It is a commonplace to characterize 19th century thinking on religion as a turn to the
human. This shift in the discourse from the natural world to the subjective, inner
world was particularly prominent in the German-speaking world. It is seldom appre-
ciated to what extent this was not only an anthropological turn, but a specifically
aesthetic one. Friedrich Schleiermacher’s definition of religion as feeling and taste
for the infinite [Sinn und Geschmack für das Unendliche], and as a feeling of depend-
ence on the universe, in his Ueber die Religion (1799) was to be highly influential in-
deed.⁸ Yet more important than any specific formulation was a general revitalization
of ideas about religion as natural, as rising from the depths of the human being, from
inner nature. In such views, religion could be denied and suppressed but not done
away with, and the privileged access to the truth of religion was through feeling or
intuition. Thus, Romantic theology rose against the rationalism of 18th century theol-
ogy, which was blamed for failing to respond to Enlightenment criticisms of religion.
While this shift was meant to respond to atheistic and materialistic currents, a mo-
tivation which is evident in Schleiermacher’s work, it provoked an unexpected coun-
ter-reaction. So besides having a lasting impact on theology and the study of religion
(cf. Lang 1993, 167– 168), the shift in the discourse mostly associated with Schleier-
 Although not a single copy of a work by Schleiermacher has been found in what remains of
Nietzsche’s personal library, one can assume that Nietzsche learned about Schleiermacher’s formula
during his education, as it was common knowledge among the educated and as there are many pas-
sages in his work that seem to comment on it (cf. Sommer 2016, 251).
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macher also influenced the direction of atheistic thinking, and ultimately paved the
way for a more radical atheism.
Arguably, the shift in the discourse did create a challenge for critical thinking
about religion, as would be critics now had to contend with the anthropological
“truth of religion”. A typical response was to pay respect to the impulse behind re-
ligion, if not to religion itself. Such a strategy is perhaps most associated with the
name of Ludwig Feuerbach, and indeed he is a telling example (cf. Feuerbach
1849), but the single most important source for Nietzsche’s thinking on religion
(Young 2006, 8; cf. Hödl 2009, 321), Arthur Schopenhauer, is also a case in point
and more relevant here. The avowedly atheistic philosopher wrote of a metaphysical
need arising from the experience of finitude (Schopenhauer 1999, 184). What, how-
ever, is it that makes finitude unendurable? Why is there a need to transcend it?
Schopenhauer’s answer is that the human being can’t stand individual existence
in time, because it is necessarily marked by suffering and the inevitability of
death. Because of the universality of suffering and death, there is a universal
need to transcend finitude. For the majority of humans this need is in his view sat-
isfied by religion, for the few by philosophy: Both raise humans out of their individ-
ual existence, out of time, and thus allow them to experience themselves as infinite.
Art, or aesthetic experience more generally, can also lead to the realization of this
metaphysical truth that existence in time is undesirable and ultimately illusory
(Schopenhauer 1999, 184– 218; cf. Young 2006, 8– 14). What is noteworthy is that
this view is as melancholic as it gets: all earthly life is essentially suffering and
only art, religion and philosophy can lift the human being to a higher realm. It is
of no small consequence that Nietzsche in his student days encountered precisely
this philosophical formulation of the idea of an emotional need for transcendence,
since it at least leaves room for an independent philosophical answer or replace-
ment that serves the same function as religion. So even if it was precisely as a re-
placement of a lost faith that Nietzsche initially treated this philosophy (cf. Young
2010, 86–89),⁹ reading Schopenhauer undoubtedly furthered Nietzsche’s develop-
ment as a thinker. “Discovering” Schopenhauer in 1865 (Young 2010, 81; cf. Hödl
2009, 306), and becoming an ardent Schopenhauerian had more than intellectual
repercussions for Nietzsche, as common enthusiasm for “the master” played no
small role in uniting him and Richard Wagner in 1868 (Young 2010, 77–78 and
87–88). In other words, Schopenhauer had a tremendous influence on Nietzsche.
Not least because his most important social contacts were with Schopenhauerians,
the pessimistic philosopher was Nietzsche’s single most important influence in the
1870s when he started to develop into an independent philosophical thinker.
 Nietzsche had already become sceptical of Christianity, and for all effect “lost faith”, some time
(1863 at the latest) before leaving school to study theology in Bonn; studies which he dropped within
the first year to instead study classical philology in Leipzig (Young 2010, 86–87; cf. Hödl 2009, 252–
253).
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It is not unimportant that the one living scholar that Nietzsche respected most, a
respect that remained intact from their first meeting until the end, shared Schopen-
hauer’s view on this issue. Jacob Burckhardt, the renowned historian, Nietzsche’s
colleague and mentor at the University of Basel, followed Schopenhauer in positing
a metaphysical need to explain religion; a need eternal, indestructible and mostly
unconscious, based on experiences of fear of and dependance on nature (Burckhardt
1978, 28). However, his influence should not be overestimated. Burckhardt has been
mentioned as another possible source for Nietzsche’s discussion on the metaphysical
need (e.g. Riccardi 2009, 103), which is misleading insofar as Nietzsche read
Schopenhauer before attending the lectures of Burckhardt in 1870, in which the his-
torian discusses the metaphysical need.¹⁰ More important than establishing a partic-
ular source of influence is to note how common similar ideas were in the intellectual
discussions of the time, whether or not they were presented by believers or critics. In
fact, ideas concerning a supposed need for religion, whether expressed in terms of
innate religiosity, desire for God or the moral necessity of God, were so widespread
in the era that it is impossible to reduce Nietzsche’s reception and critique of such
ideas to be a response to a single thinker. To give but one example, the question
about a need for religion was almost certainly discussed in the circle of Malwida
von Meysenbug, another devoted Schopenhauerian, whom Nietzsche had become ac-
quainted with through Wagner at Bayreuth in 1872 (cf. Young 2010, 150). In a critical
note written in summer 1880, Nietzsche explicitly refers to her as advocating the view
that humanity needs God (cf. NL 1880, 4[57], KSA 9, 113). To provide one final exam-
ple of a source that Nietzsche studied carefully in the early 1870s (cf. Figl 2007, 230),
Friedrich Max Müller is worth mentioning. The émigré professor at Oxford, common-
ly counted among the founders of the history of religions as an academic enterprise,
posited a specific faculty for apprehending the infinite. According to Müller, the very
basic aesthetic experience of limits, and the capacity to see beyond them, points to-
ward the love of God that all mankind strives toward and that is most fully realized in
Christianity (e.g. Müller 1873, 14– 15). Yet when encountering that idea in Müller’s
work and excerpting passages from it in 1870, Nietzsche’s attention is fixed on the
different idea that all Gods must die, “alle Götter müssen sterben”, as Johann Figl
has shown (Figl 2007, 234; cf. NL 1870–71, 5[57], KSA 7, 107). This might indicate
that Nietzsche by then rejected a religious interpretation of the need for religion.
Be that as it may: Under the influence of Schopenhauer and others who championed
similar ideas the early Nietzsche nevertheless seems to accept a philosophical inter-
pretation of the idea that religion has its origin in an innate need to transcend the
 In a letter to his friend Carl von Gersdorff from 1870, Nietzsche even presents Burckhardt as a de-
voted Schopenhauerian (cf. KGB II/1, Bf. 107). The only sense in which Burckhardt might be truly con-
sidered a source of Nietzsche’s later thinking about the matter has to do with the fact that Burckardt
goes some way towards historicizing the notion of a metaphysical need, in the sense that he notes
that despite being indestructible the metaphysical need does not seem to be as strong in every
era, i.e. that it waxes and wanes (cf. Burckhardt 1978).
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merely natural. He will in the late 1870s explicitly turn against this interpretation of
religion, yet importantly he not only retains the aesthetic framework but radicalizes it
through a psychological critique as is evident when one examines the general trajec-
tory of his criticism of religion.¹¹
2.3 The general trajectory of Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion
Nietzsche’s “philosophy of religion” has been presented many times and from many
different angles, but if there is one question above others that provides access to the
heart of his thinking on religion it must be the question of desire. Not only does view-
ing Nietzsche’s thinking from this perspective allow one to situate his thinking with-
in the major discourse of his era, it also allows one to appreciate why his thinking is
still a reference point in debates about religion and atheism.
Initially, Nietzsche seems to have accepted the idea of a metaphysical need after
reading Schopenhauer, and perhaps precisely therefore he seems not to have paid
much explicit attention to it in his writings until he rejected its adequacy. While
some passages in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) testify to the lingering influence of
this Schopenhauerian understanding, Nietzsche’s development into an independent
thinker coincides with the critique of the metaphysical need. This critique is unleash-
ed in full force in 1878, in Human, All Too Human (HH I 26 and HH I 27, KSA 2, 47–48;
HH I 131– 135, KSA 2, 124– 129; see chapter 4). The main point of Nietzsche’s critique
is that the metaphysical need is not really a need at all in the sense of a compelling
force such as the need for food, but rather a “need”more akin to an acquired taste. In
other words, it is no need but a desire.¹² Desires can be redirected, but they can also
be fundamentally transformed and thus effectively extinguished. When it comes to
the metaphysical need or rather those desires that make it up, Nietzsche opts for
the latter strategy (cf. HH I 27, KSA 2, 48), which entails a radical revaluation. This
 This concluding point cannot be emphasized enough. So even if this turn against the “metaphys-
ical need” was initially to a significant extent inspired by his direct reading of ethnology and Victor-
ian anthropology, as well as his second-hand reading of works of classical philology that applied
such work, as mentioned briefly in section 4.1.2 of this study and as discussed in detail in a mono-
graph by Andrea Orsucci (Orsucci 1996), Nietzsche retains the aesthetic framework until the very end
and views desire for another world as the defining feature of religion as it concerns him in his criti-
cism. Hence, figures such as Tylor or Lubbock should not be counted among the most important sour-
ces of Nietzsche’s understanding of religion, nor is it reasonable to claim that it was his intensive
reading of such non-philosophical figures in late 1875 that transformed him from philologist to phi-
losopher (cf. Orsucci 1996, 7). In other words, this turn also speaks of an internal development of
thought (See chapter 4, esp. 4.1).
 This initial deconstruction might be “explained” with reference to his readings of anthropolo-
gists, the works of whom suggest that both psychological “needs” and what is called religion have
a history (= are not immutable, again, see chapter 4, section 4.1.2, cf. Orsucci 1996), but what follows,
namely the reevaluation of desire, can not.
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decision arguably informs all of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion from HH onward,
and is to be considered an important background to his communication of mood.
Since providing evidence for this interpretation about Nietzsche’s communication
of mood is a key task of the central chapters of this study, it is now only necessary
to give a sketch of the intention behind it. What is it about desire for another world
that according to our philosopher makes it so important to get rid of it, and to get rid
of it not only as an idea but also as a desire?
Nietzsche’s intention can’t be grasped by referring to his readings; as respect for
science.While he thinks that religious desires can impede the pursuit of knowledge,
the focus of his critique lies elsewhere. Basically, Nietzsche claims that directing
one’s desires at religious goals or pursuing metaphysical philosophy diverts attention
away from the earth, the only world there is, and therefore stands in the way of mak-
ing life on earth great. The desire for another world is for him still not only a trivial
hindrance to the earthly projects he considers desirable. He instead consistently
presents it as something morbid and dangerous; though this is most apparent in
his final works. In the Antichrist, Nietzsche polemically turns the idea of the melan-
choly of the unbeliever on its head by portraying the believer, particularly the Chris-
tian, as the one with the necessarily despairing view of life, i.e. of that mortal life
which we in fact live. For only the melancholic or physiologically weak person, his
challenge rings, can feel such a need as to desire escape from this world, to desire
the existence of a higher world in the first place. In this regard, he specifically decon-
structs the Christian idea of God as the greatest objection to life that there has been,
as an idealization of death (cf. A 18, KSA 6, 185). However, it is important to note that
Nietzsche understands his critique as a challenge to atheists as much as to Christi-
ans. For the great majority of European atheists have been raised as Christians and
inherited the emotional legacy of European Christianity, and thus risk falling into an
even deeper melancholy. Therefore, Nietzsche speaks suggestively of a great crisis,
which entails that “we” either have to get rid of the moral and emotional legacy
of Christianity or perish (GS 346, KSA 3, 581; cf. NL 1870–71, 5[115], KSA 7, 124–
125). How would Nietzsche then transform the emotions so as to get rid of any
need for religion, while simultaneously enabling a greater affirmation of life? Or is
it only Christianity that is problematic, in the sense of being life-denying, and the
answer lies in leading the way towards a life-affirming religion? Is the goal a more
radical atheism, a more radical scepticism, or a new faith?
To begin to answer these questions, I will in the next chapter delve deeper into
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking about the life of feeling. To conclude the discus-
sion here, Nietzsche’s relevance for the understanding of 19th century secularization
lies in his questioning of the nature of secularization. Nietzsche questions whether a
mere repudiation of the intellectual aspects of faith can ever be enough, and it is ar-
guably precisely this questioning of the secularization of the heart and the desire for
other worlds that makes him relevant to contemporary thinking on atheism and re-
ligion (see chapter 8).
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3 Nietzsche’s psychology and the tension between
body and spirit
In this chapter, I lay out and justify the foundations of my approach to Nietzsche’s
psychology through a critique of what I take to be misguided attempts to construct
a coherent theory of drives on the basis of his writings. Not only has the excessive
focus on drives in recent scholarship led to an unproductive focus on technicalities,
but the resulting “Nietzschean” theories tend to obscure rather than illuminate
Nietzsche’s greater philosophical and critical projects. Moving beyond the current
debate is an essential task of this study, because the dominant perspectives on
Nietzsche’s psychology hardly provide the resources required to advance under-
standing of his thinking on religion. That notwithstanding I do not intend to deny
that theoretical reconstructions can be useful tools in scholarship. Instead, I seek
to ask again, from the beginning, what generalizations about Nietzsche’s psycholog-
ical views can be made. In this regard, the philosopher’s thinking about feelings is of
particular interest, since he is in his criticism of religion preoccupied with the topic
of religious feelings and especially religious interpretations of extraordinary feelings.
I will therefore start by taking a closer look at Nietzsche’s terminology for feelings.
For someone who purportedly holds the view that unconscious drives govern the
psyche (cf. Leiter 2002), Nietzsche pays very close attention to conscious mental
states and employs a remarkably rich vocabulary for affective phenomena. Besides
a wealth of words for specific feeling-states, Nietzsche also uses quite a few general
concepts. Affect [Affekt], feeling [Gefühl], passion [Leidenschaft, Passion], attune-
ment/mood [Stimmung], and “state” [Zustand] are Nietzsche’s favoured concepts to
describe felt experience. Very rarely, he also uses the term emotion [Emotion].
These are not technical terms in any rigid sense nor does Nietzsche draw rigorous
distinctions between them. Though it could perhaps be argued that his terms affect
and feeling correspond most closely to feelings in contemporary philosophy of emo-
tion, in the sense that they seem to be bodily, mostly episodic states, there is not
much that distinguishes passion, attunement/mood and state from the former
terms. The only minor difference is that the last two terms are perhaps more often
used by Nietzsche to describe a greater unity of distinct feelings, such as an envel-
oping background of feeling that is always there. In any case, there is a continuum
between shorter episodes of feeling and more stable states. This view does not only
remain implicit in the writings, although it is already quite evident as such. Nietzsche
also explicitly affirms that the most commonly discussed emotions are only excep-
tional states that fit into a larger picture of affectivity: “Anger, hatred, love, pity, de-
sire, knowledge, joy, pain all are names for extreme states: the milder, middle de-
grees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us,
and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny.” (Holling-
dale transl. Clark and Leiter 1997, 71; D 115, KSA 3, 107) Importantly, this view of a
constant background of feeling, of a continuum between evanescent and enduring
DOI 10.1515/9783110621075, © 2020 Sampsa Andrei Saarinen, published by De Gruyter.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
 
as well as intense and barely noticeable feelings, remains the same even as Nietz-
sche’s vocabulary changes. A case in point would be Nietzsche’s use of the German
term Stimmung. This term might be thought to be of special interest to us, because it
is the most direct and most commonly used translation of the English word “mood”.
However, the term Stimmung plays a rather insignificant role in Nietzsche’s writings,
which allows me to here reserve the use of the English term mood to primarily serve
the technical function of referring to the continuum of feeling as a whole.¹
The importance of the term for mood [Stimmung] diminishes in Nietzsche’s ma-
ture philosophy; so much so that he not even once uses the term in his published
works after the Gay Science of 1882. The first scholar to draw attention to this fact
was Stanley Corngold. In an article on Nietzsche’s use of the term mood [Stimmung],
he advanced the thesis that in Nietzsche’s later writings “Affect displaces Mood as
the feeling mode of disclosure” (Corngold 1990, 87). Furthermore, Corngold connects
this change of vocabulary to a more significant turn away from residual romanticism
and idealism towards a fully-fledged vision of the world as will to power. Although
Corngold is certainly on the right track concerning the change in terminology, he sim-
plifies the issue and only by this simplification can he make the exaggerated claim
that specifically affect would displace mood. Corngold’s thesis needs to be qualified.
First of all, it should be noted that this is merely a change of vocabulary, and not a
significant change in the way that Nietzsche thinks about the phenomena in ques-
tion. The term affect [Affekt] takes over some of the meanings attached to the term
mood [Stimmung], while feeling [Gefühl] and state [Zustand] take on other aspects.
There is especially one aspect that the term affect can’t easily assimilate. One of
the things the term mood [Stimmung] accomplishes is to refer to a unity of feeling
or a unifying background feeling. The term affect is if not totally unsuited then at
least not the ideal candidate to take over this meaning,² whereas state [Zustand]
serves this purpose well. Even feeling [Gefühl] can be used to refer to a synthesis
of feelings. In this regard, the English speaker might want to remind him- or herself
that the German language does not distinguish between feeling with a small f and
the capitalized Feeling, so it is harder to distinguish whether one is dealing with a
distinct feeling or generalized feeling. In any case, it should come as no surprise
that before giving up on the term mood [Stimmung], Nietzsche at times uses the
 For some reason unknown to me, the term affect has become the preferred term of scholars when
discussing the topic. It is worth pointing out that this has nothing to do with the frequency that
Nietzsche employs the term. The simple term feeling [Gefühl] is actually used far more often by
Nietzsche. Throughout this study, I follow Nietzsche in not drawing rigid distinctions in this regard,
and the scholarly justification for preferring the term mood is simply this: there is no other term in the
English language that is as well suited to describe the kind of continuum in question. Furthermore,
such use of the term mood is already established due to Heidegger (cf. Heidgger 2006).
 This comment refers to Nietzsche’s use of the term affect. I have nothing against the broader use of
the term in contemporary scholarship, e.g. in “core affect theory” (Colombetti 2014), and I frequently
employ the term affectivity in a way comparable to the use of the term mood throughout this study.
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terms mood [Stimmung] and state [Zustand] interchangeably (HH I 134, KSA 2, 129;
D 552, KSA 3, 322–333; cf. GS 288, KSA 3, 528). The same goes for mood [Stimmung]
and feeling [Gefühl] (D 28, KSA 3, 38–39; cf. GS 288, KSA 3, 528). Obviously, this
doesn’t mean that the terms always refer to the same phenomena. In the end, only
a contextual approach to the texts can avoid overgeneralization (and thus: misinter-
pretations). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that all of Nietzsche’s terms for felt expe-
rience refer to a continuum; a continuum that is perhaps best captured by the term
mood. Now, if he also thinks that all such states are generated in the body, more spe-
cifically through the operation of the drives or instincts,³ it would seem that the cur-
rent scholarly preoccupation with drives is more than justified.
Throughout this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche certainly thinks that one cannot
separate spirit from body, and also that drives play an important role in this picture,
but that there nevertheless are major problems with the dominant interpretation of
Nietzsche’s thinking on drives. Since this specific way of interpreting Nietzsche’s
statements on drives as evidence of an underlying theory of action is a very recent
development, I will begin by presenting a short history of research on Nietzsche’s
psychological thinking, with special attention paid to how it came to be that Anglo-
phone scholarship ended up where it is today.
3.1 A short history of research on Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is nowadays seen as central to scholarship on
Nietzsche.⁴ This was not always the case. Walter Kaufmann complained in the late
1970s that Nietzsche’s psychological thinking had until then received scant attention,
in spite of the philosopher’s explicitly stated wish to be recognized as a psychologist
(Kaufmann 1978, 261). This claim is often repeated almost verbatim (e.g. Parkes 1994,
2 and 383–384; cf. Brobjer 1995, 59), and accepted as such as a valid starting point
for discussing Nietzsche as a psychologist. One should however ask, in what specific
sense Nietzsche had until fairly recently not been recognized as a psychologist, be-
cause it is certainly not the case that the psychological aspects of his thinking had
 It is generally recognized that Nietzsche uses the terms drive [Trieb] and instinct [Instinkt] inter-
changeably (Clark and Dudrick 2012, 169; cf. Katsafanas 2013), though it is worth noting that it has
been argued that this is the case only until 1888, after which the final notes and writings perhaps
distinguish the two (cf. Conway 1999, 58–59).
 Not only has there been a number of special journal issues, conferences and edited volumes (cf.
Dries and Kail 2015) dedicated to Nietzsche’s psychological thinking during the last few years, but
such scholarship has also become integrated into both general accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy
(see Pippin 2010) and interpretations of specific works (see Clark and Dudrick 2012). The recent mon-
ograph of Paul Katsafanas also deserves mention as it exemplifies the trend (Katsafanas 2016).
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been ignored altogether. If Nietzsche indeed had revolutionary psychological ideas,
why then would they have been overlooked for such a long time?
A closer look at the history of the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy reveals
that the psychological aspects of the philosopher’s writings did not escape early
commentators. Besides enthusiastic endorsements, many critical remarks can be
found. Admittedly, the vast majority of early commentators made only cursory re-
marks if any on Nietzsche’s psychological ideas; and not a few betray a superficial
grasp of Nietzsche’s thinking.⁵ However, there was also more focused scholarly com-
mentary. Despite predating the emergence of historical-critical approaches in
Nietzsche-scholarship, the literature in question is not entirely lacking in insight.
Some contributions even prefigure contemporary debates, especially when it
comes to the question whether Nietzsche’s psychological views can be systematized
and presented in the form of a coherent theory.
A case in point is Max Riedmann’s Nietzsche als Psychologe from 1911. Having
summarized the most important elements of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking fairly
accurately, Riedmann concludes that Nietzsche’s psychology will never become in-
fluential if understood as a whole (Riedmann 1911, 123).⁶ This judgement is best un-
derstood against the ideal of a systematic, experimental and scientific psychology,
the emergence of which is in the German-speaking world indissociable from the
name of Wilhelm Wundt and the institutionalization of which was advancing rapidly
in the years that Riedmann wrote. According to Riedmann, Nietzsche crucially fails
to develop and prove the scientific value of the idea that could serve as the founda-
tion for a psychological theory; namely the principle of the will to power. Riedmann’s
main objection is that instead of carefully basing his analysis on experiential evi-
dence, the later Nietzsche simply presupposes the operation of the will to power
so that in effect the idea acts as a prejudice [Vorurteil] through which Nietzsche ap-
proaches psychological phenomena (Riedmann 1911, 118–123). A properly scientific
approach would instead proceed inductively from simple elements to complex phe-
nomena (Riedmann 1911, 134). Because Nietzsche’s psychological thinking is not of a
systematic nature, and is instead made up of fragmentary and often contradictory
statements, Riedmann goes as far as to question whether it is at all meaningful to
call Nietzsche a psychologist (Riedmann 1911, 123). Nevertheless, he finally asserts
 In this latter category, a 1909 article by H. Aschkenasy deserves special mention, as it can be con-
sidered the first scholarly attempt to view Nietzsche’s thinking on religion through the lens of his psy-
chological thinking. The article is marred by inconsistency and a lack of textual evidence for support,
but on a positive note, it did note Nietzsche’s preoccupation with moods [Stimmungen] (cf. Aschke-
nasy 1909, 143). For early works explicitly focusing on Nietzsche’s psychology consult the Weimarer
Nietzsche-Bibliographie; specifically pages 998– 1001 of volume three (WNB 2002a) as well as pages
244–245 of volume five (WNB 2002b). Cursory remarks on Nietzsche as psychologist can be found in
many of the works discussed by Richard Frank Krummel in his works on the reception of Nietzsche’s
writings in the German-speaking world (cf. Krummel 1998a–c).
 “Im Ganzen wird Nietzsches Psychologie nie eine Bedeutung gewinnen.” (Riedmann 1911, 123)
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that Nietzsche’s psychological intuition was extraordinary and that therefore the psy-
chological fragments that play no small role in Nietzsche’s writings might yet serve
science; they might even turn out to be a real treasure trove (Riedmann 1911, 135).⁷
Riedmann’s work can usefully be compared to and contrasted with another con-
temporaneous study, namely Hans Schaffganz’s doctoral dissertation Nietzsches
Gefühlslehre from 1913. Just as Riedmann (cf. Riedmann 1911, 134), Schaffganz
works under the impression that Nietzsche had only a weak grasp of late 19th century
psychological thinking and instead relied on his own experience and intuition in his
psychological thinking (Schaffganz 1913, 1, 34–35 and 59).⁸ However, instead of only
criticizing Nietzsche’s psychological thinking on scientific grounds, Schaffganz also
seeks to prove that it is systematic in its own way by trying to show that Nietzsche’s
intuitive understanding of feeling guides his entire philosophizing (cf. Schaffganz
1913, 58). In this view, Nietzsche’s philosophy is essentially the result of intuitive
thinking through feeling, which is perhaps a bit too bold a thesis, although it rests
on the solid observation that Nietzsche is preoccupied with the affective life through-
out his writings. According to Schaffganz, Nietzsche’s thinking through feeling cul-
minates in and finally becomes fully systematic in the idea of will to power as a met-
aphysical principle (Schaffganz 1913, 59–60). It is however precisely here that the
major problem of the dissertation comes to light, as Schaffganz inevitably fails to
prove convincingly that one can reduce all of Nietzsche’s late thinking to this system-
atic design. In this regard, the work is clearly influenced and distorted by the general
consensus of the time that a work entitled The Will to Power [Der Wille zur Macht]
was Nietzsche’s main work,⁹ but it is worth adding that although Schaffganz is de-
 To be precise, Riedmann writes that the fragments “können zur Fundgrube für die Wissenschaft wer-
den” (Riedmann 1911, 135).
 This assumption is only insofar mistaken that Nietzsche, besides reading psychological literature
in the broad sense that would include literary authors, did read quite extensively about contemporary
developments in psychology that eventually led to the differentiation of a new science from within
philosophy. To mention but two broad works: 1) early, in 1866, he read Friedrich Albert Lange’s Ge-
schichte des Materialismus (1866), in which the neo-Kantian philosopher also discussed recent phys-
iological and psychological research and reflected on their relevance to philosophy (cf. Brobjer 2008,
32–36), and 2) late in 1887 he read and heavily annotated Harald Höffding’s Psychologie in Umrissen
auf Grundlage der Erfahrung (1887), which discusses both classical and contemporary psychology (cf.
Brobjer 2008, 103–104). What arguably should concern us most about Nietzsche as psychologist,
namely his revaluation of desire, his insight into the question about mood, simply cannot be said
to be the logical consequence of such readings, wherefore the judgement that he relied most on
his intuition is basically correct.
 Nietzsche at most suggested the possibility of a systematic metaphysics of will to power and never
himself carried out the project to write a major work on will to power, as Mazzino Montinari has
pointed out (KSA 14, 383–400). Various efforts at the beginning of the 20th century to compile a
work of that title from the Nachlass,most notably at the Nietzsche-Archiv controlled by Elisabeth Förs-
ter-Nietzsche, proved disastrous for the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and helped to create the
unfortunate association between Nietzsche’s thinking and National Socialism. In this regard, the
work done at the archive has rightly been considered more than merely a scholarly failure.
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termined to present Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the will to power as the most bold
and radical psychological attempt of its kind ever undertaken (Schaffganz 1913,
130), he remains ambivalent as to the scientific and philosophical merits of the at-
tempt and points to serious inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s psychological thinking
(e.g. Schaffganz 1913, 101). Indeed, all in all, both of these early works (of Riedmann
and Schaffganz) are marked by a healthy scepticism.
So if we now look closer at Kaufmann’s claim that Nietzsche’s psychology had
not received the attention it deserves, we can see that what really is at stake is
more than taking account of Nietzsche’s psychological ideas or even taking account
of his desire to be recognized as a psychologist. In fact, the claim rests on the will-
ingness of the interpreter to accept Nietzsche’s claim of being a psychologist without
equal (EH 5, KSA 6, 305). This self-aggrandizing hyperbole does of course not dis-
qualify Nietzsche’s psychological ideas from serious attention. However, taking an
acceptance of his self-interpretation as a standard of judging whether a scholar
has recognized Nietzsche as a psychologist can only result in a distorted picture of
the history of scholarship. Just as I have argued that there is a heavy price to pay
if one takes Nietzsche’s own statements in EH at face value as a starting point for
discussing Nietzsche’s communication of mood, taking his mockery of a self-assess-
ment as a starting point for discussing his philosophical psychology must necessarily
lead to a neglect of valuable contributions that do not fit into the picture. This, how-
ever, is exactly what Kaufmann does. Against this background, it is no wonder then
that the only work that Kaufmann mentions as a precursor to his own is one which is
more about celebrating Nietzsche’s psychological genius than seriously engaging
with his ideas.
Apart from his own work Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, pub-
lished in 1956, Kaufmann mentions Ludwig Klages’ Die psychologischen Errungen-
schaften Nietzsches, from 1926, as the only significant contribution to the topic (Kauf-
mann 1978, 262). This judgement is problematic in more than one respect. First of all,
Klages seems to be interested in Nietzsche only insofar as the philosopher’s thinking
can be absorbed into his own eccentric project of characterology [Charakterologie/
Charakterkunde] (Klages 1926). As if that were not enough to disqualify his work, Kla-
ges’ treatment of the subject matter is thoroughly irrationalist (cf. Parkes 1994, 383).
Therefore, it is hard to view his book as a serious contribution to the understanding
of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking. Secondly, Kaufmann not only omits all works
critical of Nietzsche’s psychology but also one influential early work that is sympa-
thetic to its subject matter. Unlike the less well-known works of Riedmann and
Schaffganz that I have discussed, works that Kaufmann might be forgiven for not
mentioning,¹⁰ this is a work of whose existence Kaufmann was well aware.
 I definitely do not thereby mean to suggest that these works should be considered obscure curi-
osities. Considering that it was a doctoral dissertation, the work of Schaffganz was surprisingly wide-
ly reviewed. A striking example of the internationalism of early 20th century philosophy is a review by
Ellen Talbot, who was one of the first female professors of philosophy in the USA, in The Journal of
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This early work that definitely should be mentioned is Karl Jaspers’ Nietzsche.
Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens, from 1936, which despite lack-
ing a mention of psychology in its title provides a more helpful introduction to
Nietzsche’s thinking on affects and moods than either Klages or Kaufmann. Kauf-
mann’s failure to mention Jasper’s work is perhaps best explained as being a result
of personal animosity and/or intellectual rivalry,¹¹ but the omission also raises the
question as to what we are talking about when we are talking about Nietzsche’s psy-
chological thinking. Jacob Golomb, for example, in his turn wonders about the word
“psychologist” in the title of Kaufmann’s famous work, because even as Kaufmann is
“referring to Nietzsche’s psychological leanings, he then proceeds largely to ignore
them” (Golomb 1999, 16). This judgement is a bit too harsh, as Kaufmann clearly
takes a broader view of psychology than Golomb’s depth psychological perspective
allows for.¹² Nevertheless, it points to a real problem: neither Kaufmann nor other
early writers were all too clear about in what if any sense Nietzsche should be under-
stood as a psychological thinker and what his most important contributions in this
domain were. This question seems to have been settled in more recent years, in the
sense that there is a consensus on the question, and next I will briefly outline how
this came to be.
The current flourishing of research on Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is to
a great extent the fruit of Anglophone scholarship.¹³ One might even say that Kauf-
mann’s exhortation to take Nietzsche’s psychology seriously and his call for more re-
search in this area did not go unheard, even if it was initially met with silence. In any
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (Talbot 1915), which is nowadays known simply as
The Journal of Philosophy and is still counted among the best American journals in the field.
 Kaufmann and Jaspers were well acquainted with each other’s works and had fundamental dis-
agreements about the methods of Nietzsche-interpretation (cf. Pickus 2007). Put shortly: Kaufmann
emphasized textual evidence more, whereas Jaspers emphasized the intuitive understanding of the
interpreter. While the former is essential for scholarship, one can also not do without the latter. As
I do not see why one would have to choose one approach over the other, I think it is best to refrain
from judging, which of the two scholar-philosophers left a more lasting legacy.
 Kaufmann, in my view correctly, pays most attention to Nietzsche’s revaluations, e.g. his analysis
of ressentiment.
 Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology has not received comparable attention during the last de-
cades in continental scholarship, though there are always exceptions. Again, the Weimarer
Nietzsche-Bibliographie is a good place to start, but it is in no way exhaustive. Besides useful studies
on self-fashioning (e.g. Brusotti 1997 and Hödl 2009) that are relevant to the understanding of
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking, the most enlightening contributions can be found in historical
scholarship, the paradigm of which would be studies on the relations between Nietzsche and
Freud (e.g. Assoun 2002; Gasser 1997) and to a lesser extent Nietzsche and Jung (e.g. Liebscher
2012). Although these studies are excellent in their own right, they contribute little to the understand-
ing of what I have already suggested is most relevant in the big picture of Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking: his psychological revaluations of desire and mood. While some continental scholars have
also written on the topic of drives, they have not significantly contributed to the Anglophone discus-
sion, wherefore I will not here engage their work.
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case, it would still take quite a few years until the first attempt at a comprehensive,
in-depth investigation of Nietzsche’s psychology was published under the title Com-
posing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology (Parkes 1994).¹⁴ This pioneering
work by Graham Parkes remains an invaluable contribution to the discussion. Parkes
pays attention to the whole range of metaphors that Nietzsche employs to get grips of
the psyche from the inorganic over the vegetal, animal and political realms to the
landscapes that are composed out of these. His work is equally alert to the variety
of Nietzsche’s concepts. Affects, atmospheres and moods all find a place alongside
drives and instincts in this multifaceted yet balanced tome that eschews undue sys-
tematization. Parkes’ effort to provide a comprehensive account of the development
and transformations of the many layers and aspects of Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking is all the more significant, precisely because the current discussion is al-
most exclusively focused on the notion of drives (cf. Katsafanas 2013).
When it comes to the prominence of drives in later scholarship one can observe a
certain historical irony. To a great degree, Parkes’ work is responsible for the atten-
tion given to drives in more recent years. According to Parkes, the notion of drives
had been either underappreciated or misunderstood in previous scholarship (Parkes
1994, 273 and 444).¹⁵ In contrast to earlier accounts, he singles out the idea of the
psyche as a multiplicity as the most “revolutionary” and “radical” feature of
Nietzsche’s psychology (Parkes 1994, 18 and 251). Since Parkes then goes on to dis-
cuss the psyche as composed of multiple drives, it is not entirely unjustified to con-
clude that Parkes considers Nietzsche’s thinking on drives his most important contri-
bution to psychology. After all, it is precisely this aspect of Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking that echoes forth in depth psychology (Parkes 1994; cf. Gasser 1997). So
Parkes settled the question in what sense Nietzsche was a psychologist by describing
his psychological thinking as culminating in a drive-psychology.What remained un-
clear was if this drive psychology relies on a systematical drive-theory that can be
spelled out. This latter question is already present in the immediate reception of
Parkes’ book.
The main worry in the reviews was not so much to what extent it is enlightening
to take account of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking when approaching his philos-
 Jacob Golomb’s equally pioneering work Nietzsche’s Enticing Psychology of Power (Golomb 1989),
which was originally written as a dissertation and published in Hebrew in 1987, focused on the ther-
apeutic dimensions of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking and did not aim for a comprehensive view
of Nietzsche’s psychology. Perhaps because of Golomb’s attempt to present Nietzsche as something of
a psychoanalyst in his own right, this work did not become influential in the Anglophone discussion
on Nietzsche’s psychology. The work would however have deserved more attention than it received,
because of its challenging discussion of the role of mood in Nietzsche’s thinking and writing.
 In the first footnote of chapter 8, “Dominions of Drives and Persons”, Parkes mentions a few ex-
ceptions to “the general rule of ignoring the Nietzsche’s ideas about the drives” (sic!) (Parkes 1994.
444).
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ophy,¹⁶ but rather to what extent his psychology is systematic or could be systemat-
ized. So in a sense Parkes’ work had put scholarship at a crossroads; one would now
have to choose between taking a more systematic or a more contextual approach.
Alexander Nehamas for one sought to emphasize that Nietzsche’s psychological
thinking cannot be dissociated from his project of self-fashioning, and that therefore
any systematization must necessarily fail to take account of the broader context of
his psychological statements (Nehamas 1996). This is indeed a valid concern, insofar
as it points to the necessity of a certain kind of contextual interpretation, which al-
ways keeps Nietzsche’s projects in mind. However, one should remember that
Nietzsche pursued a great variety of interconnected projects, and that Nietzsche’s
texts do not present his self-fashioning as such, but what he considered significant
enough about his self-fashioning to communicate to his readers. One might therefore
question whether that which is essential about this communication cannot be sys-
tematized after all. I nevertheless take Nehamas’ critical perspective on attempts
to systematize Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology as a useful warning, which is
worth heeding carefully, not least because it was not the only one of its kind.
Already in the year preceding the publication of Parkes’ study, Bernard Williams
wrote bluntly that “Nietzsche is not a source of philosophical theories” (Williams
1994, 237).¹⁷ For Williams this is apparent when we carefully examine Nietzsche’s
writings: it is not only that he nowhere presents systematic psychological theories,
but that his texts positively render such a pursuit futile (Williams 1994, 237–238).
In other words, the very fact that Nietzsche himself never cared to present his psy-
chological thinking as a systematic theory already speaks against efforts to do so
on behalf of the philosopher. In Williams’ view, Nietzsche’s moral psychology is min-
imalist in the sense that he does not seek to apply a pre-given theoretical framework
to specific human actions, but instead seeks to invite his readers to interpret experi-
ences and actions through a variety of non-moral perspectives (Williams 1994, 240).
Ergo, Nietzsche’s psychologizing is strategic. This means that it is crucial to see what
use Nietzsche makes of psychology in any given context and that his psychological
statements should always be interpreted from within his projects.
Despite such strong-worded warnings, not a few Anglophone scholars have de-
voted their time to the task of providing a more systematic account of Nietzsche’s
 Though such a worry was expressed by Glenn Martin, who feared that a focus on psychology per-
haps necessarily obscures the historical problem of nihilism, which Martin correctly identifies as
being central to Nietzsche’s philosophical concerns (Martin 1996). While it is certainly the case
that Parkes (1994) does not have much to say about nihilism, I do not share Martin’s fears. Quite
to the contrary, I argue throughout this study that it is rather the case that in Nietzsche’s thinking
the historical and the psychological are intertwined, so that Nietzsche’s thinking on nihilism and
the death of God cannot be fully understood without taking account of his psychological thinking
and vice versa.
 Williams’ article was first published in the European Journal of Philosophy in 1993 (see Williams
1993), but for reasons of convenience I here cite the later publication of it in an edited volume (Wil-
liams 1994).
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psychological thinking. More specifically, much effort has been put into the attempt
to turn Nietzsche’s disparate, at times contradictory statements into a coherent drive
theory. The desired result would be a Nietzschean psychological theory, which be-
sides allowing scholars to interpret other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy more au-
thoritatively could perhaps even contribute to contemporary discussions in philo-
sophical psychology. This approach has most forcefully been advanced by Brian
Leiter, who in his influential Nietzsche on Morality (Leiter 2002) first constructs a nat-
uralistic moral psychology centred on the notion of the drive, and then proceeds to
interpret GM on the basis of this naturalistic psychology, in order to finally argue that
Nietzsche’s psychology is more in tune with contemporary research in psychology
than the ideas of any other major philosopher. The implication for textual scholar-
ship is that the same naturalistic psychology could be applied in a similar procedure
to all of the mature works.
The notion of the “drive” is certainly a key term in Nietzsche’s psychology. Be-
sides that the analytic approach, and more specifically the theory-building approach,
has become dominant within Anglophone scholarship. Therefore, the following sec-
tion is devoted to the drives and the question what role they play according to
Nietzsche, i.e. how one should understand Nietzsche’s drives. However, this exami-
nation is done with the question of mood in mind. What is the relation of drives to
felt experience? Do drives explain mood? Are drives irrational forces of nature and if
so does this also apply to mood? This approach makes it possible to question the
dominance of drives, i.e. the exclusive focus on drives in contemporary scholarship,
without denying that they do play an important role in Nietzsche’s philosophy. This
is a necessary first step towards an approach that recognizes the importance of
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking for any interpretation of his philosophy without
succumbing to the temptation of constructing a systematic theory.
Surveying the history of scholarship on Nietzsche’s psychology, it is hard to es-
cape the impression of historical contingency. Which concepts are deemed to merit
special attention depends much on the scholar’s research interests as well as his
or her understanding of what constitutes psychology. This applies to my treatment
as well. I do not here claim to provide a representative overview of Nietzsche’s phil-
osophical psychology; indeed, I have suggested that there are reasons to be sceptical
about the very possibility of such a presentation. Instead, I concentrate only on those
aspects most relevant to the guiding question of my work; namely Nietzsche’s think-
ing about reorienting feeling and creating new moods. While there have hitherto
been a few exceptions (Jaspers 1936, Golomb 1989, Parkes 1994 and Solomon
2003), those aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking most relevant to the “philosophy of emo-
tion” have been neglected in the scholarly literature.While it is certainly the case that
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking has received more sustained attention in recent
years than ever before, many central questions still remain unexplored; perhaps be-
cause they can only be asked after the dominant view on “Nietzsche’s drive theory”
has been thoroughly questioned.
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3.2 Drives in Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology
The first appearance of the concept “drive” [Trieb] in Nietzsche’s oeuvre is to be
found in a short essay entitled “On Moods” [Über Stimmungen], written in 1864 by
the then 19-year old student (cf. Parkes 1994, 273). This youthful exercise, which re-
mained unpublished during the lifetime of the philosopher, serves to prove that
Nietzsche’s interest in the affective dimension of life is not confined to his mature
philosophical writings. In that early text the notion of the drive appears only as
one term among others to make sense of the workings of the psyche, and the term
mood [Stimmung] is at the centre of the picture. It is, however, when consulting
the secondary literature, hard to escape the impression that in Nietzsche’s mature
thought the concept of the drive plays a more important role than any other term
that relates to affectivity. Yet it would be misleading to claim that the concept
“drive” gains in importance at the expense of other terms related to the life of feeling.
It is true that the term mood [Stimmung] almost disappears (cf. Corngold 1990), but
the later Nietzsche still talks about affects, feelings and states all the time; in other
words, he merely replaces one term with others. So if there is a shift, and there is
some textual evidence to suggest there is one, it does not have so much to do
with the disappearance of any specific term nor with the frequency of the appearance
of the term drive. It is rather about the possibility of a new interpretation of the re-
lation between the terms in question.When did this shift take place and how is it to
be understood?
The shift can be dated to the early 1880s. In Daybreak, there are passages that
emphasize the primacy of drives and instincts (D 109, KSA 3, 96–99; D 119, KSA 3,
111–114). What these passages do is to open up the possibility of reinterpreting in
terms of drives any passage that applies a more conventional vocabulary of thinking,
feeling and willing. So even if Nietzsche continues to refer to conscious states
throughout D and even explains actions with reference to such states, these passages
suggest that all conscious states and actions are the result of the unconscious oper-
ation of drives and could perhaps in principle be explained by drives. So for example
with regard to mood, Parkes notes about this stage “that moods may well be mani-
festations of drives” (Parkes 1994, 289). Quite tellingly, Parkes does not have much to
say about moods in Nietzsche’s thinking after this. From now on, it would instead
seem, the drives become the undisputed driving forces within the psyche. Is then
not the result a view of persons as driven to act by forces utterly beyond their control?
It is precisely in this sense that D, according to Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter,
marks the arrival of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy (Clark and Leiter 1997, viii). The
key question here, however, is whether Nietzsche’s emphasis on the drives, his grant-
ing them some kind of primacy, implies that he thinks drives determine human life in
the sense that the operation of the drives cannot be influenced consciously. Before
seeking to answer that question, an initial overview of Nietzsche’s use of the concept
“drive” is called for; not least because Nietzsche never in his published work defines
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what he means by a drive or gives an unequivocal presentation of the role of drives in
conscious life.
In recent years a number of Anglophone scholars have come to recognize that it
is far from clear what exactly Nietzsche had in mind when talking about drives, and
that he even seems to present contradictory statements regarding their role (e.g. Kat-
safanas 2013; cf. Stern 2015). This recognition might serve as an important step to-
wards a sceptical view regarding the possibility to present Nietzsche’s psychology
as a drive theory, since it points toward very real problems with taking his statements
out of context and generalizing them; especially if that is done without balancing the
resulting view with possibly contradictory tendencies in the texts. In this regard, the
greatest temptation has been and still is to equate drives with physiological occur-
rences. It certainly is the case that the philosopher’s rhetoric occasionally seems to
encourage such a reading. Nevertheless, it can easily be shown that Nietzsche’s
“drives” should not exclusively be identified with “very basic motivational states,
such as urges or cravings” (see Katsafanas 2013, 727). In his writings, Nietzsche men-
tions a vast number of drives from the sex-drive (BGE 189, KSA 5, 111) over art-drives
(BT 2, KSA 1, 30) all the way to the drive to truth (GS 110, KSA 3, 471).¹⁸ In other words,
there are clearly different kinds of drives; e.g. in D Nietzsche distinguishes drives
such as hunger which require material satisfaction from moral drives that are to a
certain extent satisfied through illusory fulfilment (dreams etc., cf. D 119, KSA 3,
112). This does not mean that the basic drives would even all be based on the
same physiological model; i.e. akin to hunger in the sense that they would motivate
specific actions or require nourishment. After all, one of the most basic, fundamental
drives is supposedly the drive to form metaphors [Trieb zur Metaphernbildung] (TL 2,
KSA 1, 887), which simply operates without any special nourishment.
As the text On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense might not be considered an
admissible source to base any interpretation on, and can be blamed for rather fan-
ciful interpretations of Nietzsche,¹⁹ it is important to note that the idea that all
talk of psychic reality is metaphorical is not limited to this text but pervades
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking. In arguably the most important passage on drives
in D, Nietzsche explicitly affirms that all talk of the operation of drives is metaphor-
 The way that Nietzsche multiplies drives at will is perhaps itself a hint not to take his drive-talk
too literally. A prime example is Nietzsche’s talk of the philosopher’s sceptical drive, his analytical
drive and his drive to compare etc. (GM III 9, KSA 5, 357).
 The text was not intended for publication and is often used as a justification for “postmodern” or
“post-structuralist” approaches to Nietzsche’s thinking that find in the text a denial of truth similar to
their own (Leiter 2002, 14– 15; cf. Hödl 1997, 13). Approaching Nietzsche’s later writings through the
perspective of this early text is indeed problematic, as Maudemarie Clark has argued, at least if one
does not take into account of the facts that 1) the text is not a denial of the possibility of scientific
knowledge 2) his views on truth evolved considerably over the years (Clark 1990, 63–95). This is
the case whether or not Clark misrepresents the positions of the “postmodernists” and whether or
not she approaches the question of truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy from an analytic perspective un-
suited to the task, as has been suggested (cf. Hödl 1997, 17– 18).
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ical [es ist alles Bilderrede] (D 119, KSA 3, 112) and that what is really going on is per-
haps unknowable, although felt (D 119, KSA 3, 113). A notable example of Nietzsche’s
metaphorical approach to the drives is that Nietzsche repeatedly insists that drives
interpret the world; that drives reflect or even philosophize (D 119, KSA 3, 111– 114;
cf. BGE 6, KSA 5, 19–20). In light of this, one could close the discussion with the
banal and unhelpful claim that Nietzsche’s physiological terminology is metaphori-
cal and could altogether be reinterpreted in terms of mental states accessible to con-
scious control. Such a move, however, ignores that Nietzsche most certainly is creat-
ing an opposition between the drives and rational, reflective consciousness. Precisely
how this opposition should be conceived of is the decisive question.
To begin with, I identify the opposition between the drives and conscious control
as a tension, and do not seek to resolve it in one direction or the other. Put different-
ly, my approach is based on the intuition that the tension in question plays a con-
structive role in Nietzsche’s thinking and on the fact that Nietzsche nowhere suggests
that the tension can be fully resolved. It is clear enough that for Nietzsche the origin
of metaphorization is in the affective body. The physical and physiological connota-
tions of the word drive are of utmost importance, even if they would serve only to
emphasize the bodily nature of the phenomena in question.While it is therefore un-
helpful to think that one could remove the drives as a central element of Nietzsche’s
psychological thinking, the question is whether there are any grounds to generalize
in the other direction, as if only the drives would matter. Specifically, it can be ques-
tioned whether it is possible to turn Nietzsche’s discussions about drives into a co-
herent drive theory, according to which the operation of drives is mechanical and
there is no room for consciously influencing one’s drives. This is however precisely
what the dominant approach in Anglophone scholarship on Nietzsche looks like.
Therefore, in order to establish the foundation of an alternative approach, I will in
the following section critically examine and evaluate the strongest attempt to cast
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking into the mould of drive theory. This is the paradig-
matic account of Brian Leiter, which is built on the foundation of those passages in
Nietzsche’s oeuvre that go the furthest in questioning the status of conscious states.
3.3 Beyond Nietzsche’s purported epiphenomenalism
It has now become necessary to engage the problem how to understand the tension
between Nietzsche’s emphasis on drives on the one hand and his equally strong con-
cern with reorienting affective life on the other. This issue mirrors one of the most
problematic questions in Nietzsche-scholarship, namely how to reconcile his fatal-
ism with his emphasis on self-making. There is an extensive and fairly technical de-
bate on this topic, further obscured by the tendency of interpreters not only to draw
on contemporary philosophical positions to elucidate Nietzsche’s statements
through comparison but to claim that he in fact espouses one or another such posi-
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tion.²⁰ Here I will limit the scope of the discussion by viewing it only from the per-
spective of philosophical psychology. Specifically, I aim to show what can be gained
for a contextual account of Nietzsche’s psychological thinking when one challenges
the view that Nietzsche espoused epiphenomenalism. For the sake of clarity, I will
primarily draw on D in the discussion, because this work has been identified as in-
augurating the shift in emphasis toward the drives and because it contains the most
illuminating passages on the topic. After introducing the problem and the currently
dominant interpretation, I will develop a novel solution through a constructive cri-
tique of Robert Solomon’s enlightening reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of emo-
tions. Finally, I will reflect on the implications of adopting this new interpretation.
Nietzsche’s works abound with vivid descriptions of mental states and exhorta-
tions to change the way we feel about things.²¹ These descriptions and exhortations
coexist with statements that drives determine actions and with genealogical explana-
tions of specific actions in terms of drives. The philosophical and interpretative prob-
lem concerns their relation, and has often been stated thus: Does Nietzsche think
that consciousness is epiphenomenal?
The dominant interpretation in Anglophone scholarship has been that in
Nietzsche’s view consciousness is epiphenomenal (e.g. Leiter 2002). In what specific
sense is this the case? How should one understand his purported epiphenomenal-
ism? According to the influential account of Leiter, Nietzsche thinks that a person’s
unconscious drives, i.e. physiological facts about that person, causally determine the
person’s mental states. Such physiological facts, or what Leiter calls type-facts, are
practically unchanging and determine what kind of person one is and what one
can become. So a particular person’s conscious states might play a role in causal ex-
planation, in so far as they are part of a causal chain leading to an action. Neverthe-
less, “the real story of the genesis of an action begins with the type-facts, which ex-
plain both consciousness and a person’s actions”. That means that type-facts are
both causally primary and explanatorily primary with regard to consciousness and
action; consciousness is in itself not causally efficacious. (Cf. Leiter 2002, 91–92.)
One can certainly find passages in D that at least suggest the possibility of such
an interpretation (D 116, KSA 3, 108–109; D 129, KSA 3, 118– 120; D 130, KSA 3, 120–
122).²² Still, this interpretation is best understood as a rationalization of Nietzsche’s
 So in this case one does not only encounter the usual “he says this – no he says that” kind of
debate in the literature, but also a debate about fundamental philosophical commitments and theo-
ries. Needless to say, Nietzsche did not care to provide a clear answer himself. For an introduction to
this debate, see Leiter (1998) and Solomon (2002).
 A very clear example is the concluding sentence of aphorism 103 of D, “Wir haben umzulernen, –
um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen” (D 103, KSA 3, 92), which beyond
any doubt suggests the possibility of changing one’s affective constitution, at least over a long span of
time.
 In these passages Nietzsche vehemently criticizes traditional understandings of free will, but does
not affirm any definite opposing view and importantly qualifies his discussion of necessity with many
a perhaps [vielleicht].
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statements in one particular direction. Even if one accepts the thesis that he ex-
pressed epiphenomenalist views, one can question whether he did this because he
assumed that there are inflexible, rigid type-facts that determine actions, instead
of for strategic reasons. Leiter rhetorically recognizes that his interpretation has to
be qualified at least in one regard; the environment (which for Leiter includes values)
plays a causal role in shaping a person’s life and his actions (Leiter 2002, 97). Still he
denies that a person could gain any kind of autonomy through interactions with his
environment,²³ because it “simply does not square with the theory of action that un-
derlies the basic fatalistic doctrine” (Leiter 2002, 98). While Leiter’s emphasis on
type-facts can and should be challenged, let us for now be content with examining
what follows from his premise.
What are we to make of Nietzsche’s talk about self-mastery? In this view, “self-
mastery is merely an effect of the interplay of certain drives” (Leiter 2002, 100). Con-
sequently, there is no real tension in Nietzsche’s writings, but only in the confused
mind of the interpreter. In practice, Leiter’s interpretative framework resolves any ap-
parent contradictions within a single text as well as between texts by referring to an
underlying theory of action that has been arrived at through an interpretation and
rationalization of a few chosen passages.²⁴ Still, it is of no use to deny that the con-
clusions that Leiter draws can be drawn from the textual evidence. One can however
ask two critical questions: Firstly, and most importantly, one can ask if such an in-
terpretation does not clarify Nietzsche’s psychological thinking at the expense of ob-
scuring much of Nietzsche’s philosophical project, not to speak of casting doubt on
its viability. Secondly, and more modestly, one can ask if there is no other way to un-
derstand his emphasis on psychic forces that resist rational control than to conclude
that Nietzsche thinks physiological facts should always be considered explanatorily
primary.
A number of scholars have sought to challenge Leiter’s interpretation of the
statements that he bases his epiphenomenalist thesis on, most often drawing on ad-
ditional textual evidence (cf. Katsafanas 2013 and Dries 2013). The problem with
these challenges is that Leiter’s conclusions can certainly be drawn from the passag-
es he cites. The competing interpretations of what Nietzsche says are hardly more
plausible than Leiter’s and thus end up with at least equally implausible “Nietz-
 Leiter thus rejects the view that “while type-facts may circumscribe the range of possible trajec-
tories, it now seems that a person can ‘create’ his life – and thus be morally responsible for it – in-
sofar as he can create those values that (causally) determine which of the possible trajectories is in
fact realized” (Leiter 2002, 98).
 Leiter draws primarily on D when justifying his account, but this same work contains passages
that can be used to resist such a reading. Besides the already cited aphorism 103, which suggests
that one can in a genuine sense learn to feel differently, the most obvious evidence is to be found
in aphorism 104, in which Nietzsche states that all actions derive from evaluative judgements, either
one’s own or someone else’s (D 104, KSA 3,92). Even the most minimalistic interpretation of this pas-
sage must admit that Nietzsche thinks one can “own” one’s actions. I examine other relevant passag-
es in D in the final section of this chapter (3.5), before the conclusion.
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schean” psychological theories (e.g. Katsafanas 2016).²⁵ Perhaps a more fruitful ap-
proach would be to pay more heed to context and to what Nietzsche in fact does, in-
stead of merely interpreting single statements. In this regard, I fully subscribe to Tom
Stern’s criticism of the dominant approach to Nietzsche’s psychology, and in partic-
ular I want to follow up on his suggestion that what Nietzsche was trying to do might
contradict any effort to force his thinking into the mould of drive theory (cf. Stern
2015, 139).²⁶ It certainly seems that Nietzsche was not too concerned about the the-
oretical problem of epiphenomenalism. As Peter Poellner correctly notes, he “explic-
itly uses explanations” that rely on conscious states as causes “on almost every page
of his writings” and that “there are a plethora of passages indicating that Nietzsche,
even in the later phase of his creative career, regards consciousness as efficacious”
(Poellner 2009, 297). The key question then becomes, why Nietzsche nevertheless op-
poses the drives to conscious mental states. What kind of project or projects does
Nietzsche pursue when employing the vocabulary of drives to question inherited
conceptions of mental life?
Poellner regrettably evades this crucial question by identifying Nietzsche as a
proto-phenomenologist, specifically as a forerunner of Husserlian phenomenology,
for whom the mental is always primary.²⁷ Nietzsche’s philosophical project can in-
deed be described as an attempt to redirect attention to what he poetically calls
the earth but to equate this concern with Husserl’s preoccupation with the “life-
world” is an anachronism that only sows confusion. That Nietzsche was not too con-
cerned with the theoretical problem of epiphenomenalism, does not mean that he
was not deeply concerned with the more practical question of what role conscious-
ness can play in shaping action. Just as Nietzsche’s expressions of scepticism con-
cerning the power of consciousness should not be interpreted as a fundamental com-
mitment to a rigid theory of action, one should also resist the temptation to undo the
tension in the opposite direction. Against both extremes, I argue that Nietzsche was
well aware of a tension between bodily nature and conscious thought and that the
tension plays a productive role in his philosophical writings. There is a danger
 Most problematically, Katsafanas presents his own theoretical construction as if it were nothing
but an elucidation of Nietzsche’s own theoretical commitments. I am willing to grant Katsafanas the
use of the term Nietzschean, as he clearly builds his psychological theory on statements by Nietzsche,
but only if one then distinguishes the “Nietzschean”, as philosophy inspired by Nietzsche, from
Nietzsche’s actual intentions, which resist theorization.
 Brian Leiter has sought to defend his interpretation against exactly this kind of criticism by as-
serting that there is no fundamental conflict between the “Humean Nietzsche” of drive theory and
the “Therapeutic Nietzsche”, who speaks of revaluation and who aims to influence select readers.
However, this entire defence rests on the implausible premise that the “Therapeutic Nietzsche”
works within the framework of drive theory, and not the other way around. (Cf. Leiter 2013, 582–584.)
 Poellner goes as far as to assert that “Nietzsche not only pervasively uses and anticipates phe-
nomenological modes of inquiry, but that, perhaps even more importantly his work contains the
most powerful and perceptive statement of the implicit motivations of the ‘phenomenological turn’
in early twentieth-century continental philosophy” (Poellner 2009, 298).
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that if one accepts either Poellner’s or Leiter’s view, one loses sight of this tension
that influences Nietzsche’s thinking far beyond his psychological speculations.
I already suggested that opposing drives and conscious thought might for
Nietzsche at least in part be a strategic move. According to Bernard Williams,
Nietzsche’s statements suggesting epiphenomenalism are best read as parts of argu-
ments against certain moral interpretations of psychology.²⁸ Robert Solomon also
notes the polemical intent of such statements (Solomon 2003, 75). In order to pursue
this thread, it is useful to turn from the abstract debate on epiphenomenalism to the
question how the tension between drives and conscious states should be understood
in the case of emotional experience. It is generally recognized in analytic scholarship
that whatever other functions drives have in Nietzsche’s psychological thinking, their
primary functions is to influence emotional experience. According to Katsafanas:
“Drives manifest themselves by coloring our view of the world, by generating percep-
tual saliences, by influencing our emotions and other attitudes, by fostering desires.”
(Katsafanas 2013, 743; cf. D 119, KSA 3, 113– 114) Though the metaphor of colouring is
not unproblematic and Nietzsche only occasionally uses it,²⁹ Katsafanas is right to
point out that for Nietzsche there is a close connection between the drives and
other affective phenomena, at least in the sense that the drives have something to
do with the all-enveloping background of feeling through which one encounters
the world. How specific drives relate to specific emotions is a different question al-
together, though it is worth noting that another influential scholar goes as far as
to claim: “Drives and affects are undistinguishable, for an ‘affect’ is simply what it
feels like to be driven by a drive” (Constâncio 2011, 16). Be that as it may, these ex-
amples from contemporary scholarship open the possibility to look beyond Nietz-
sche’s terminology and to consider the concepts he employs attempts to approach
certain phenomena, among them not least the nature of feelings and motivational
states and their relation to rational and non-rational aspects of consciousness. In
the following section, I follow this line of thought by engaging Robert Solomon’s
reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of emotion, which is particularly interesting pre-
cisely because he dares to think beyond the terminology provided by Nietzsche.
 “Nietzsche’s doubts about action are more usefully understood, I suggest, as doubts not about the
very idea of anyone’s doing anything, but rather about a morally significant interpretation of action,
in terms of the will.” (Williams 1994, 242–242)
 It must be said that probably the most common description of the role of moods and feelings in
contemporary analytic philosophy involves “colouring our view of the world”. The metaphor of col-
ouring has been criticized for reducing feelings and moods to mere aesthetic phenomena that serve
no important function (cf. Ratcliffe 2008, 47), but this criticism does not hit the target in the case of
Nietzsche, for whom aesthetics is never mere aesthetics. Nietzsche himself employs the metaphor of
colour occasionally, e.g. when he in GS writes that we lack a history of all that has given colour to life
(GS 7, KSA 3, 378–379) or that a cold grey sentiment associated with the historical sense is only one
colour of the new feeling [Farbe dieses neues Gefühls] (GS 337, KSA 3, 564–565).
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3.4 Robert Solomon on the tension in Nietzsche’s
understanding of the emotions
We have seen that the concept of the drive is intimately associated with the body in
Nietzsche. On the other hand, we have noted that there is no gulf between the phys-
iological and the phenomenological; that drives are intimately related to what we
have called mood. Robert Solomon suggests that the interpreter could in most
cases replace the term drive with other terms such as passion, emotion and desire.
In Solomon’s view, such an approach would recover a rich understanding of psychic
life in Nietzsche sadly obscured by his reliance on the theory of drives that was pop-
ular in the late 19th century (cf. Solomon 2003, 78). So instead of trying to build some
kind of Nietzschean psychological theory, (which, as a drive theory, could only be
mistaken in his view),³⁰ Solomon suggests readers should learn to appreciate
Nietzsche’s observations about the motivating forces driving human actions as
well as the philosopher’s emphasis on the value of living passionately. In this
view, Nietzsche was no great psychological theorist but he did have a keen psycho-
logical eye. For Solomon, it follows that one therefore need not pay too much atten-
tion to Nietzsche’s preferred conceptual apparatus; one should rather seek to draw
insights from what Nietzsche is trying to say. This approach is understandable
against the background of Solomon’s own philosophical project, which includes
making Nietzsche relevant to contemporary philosophy of emotions, but I will
seek to show that it also provides important clues for scholarship that seeks to un-
derstand Nietzsche’s psychological thinking in its own right.
Solomon’s suggested strategy of reading is worth interrogating closely.While de-
veloping his strategy of reading Nietzsche’s writings, Solomon identifies an internal
contradiction in the philosopher’s statements on emotion that should not seem too
surprising when one takes into account the debate over epiphenomenalism.
Nietzsche at times treats emotions as if they were first and foremost strategies or
ways of engaging with the world, talking about the importance of cultivating the
emotions and the possibility of spiritualizing passions (Solomon 2003, 79–81 and
83). The understanding of emotions implied by such talk is quite at odds with the
view of given and fixed forces of nature, torrents and streams rushing up to take
hold of the mind, which Solomon suggests is also present in Nietzsche’s writings (So-
lomon 2003, 82–83). The first understanding of emotions gives room for conscious
control, while the second one puts constraints on choice. Solomon undoubtedly de-
tects a real tension in Nietzsche, but it is precisely here that one should halt, instead
 For Solomon’s objections against psychological drive theories, see Solomon 2003, 76–78. I tend to
agree with Solomon that trying to build some kind of comprehensive Nietzschean psychological theo-
ry is a futile effort, but I would add that trying to clarify his views to serve historical scholarship is a
quite different and wholly legitimate endeavour. To what extent Nietzsche-scholarship and philoso-
phers writing on Nietzsche have been engaged in the former effort, at the expense of the latter, is a
question everyone involved in the discourse should ask himself.
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of rushing onwards.³¹ Solomon’s eagerness to reclaim Nietzsche for himself is prob-
lematic. In order to be able to replace Nietzsche’s drive-talk with his own vocabulary,
Solomon has to overlook the differences between his own conception of an irratio-
nalist “hydraulic model” of emotions and a more fundamental yet subtle constraint
on choice presumed by Nietzsche. Therefore, we cannot follow Solomon without first
examining the premises of his project. This strategy also allows us to better appreci-
ate Nietzsche’s efforts by contrasting his thinking with what is one of or perhaps even
the most influential perspective in the philosophy of emotions.
Only against the background of Solomon’s understanding of choice can one
make sense of his reading of Nietzsche and judge to what extent it hits the mark.
While Solomon did revise important details over the years, those aspects of his theo-
ry of emotion that most concern us here remained virtually unchanged and are most
clearly expressed in an early article. In his classic article on “Emotions and Choice”,
Solomon sets out to develop an alternative against what he takes to be a dominant
perception of emotions as physiological occurrences that happen to us (Solomon
1973, 20). Here I want to focus only on his rejection of the idea that emotions resist
our control and on the question in what sense he instead argues that one can choose
one’s emotions. According to Solomon, views that emphasize the uncontrollability of
emotions overlook that emotions are in most if perhaps not all cases intentional, i.e.
about something. To paraphrase Solomon’s example, I am angry at John for stealing
my car. If I learn that John did not steal my car, that he only bought a car that looks
exactly like mine, I won’t be angry at him anymore. (Solomon 1973, 21–23). This
means that emotions are judgements, specifically normative judgements. Solomon
adds that not only are emotions about something (i.e. emotions are intentional)
they are also about something in a specific situation (i.e. emotions are situational),
so he ends up with the view that “to have an emotion is to hold a normative judge-
ment about one’s situation” (Solomon 1973, 27). So if emotions are judgements that
one can in some sense choose, why is it that emotions are commonly considered irra-
tional and beyond our control?
Solomon argues that the apparent irrationality of emotions shouldn’t be con-
fused with uncontrollability. Instead, the best explanation for the widespread view
that emotions can resist our control is that emotions are bound to situations. Emo-
tions are responses to situations, which for one or another reason (e.g. on grounds
of being unusual) demand a quick response. So emotions are hasty judgements that
are appropriate and rational in the situations in which they arise (Solomon 1973,
34–35). Because emotions are linked to situations, one cannot simply choose to
feel angry without any reason, without being in a situation where anger is a possibly
appropriate response (Solomon 1973, 31 and 40).What one can do is to become more
self-aware about one’s judgements, to strive towards making correct judgements
 The ambivalence Solomon detects in Nietzsche’s philosophy of emotion is also reflected in Solo-
mon’s text with frequent exclamations of “and yet”, “but despite” and so forth (cf. Solomon 2003).
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about situations and (eventually) change what kind of judgements one tends to make
in particular circumstances (Solomon 1973, 32).³² Consequently, emotional control
does not involve fighting against some natural force, but in various ways challenging
the normative judgements that constitute emotional responses, and thus eventually
changing the way one tends to act in any given situation.
Solomon’s early view certainly captures something important about the role of
emotions in everyday life even if it does not provide a full picture.³³ If one discounts
fundamental objections to his approach,³⁴ I think there is only one issue that is of
concern to us here. After initially opposing his view against theories that consider
emotions to be occurrences beyond our control, Solomon ends up with a view in
which the possibility to choose one’s emotions is constrained to a great extent by
the nature of the situation in which one finds oneself. For any given situation only
a limited number of emotional responses are appropriate, after all. One can then
ask if Solomon does not go too far in externalizing the reasons for the experience
that emotions might resist conscious control. Even as Solomon would later revise
and tone down some aspects of his theory of choice, he never recanted this external-
ization of the constraints on choice.³⁵ Nietzsche certainly emphasizes constraints on
choosing one’s emotions that have more to do with the individual facing a specific
situation than with the situation itself, as I will soon show in more detail. Solomon
is vaguely aware of this and it is for this reason that he brings the idea of hydraulic
models of emotions into his discussion about the understanding of emotions that
finds expression in Nietzsche’s philosophical texts.
Solomon’s talk of a hydraulic model refers to (mis‐)understandings of emotion,
in which emotions are thought of as fixed natural forces. Hydraulic metaphors of rag-
ing torrents and subterraneous streams are a common identifier of such understand-
ings. The key problem with such metaphors is that torrents are wholly mindless even
if they flow in specific directions. As natural forces, torrents of emotion have to be
dealt with. One can perhaps resist a torrent, redirect it or try to cope with it, but
 “I can take any number of positive steps to change what I believe and what judgments I hold and
tend to make. By forcing myself to be scrupulous in the search for evidence and knowledge of circum-
stance, and by training myself in self-understanding regarding my prejudices and influences, and by
placing myself in appropriate circumstances, I can determine the kinds of judgments I will tend to
make. I can do the same for my emotions.” (Solomon 1973, 32)
 Solomon is well aware of this as he himself remarks that the entire problem of “unconscious emo-
tions” falls beyond the scope of his article (Solomon 1973, 26).
 One implication of tying emotions to a certain kind of situations is that a large part of affective life
falls outside the scope of the discussion on emotions. This could be contrasted with a more holistic
account of all human experience as shaped by mood as we find in Heidegger, to name but one prom-
inent example (cf. Heidegger 2006, 134–140).
 Or as Paul Griffiths puts it: “While Solomon emphasized the cultivation of appropriate emotion
through enculturation, his existentialist emphasis on personal responsibility would have made him
uneasy with any theory in which the emotions – or at least the normative standards governing them –
are inscribed into the psychology of the individual by the cultural milieu.” (Griffiths 2010)
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one cannot be rid of it. One cannot choose not to have torrents of emotion raging
through one’s body. (Cf. Solomon 2003, 73–74.) Does Nietzsche’s talk of drives com-
mit him to such a hydraulic model?
Nietzsche certainly thinks of emotions as natural forces, but does he think of
them as being of a fixed, unchanging nature? Despite occasionally employing hy-
draulic metaphors, it is my contention that Nietzsche’s understanding of the “nature”
of emotion differs from Solomon’s hydraulic model. Unless one thinks of nature as
inherently inflexible, there is no reason to see the bodily nature of emotion as nec-
essarily constricting choice, if one takes the choice to involve choosing among alter-
native emotions that are appropriate responses in a given situation. If one look closer
at what Nietzsche has to say about the relation of affective phenomena to conscious
thought and compare it to Solomon’s views, one will see that while Nietzsche com-
plicates the question of choice in a different way, the consequences are strikingly
similar to Solomon’s.
As we have seen, Nietzsche suggests that drives primarily operate on a sub-con-
scious level, in and through our bodies. They become manifest as emotions and atti-
tudes. That means that drives are accessible to consciousness at least insofar as they
are felt; and thus to a certain extent open to conscious reflection. In fact, Nietzsche
only means to say that we cannot with certainty know reflectively all of the drives
which constitute our affect and thus guide our action in any specific situation. In
other words, we cannot be aware of all of the factors influencing our emotional expe-
riences, reactions and actions (D 119, KSA 3, 111). Nietzsche writes that “However far a
man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his
image of the totality of drives which constitute his being.” (Hollingdale transl./
Clark and Leiter 1997, 74; cf. D 119, KSA 3, 111) That would simply be too much for
the conscious mind.³⁶ While such an understanding raises some initial doubts
about the power of conscious reflection, the rather banal fact that we are not
aware of the origin of all the content of our consciousness in itself renders neither
choice impossible nor consciousness illusory. One does not have to draw on any ad-
vanced existentialist theory of freedom to account for that. One merely has to expand
the notion of choice from a narrow conception of reflective deliberation to allow the
felt body to play a more important role in choices. Such a view is fully compatible
with Solomon’s original understanding of emotion and choice, which emphasized
that one has to go through a process of learning in order to be able to choose differ-
ently in any given situation. This is the case as long as Nietzsche allows for ways to
consciously influence one’s drives. There certainly are no philosophical reasons to
rule out that possibility a priori. In this regard, it is worth noting that Solomon started
emphasizing the bodily nature of emotion in his late work, in much the same way as
 This brings up the thorny issue of self-knowledge in Nietzsche. Suffice it to say that there is no
consensus about what kind of self-knowledge Nietzsche considers possible. A strict reading of the
passage in question would suggest that Nietzsche thinks only complete self-knowledge is impossible.
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Nietzsche, but did not consider it an objection to his earlier views.³⁷ This strengthens
our suspicion that the problem, which is at the basis of the tension apparent in
Nietzsche’s statements on the affective life, does not derive from Nietzsche accepting
a hydraulic model of emotion or any strictly deterministic drive theory for that matter.
Solomon concedes that the hydraulic model does not fit Nietzsche too well. His
“metaphors are not all so hydraulic” (Solomon 2003, 75).³⁸ Solomon also admits that
Nietzschean drives can be acquired (Solomon 2003, 76). Indeed, Nietzsche talks a lot
about the incorporation of ideas and their becoming sub-conscious instinct: this is
one of the main themes of the Gay Science (GS 21, KSA 3, 391–393; cf. Franco
2011, 102). Recognition of these facts leads Solomon to resolve the tension he has de-
scribed by correcting Nietzsche with existentialist terminology. There is, however, an
important sense in which this move can only be considered an attempt to get rid of
Nietzsche’s recognition of certain constraints on choosing one’s emotions that can
only be understood as deriving from within us. Although I think it can be shown
that Nietzsche’s conception of natural forces does not imply rigidity, there is still
an unresolved tension between the bodily nature of emotions and the possibility
to choose one’s emotions. This tension resides on a more fundamental level than
the dichotomy of hydraulic and existentialist models of emotion allows for. Next, I
will examine some particularly illuminating statements on the tension between con-
sciously choosing one’s emotions and forces constraining choice in Daybreak.
3.5 The history of emotions and the tension in question
Nietzsche’s Daybreak is the work that is most often cited by scholars arguing for an
epiphenomenalist interpretation (cf. Leiter 2002, 95 and 99–101). As I already
noted, the text also contains statements that can be used to question that interpreta-
tion. Now I will examine three aphorisms that in my view indicate that Nietzsche is
aware of a tension between choosing one’s emotions and forces constraining choice.
These aphorisms are unsystematic, and in this sense they do not differ from the evi-
dence that the competing interpretations draw upon, but they do form a suggestive
chain of thought and suffice to give an alternative picture that is more in tune with
Nietzsche’s critical projects. I want to pay particular attention to aphorisms 34, 35
and 38.
In aphorism 34, Nietzsche writes that moral feelings are apparently transmitted
from parents to children when children notice strong sentiments for or against cer-
 A striking example of this Nietzschean emphasis on the body is Solomon’s clarification that “the
judgments that I claim are constitutive of emotion may be non-propositional and bodily as well as
propositional and articulate. They manifest themselves as feelings.” (Solomon 2004, 88)
 One could add that even when Nietzsche is at his most hydraulic, he allows for ways of manip-
ulating the nature of the torrents and leaves room for the intellect to choose between competing
drives (e.g. D 109, KSA 3, 96–99).
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tain actions in their parents and copy their reactions.³⁹ Eventually practice makes
specific feelings habitual and one learns to provide reasons for one’s emotions.
Nietzsche critically suggests that these reasons all too often only serve to justify emo-
tional reactions after they take place, so in many cases habitual feelings are prior to
any rational judgements. (D 34, KSA 3, 43) This, however, does not mean that feelings
are not judgements, which becomes clear in the following aphorism that develops
the theme:
35. Feelings and their origination in judgments. – ’Trust your feelings!’ – But feelings are nothing
final or original; behind feelings there stand judgments and evaluations which we inherit in the
form of feelings (inclinations, aversions). The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a
judgment – and often of a false judgment! – and in any event not a child of your own! To trust
one’s feelings – means to give more obedience to one’s grandfather and grandmother and their
grandparents than to the gods which are in us: our reason and our experience. (Hollingdale
transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 36; D 35, KSA 3, 43–44)
If there is one aphorism above others in Nietzsche that could be said to reflect Solo-
mon’s view of emotions as judgements then this would be it. The aphorism clearly
states that feelings are judgements, but there is something that is even more impor-
tant here. Firstly, Nietzsche claims that feelings are inherited. The relation between
feelings and judgements is also familial; the inspiration that derives from feelings
is a grandchild of a judgement [Enkelkind eines Urtheils]. The addition that the judge-
ment that “one’s” feeling depends on is not one’s own, but of one’s grandfather,
grandmother and their grandparents, hammers the point home. While I think that
it is reasonably clear that Nietzsche here primarily means to point to the historical
dimension of feelings, to the cultural transmission described in the previous aphor-
ism, the metaphor of inheritance is potentially misleading. The problem is that as
Nietzsche does not specify the manner of inheritance, it cannot be ruled out that
he also considers a biological transmission of acquired characteristics to be possi-
ble.⁴⁰ The second important point that merits commentary is the final suggestion
that trusting one’s feelings means obeying the human past instead of obeying
one’s own reason and experience. If the use of reason, which I take to entail con-
scious deliberation, had no power over the affects and no power to guide action,
 “Ersichtlich werden moralische Gefühle so übertragen, dass die Kinder bei den Erwachsenen starke
Neigungen und Abneigungen gegen bestimmte Handlungen wahrnehmen und dass sie als geborene
Affen diese Neigungen und Abneigungen nachmachen” (D 34, KSA 3, 43).
 The view that acquired characteristics could be passed on from one generation to the next, asso-
ciated with the name of Lamarck, remained widespread even after Darwin’s theory gained ground.
Nietzsche seems at times to have taken this idea very seriously as scientific fact (see Schacht 2013;
for an opposite view see Clark 2013). This is not much of a problem for philosophical work that
draws on Nietzsche, since passages that invite a Lamarckian interpretation can fairly easily be reread
in terms of cultural transmission. It does however pose problems for a reading of Nietzsche’s thinking
that aims for historical accuracy.
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it would be strange for Nietzsche to raise such a criticism. All in all, the aphorism fits
Solomon’s view that one is in some sense responsible for one’s judgements, but it
also complicates the picture by opening up a historical dimension.
In aphorism 38, Nietzsche seeks to draw attention to the way in which moral
judgements transform drives. He opens the aphorism by claiming that the same
drive, which in one cultural context expresses itself as a feeling of cowardice, can
in a culture shaped by Christian morality become a pleasant feeling of humility. In
themselves drives are immoral and only through moral judgements do they really be-
come the feelings and emotions that we speak of. So moral judgements shape drives
and give them a second nature [zweite Natur]. After making this initial point,
Nietzsche devotes the remainder of the aphorism to historical examples. These exam-
ples are cursory and amount to little more than mere claims (to the effect) that the
ancient Greeks felt both jealousy and hope differently than we do and that the Jews
of the time of the prophets felt wrath as something divine.⁴¹ (D 38, KSA 3, 45–46)
What is important is that Nietzsche speaks of drives as malleable. This foreshad-
ows his discussion of the drives in his following work, The Gay Science. There
Nietzsche explicitly states that consciousness is a fairly recent development within
organic lifeforms and that therefore it is still weak (GS 11, KSA 3, 382). Consciousness
itself, he thus presumes, springs forth from the operation of the organism and its
drives. Nevertheless, he suggests that conscious experience and thought can alter
the nature of the drives and perhaps even give birth to new drives under the right
circumstances. Far from intending to deny the reality of consciousness, Nietzsche’s
criticism of the overvaluation of consciousness, his criticism of the idea that we al-
ready fully have consciousness, is meant to spur us to become more conscious (GS 11,
KSA 3, 383). What follows for Nietzsche is a grand task to “incorporate knowledge”
and to review all normative judgements, in order to open up new ways of affirming
life (cf. Franco 2011, 101– 103). That, however, is a story beyond the scope of our dis-
cussion here (see chapter 5), so let us try to return to the question concerning the role
of choice in emotional experience.
Not only does Nietzsche acknowledge that under specific circumstances “emo-
tions” might resist conscious control, appear to us as torrents and thereby restrict
choice. He also implies that there is a more fundamental irrationality constraining
what affective response one can choose. Nietzsche never systematically elaborates
the implications of his historical perspective on the issue that today is put in
terms of emotions and choice, but some implications are clear enough to be summar-
 In the Heidelberg-commentary on D, Jochen Schmidt helpfully points out that Nietzsche’s exam-
ples about the Greeks rely on extreme overgeneralization; in fact, he presents Hesiod’s rather person-
al view as the collective view of the Greeks. Nietzsche’s example about the Israelites is similarly mis-
leading (Schmidt and Kaufmann 2015, 128– 132). This of course need not impact the philosophical
point Nietzsche is trying to make, as there are very good reasons to think that the experience of emo-
tions is shaped by historical forces; indeed, this is a trivial starting point for any history of emotions
(cf. Plamper 2015).
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ized thus: One cannot invent new feelings for any given situation and choose to feel
whatever one wants. Most of our everyday affects are the results of untold years of
natural and cultural history. One can choose not to let a “torrent” rage, but one can-
not choose not to have affects at all. Choosing against one affect means choosing or
giving into another affect. Being human means being affective, being in a mood. Be-
sides disruptive or strong episodes of feeling, there is also always a background af-
fectivity or mood structuring our perceptions and influencing choice even beyond the
choice of emotions. Both the affects in the strict sense and background affectivity are
mutable and the conscious cultivation of mood is possible. One should still not over-
estimate the power of consciousness, especially not that of the individual, for it is
rare indeed in history that entirely new forms or directions of the emotions appear
and leave a lasting legacy.
3.6 Conclusion
Returning to Solomon, one can conclude that he detects a real tension in Nietzsche’s
understanding of affective life, which has went unnoticed by scholars of Nietzsche’s
philosophy who tend to accept some form of drive theory without question (cf. Dries
and Kail 2015).⁴² The desire to resolve the tension is understandable. Still, Solomon
goes too far by imposing a foreign framework onto Nietzsche; thereby correcting him
with a more “existentialist” theory of emotions. This is insofar unproblematic, as So-
lomon is mostly concerned with reclaiming Nietzsche as an advocate of the passion-
ate life (Solomon 2003, 3–5). For a contextual interpretation of Nietzsche’s psycho-
logical thinking the tension presents a major challenge. Must one conclude that
Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology is just hopelessly confused and contradictory?
One can and must of course concede that Nietzsche’s statements are confusing.
This need not mean that his psychological thought is hopelessly confused. There is a
real philosophical and existential problem at the basis of this confusion; it is a con-
fusion that concerns the relation between nature, history and consciousness. The
tension in Nietzsche’s thinking about feeling is best not conceived of as one between
a hydraulic and an existentialist model but rather as a tension between historical
forces and the power of consciousness. Therefore, one should be careful not to reject
an inquiry into Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology as fruitless outright on account
of his contradictory statements, and instead inquire into the problem. So let us ask
one final time: does Nietzsche think that consciousness is epiphenomenal? I have
suggested that for Nietzsche, the decisive issue is rather one of the relative strength
 Perhaps it would be more diplomatic if not more accurate to say that this tension in Nietzsche’s
understanding of affectivity has been overshadowed by an overtly abstract debate on Nietzsche’s fa-
talism in general and his epiphenomenalism in philosophical psychology. That scholars and philos-
ophers writing on Nietzsche tend to disregard all criticism of drive theories is nevertheless the main
issue, and this justifies the polemical statement here.
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of consciousness and of conscious thought compared to that of the drives and the
power of history that they represent. That this solution to the problem of Nietzsche’s
purported epiphenomenalism goes some way towards explaining the prevalence of
discussions about feeling in Nietzsche’s philosophical writings is evident, for it fol-
lows that the life of feeling is a privileged domain between more or less unconscious
drives and more or less conscious thought; a sign of the tension between body and
embodied spirit. Nietzsche’s position is one that might or might not be attractive to
contemporary philosophers. What matters here is that Nietzsche can plausible be
thought to have held such a view, and that this assumption is a good starting
place for a contextual interpretation of his writings. Further evidence that Nietzsche
in fact espoused such a view will be presented in the following chapters, along with
discussions of the reasons that led him in the direction of developing such a view.
Now it here only remains to outline the approach taken in the following chapters.
I would suggest that the tension in question is best explored on two levels; by
taking account both of 1) Nietzsche’s explicit psychological statements on the life
of feeling and especially those statements dealing with the historical dimensions
of feelings as well as the possibility of new configurations of feeling, and 2) his
use of style, and of a variety of artistic means, in his writings in order to communi-
cate mood and thereby open up new possibilities for philosophical thinking. In the
following chapters, I limit my discussion by focusing primarily on Nietzsche’s criti-
cism of religion in the light of his communication of mood. This strategy is justified
firstly because of the outstanding place that religion has in Nietzsche’s writings both
as inspiration and as target of critique and secondly because it allows to solve central
problems in the scholarly literature on Nietzsche (as presented in the introduction of
the study). To conclude: If Nietzsche’s psychological thinking has played a marginal
role in continental scholarship, Anglophone scholarship has been one-sided and ob-
sessed with those aspects of his psychological thinking that are close to concerns in
contemporary philosophy of mind and action. This focus has not resulted in a total
neglect of mood, but it has subordinated the discussion about felt experience to the
discussion about Nietzsche’s assumed theory of drives. My question, the question of
the historical dimension of affective phenomena and the possibilities of shaping the
future of emotional experience, has been almost altogether neglected, although it is
arguably of utmost importance to understanding Nietzsche’s critical project concern-
ing morality and religion. As I noted, Nietzsche never defines the concept of drive in
his published work. Given the results of the investigation thus far, it is nevertheless
worth noting, that when Nietzsche does define the closely related term instinct in a
note from 1881, he speaks of instinct as a judgement that has become embodied.⁴³
This is of no small importance, for the evidence certainly points in the direction
that Nietzsche thinks one can learn to judge differently.
 “Ich rede von Instinkt, wenn irgend ein Urtheil (Geschmack in seiner untersten Stufe) einverleibt ist”
(NL 1881, 11[164], KSA 9, 505).
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4 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in Human,
All Too Human and Daybreak
This chapter is devoted to examining Nietzsche’s psychological approach to religion
in HH and D.
Although this involves clarification and reconstruction, the aim of the chapter is
not primarily to present a summary of Nietzsche’s views. A mere systematizing sum-
mary would run the risk of depriving the reader of a sense for the rich affective di-
mension of Nietzsche’s text, which is precisely what concerns us. So besides present-
ing Nietzsche’s thinking about the topic on the basis of the content of the works
(sections 4.1 and 4.3), this chapter also explores what can be said about Nietzsche’s
use of mood in these two works and to what extent that should influence the inter-
pretation of his remarks on religion (sections 4.2 and 4.4). These latter questions are
pursued through a critical engagement with the work of Jacob Golomb (on HH) and
Rebecca Bamford (on D). Many scholars have made scattered, cursory remarks about
Nietzsche’s use of affective means in his writings, but these two are the only scholars
who have paid serious attention to Nietzsche’s use of mood in these specific works. If
indeed mood is central to the conception of these early works, there is reason to as-
sume that it is of no small importance to examine its role thoroughly. The question of
mood is worth more than a footnote or two, if one aims for a viable reading.
4.1 Schopenhauer’s shadow and the independence of HH
The following foray into Human, All Too Human serves to outline the basics of
Nietzsche’s psychological approach to religion. The focus of the reading will be on
questions of affectivity, which means I will necessarily ignore most of the work.
The chosen approach is justified within the context of the work at hand as the chap-
ter is meant to perform a preliminary function. This function consists in outlining the
basics of Nietzsche’s psychological approach to religion, before we move on to D and
GS. Besides this pragmatic justification, there are more important reasons for the
focus on affectivity. I will argue that the focus on affectivity improves our under-
standing of Nietzsche’s departure from Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion.
That matters because it is after all precisely this departure, which allows one to con-
sider HH foundational for Nietzsche’s development into an independent thinker. The
focus on affectivity makes it possible to argue against the popular narrative which
holds that as Nietzsche in HH distances himself from Schopenhauer’s philosophy,
he also seeks a perspective that renounces all ideals and denies the value of feel-
ings.¹ If one would fully embrace that view, it would hardly make sense to speak
 E.g. Marco Brusotti contends that Nietzsche in HH seeks a perspective that is not only free from
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of Nietzsche giving any significant constructive role to feeling in that work, not to
speak of him making use of mood. Therefore, I will begin by challenging that narra-
tive, whereafter I will through an examination of the foundations of Nietzsche’s psy-
chological criticism move on to the question about the potential constructive role of
mood in the work (section 4.2).
4.1.1 A turn against feeling?
What makes the narrative that Nietzsche turns against all feeling so compelling is
that it not only superficially fits what we know about the circumstances which led
to the creation of HH but that Nietzsche himself also suggests the possibility of
such an interpretation. In his late work, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche recounts that it was
his sobering experience of the first Bayreuth Festival of 1876 that triggered the crisis
that found its expression in HH (KSA 6, 323–324; cf. Young 2010, 224 and Franco
2011, 10). That the crisis was a matter of feeling and taste, more specifically a rejec-
tion of that which he encountered at the festival, is beyond doubt. Was it also a re-
jection of feeling more generally? The terse aphoristic style as well as the philosoph-
ical content of HH, especially its piercing psychological analyses of feelings, might
tempt one to affirm that conclusion. In contrast to the baroque excesses of feeling
displayed at Bayreuth, HH is in this view propagated by Nietzsche an exercise in
self-restraint that puts an end to all “feminine” concerns about ideals and “beautiful
feelings” (KSA 6, 327).² It is moreover a war, which is fought without any pathos, as
he curiously writes, because fighting with pathos would still be “idealism” (KSA 6,
323). Despite such strong-worded statements, the narrative of a general turn against
feeling gives at best a partial explanation of Nietzsche’s Bayreuth-crisis.
There is another, more enlightening way of reading Nietzsche’s crisis. Rather
than being a turn away from strong feeling altogether, Nietzsche’s turn away from
the Wagnerians can be read as itself driven by a strong feeling. On this reading,
what bothered Nietzsche about Bayreuth was not the displays of intense feeling
per se, but his shock that what he considered the highest feelings were mingled
with the lowest motivations.What he found was that Wagner had become “German”
and succumbed to the impulse to please the crowd (cf. KSA 6, 323; cf. Janz 1978 I,
708). Nietzsche’s error was to go to Bayreuth with an ideal in mind, as he himself
attests in a note from 1878 (NL 1878, 30[1], KSA 8, 522). This was an ideal that he
troubling affects (Brusotti 1997, 14), but also free of passions altogether, i.e. apathetic (Brusotti 1997,
228). Even though Brusotti is careful to point out that Nietzsche seems to have had doubts about the
issue all along, Brusotti still emphasizes what he interprets as signs of how hard it was for Nietzsche
to give up the goal of attaining such a perspective (Brusotti 1997, 188 and 630–632).
 “Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, dies Denkmal einer rigorösen Selbstzucht, mit der ich bei mir
allem eingeschleppten ‘höheren Schwindel,’ ‘Idealismus,’ ‘schönen Gefühl,’ und andren Weiblichkeiten
ein jähes Ende bereitete” (KSA 6, 327).
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had himself elaborated and celebrated in the fourth untimely meditation, Richard
Wagner in Bayreuth, which was specifically published for the occasion in 1876.
This ideal Wagner was a cosmopolitan or over-German [überdeutsch] phenomenon,
whose music was above all an expression of the “truth” of pathos, i.e. that honest
passion is far better than moralistic hypocrisy and conformism (cf. RWB, KSA 1,
506–507; cf. Janz 1978 I, 712). After his arrival in Bayreuth, it did not take long for
Nietzsche to realize that his ideal did not matter and that honesty in matters of feel-
ing was out of the question in the company now gathered; the company of “impor-
tant” persons such as princes and other wealthy sponsors.³ This disappointment,
however great it was, did not lead to a rejection of the value of feeling but to the
task of purifying feeling. What Nietzsche craves is purity of feeling, and greatly
aided by his escape into the mountains he finds within himself an affective ideal
that matches his demands.⁴ He then rereads and reinterprets Schopenhauer in the
light of his new experience and it is this engagement with his former master,
which finally allows him to develop into an independent thinker.
Against this background, I advance the thesis that Nietzsche’s focus on affectiv-
ity in his analysis of the religious life is a direct result of his rereading and appropri-
ation of Schopenhauer, and that Nietzsche’s quarrel is not with heightened feeling
per se but with metaphysical and religious interpretations of extraordinary emotions.
Herein lies the independent scholarly interest of the ensuing discussion, if one were
to disconnect it from the broader arguments of the study. To reiterate, I argue that
Nietzsche does not question the value of intense feelings and that he instead only
attacks misguided interpretations. That he does seek a certain distance from feeling
is undeniable, but that does not contradict his aim. To the contrary, I will seek to
show that one can plausibly assume that Nietzsche at least implicitly already in
HH understands distance as pathos (cf. BGE 257, KSA 5, 205), and connects “being
above” certain feelings with a specific affective ideal. Arguably, HH is to a great ex-
tent about articulating this affective ideal of distance, and arguably, Nietzsche strug-
gles to express his experience and to transmit it to his friends and readers. Indeed,
we will yet come to ask if he is perhaps right to doubt to what extent he can succeed.
First of all, however, the foundations for the interpretation sketched here must be
laid through an examination of the foundations of Nietzsche’s psychological criti-
cism.
 “die erbarmungswürdige Gesellschaft der Patronatsherrn und Patronatsweiblein”, as he noted in a
first draft for the description of his crisis in EH (KSA 14, 492; cf. Janz 1978 I, 720).
 In fact, Nietzsche himself represented his turn away from the Wagnerians as such in his letters.
E.g. in a letter to Mathilde Mayer he justifies his escape from Bayreuth in terms of the discovery of
a mood that he metaphorically relates to the fresh mountain air [Höhenluft], a mood so promising
that it compels him to break with the Wagnerians and seek solitude: “ich bin auf einem Grad der Ehr-
lichkeit angelangt, wo ich nur die allerreinlichsten menschlichen Beziehungen ertrage” (KGB II/5,
Bf. 734). I present more evidence about this mood and discuss it in detail in the final parts of the dis-
cussion on HH.
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4.1.2 The foundations of Nietzsche’s psychological criticism
HH is notable for the reason that Nietzsche at the beginning provides a sketch of his
method of doing philosophy.⁵ Chapter one introduces the reader to a specific kind of
philosophizing that Nietzsche calls historical philosophizing, though it could at least
as well be called psychological philosophizing. This latter claim gains support from
the very first two passages (“aphorisms”) of HH, which announce the new program.
The Chemistry of concepts and sensations that Nietzsche calls for is a critical practice,
in which the focus of attention is on the construction of our concepts and feelings; be
they of a moral, religious or scientific nature.⁶ While this practice mostly results in
penetrating psychological analyses of the origins of metaphysical and religious con-
cepts, Nietzsche importantly justifies the new practice as an expression of historical
sense. Attentiveness to the various elements that make up unified concepts (e.g. Self-
lessness, Love etc.) is according to him necessary because of a particular reason.
Only such philosophizing avoids what he calls the original sin of philosophers,
which is a lack of historical sense. Nietzsche then illustrates what he means by a
lack of historical sense by mocking the method with which some philosophers
treat the concept of the human: They take the man of today, find certain features
and assume that these features have always belonged to mankind. Instead of taking
the human beings one encounters in one’s own day as paradigmatic (“the human” as
aeterna veritas), Nietzsche insists one must as philosopher be sensitive to and open
to the reality of change and aware of the historical conditions that shape what we
call humanity. (HH I 1 and HH I 2, KSA 2, 23–25)
In itself, Nietzsche’s call for more historical consciousness in philosophy is noth-
ing revolutionary in the late 19th-century context. He is in fact unusually explicit
about his indebtedness to contemporary thought in speaking of historical philosophy
as the youngest of philosophical methods to have been developed, even though he at
this point fails to mention anyone who would have put the method to practice. A clue
can be found in the fact that he connects the necessity of historical philosophizing
with the advancement of natural science, writing that the former can no longer be
thought of in separation of the latter (HH I 1, KSA 2, 23). A quick glance at Nietzsche’s
reading is enlightening in this respect. Nietzsche might have made the connection
between historical philosophizing and natural science at the very beginning of his
turn towards philosophy. Nietzsche read the first edition of Friedrich Albert Lange’s
 Importantly, as Hödl emphasizes, Nietzsche does not abandon the central features of the critical
program he explicates in HH, not even in his late works (Hödl 2009, 359). Likewise, Young cursorily
notes that the basic thrust of HH is the same as in Nietzsche’s later genealogical investigations
(Young 2006, 62).
 A presupposition for the view advanced by Nietzsche is that all those moral, religious and scientific
concepts that concern him are made up of analysable components. Aphorism 14 of book one is an
attempt to explain how the perception of unity in concepts such as “moral feeling” or “religious feel-
ing” arises in the first place (HH I 14, KSA 2, 35).
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History of Materialism [Geschichte des Materialismus] in 1866, in which the neo-Kant-
ian philosopher among other things discussed recent physiological and psychologi-
cal research and reflected on their relevance to philosophy (cf. Brobjer 2008, 32–36).
Although Lange’s work was important in Nietzsche’s philosophical development (cf.
Stack 1983, 1–2), especially in the late 1860s, there is no evidence to suggest that he
reread that book in the years directly leading up to the publication of HH (Brobjer
2008, 35). In those decisive years, however, Nietzsche became acquainted with the
work of British anthropologists who sought to apply the idea of evolution to
human history and society; not least Herbert Spencer, J. Lubbock and E.B. Tylor
(cf. Orsucci 1996). That Nietzsche thought of the works of these thinkers as intimately
connected with natural science can be sufficiently explained with reference to their
content. In the case of Spencer, one can also add the fact that Nietzsche read his
work as part of an edited series (Internationale Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek), which
contained both natural and social science (cf. Brobjer 2008, 64–65). Closer to
home, Paul Rée further familiarized Nietzsche with this kind of thinking. So what
is it that sets our philosopher apart from others, who were keen to integrate the
most recent findings of anthropology, psychology and historical methods into philos-
ophy? In Nietzsche’s hands the combination of psychological insight and historical
method results in an intensity quite unlike anything to be found in his predecessors
and contemporaries. This intensity is the result not of some improvement of the his-
torical method by Nietzsche, but rather derives from the originality and boldness of
his psychological vision; reflected in the uncompromising vehemence of his cultural
criticism, which is especially evident in his reevaluation of the tradition regarding
desire and mood.
The two opening aphorisms already suggest the most important target of his cul-
tural criticism: narrow and outright false interpretations of “the human”. How
human life is interpreted is important, the aphorisms imply, because interpretations
of what it is like to be human and how various phenomena are to be understood in
fact shape what life is like. That Nietzsche in the second aphorism explicitly men-
tions religion, besides politics, as a force that has shaped humanity is an important
indicator of that which is to come (HH I 2, KSA 2, 24–25). For once one recognizes
that the idea of humanity that reigns in one’s own day does not reveal the eternal
truth about humans, as Nietzsche here does, a number of critical questions are
made possible. How and why does the image of “the human” change? What are
the historical and psychological roots of the contemporary construction of “the
human”? What instincts, desires and moods does it express? Does it perhaps present
a misshapen picture of “the human”? If so, what could be done to change the pic-
ture?
As hinted at above, the historical philosophizing that Nietzsche practices in HH
cannot be disconnected from cultural criticism. This at first sight rather banal thesis
hides a potential for great conflict, as it is necessary to specify what kind of culture is
the target of criticism. That this is indeed the case can be seen in the work of Paul
Franco, who most recently has defended the thesis that culture is the central concern
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of HH. Franco is of course right to identify the theme of culture as central to HH, but
his talk of a single problem of culture (Franco 2011, 16), specifically a problem of mod-
ern culture, suggests to me a more systematic treatise than Nietzsche in fact delivers.
Are there not more than one problems of culture in HH, the most important of which
arguably would be the problem of metaphysics?⁷ In Franco’s interpretation, metaphy-
sics does form the “deepest substratum of Nietzsche’s critical excavation of the prob-
lem of modern culture” (Franco 2011, 17). It is, however, anything but clear from
Franco’s examination of the issue what relations pertain between the different sub-
strata of the purportedly singular problem of “modern culture” and whether they de-
pend in some way on metaphysical errors in the deepest substratum. How, for exam-
ple, do the chapters Woman and Child or A Glance at the State relate to metaphysics?
Resolving the issue lies beyond the scope of this study. Here I will focus on the prob-
lem of metaphysics as a cultural problem, which certainly is one of the main con-
cerns of the book.
Firstly, Nietzsche’s concern with metaphysics needs to be specified. Nietzsche is
not primarily concerned with metaphysics per se, as in classical questions of meta-
physical philosophy, but rather focuses on metaphysical interpretations, i.e. meta-
physics in and as culture. Characteristic of this psychological approach is his admis-
sion that there might be a metaphysical world, but that all attempts to gain
knowledge of metaphysical worlds has relied on the very worst methods of reason-
ing. In short: metaphysical assumptions are the result of passion, error and self-de-
ception [Leidenschaft, Irrthum und Selbstbetrug] (cf. HH I 9, KSA 2, 29–30). Secondly,
Nietzsche’s attack on the reasoning supporting metaphysics is not limited to the first
chapter, Of the First and Last Things. Franco is of course quite correct in his assess-
ment that the first chapter is primarily directed at Schopenhauer (Franco 2011, 17; cf.
Heller 1972, 6). To this must be added that the concern with metaphysical interpreta-
tions and consequently the engagement with Schopenhauer resurfaces throughout
the work, though it is most strongly present in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4. Instead of sys-
tematically working my way through the entire work, I here want to follow one spe-
cific trace that is especially relevant for the understanding of Nietzsche’s psycholog-
ical criticism of religion. This is a trace, which leads straight back to Schopenhauer’s
philosophy.
In order to pick up the trace, it is necessary to return to the first aphorism.
Nietzsche there contends that metaphysical philosophy avoided the difficult task
of explaining how something could arise from its opposite, e.g. feeling life from
 Judging from the fact that quite a few commentators on HH focus exclusively on the problem of
metaphysics (cf. Golomb 1989), one could mistakenly assume that there is a consensus. On this
issue, I lean in favour of Young, who does not seek to subsume all the content of HH under one prob-
lem of culture, but nevertheless notes that the problem of metaphysics is central to Nietzsche’s cul-
tural criticism in the work. Young writes that “The fundamental aim of Human, we have seen, is to
hunt down and destroy belief in a metaphysical world”, and this is to be done “as a preliminary
to constructing a new, post-metaphysical, ’rational’ culture” (Young 2010, 249).
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dead matter, intellect from ignorance, truth from lies and so forth, by simply denying
that anything of value could have arisen from its opposite. Instead, metaphysical
philosophy dreamt up a higher origin for all that which is valued more highly,
thus positing a wondrous origin directly from the “thing in itself” (HH I 1, KSA 2,
23). It is precisely this interpretative tendency, or in more Nietzschean words: this
method of knowledge, that is the main target of Nietzsche’s attack on metaphysics.
So what at first sight might seem an insignificant detail in the argument of the aphor-
ism turns out to be the key to understanding the problem of metaphysics as
Nietzsche presents it in HH.⁸ Indeed, its relevance goes far beyond the practice of
metaphysical philosophy. We will soon see that Nietzsche thinks this operation of
positing a wondrous origin is at least as, if not more present in everyday life as in
philosophical reflection and that he thinks his critique rings especially true of
those ideas, experiences and emotions that are granted the highest value. Now, how-
ever, I will turn to examine the origins of this understanding of metaphysical reason-
ing, which are to be found in Schopenhauer. As will be shown, a close examination
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion is essential for understanding Nietzsche’s
psychology of religion in HH and beyond. Such an examination is also particularly
illuminating when it comes to understanding Nietzsche’s appropriation of Schopen-
hauer’s thinking in general.
4.1.3 Approaching Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion as the model for and
target of Nietzsche’s psychological criticism
Before I examine the most relevant passages of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of reli-
gion in detail, some words about the methodical approach taken here are necessary.
A good starting point is to be found in the principle that one must resist a naive un-
derstanding of the relation between source and influence in order to grasp the char-
acter of Nietzsche’s reception of other writers. This is because he always reads others
with his own projects in mind. So even when he seemingly merely quotes an author
or reproduces a viewpoint, only the context of his own projects make his borrowings
intelligible.
Even once one accepts that context is king, in the sense that Nietzsche’s own
projects take precedence over the intentions of his sources, there is in the case of
his reception of Schopenhauer a specific tension that cannot be done away with easi-
 Notably, Nietzsche repeats exactly the same critique at the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil.
There, in the second passage, he writes that inventing a divine origin for all that which is valued
most highly is the defining mark of metaphysics. Such interpretation “macht das typische Vorurteil
aus, an dem sich die Metaphysiker aller Zeiten wiedererkennen lassen; diese Art von Wertschätzungen
steht im Hintergrunde aller ihrer logischen Prozeduren” (BGE 2, KSA 5, 16). This fact further testifies to
the foundational role of HH for Nietzsche’s later criticism and the importance Nietzsche attached to
casting light on the reasoning that begets metaphysics.
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ly. So one might correctly emphasize that Nietzsche’s entire criticism of religion can-
not be understood on the basis of one source (cf. Hödl 2009, 323). Nevertheless, as
Hödl rightly insists, it is of crucial importance for the understanding of Nietzsche’s
thinking on religion to determine precisely how it relates to Schopenhauer, and
this applies especially to the understanding of his early works (Hödl 2009, 321).
The shadowy gloom of Schopenhauer’s philosophy looms large over that period in
which Nietzsche develops into an independent thinker. This means that reading
Nietzsche with Schopenhauer in mind is a veritable balancing act. How can one
avoid either understating or overstating Schopenhauer’s influence? Julian Young,
as a prominent example, goes too far as he attempts to understand most if not all
of what Nietzsche has to say about religion from the perspective of Schopenhauer’s
philosophy of religion. In the process,Young elevates Schopenhauer to the status of a
standard for judging the merits of Nietzsche’s thinking (Young 2006, 10). Not only
does this approach prevent Young from appreciating Nietzsche’s thinking on religion
in its own right, it also leads him to repeatedly overstate the influence of Schopen-
hauer.⁹ To avoid overestimation, and in order not to give in to the opposite vice of
understatement, I adopt an idea first presented by Hödl, who characterizes Nietz-
sche’s reception of Schopenhauer as one of transforming appropriation [anverwan-
delnde Übernahme] (Hödl 2009, 321–330). This is an idea which deserves serious con-
sideration and more attention than it has hitherto received.
The main thrust of Hödl’s argument is that one must attend carefully to the man-
ner in which Nietzsche relates to Schopenhauer (Hödl 2009, 321). According to Hödl,
the textual evidence that bears on the issue of Nietzsche’s appropriation of Schopen-
hauer testifies either of a rejection and move away from the core tenets of Schopen-
hauer’s teaching on religion or of a transposition, in which the valuations are sub-
verted (Hödl 2009, 330). This is the case even with those basic tenets of
Schopenhauer’s theory of religion that retain their importance for Nietzsche’s think-
ing on religion all the way through the late works.¹⁰ While Hödl, due to the nature of
 This is especially the case whenever Young discusses the “metaphysical need” in Nietzsche, an
issue that I discuss in some detail below. Young’s most egregious claim is that Nietzsche never
truly abandons the idea that there is a religious need that has to be stilled and therefore comes
up with a Dionysian pantheism to serve the function of religion in Schopenhauer’s theory (Young
2006, 201). The problem with this claim is that Nietzsche clearly rejects the idea that that religion
grows out of one immutable need; instead, religion is based on many different needs and desires.
That these needs are historically mutable is something that Nietzsche emphasizes already in HH.
Characteristically, Young mistakes the decisive aphorism expounding this historicist view for a dis-
cussion of a singular “metaphysical need” (HH I 27, KSA 2, 48; cf. Young 2006, 85).
 These basic tenets are: 1. religion is basically mythological and must be interpreted philosophi-
cally, 2. Christianity is a form of Platonism, just as religion is metaphysics for the people, 3. Christian-
ity and Buddhism are pessimistic religions, and 4. Christian love is a kind of Mitleid, just as Schopen-
hauer understood it to be (Hödl 2009, 322). Contrary to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche rejects Christian
Mitleid, pessimism and Platonism, and the manner in which he philosophically interprets religion
is markedly different. So the foundation is intact, but the evaluation differs.
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his research interest, uses the idea of transforming appropriation to allow for gener-
alizations about the relation in which the younger philosopher stands to the older, I
here intend to show how this idea can be applied in a specific context to a specific
text. So in the following, I want make a specific claim plausible: a claim that con-
cerns the manner in which Nietzsche appropriates elements of Schopenhauer’s
thinking for his own ends.
4.1.4 Nietzsche’s appropriation of the “metaphysical need”
The most important expression of Schopenhauer’s thinking on religion is to be found
in chapter 17 of the second volume of The World as Will and Representation [Die Welt
als Wille und Vorstellung].¹¹ This chapter is called “On the metaphysical need of
man” [Ueber das metaphysische Bedürfnis des Menschen] (Schopenhauer 1999,
184). It could be assumed that Nietzsche was influenced by the chapter already
based on the fact that he himself makes use of the term metaphysical need. It is,
however, not the case, as Young asserts, that Nietzsche “refers constantly to ‘the met-
aphysical need’” and that this presumed fact “shows the importance of this chapter
as a background to understanding his own philosophy of religion” (Young 2006, 9).
In fact, Nietzsche only five times explicitly mentions the metaphysical need in his
published works (and all forms of spelling are here accounted for); thrice in HH
(HH I 153, KSA 2, 145; twice in quotation marks: HH I 26, KSA 2, 47 and HH I 37,
KSA 2, 61), once in GS (GS 151, KSA 3,494) and finally one last time in EH when de-
scribing HH as laying an axe at the roots of that “need” (KSA 6, 328). All of these
cases express Nietzsche’s rejection of the idea of a perennial metaphysical need.
The only neutral use of a related term is the mention of a metaphysical drive [meta-
physische Trieb] in BT (BT 23, KSA 1, 148), which also remains the only mention of
such a drive in the published works. In the Nachlass of winter 1876 to summer
1877, Nietzsche twice mentions the metaphysical need, both times as “the so-called
metaphysical need” (NL 1876, 19[85], KSA 8, 350 and NL 1876–77, 23[164], KSA 8,
464). The only other original mention in the Nachlass, also from the summer of
1877, explicitly criticizes the philosopher who on the basis of a false psychology
turns everything into metaphysical need (NL 1877, 22[107], KSA 8, 399). Then there
is finally one note from autumn 1880 which is in fact a sketch [Vorstufe] of the criti-
cism of the metaphysical need found in GS (NL 1880, 6[290], KSA 9, 271–272, cf.
GS 151, KSA 3,494), and that is all. A charitable interpretation of Young’s assertion,
 Another important expression is the dialogue between Demopheles and Philaletes in chapter 15
“On Religion” [Ueber Religion] of Parerga und Paralipomena II. Philosophically, the dialogue adds lit-
tle to the treatment of religion in World as Will II. The treatment there is also more clear and concise.
Though Nietzsche most certainly read the Parerga-chapter, he made no annotations to it in the only
surviving copy that was in his possession (Brobjer 2008, 125). For pragmatic reasons, I therefore focus
on chapter 17 of World as Will II.
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one that would broadly keep his intention intact, could point to the fact that
Nietzsche does again and again return to the question what kind of impulses, in-
stincts and needs are at work in religious persons, i.e. what it is that drives people
to act religiously. A case in point would be Nietzsche’s discussion in his major work
on the genealogy of morality of what is perhaps best described as a need for meaning
(GM III 1, KSA 5, 339 and 411–412).¹² In this sense, there is a continuing engagement
with questions raised by Schopenhauer’s theory of religion, but only because
Nietzsche considers said theory so unsatisfying.What Nietzsche is after is a more fit-
ting psychology of religion.
For our task here, which is to establish in which sense Nietzsche relies on
Schopenhauer in his discussion of religion in HH, considerations about Nietzsche’s
alternative explanations are as of yet of a secondary importance. The key issue here
is that his rather rare references to the metaphysical need cannot be used as evi-
dence in an argument about the importance of chapter 17 of World as Will II as a
background for the understanding of Nietzsche’s thinking on religion in HH, and
even less can they be used as evidence for more general claims about Nietzsche’s re-
lation to Schopenhauer. This is because Nietzsche has by the time of HH decisively
rejected any positive use of the term metaphysical need; a rejection which is reflected
in the fact that he no longer uses the term after GS. Therefore, I here take a different
approach to establishing the indebtedness of Nietzsche’s thinking in HH to Schopen-
hauer. I intend to make plausible that some of the critical manoeuvres Nietzsche
makes in HH can only be understood against the background of the Schopen-
hauer-chapter. Thus, I will draw on evidence from within the text to support the
view prevalent in historical scholarship that Nietzsche not only read but studied
the chapter carefully.¹³
According to Schopenhauer, religion is about the thing-in-itself [das Ding an sich]
just as philosophy but caters to the populace that is unable to think their way to the
truth. If the common folk can’t think properly, they certainly can feel. Religion rep-
resents and connects to the thing-in-itself through allegory. In this view, mysteries,
obscure rites and even absurdities are not corruptions of religion. Schopenhauer ex-
plicitly writes of such aspects of religion that they are the only way that one can
make the common folk feel what they can’t grasp in thought; namely that there is
 In a late note from autumn 1887, Nietzsche also explicitly connects the felt need for another world
with a failure to find meaning within this world (cf. NL 1887, 9[73], KSA 12, 374).
 In the case of HH, the prevalent view is supported by the fact that Nietzsche made extensive an-
notations when he reread the second volume of The World as Will and Representation in 1875 (Brobjer
2008, 125). More generally, it can be added that: “Nietzsche continued to read, annotate, and make
excerpts from Schopenhauer’s writings almost every year, even after his break with Schopenhauer, to
the very end” and that “Most of Nietzsche’s continued reading of Schopenhauer was of his two main
works, Die Welt and Parerga” (Brobjer 2008, 32).
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a wholly other realm beyond appearance (Schopenhauer 1999, 192).¹⁴ So the point of
allegory, for Schopenhauer, is to allow the believer to feel, to intuit, the presence of a
more fundamental, completely different level of reality.
Nietzsche of course rejects Schopenhauer’s theory of the allegorical nature of
religion in HH (HH I 110, KSA 2, 109– 111), a fact which has not escaped the notice
of scholars (cf. Hödl 2007, 155 and Franco 2011, 36). Nevertheless, Nietzsche grants
Schopenhauer’s model a paradigmatic status insofar as metaphysical and religious
reasoning is concerned. He admits as much in the very same aphorism that criticizes
the allegorical interpretation of religion, when he writes that through Schopen-
hauer’s interpretation of religion very much can be gained for the understanding
of religion (HH I 110, KSA 2, 110).¹⁵ As I understand Nietzsche, he thinks that
Schopenhauer is not simply plain wrong. He rather thinks that Schopenhauer’s
thinking builds on and repeats an erroneous way of thinking typical of religion.
So in a sense, one could say that Nietzsche treats Schopenhauer not only as a philo-
sopher who presented a theory of religion but as a high priest, in whose thinking
religious passions are articulated in philosophical terms. Less dramatically stated,
Nietzsche perceives an affinity between Schopenhauer’s thinking on religion and re-
ligious thinking in general.
Now we can begin to see why it is that in Nietzsche’s own elaborations in HH the
Schopenhauerian structure remains intact, although the thing-in-itself is removed
from the picture. For what remains when that which allegory supposedly gets at is
removed? Simply feeling. More precisely: all that in metaphysics, religion and art
which makes one feel as if there were another world beyond this one, all those ex-
periences which lead one to posit a metaphysical world, all that which in Schopen-
hauer’s view makes the existence of a metaphysical world something that can be felt.
In other words, all that remains which leads one to speak of a metaphysical need in
the first place. No wonder then that Nietzsche devotes special attention to religious
interpretations of feeling-states in his discussion on religion in HH. For in order to
liberate himself and his readers from the Schopenhauerian view that certain experi-
ences truly allow one to intuit a metaphysical world, Nietzsche has to argue that
what really is going on is interpretation, and false interpretation at that. Then
there still remains the task to explain, why certain affective experiences are prone
to be interpreted falsely in the first place. Both of these critical tasks are present
in HH, though the focus is overwhelmingly on the former. To conclude: Even as
Nietzsche’s indebtedness to Schopenhauer has been recognized in scholarship,
this important affective aspect has been overlooked with the result that Nietzsche’s
 “diese sind eben der Stämpel ihrer allegorischen Natur und die allein passende Art, dem gemeinen
Sinn und rohen Verstande fühlbar zu machen, was ihm unbegreiflich wäre, nämlich daß die Religion im
Grunde von einer ganz andern, von einer Ordnung der Dinge an sich handelt” (Schopenhauer 1999, 192).
 He writes specifically that “… we can gain a great deal for the understanding of Christianity and
other religions from Schopenhauer’s religious-moral interpretation of human beings and the world…”
(Handwerk 1997, 87; HH I 110, KSA 2, 110).
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focus on emotions in HH must seem arbitrary if not incomprehensible. That
Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s allegorical understanding of religion has led schol-
ars to ignore the role played by feeling in the very passage in which Schopenhauer
writes about allegory. As a consequence, it has not been adequately recognized, in
what specific sense Nietzsche’s psychological take on religion in HH draws on
Schopenhauer’s thinking. The following interpretation of Nietzsche’s psychology of
religion in HH is in this sense to be understood as a contribution to recognize not
only the ways in which he distances himself from Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but
also how he remains tied to it.¹⁶
4.1.5 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion and salvation
In the chapter The Religious Life, Nietzsche leads the reader into the topic of religious
interpretations of emotions through a brief discussion of pain.When beset by pain, he
claims in aphorism 108, one can either seek to rid the cause of the ill or reinterpret the
experience. This second way, namely that of reinterpretation, is the way of both reli-
gion and art. At first Nietzsche speaks of reinterpretation as a matter of justifying
pain, e.g. with reference to God’s justice. Then Nietzsche adds the really interesting
observation: changing one’s judgement about a painful experience is only one part
of the picture, one can also seek to transform the emotional experience more directly.
Tragic art, he writes, has its origin in a “a pleasure in pain, in emotion generally”
(Handwerk 1997, 85; HH I 108, KSA 2, 107). Although this statement that one can
take pleasure in emotion for its own sake, even if the emotion were painful, is
about tragic art it is also of utmost importance to Nietzsche’s reflections on religion
in HH. For in this work, analysing such transformations of emotions through interpre-
tations is a crucial ingredient of Nietzsche’s formula for challenging Schopenhauer’s
view that certain experiences in fact point toward a realm behind appearance.
Throughout the chapter there are a few longer passages as well as shorter aphor-
isms that seem to stand on their own; digressions unconnected to the more system-
atic chains of thought. Nevertheless, most of them contribute to the discussion about
the interpretation of emotion. One such freestanding aphorism is Nr. 120, in which
Nietzsche mocks “all religions” for making use of the all too human tendency to
think that those opinions which please the emotions also must be true (HH I 120,
KSA 2, 120). Such aphorisms reinforce the criticism of the more systematic passages.
This is the case even in those aphorisms that concern the “truth” of religions and re-
ligious interpretations of nature. The key reason for Nietzsche to reject the Schopen-
hauerian understanding of the allegorical nature of religion is that one does not need
 When it comes to the interpretation of HH, Peter Heller was the first to recognize the importance
of such an endeavour, when he in a footnote tentatively suggested that interpreters should not only
spell out those points in which Nietzsche distances himself from Schopenhauer but also the affinities
that remain (Heller 1972, 6).
66 4 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak
to assume that religion has any meaningful relation to truth in order to explain reli-
gion. The origin of religion is not to be found in a realm of metaphysical truth but in
emotion that guides reason astray; “For every religion has been born out of fear and
need” (Handwerk 1997, 88; HH I 110, KSA 2, 110). Nietzsche’s reflections on the cog-
nitive aspects of religion can hardly be considered original when one takes account
of his knowledge of the leading British anthropologists of his time (cf. HH I 111,
KSA 2, 112– 116; Orsucci 1996). What merits attention here is rather to what use
Nietzsche puts his reading. Nietzsche effectively creates an analogy between errone-
ous interpretations of nature and erroneous interpretations of our inner nature. The
error-theory of religious cognition that Nietzsche advances thus serves an important
role in his argument about the interpretation of emotional states. In aphorism 126
Nietzsche explicitly talks about the The art and force of false interpretation in this
sense, when he asserts that all those extraordinary experiences that are associated
with saints are well-known pathological states that are only interpreted religiously
(HH I 126, KSA 2, 122). What emerges here is an alternative interpretive scheme,
which builds on Schopenhauer’s theory of religion, while rejecting its “truth”.
The passages starting with aphorism 132, Of the Christian need for salvation, are
of a more systematic character, and provide a particular example in which Nietzsche
applies his interpretative scheme and develops his argument.¹⁷ It is noteworthy that
Nietzsche explicitly sets his psychological explanation apart from the psychological
approach taken by Schleiermacher, whose influence on 19th-century German thinking
about religion should not be underestimated (see chapter 2 of this study). Curiously,
Nietzsche’s only objection to that tradition relates to what he perceives to be the in-
tentions of its practitioners. So even as Schleiermacher purported to explain religious
feelings, Nietzsche contends, the goal was always to support the Christian religion.
This goal, it is implied, distorted the interpretation. Needless to say, Nietzsche
dares a different interpretation of religious feelings, one that is not bound by such
a goal. Still, Nietzsche cannot be seen as being entirely opposed to said tradition
since he implicitly agrees that religious feeling is the proper object of the psychology
of religion. (Cf. HH I 132, KSA 2, 125– 126.)
Basically, Nietzsche claims that the need for salvation can only arise if one is dis-
satisfied with oneself. Simply being dissatisfied, however, is not enough. The Chris-
tian compares himself with his God, an ideal that is completely free from egoistic mo-
tives. Doing so he puts himself into a state in which he necessarily feels that he is
bad: Being incapable of fully non-egoistic actions, he begins to loathe himself and
fear the retribution of his ideal. Thankfully, there is salvation. The feeling of despis-
ing himself is not constant, but eventually gives way to a freer disposition. The nat-
ural feeling of self-love reappears, but is not interpreted as such. The joyful mood is
instead interpreted as a gift from God, as grace, as a foretaste of salvation. The felt
 Because of the systematic character of the discussion, some scholars speak of Nietzsche develop-
ing a psychology of the need for salvation (cf. Hödl 2007, 153).
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love is interpreted as Love, an external power with a divine origin. (HH I 132– 135,
KSA 2, 125– 129)
We are not here concerned with the question to what extent Nietzsche’s depic-
tion hits the spot; suffice it to say that it is hard to be contented with his explanation,
as there would be so much more to say about the issue. Instead,we want to note how
the passages in question form a particularly potent example of Nietzsche’s interpre-
tive scheme. First, he examines the cognitive and affective parts and moments that
make up this particular psychological “need”. Then he shows how the religious in-
terpretation of the feelings involved covers up the actual origins of the feelings. This
is done by coming up with a “wondrous origin” that hides its complex natural origin.
In conclusion, Nietzsche writes that a false psychology is a presupposition for being
Christian and feeling a need for salvation. And what is it that makes a psychology
false? Fantastic interpretations of psychic processes, “a certain kind of fantasizing
in the interpretation of motives and events” (Handwerk 1997, 104; HH I 135, KSA 2,
129), which on the grounds of its centrality to the whole chapter and its importance
in the preceding passages, I take above all to refer to the tendency of positing a “won-
drous origin” in another world for all extraordinary experiences. This is according to
Nietzsche the process whereby experience is transformed into religious experience
and emotion into religious emotion.
After the passages on salvation, Nietzsche continues his analysis of the religious
life with an examination of asceticism and sainthood. There is no reason to examine
these passages in detail at this point (see section 4.2.5), as Nietzsche basically re-
peats the same pattern of interpretation. In all ascetic practices, however complex
and hard to explain, he discovers the same glorying in emotion for its own sake,
“pleasure in emotion as such” (Handwerk 1997, 107; HH I 140, KSA 2, 133). Nietzsche
sums it up in aphorisms 142 and 143: The saintly person’s state of mind is made up of
components that in themselves are familiar, but take on a different colour when they
are put together and interpreted religiously. Along with unsurprising virtuous feel-
ings such as humility, other feelings such as egoism, vengefulness and lust to rule
are some of the components of saintliness. In the saintly person’s mind and more
crucially in the minds of religiously minded interpreters these components give
way to the overall impression of holiness, which of course is of divine origin.
Thus, the historical importance of saints is tied to religious belief in general: the be-
lief in saints supports belief in God and vice versa. (HH I 142 and HH I 143, KSA 2,
137– 139)
Nietzsche does not as rigidly apply such an interpretative scheme in any of his
later works. Nevertheless, the results of his application of the method of historical
philosophizing laid the groundwork for his later critical efforts. Two ideas that sur-
face in HH are especially instructive in this regard, and worth noting. Firstly,
Nietzsche seems to suggest in HH that intense emotional experiences are especially
prone to be interpreted religiously. But why would this be the case? HH provides no
clear answer, so we will leave that question for now and content ourselves with not-
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ing that HH contains the seeds of an explosive idea.¹⁸ Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, Nietzsche’s idea that the interpretation of feeling can transform feeling
has radical consequences once thought through. Due to this foundational idea, it is
no wonder that Nietzsche’s historical psychologizing leads him to a diagnosis and
criticism of the spiritual-affective predicament, the mood, of his own time. Although
Nietzsche later expands on and improves the diagnosis, this early expression is
worth looking into, if only to appreciate the development of his thinking the better.
4.1.6 The history of emotions and Nietzsche’s diagnosis of his time
Already the second aphorism of the third chapter, Sorrow is knowledge, implicitly re-
lies on the idea that the cultural and religious education of the past have made mod-
ern humans especially soft. Bereft of religious consolation, Nietzsche bluntly states
that contemporary humanity is at risk when facing the harshness of reality, especial-
ly the well-founded knowledge presented by modern science. Nietzsche then aban-
dons the topic as fast as he introduced it by referring to the possibility of a lightheart-
ed, cheerful response to knowledge, but the historical problem hinted at here
informs much of his later thinking on the issue, especially in D and GS (HH I 109,
KSA 2, 108– 109).
In aphorism 130 Nietzsche again approaches the emotional legacy of thousands
of years of religious education. He writes about religious feelings that were created
and nurtured long ago in the past by religious cults. He specifically mentions the
Catholic church as an organization that had mastered all the means to transport hu-
mans into moods and states of mind beyond the everyday. This original process of
cultural creation is according to him the source of many moods [Stimmungen] of
the sublime kind, of feelings of hope and premonition that “now exist in the
soul”. He furthermore notes that even as the religious foundations of such feeling-
states have crumbled, the results of this process remain with us. (HH I 130, KSA 2,
123) Such moods, he writes, can now be encountered in the arts, especially in
music, but also in philosophy wherever the author plays with metaphysical hopes
(HH I 131, KSA 2, 124). So Nietzsche at first look seems to imply that we are not easily
rid of emotions that have become part of our cultural heritage. Such an interpretation
is still only partially true. One must indeed beware of such an interpretation, how-
ever tempting it is. According to Nietzsche, it is strictly speaking not the case that
the emotional configurations of the past would determine the future directions of
feeling. In the very same aphorism in which he describes various Religious afterpains
he speaks of the taste for religious feelings as a passing need, as “an acquired and
 I return to the question and discuss Nietzsche’s late thinking on the matter in chapter 7 amidst
the discussion on Nietzsche’s late ideal.
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consequently also a transitory need” (Handwerk 1997, 99; HH I 131, KSA 2, 124).¹⁹ It is
near at hand to add that the taste that Nietzsche diagnoses in (himself and) his con-
temporaries might suffer the same fate as the taste for antique sacrificial rituals. In
aphorism 112, Nietzsche muses on the fact that “we” (i.e. he and his contemporaries)
no longer are able to fully understand how in certain times obscenity could go to-
gether with religious feeling; e.g. in Dinoysian rites as well as in medieval Easter-
plays. The historical record testifies that such combinations of feeling have existed,
but we cannot bring ourselves to anything resembling the feeling that must have
been felt. Similarly, Nietzsche concludes, combinations of feeling that still exist in
his day, such as a union of the sublime and the burlesque, might not be understood
in the future (HH I 112, KSA 2, 116). It is striking that Nietzsche here only mentions the
possibility of feelings being lost to posterity. By the same logic, however, it should be
possible that entirely new combinations of feeling arise, and perhaps even new feel-
ings; feelings so distinct from past experiences that new names are needed for them.
There is thus an uncertainty in Nietzsche’s take on the history of emotions in HH
that deserves to be spelled out in detail. Nietzsche suggests that at least some reli-
gious emotions have a history in the sense that they were born in a specific time
and will pass away some day. That means that some emotions would never have
been felt if it were not for centuries of religious practice. If “religious emotions”
are in a sense creations of religious practice, can the interpretation of feelings in
fact give birth to new feelings? Or is it after all only the case that various practices
can condition or influence the way specific emotions are felt, thus transforming
them? Are there only “natural”, basic emotions that are interpreted in various
ways or are at least some emotions better understood as cultural constructions in
a more thoroughgoing sense? Nietzsche never articulated such purely theoretical
questions, yet the issue is of utmost importance in his later projects. Instead of pro-
viding a theoretical answer, answers emerge in his cultural criticism. In the case of
the third chapter of HH, all there is to say is that it would seem that Nietzsche prefers
to speak of interpretation rather than of creation. Since these questions define the
limits of cultural criticism when it comes to emotions, we will pursue them further
by considering what Nietzsche has to say about the history of emotions in chapters
four and five. These chapters are particularly interesting, because Nietzsche in chap-
ter four deals with art and artists and in chapter five with what he considers higher
culture.
 “eines gewordenen und folglich auch vergänglichen Bedürfnisses” (HH I 131, KSA 2, 124). A similar
rejection of the idea of a universal metaphysical need can be found in the chapter on the state, where
he describes the needs that the “universal” Catholic church served as fantastic creations: “auf Fiktio-
nen beruhenden Bedürfnissen, welche es, wo sie noch nicht vorhanden waren, erst erzeugen musste
(Bedürfniss der Erlösung)” (HH I 476, KSA 2, 311).
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4.1.7 The history of emotions in chapters four and five: From art to higher culture
The discussion on art in HH sets off with yet another reminder of the problem intro-
duced in aphorism 1, i.e. the problem of assuming a wondrous origin for that which
is valued. This time the focus is on the “perfect” artwork. For some reason, Nietzsche
suggests, “we” are accustomed not to let questions about origins interfere with our
experience of art; instead, “we” act as if that which is perfect cannot have become.
In other words, we would prefer to blend out any knowledge of the process of artistic
creation. One would rather believe, and perhaps the artist would rather have one be-
lieve (cf. HH I 155, KSA 2, 146), that the artwork has its origin in improvisation, a
miracle-like instant of creation (HH I 145, KSA 2, 141). Nietzsche does not here use
the word inspiration, but that ideas of inspiration are the main target can be seen
in aphorisms 155 and 156 that repeat and build on the criticism of the opening aphor-
ism. But why is it so hard to entertain a rational view when faced with great art?
What psychic mechanism is it that supports mystifying interpretations? The best
Nietzsche has to offer for an answer is the suggestion that “we” seem still to be cap-
tives of an age-old mythological impression (HH I 145, KSA 2, 141).
So the fourth chapter opens up with a strong statement of the power that histor-
ical forces wield over us, and much of the chapter continues in the same vein. The
weight that Nietzsche gives to art in his critical project derives from what he takes
to be the ability of art to wake up such historical forces within us (HH I 147, KSA 2
142– 143). This potential makes art dangerous, in the same way as religion, because
it works to temporarily ease spirits by turning them away from their predicament in
time, instead of striving to overcome the conditions in their time that create the need
to be “eased” (HH I 148, KSA 2, 143). His earlier and later writings considered, it is
remarkable that Nietzsche here denies artistic creation the possibility of present-
and future-orientation.²⁰ He goes so far as to describe the artist as necessarily turned
toward the past (HH I 148, KSA 2, 143). That he then finds the backward looking gaze
of art troublesome is understandable, since he takes the past to be above all reli-
gious.
In aphorism 150, Nietzsche explicitly diagnoses his own time as one in which art
has taken a wealth of religious feeling upon itself, though he does add that similar
 That art can show the way toward a desirable future is a conviction that informs the entirety of
The Birth of Tragedy. According to Franco, Nietzsche still subscribes to this view in the fourth untime-
ly meditation of 1876, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, where he ascribes Wagner’s art the potential to
initiate a “reform of the world” (Franco 2011, 10). Janz sceptically notes that Nietzsche’s comments
in that direction can be read as referring to himself, and that he might actually at this point already
deny art and Wagner a stake in the future (Janz 1978 I, 712–713). Be that as it may, one must concede,
as Janz does, that when it actually comes to opening the future, Nietzsche relies on artistic means, not
least the fictional character Zarathustra (Janz 1978 I, 713). The conviction that opening the future is a
creative process, a process at least akin to artistic creation if it cannot after all be called artistic cre-
ation, informs Nietzsche’s thinking from GS onward (cf. GS 58, KSA 3, 422).
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transfers of feeling have to a lesser extent taken place in politics and even in science
(HH I 150, KSA 2, 144; cf. HH I 472, KSA 2, 304). It is above all in art that the “meta-
physical need” troubles the free spirit, as aphorism 153 shows. In this aphorism that
undoubtedly contains an autobiographical element, Nietzsche writes of the “strength
of the metaphysical need”, and admits that the highest artistic expressions bring to
life a long-silenced and almost broken “metaphysical string” in the free spirit. He il-
lustrates this by mentioning how certain parts of Beethoven’s ninth symphony elicit
a feeling of floating far above the earth with “the dream of immortality” in one’s
heart. Such an experience creates a longing in the free spirit for the person who
could lead him back to metaphysics or religion (HH I 153, KSA 2, 145). Nietzsche’s
choice of words comes close to validating the Schopenhauerian interpretation that
through music one can experience the timelessness of the thing-in-itself. Indeed, it
is almost as if he would after all accept the existence of a metaphysical need and
the aesthetics of redemption through art. Yet at the end of the aphorism, Nietzsche
plays down any hope that he might return to the Schopenhauerian view by bluntly
stating that in such cases where art plays on metaphysical hopes the intellectual
character of the thinker is put to the test. Intellectual integrity must triumph over
vague longings (HH I 153, KSA 2, 145). It is in this sense that the title (Art weighs
down the thinker’s heart) of the aphorism should be understood; art troubles the
heart of the thinker by waking up religious and/or metaphysical feelings of past
times. That the task is not simply to consign religious feelings to the past but to be-
come aware of their historicity in order that they might lose their power to compel is
a thought that appears frequently in the aphorisms of chapters four and five.
In HH, Nietzsche denies art any constructive role in working for the future and
even goes so far as to suggest that art is coming to an end. (HH I 222, KSA 2, 185–
186 and HH I 223, KSA 2, 186). In the historical scheme of HH, scientific man is an
outgrowth of and development beyond artistic man. Artistic man in his turn
would seem to have inherited a wealth of religious feeling from religious man.²¹
Yet these are not the rudiments of a straightforward replacement theory. Nietzsche
does not make the simplistic claim that scientific man replaces artistic man who re-
placed religious man. As a type, scientific man does not act out the same drives as
any of the types from which it has developed. Though he too has inherited a wealth
of religious feeling, he is not defined by this inheritance. The higher culture (of sci-
entific man) that Nietzsche describes in the fifth chapter is characterized by a multi-
tude of drives, and is therefore according to him misunderstood by those scholars
 “Man könnte die Kunst aufgeben, würde damit aber nicht die von ihr gelernte Fähigkeit einbüssen:
ebenso wie man die Religion aufgegeben hat, nicht aber die durch sie erworbenen Gemüths-Steigerun-
gen und Erhebungen. Wie die bildende Kunst und die Musik der Maassstab des durch die Religion wir-
klich erworbenen und hinzugewonnenen Gefühls-Reichthumes ist, so würde nach einem Verschwinden
der Kunst die von ihr gepflanzte Intensität und Vielartigkeit der Lebensfreude immer noch Befriedigung
fordern. Der wissenschaftliche Mensch ist die Weiterentwickelung des künstlerischen.” (HH I 222, KSA 2,
185)
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[Gelehrte] who besides a drive for knowledge [Wissenstrieb] only have an acquired
religious drive. In this sense, he disapprovingly mentions those would see only a
misplaced search for religious feeling in modern science: “Indeed, people who are
only religious understand even science as a search for religious feeling…” (Handwerk
1997, 190; HH I 281, KSA 2, 230)
How then does the free spirit go about with his problematic inheritance? What
will Nietzsche’s scientific man do with the wealth of feeling that he inherits? In
HH it would seem above all that he will treat them as objects of knowledge and re-
flect upon them. This reflection is at once both self-reflection and reflection on the
past. As objects of knowledge, religious feelings lose their immediate power to com-
pel; i.e. their power to bind the free spirit to a religious point of view. Nevertheless,
the historical sense of the free spirit allows him to see their value. This value he ex-
presses with striking metaphors:
What is best in us has perhaps been inherited from the sensations of earlier times,which we can
scarcely approach in an immediate way any more; the sun has already gone down, but the heav-
en of our life still glows and shines from its presence, even though we no longer see it. (Hand-
werk 1997, 152; HH I 223, KSA 2, 186)
In other words, our most noble sentiments derive from a past that is becoming in-
creasingly distant. Does that mean that all higher feelings could be lost in the future?
This question is at the heart of the important final aphorism of chapter five, which
similarly emphasizes the value of religious and artistic passions as objects of knowl-
edge.
The aphorism, entitled Forward, views the task of the free spirit from the perspec-
tive of an open future. From this viewpoint, the religious heritage of the free spirit is
nothing to scorn. After all, such feelings might one day no longer be accessible. As
long as they are accessible, and as long as they are viewed from a distance, they
allow the free spirit a fuller understanding of the past. Importantly, Nietzsche under-
lines that this understanding reveals not only where mankind can no longer go in the
future but also where it must not go. That which motivates this claim is a vision of the
future. Living only for knowledge, the free spirit will in self-reflection see the emer-
gence of future cultures. Irritatingly, Nietzsche does not specify how this is to be un-
derstood. It is near at hand to suggest that because self-reflection here refers to the
kind of reflection on morality, on feelings and on knowledge that he has practised in
HH, new moralities, new feelings and new kinds of knowledge will emerge out of it.
The evidence is too scarce, however, to say anything definite about how the “new” is
here to be understood. What he does manage to convey through his presentation is
his conviction that there is joy in this vision. Switching to the personal level at the
end of the aphorism, Nietzsche praises the ideal of knowledge in colourful language
(“no honey is sweeter than knowledge” etc.) and goes as far as to promise the free
spirit a good death: “Toward the light – your final movement; an exulting shout of
knowledge – your final sound.” (Handwerk 1997, 194–196; HH I 292, KSA 2, 235–237)
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Now we can see that Nietzsche denies the artist any stake in working for the fu-
ture only to give this task to the free spirit or “the scientific man”. The intensity of
feeling that characterizes religious and artistic man is in no way lessened, it is rather
taken to the next level and heightened in self-reflection. The self-reflective activity of
the free spirit, which on the basis of the aphorisms examined can hardly be consid-
ered dispassionate, contributes to bringing forth “future humanity”. Still, one cannot
help but notice that there is something missing here; namely a stronger statement of
an active creation of the future and a vision of how this is to be done.
4.1.8 Conclusion: Nietzsche’s attack on religion and metaphysics in HH
The focus of Nietzsche’s attack on metaphysics and religion in HH is on feeling. He
turns feelings that are prone to be interpreted metaphysically into objects of knowl-
edge in order to reflect on them. In this project, he makes use of Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy of religion.While Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s theory of the allegorical
nature of religion in so far as it assumes that religion really connects the believer to
metaphysical truth, he does think religion is primarily about making one feel as if
there were a “higher reality”. In this sense, and in this sense only, Schopenhauer’s
metaphysics provides the foundation for Nietzsche’s psychology of religion. That
Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in HH is an achievement of independent thinking
is beyond any doubt, which shows how fitting the idea of transforming appropriation
is when trying to understand the relation between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.
At the core of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion in HH there is an unresolved ten-
sion. On the one hand, Nietzsche implies that acquiring knowledge into the origin of
one’s religious needs is enough to make them disappear, as if those affective forces
which make up the “metaphysical need” were like unto some common delusion that
reason can effortlessly dispel. This crudeness is expressed occasionally in concluding
sentences, e.g. “with the insight into this origin, that belief falls away” (Handwerk
1997, 102; HH I 133, KSA 2, 127) or “With the insight into this confusion of reason
and imagination, one ceases to be a Christian.” (Handwerk 1997, 104; HH I 135,
KSA 2, 129) Such statements contrast with and possibly contradict what Nietzsche
on the other hand emphasizes repeatedly, which is that religion continues to wield
an immense power through emotions, first and foremost those encountered in the
arts. Perhaps the statements quoted above are best read as indicating only a distanc-
ing that is a first step; a distancing that allows one to no longer call oneself a believ-
er. The real task, however, concerns the emotional legacy of the past; the configura-
tion of mood bequeathed by tradition. Given that religion, and especially that which
Nietzsche considers problematic and worth questioning about religion, is more a
matter of feeling than propositional belief, one can ask whether a merely intellectual
attack on religion is ever enough. This ambivalence serves well as a sceptical starting
point for the following investigation into what has been called Nietzsche’s use of
mood in HH.
74 4 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak
4.2 Nietzsche’s use of mood in HH
Does Nietzsche make creative use of his psychological thinking about mood in his
writing in HH in the sense of trying to influence the reader? If yes, how exactly
and to what end? Is understanding the mood or moods that are expressed in HH es-
sential to understanding the philosophical project of the book? Can Nietzsche’s criti-
cism of religion in the work be fully understood if one ignores the question of mood
altogether? Jacob Golomb has presented a thesis regarding Nietzsche’s use of mood
in HH that can be read as an attempt to answer precisely those questions, which
means that it is of great interest to us and cannot be overlooked (Golomb 1989).²² Ac-
cording to Golomb, Nietzsche uses mood in HH to freeze the metaphysical need (Go-
lomb 1989, 162). A critical engagement with Golomb’s efforts presents an opportunity
to highlight some of the methodological and interpretative problems involved in
placing mood at the centre of investigation. Despite the critical emphasis that char-
acterizes the sections on his work, an emphasis which is to be understood as much
as self-criticism as criticism of Golomb’s scholarship, I will seek to expand and de-
velop Golomb’s arguments where possible. In other words, I begin by interrogating
Golomb’s work, whereafter I expand on his analysis in order to provide as full a pic-
ture as possible of the role of mood in HH.
4.2.1 Jacob Golomb’s thesis on Nietzsche’s use of mood
According to Golomb, Nietzsche’s use of psychology in HH is misunderstood if one
only thinks of it as a matter of him using psychological knowledge to argue against
metaphysics. Of course, this is something that Nietzsche does but he also makes use
of psychology in a sense that has little to do with the refutation of specific metaphys-
ical beliefs. Instead the “main concern in his application of the psychologistic meth-
od is to evoke a mood of deep suspicion and distrust regarding metaphysics” (Go-
lomb 1989, 169). By instilling a mood of doubt in the reader, Nietzsche would in
this view seek to effect an affective transformation that would make a direct refuta-
tion of metaphysical arguments unnecessary (cf. Golomb 1989, 170). The result would
be a freezing of the metaphysical need from which all interest in metaphysical ques-
tions springs.
 Golomb presents his ideas on mood in HH as part of a larger thesis about the therapeutic aims of
Nietzsche’s philosophizing, which involves 1) using mood to “freeze” destructive habits and 2) open-
ing a psychological perspective that entices the reader to reactivate suppressed power (Golomb 1989,
14–15 and 20). There as well as in a later publication, Golomb at times seems to imply that his thesis
about Nietzsche’s use of mood to freeze the metaphysical need applies not only to HH but to
Nietzsche’s philosophy more generally (Golomb 1989, 14– 16; cf. Golomb 1999, 2–6). For reasons of
clarity, I will here restrict the discussion to HH, as Golomb’s reading of the work is the foundation
for his more ambitious thesis about the therapeutic aims of Nietzsche’s philosophy.
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This aspect of Nietzsche’s historical philosophizing, or what Golomb calls his
“psychologistic method”, intuitively hits the spot, i.e. it catches at least some of
what is going on in HH. The scholar still hast to ask on what grounds the claim
rests. The lack of clear evidence for Golomb’s thesis is problematic. Golomb himself
recognizes the difficulty by stating that as Nietzsche did not “articulate his method
explicitly”, one must inductively reconstruct his method by analysing his writings,
especially those that deal with psychological themes (cf. Golomb 1989, 162). There
are three fundamental problems with this approach; two of a general nature and a
third relating to the manner in which he undertakes the reconstruction. The first
problem is that Nietzsche does at least provide sketches of the method he calls his-
torical philosophizing (cf. HH I 1 and HH I 2, KSA 2, 23–25) and nowhere mentions
that the goal of this method would be to instill a mood of doubt. The second problem
is that the procedure amounts to a reconstruction of authorial intention on the basis
of nothing more than a reading of the authored book. While such an approach can-
not be rejected a priori, it does provide reason to put the evidence presented under
close scrutiny and to ask if there is any additional evidence that should be taken into
account. The third and final problem is that in this particular case it also seems that
Golomb, when formulating his thesis, has not so much relied on the contents of HH
as on Nietzsche’s own later statements concerning the book.
The interpretation of HH as “freezing the metaphysical need” has its roots in
Nietzsche’s own interpretation of the work in Ecce Homo, which was completed in
1888 (cf. Golomb 1989, 172). There, about eleven years after the publication of the
first version of HH in 1877, Nietzsche looks back at his earlier works with a marked
distance. Much of what he has to say is hard to disagree with. Compared to BT, and
even to the untimely meditations, the tone of the work has undergone a marked
change. Nietzsche writes: “The tone, the timbre is completely different: people will
find the book clever, cool, perhaps harsh and mocking.” (Large 2007, 55; KSA 6,
323) This description is true to much of the work, though we will yet come to ask
if there is not more to say about the matter. At this point, the most urgent question
that vexes the scholar is whether one can with any certainty determine if the cool
tone was put into the work intentionally and if it was made thus to achieve a specific
effect. If the answer is positive one must inquire how it was achieved; whether
through the philosophical contents alone, or whether it also depends on the manner
of presentation, i.e. choice of style, tone and perhaps even the aphoristic form. To
these questions one finds no answers in EH. There Nietzsche simply describes
what happens in the work, as if it were from the outside:
One error after another is calmly put on ice; the ideal is not refuted – it dies of exposure… Here,
for example, ‘the genius’ is freezing; a long way further on freezes ‘the saint’; beneath a thick
icicle ‘the hero’ is freezing; in the end ‘belief ’, so-called ‘conviction’ freezes, even ‘pity’ is grow-
ing considerably cooler – almost everywhere ‘the thing in itself’ is freezing to death…
(Large 2007, 56; KSA 6, 323)
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To find out whether or not there are any unambiguous answers to our questions in
the original publication itself, we will now examine the text of HH; beginning with
some general observations and a particularly promising aphorism, before examining
those passages that Golomb draws on to support his thesis.
4.2.2 Aphorism 38 and the temperature of HH
Not a single passage in HH mentions the freezing of beliefs, feelings or needs
through the word employed in EH [erfrieren], but the work does contain vocabulary
suggestive of coldness. Most notably, Nietzsche does at one point employ words such
as wintery [winterlich], cool [kühl] and cold [kalt] in an important discussion on the
usefulness (and harm) of psychological observation. Aphorism 38 of book one is in-
deed particularly instructive for any reconstruction of authorial intention, when it
comes to Nietzsche’s possible use of mood in the work. Nietzsche here presents
his view on the nature of scientific inquiry in general. Science, he writes, as the re-
flection of nature in concepts [Nachahmung der Natur in Begriffen], does not have any
final goals. If science has done any good, it has done so unintentionally, he conse-
quently contends. This scientific view of things, he continues, might seem too cold
[zu winterlich], for some people, but there are people for whom almost no air is
cold and clear enough as well as people who would desperately need some cooling
down. Before ending the passage he repeats this emphasis on relativity by writing
that as there are individuals and even peoples that are so serious as to need trivial-
ities, there are others that are so irritable and excitable as to need heavy burdens as a
matter of health. Nietzsche finally asks whether not the more spiritual humans of his
own time, adding that the appearance of this time suggests to him a world more and
more on fire, should seek out all cooling means at hand in order to stay so moderate
and composed as they still are, so that they eventually might serve as a mirror (i.e. as
self-reflection) of the time. (HH I 38, KSA 2, 61–62)
Let us pause to consider the significance of this passage. Two points that can be
made on the basis of the passage strike me as particularly fruitful for finding answers
to our questions. Firstly, there is reason to assume that whether any particular per-
spective (and by extension: any text!) is felt in a particular way, say as cold or hot,
depends in Nietzsche’s view on the one who would come in touch with the perspec-
tive. In a sense then, coolness is relative. So the text of HH will seem cool to many,²³
but Nietzsche leaves the possibility open that his own perspective on his writing in
HH might be different. Secondly, there is the suggestion that the spiritual natures,
among whom Nietzsche as author obviously counts himself, can be seen as useful,
 Notice that Nietzsche in EH does not write that the tone of the book is cool, but that it will be
considered cool: “people will find the book” (Large 2007, 55); “man wird das Buch…” (KSA 6, 323).
This later assessment reflects the reception of the work, which Nietzsche feared and anticipated in
the passage in HH.
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as serving an important function: the image that they cast can serve the time by pro-
viding opportunities for self-reflection. It is near at hand to conclude that the image
of the spiritual natures is reflected in their work. So if we now combine these two
points and apply them to HH, we can conclude that Nietzsche’s writing in HH
shows his own attitude and that many, particularly in his own time, will find the af-
fective landscape reflected in his writing cold and uninhabitable, but that the inter-
pretation of the mood of the text finally depends on the perspective of the reader. It is
precisely this latter idea that allows for the possibility to use mood artistically to
guide the reader to an affective perspective, through which the philosophical content
of the work appears more understandable. But is there any suggestion in the passage
that Nietzsche in fact would make such use of mood?
On the basis of this single passage, no far-reaching conclusions can be made. In
fact, one might argue, given the centrality of the metaphor of mirroring in the pas-
sage, that the tone of the work is a simple reflection of the mood of the author. If
indeed one would take Nietzsche to be striving towards the same objectivity as sci-
ence, then one might conclude that the affective tone of the writing is nothing more
than an unintentional result. The tone merely reflects the objectivity of science and
there is no conscious effort on Nietzsche’s part to lead the reader to the same state.
On the other hand, the latter part of the passage with its talk of reaching for any
means that could serve the purpose of cooling down and the clue that the coolness
of the spiritual nature could do a service to a world that seems to be on fire, does
suggest a more active role in guiding the reader. Though these two perspectives do
not necessarily contradict each other, there is no denying that there is a marked ten-
sion between them. Put differently, it might be necessary to specify how “guiding the
reader” should be understood, whether as an attempt at manipulation of the reader’s
emotions or as an open-ended communication that requires an active effort by the
reader. There is also as of yet no clarity what this “cooling down” actually involves
and what the resulting coolness consists of. Therefore, we will continue by discussing
more evidence; specifically that evidence which Golomb relies on.
4.2.3 Textual evidence about Nietzsche’s use of mood
There are only two aphorisms in HH where one can find the phrase “to put on ice”
[auf Eis legen]; of which only one in the original publication of 1877, the other in The
Wanderer and his Shadow. I will examine this latter aphorism first, as it plays an im-
portant role in Golomb’s argument. The aphorism inWS, Upon the ground of disgrace,
concerns the question how best to rid people of views one would rather see eliminat-
ed. Nietzsche explicitly chastises those who are not content to simply refute a belief
but seek also to evoke a negative affective response in the person who holds the be-
lief in order to prevent the belief from rising again. Instead of what he deems to be a
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counterproductive approach of throwing dirt on ideas,²⁴ he recommends one to put
beliefs on ice; if need be again and again. There is no suggestion that this would
imply anything else (e.g. a different kind of affective manipulation) than simply
sticking to a refutation of the beliefs that one wants to be rid of: if the belief arises
again one should simply repeat the process patiently. The exhortation to put what
one wants to set aside on ice again and again, certainly suggest a process of pains-
taking repetition. Such a reading gives a plausible explanation for the maxim that
Nietzsche offers to conclude the aphorism: “One refutation is no refutation at all”
(Handwerk 2012, 242; HH II, WS 211, KSA 2, 644). In this light it is hard to see how
this aphorism could be used to support the claim that “Nietzsche preferred the meth-
od of freezing psychologization to rational disputation” (cf. Golomb 1989, 165).²⁵ In
any case: To take the passage (HH II,WS 211, KSA 2, 644) from the middle of The Wan-
derer and his Shadow, the last text to be added to HH,²⁶ to support an argument con-
cerning the method of the entirety of HH, as Golomb does, is questionable to say the
least. There is also a further problem with Golomb’s interpretation that makes his
statement doubly misleading.
Golomb’s statement is doubly misleading, since it presupposes that the psychol-
ogy that Nietzsche practices in HH is somehow opposed to rational disputation and
the refutation of beliefs. Here I take it that Golomb follows Nietzsche’s comments in
EH, where he declares that in HH errors are not refuted, but frozen (KSA 6, 323).²⁷
This reinterpretation does not capture all the uses of the word “refute” [widerlegen]
in HH. In aphorism 9 of chapter one it is precisely the application of the psycholog-
ical method that refutes metaphysics; when one has uncovered the faulty methods of
 Cf. HH II,WS 211, KSA 2, 644. Nietzsche is undoubtedly himself guilty of this error of mocking the
targets of his criticism, though this “vice” is not as pronounced in HH as e.g. in the last works.
 Another passage that Golomb refers to in support of the idea that the goal of Nietzsche’s “psycho-
logization” is to instill mood and that this is thoroughly distinct from rational refutation does contain
a suggestion that a thorough mistrust in metaphysics would have the same consequences as if all
metaphysics were refuted. However, the passage, read contextually, is really about Nietzsche wanting
to challenge one to think what the consequences would be, if a sceptical sentiment would take hold
of humanity. In other words: the aphorism is concerned with a hypothetical situation, not the method
of HH (HH I 21, KSA 2, 42–43; cf. Golomb 1989, 169).
 WS was originally presented in 1880 as an independent work unrelated to HH and only added to
HH in 1886, together with Mixed Opinions and Maxims, to form volume two of the book (cf. Young
2010, 277).
 Another instance that could be used to support Golomb’s contention can be found in WS 82 (HH
II,WS 82, KSA 2, 589). There Nietzsche takes to task those who think it is necessary to refute a party or
religion, after one has left it. According to him, it is enough to see what brought one to the party or
religion in the first place, what motivations held one there and finally what motivations drove one
away. Here, Nietzsche seems to employ the term “refute” in a very strict sense; restricting its use
to matters of “pure” Erkenntnis.
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reasoning that metaphysics relies on one has refuted metaphysics.²⁸ It is certainly the
case that Nietzsche seeks to replace metaphysical reasoning with historical and psy-
chological reasoning, but this does not imply rejecting the value of rational disputa-
tion. In fact, Nietzsche takes the capacity to distance oneself from one’s own
thoughts, the ability to “put them on ice”, as a prerequisite of disputation. The
short aphorism 315 of book one boldly declares: “Requisite for disputing. – Anyone
who does not know how to put his thoughts on ice should not head into the heat
of battle.” (HH I 315, KSA 2, 315) This short aphorism, the only one containing the
phrase “put on ice” [auf Eis legen] in the original publication, expands and clarifies
the notion of putting one’s beliefs on ice. On the basis of it, one can surmise that one
should not only learn to view thoughts one wants to be rid of from a distance; it is
useful to be able to view even one’s most cherished thoughts from the same distance.
In the following, I will examine passages that spell out the ideal which forms the
basis for this view.
In his discussion on the merits of “freezing psychologization”, Golomb does refer
to some passages in the originally published work that better serve his end (cf. Go-
lomb 1989, 173– 174). For Nietzsche, psychological observation can serve to ease the
burden of life (HH I 35, KSA 2, 57). How does psychology serve this end? Golomb
speaks of the effect of “psychologization” as a “cooling” down and refers to aphor-
ism 56 of book one (HH I 56, KSA 2, 75; cf. Golomb 1989, 173). This topic certainly de-
serves a more thorough exposition than that provided by Golomb who contents him-
self with a simple reference to the aphorism. The aphorism, entitled Triumph of
knowledge over radical evil, describes the benefits of the perspective open to one
who has passed through the stage of believing in the metaphysical reality of evil
and who on account of his experiences no longer desires much more from things
than knowledge. Such a person finds peace easily, as having knowledge as his
only goal cools him down.²⁹ In itself, this single aphorism offers little more than a
description of a particular path to inner peace, to freedom from illusions, albeit
one might add that there probably is an autobiographical background to it. No far-
reaching conclusions to our questions can be drawn on account of it. There is how-
ever a more thorough discussion of the ideal of calm in HH that has much to offer us;
a passage which incidentally Golomb does not discuss.
The ideal of calm is more clearly spelled out in an earlier aphorism, aphorism 34
of chapter one; For reassurance [Zur Beruhigung], in which Nietzsche thematizes the
 “hat man sie widerlegt” (HH I 9, KSA 2, 29). This use of the term resembles what Nietzsche writes
about historical refutation [historische Widerlegung] in D (D 95, KSA 3, 86–87, cf. section 4.3.3 of this
study).
 “the single goal that fully governs him, to know at all times as well as he possibly can, will make
him cool and will calm all the savagery in his disposition” (Handwerk 1997, 56; HH I 56, KSA 2, 75). It
cannot be emphasized enough that the removal of “savagery” is not to be understood as a removal of
all powerful feeling. As we have already seen, “living for knowledge” crucially involves reflecting on
one’s feelings.
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effect of knowledge on the free spirit. He deceptively begins by asking a series of pes-
simistic questions that culminate in the question whether the quest for knowledge
does not end in despair. He then cuts this pessimistic tirade short in order to declare
that he believes the effect of knowledge to be a matter of temperament. Nietzsche
surmises that the reaction he initially described was only one of many possibilities,
and goes on to describe an alternative in which the confrontation and preoccupation
with knowledge leads the way to a form of life freer from troubling affects.³⁰ Such a
reaction to knowledge requires a good temperament: “a stable, mild, and basically
cheerful soul, a mood that would not need to be on guard against pranks and sudden
outbursts” (Handwerk 1997, 41–42; HH I 34, KSA 2, 53–55). A liberated spirit with
this kind of temperament would not rage at having once been bound. He would
have to renounce much of what is commonly valued and be content to dwell in a
free and fearless mood above customs and morality, living only for knowledge.
This state Nietzsche conceives of as a joyful state, as he declares in a sentence
that is crucial to our endeavour: “He is glad to share the joy of this state and he
has perhaps nothing else to share” (Handwerk 1997, 41–42; HH I 34, KSA 2, 53–55).
Is this not the evidence we have been looking for? Is this aphorism not proof that
Nietzsche tried to communicate a specific mood through HH? Does it not suggest that
this mood is more important than anything else in the book, perhaps the only thing
he has to communicate? Does it not imply that he wants to lead his readers toward
this ideal? Not necessarily, and therefore the questions are worth examining closely
and critically before jumping to conclusions.
First of all, one would have to assume that the state that Nietzsche describes is
an autobiographical confession, and an honest one. Secondly, one would have to un-
derstand his words as a meta-commentary on HH and take them to mean that he
seeks to share and transmit a certain mood to his readers through his writing. The
first claim is problematic, but not indefensible. The main problem is whether one
should identify the calm and joyful response as Nietzsche’s own response to knowl-
edge. One might claim that the latter alternative (good temperament – joyful mood)
presented in the aphorism should not be mistaken for Nietzsche’s own response as
little as the first alternative (melancholic temperament – despair) should.³¹ Be that as
 The key question here is how to understand Nietzsche’s words of a life “more purified of affects”
[von Affecten reineres Leben] (Handwerk 1997, 42; HH I 34, KSA 2, 53–55). As the aphorism shows,
Nietzsche thinks that knowledge can both purify and weaken violent passions. The question is wheth-
er these two necessarily go together; whether purification always entails weakening.While Nietzsche
seems unable to make up his mind in HH, I think that the metaphor of distancing makes most sense
of his statements. Nietzsche strives for a certain distance from his own passions, but this distance is
itself an affective state; an all-enveloping mood. Be that as it may, it is certainly not the case that
Nietzsche’s ideal would be a life totally bereft of feeling, as the final part of the aphorism shows.
 Marco Brusotti notes that Nietzsche’s self-understanding only shines through indirectly in HH.
Still he somewhat hesitantly concludes that Nietzsche in HH seems to count himself among those
with a good temperament. Relevant evidence can be found in unpublished writings from the period
in which Nietzsche attests to having a good temperament (Brusotti 1997, 176– 177; see especially foot-
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it may, this objection can be seen as irrelevant as one might counter it by insisting
that it is enough that Nietzsche holds out the calm response as an ideal.³² It stands
to reason that Nietzsche would not want to lead the reader to his own possibly con-
flicted state of mind, but towards an ideal state perhaps more reflective of his “higher
self”.³³ Though the possible difference between Nietzsche’s ideal and his actual tem-
perament is an interesting issue, it is my contention that it does not complicate the
question of authorial intention in any significant sense. The difference between an
all-too-human Herr Nietzsche and an ideal philosopher-author of the text dissolves
when one recognizes that the latter can be reduced to the intentions of the
human, all too human thinker. This difference does, however, raise the possibility
of a dissonance between intent and achievement. I will return to this question at
a later stage; for now it is time to move on to the second claim.
In lack of unambiguous evidence, there is greater reason to doubt the second
claim, i.e. that the passage should be understood as a meta-commentary on HH. Nev-
ertheless, even the most sceptical interpreter should concede that the passage pro-
vides the best indirect evidence that can be found in the content of the book, besides
that provided by aphorism 38. This is because it makes sense to understand the dis-
cussion of knowledge and responses to knowledge in the passage as directly related
to the knowledge that Nietzsche’s book contains – and the possible responses to the
book. This analogy is not some far-fetched speculation, but follows from the recog-
nition that Nietzsche’s inquiries in HH generate precisely the kind of knowledge that
is potentially tragic and that through HH the reader becomes acquainted with such
knowledge. Let us provisionally accept the premise that the passage can be read in
this way and see where it leads.
If one accepts the premise that the passage can be read as a meta-commentary
on HH, then there is still the problem of establishing that the passage shows that
Nietzsche sought to communicate a specific mood to his readers. A close reading
of the passage reveals that what the hypothetical free spirit gladly communicates
is his joy at his calm state of mind. The free spirit can show his own joy in what
he does, in his writing, but once again it is not clear if he seeks to lead the reader
note 319; cf. KGB II/5, Bf. 734). Brusotti notes further that this self-evaluation contrasts with the one in
Daybreak,where Nietzsche practically admits that he has a melancholic temperament (Brusotti 1997,
178).
 That Nietzsche indeed held a good, i.e. calm, lofty and joyful, temperament as an ideal in HH can
be backed up with textual evidence. This short aphorism can be considered typical: “Das Eine, was
Noth thut. – Eins muss man haben: entweder einen von Natur leichten Sinn oder einen durch Kunst und
Wissen erleichterten Sinn.” (HH I 486, KSA 2, 317)
 The idea of a “true self” or a “higher self” of aspiration plays a central role in Nietzsche’s untime-
ly meditations on Schopenhauer and Wagner (cf. Young 2010, 520). Young in his turn paid homage to
this idea, and emphasized the importance of it to Nietzsche, by allowing it to structure much of his
own biographical narrative of Nietzsche’s life and aspirations. This hermeneutic is certainly justified
from a biographical perspective, as it can hardly be denied that Nietzsche’s life was a life of constant
striving, despite the philosophical Nietzsche’s protestations to the contrary (cf. KSA 6, 294–295).
82 4 Nietzsche’s psychology of religion in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak
to the same attitude. The least that can be said about aphorism 34 is that if indeed
the free spirit seeks to communicate a mood it would be primarily that of joy. This is
quite at odds with the emphasis in Golomb’s thesis that Nietzsche seeks to instill a
cold mood of suspicion towards metaphysics, though admittedly the two should per-
haps be seen as complimentary; i.e. as a union of joy and doubt. Yet on the basis of
the whole of the passage in question, one might equally well support the thesis that
Nietzsche does not seek to instill any specific mood in the reader through the phil-
osophical content of the work, since how the reader responds to knowledge is in the
end a matter of the temperament of the reader. Despite the solid textual foundation
that it rests on, it is hard to content oneself with this last objection. This is not least
because the philosophical content strictly understood, i.e. the statements contained
in the passages, is not the only aspect that should be considered when discussing
Nietzsche’s use of mood in any of his works.We are here faced with a larger interpre-
tative problem. There is a need to specify, how one conceives of Nietzsche’s commu-
nication of mood in his writings; in specific texts understood as wholes as well as in
single passages. The key question in this regard is not the abstract one whether
Nietzsche merely holds out possibilities for contemplation or actively seeks to
force the reader to inhabit an affective perspective. It is rather the problem of distin-
guishing where Nietzsche merely holds out possibilities for contemplation from those
affects and moods that Nietzsche considers desirable and would have his readers
open up to. Needless to say, no generalizations can be made on the basis of single
passages and any credible interpretation must be contextual in the sense that it
takes into account all evidence concerning Nietzsche’s intentions.
We here seem to have reached the limits of the method that we have utilized thus
far. Following the example of Golomb, we have drawn attention to and analysed pas-
sages in HH in order to find answers to our questions. No conclusive answers have
been found. Golomb argued that Nietzsche uses mood to instill doubt in the reader,
but on the basis of the contents alone, one might equally well support the thesis that
Nietzsche’s focus in HH is more on analysing feelings than on manipulating them.
However, not all evidence has been exhausted yet. It is quite curious and irritating
that despite the emphasis he places on the role of mood in HH, Golomb has nothing
to say about the tone of the work. That Golomb does not go into a detailed discussion
about the aphoristic form is not the problem.³⁴ The question of tone is distinct from
the question of form. Both questions concern style, but the question of tone is argu-
ably primary in any discussion on the communication of mood. That is because no
form is in itself an expression of a specific mood, though form can certainly facilitate
the communication of affect. When I now ask about the tone of HH, I refrain from
 One can even question whether it is instructive at all to speak of aphorisms in the case of HH,
even if Nietzsche himself spoke of the passages in the work using that term (cf. Franco 2011, 13).
Hödl goes as far as to write of HH as a work that is wrongly called a book of aphorisms (Hödl
2007, 152). Whatever the passages that make up HH are called, I do not see how this stylistic choice
would in itself reveal anything about Nietzsche’s communication of mood.
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making any claims about authorial intention. That means that the approach is initial-
ly purely descriptive. It is my contention that an inquiry into tone that proceeds cau-
tiously can deliver important if inconclusive results, and should not simply be reject-
ed outright on account of its subjectivity.
4.2.4 A general characterization of the tone of HH
What is the tone of HH like? In EH, Nietzsche writes that one will find the tone of the
book “clever, cool, perhaps harsh and mocking” (Large 2007, 55; KSA 6, 323). Does
this assertion fully capture the tone of HH, or is there more to be said about the mat-
ter? Does the tone not guide the reader to the joyful ideal of lofty calm and inner
peace? Does it not also open up a mood of suspicion for metaphysics? There
would at least have to be some detectable glimmer of joy in the text for one to
take seriously the claim that the free spirit enjoys his viewpoint and seeks to commu-
nicate his joy (HH I 34, KSA 2, 55). To point this out and to ask such questions need
not mean denying that the tone of HH is best described as cool, but it does mean
adding something to the description. In other words, there is no reason to accept
EH as dogma, even if it serves well as a starting point for an inquiry that aims for
a full picture of the tone of HH.
Before trying to answer these questions, it has to be asked whether and in what
sense HH forms a whole. The scholarly consensus is that the text of HH as presented
in the KSA does not form a whole, though it should be mentioned that Paul Franco
has sought to argue against the consensus and for the coherence of the entire work
(Franco 2011, 14– 16).³⁵ A quick consideration of the two texts added to HH in 1886
should be enough to cast aside any doubts about the consensus view. On this
issue, I share Julian Young’s judgement. Young calls Mixed Opinions and Maxims
(1879) “a fairly random collection of bits and pieces that didn’t find their way into
the main work”, but recognizes that it “shares the same theoretical outlook” as
HH (Young 2010, 275). It should be added that not only does the theoretical outlook
remain largely in tune with the earlier books; so does the tone. The Wanderer and his
Shadow (1880), on the other hand, is quite different both in tone and content (cf.
Young 2010, 277–289).³⁶ These considerations support the consensus view, and
 I raise initial doubts about Franco’s position in the discussion on the “problem of culture” in sec-
tion 4.1.2.
 The ideal of living only for knowledge seems to have been supplanted by an ideal of living for joy.
Perhaps it would be best to say that the ideal of living for joy has been superimposed on the former
ideal, which was already characterized as a joyful one. The solitary Freigeist has the right to say “dass
er um der Freudigkeit willen lebe und um keines weiteren Zieles willen; und in jedem anderen Munde
wäre sein Wahlspruch gefährlich: Frieden um mich und ein Wohlgefallen an allen nächsten Dingen.”
(HH II,WS 350, KSA 2, 702) The focus is no longer on scientific knowledge but on the “nearest things”
that provide the means to joy (cf. Brusotti 1997, 134). Consequently, there is also a change in the char-
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allow us to restrict our focus to the original 1878 publication, which includes those
chapters that are of greatest relevance to us.
At a first glance, volume one of HH is remarkably balanced compared to some of
Nietzsche’s later writings, even if one excludes the Antichrist and Ecce Homo from
one’s survey. Whereas there is no escaping the impression that the author of the
later works is passionately concerned about the things he writes about, this work
mostly does suggest that the author dwells far above the things he writes about, gaz-
ing down at them from a distance. There is also a joy present in the work that at times
becomes very explicit (e.g. HH I 291 and HH I 292, KSA 2, 234–237), but mostly stays
in the background. To be absolutely clear, I am not denying that one might be able to
detect slight changes in tone between the chapters. More importantly, however, not
everything within the most serious chapters of volume one is that cool and dispas-
sionate. Is there not also uneasiness and irritation? This is arguably the case in
the chapter on the state but it is especially troublesome in the chapter that is centred
on the question of religion, which I will now revisit. The reason for focusing on the
chapter on religion is that the role of politics and the state in Nietzsche’s philosoph-
ical projects stands in question, so much so that now and again the question is
asked, whether Nietzsche can be considered a political thinker at all. That Nietzsche
is an important thinker on religion is beyond any doubt, and as has been mentioned
some even go as far as calling him an essentially religious thinker (cf. Young 2006,
201). That is not to say that nothing could be gained from an analysis of the tone in
which Nietzsche writes on the state and politics; in fact, such an investigation could
reveal issues obscured by a one-sided focus on the content of what he has to say.
Here, anyhow, it is justified to limit the discussion to the topic of religion and
those parts of Nietzsche’s text that are of direct relevance to the questions of this
study.
4.2.5 The unbalanced tone of chapter three: The trouble with the ascetic
The chapter The Religious Life is not that balanced despite the rational explanatory
schema that underlies it. This can be shown by careful consideration of Nietzsche’s
treatment of the Christian ascetic in aphorisms 136 to 144, the greater part of which
exhibits a tone that is best described as feverish. The starting point of Nietzsche’s dis-
cussion, and by Nietzsche I here and in what follows obviously refer first and fore-
most to the persona created within the text of HH, is to be found in what seems to be
a thinly veiled irritation with the fact that science had as of then not been able to
provide an explanation for asceticism. Nietzsche takes this task upon himself; the
task to cast a scientific light on the nature of asceticism. Because he explicitly men-
acter of the joy that is aspired to, as the emphasis is no longer on the absence of disturbing passion
but on a rejoicing in the “nearest things”. Arguably, the tone of WS reflects this change.
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tions the idea of science as a reflection of nature [Nachahmung der Natur] in the pas-
sage (HH I 136, KSA 2, 130), one would expect a treatment in tune with the dispas-
sionate spirit of objective science (cf. HH I 38, KSA 2, 61–62).We have already estab-
lished the underlying rational schema which structures Nietzsche’s analysis; his
method of explaining complex phenomena through the elements that make them
up. Now we focus on the manner in which he presents his analyses, how he puts
the schema into his text. This is an important question, for what he provides is far
from a dispassionate analysis. Indeed, his “analysis” is more akin to an exorcism,
in which he doesn’t spare words of contempt.
Nietzsche first fixes his eye on how ascetics turn their spite and wrath against
themselves, and gives a few examples that are described with a marked scorn to il-
lustrate his point. Without justifying his interpretation he suddenly exclaims: “This
shattering of oneself, this mockery of one’s own nature, this spernere se sperni of
which religions have made so much is really a very high degree of vanity”, adding:
“The whole morality of the Sermon on the Mount fits in here” (Handwerk 1997, 105;
HH I 137, KSA 2, 130– 131). The impression is that the author seeks to shock the reader
through this statement, which in its own time could only have come across as mock-
ery, but the absence of any justification for his conclusions is quite telling.
Nietzsche deals similarly with a related component of asceticism and sainthood,
charitable self-denial. Acting for the good of others, even when it might be detrimen-
tal to others, is not limited to saints, but the saint has made it his trademark. Such
acts Nietzsche explains with reference to the feeling that accompanies them and re-
sults from them. His treatment is so cursory as to be unsatisfactory: it is hard to es-
cape the impression that what matters to Nietzsche here is not the evidence but ar-
riving at the conclusion: “It is therefore really only the discharge of his emotion that
matters to him” (Handwerk 1997, 106; HH I 138, KSA 2, 131– 132). There is really no
argument as to in what sense the ascetic differs from anyone else in this regard,
only the assertion that the ascetic in fact tries to make his own life easy by renounc-
ing care about all that is mortal (HH I 139, KSA 2, 133).
In the following aphorism, Nietzsche explicitly connects the ascetics’ purported
lust for emotion for its own sake with weakness of the nerves. It serves to counter the
boredom to which their own spiritual laziness and their self-imposed submission
under a foreign will has led them. (HH I 140, KSA 2, 133– 134). The choice of
words in this aphorism, as in selected parts of the broader discussion, does speak
of a contempt that is more powerful than the ideal of scientific calm. The next aphor-
ism exhibits the same vehemence: through convoluted sentences Nietzsche moves
from a discussion about the sexual impulse to generalizations about the nature of
the feeling of sinfulness in order to finally suggest, but without explicating how,
that there is a historical connection between Christianity and societal decadence.
If there is one thing that deserves specific attention it would be that Nietzsche
seems particularly incensed about what he takes to be the use to which psychology
was put to by ascetics. In the hands of ascetics, psychology was used to make people
feel sinful. Yet instead of focusing on explaining how such a use of psychology could
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be effective in the first place, or what use of psychology would be preferable,
Nietzsche simply focuses on complaining about how ascetics chastise all that is nat-
ural (HH I 141, KSA 2, 134– 137).
In a final attempt to reassure that there is nothing special about ascetics,
Nietzsche asserts that the world-historical importance of those deemed holy is not
to be found in themselves, but in the fact that they are deemed holy by people. In
Nietzsche’s own words, the saint matters not because of what he or she is, but rather
because what he or she means. (HH I 143, KSA 2, 139)
In a peculiar twist, the last aphorism of The Religious Life, which also finishes off
the discussion on ascetics and saints, seems to recover at least something of the
calm, objective spirit that Nietzsche associates with science. It is almost as if he
would be startled by and recoil at what he has written in the preceding pages. Rec-
ognizing that the picture he has painted of the saint, which he says has painted ac-
cording to the average of the type, can be contrasted with presentations that produce
a more pleasant response, he nevertheless proceeds to defend his approach
(HH I 144, KSA 2, 139). This defence is not without irony, and it does not suggest
that Nietzsche would recant anything. Indeed he does not. He merely relativizes
his take on ascetics by adding that his explanation does not take into account sin-
gular exceptions to the rule, exceptions which he suggests could be viewed in a
more sympathetic light. The big difference to the preceding passages is in the
tone, which is once again balanced and even charitable, while simultaneously sug-
gesting that the author gazes down at the issue from an ironic distance. The ironic
tone shines especially clearly through the text when Nietzsche mentions the founder
of Christianity as being one of those exceptional creatures whose delusions cast
streams of light over their entire character. Quite aware that the notion of the founder
of Christianity being delusional was still considered scandalous by many in his day,
Nietzsche adds that one should not judge him too harshly for his delusion, since an-
tiquity did not lack its fair share of sons of God (HH I 144, KSA 2, 139–140).
This recovery of tone in the final aphorism does not change the overall impres-
sion that an explanation of the elements that ascetics and saints are made of, such
as self-denial and self-hatred, is only of secondary importance, the attack against
them primary. Most of the text on ascetics and saints expresses an irritation,
which does not suggest that the author would be above all of that he writes
about. There is more here than the irritation of the reader and more than what is cap-
tured in the quip in EH that one might find the tone “harsh and mocking” (KSA 6,
323). Nietzsche’s treatment of the ascetic is cursory and forced; passionate, not
calm. What are we to make out of this? One fruitful alternative is to point out that
Nietzsche might not seriously strive to be dispassionate, and that what is more im-
portant is his desire to express a distance. There is certainly something to this expla-
nation, as Nietzsche very vehemently seeks to distance himself from asceticism. Not-
withstanding the passages in question, Nietzsche does on the whole manage to
maintain a tone that expresses a certain aloofness, a distant joy, throughout HH.
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4.2.6 The ideal of calm and the mood of HH
To conclude, Nietzsche’s writing in HH manifests a mood of distanced suspicion in
metaphysics, a mood that at times rises to become lofty and joyful. It is also the case
that it is accompanied by a more agitated mood of irritation with metaphysics (and
religion, morality, as well as the state of culture) that now and again gains the upper
hand. This contrasts with Nietzsche’s own later assessment that a nobility of spirit
always has the upper hand in the work. In EH he writes: “A certain intellectuality
of noble taste seems to be continually keeping the upper hand over a more passion-
ate current beneath it.” (Large 2007, 55; KSA 6, 323) To me it seems that Nietzsche,
given how he presents himself in HH, can be said to be unable to fully keep his pas-
sion in check and to live up to his ideal. Nevertheless, the later admission that there
is a passionate current at work in HH is already an important concession and an in-
dication that one cannot view the work solely through the ideal of distance and calm.
The ideal of calm is problematic.
That Nietzsche declares a state of mind akin to apatheia (Brusotti 1997, 228) a
personal ideal in HH does not necessarily imply that his writing expresses that
ideal fully. More disturbingly, one might from within Nietzsche’s philosophy even
question whether this need for peace is not a symptom of something else. This, I
would argue, is precisely the question that Nietzsche asks of himself in the years fol-
lowing the 1878 publication. The claim that there is more to the tone of HH than
calm, to which we arrived through the analysis of Nietzsche’s treatment of asceti-
cism, can be supported by earlier evidence than that provided by his description
of the tone in EH. Already during his free-spirit period, Nietzsche comes to realize
that he is in the grips of a violent passion. He comes to see that his preoccupation
with knowledge is at odds with the ideal of calm, as this preoccupation is itself
the result of a passion. This passion he dubs the passion for knowledge [die Leiden-
schaft der Erkenntnis] (Brusotti 1997, 13).³⁷
This serves as a reminder of an issue, which cannot be emphasized enough:
Nietzsche’s self-presentation, his own interpretation of his texts, has to be chal-
lenged and weighed against all evidence available to scholarship. For example,
when Nietzsche writes in the 1886 foreword to HH II about the whole of HH that it
has “something of the almost cheerful and inquisitive coldness of the psychologist”
(Handwerk 2012, 5; KSA 2, 371),³⁸ we can agree but note that this something does not
 According to Brusotti, the first reinterpretation can be dated to summer 1880 (Brusotti 1997, 640).
See also Brusotti’s chapter “Die neue Leidenschaft setzt sich durch” (Brusotti 1997, 168). I have sug-
gested, that the seeds of this “reinterpretation” are already present in the first version of HH. There-
fore, it is not so much a reinterpretation as a rationalization in a specific direction. This rationaliza-
tion then leads Nietzsche to disengage the ideal of distance from the ideal of calm, which is a very
important step towards D, GS and the arrival of Zarathustra.
 “Etwas von der heiteren und neugierigen Kälte des Psychologen” (KSA 2, 371).
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completely express the mood of the work.³⁹ When he goes on about the things dis-
cussed in HH as already then having been behind him and below him, one can calm-
ly observe that this is simply not the case as he returns to the very same problems of
metaphysics and religion in his later writings. To mention but one example, one can
think of the relation between science and asceticism, which gains a far more thor-
oughgoing treatment in The Genealogy of Morals. Such discrepancy gives rise to a
new critical question that must be taken into account by scholars concerned with
Nietzsche and mood. Given that Nietzsche aspires to communicate mood, how
well does he succeed? Now one might object that there is no reason to raise such
a question at all, or at least not at this point. The critic can point to the fact that
in the case of HH, it has not been possible to establish the intention of the author
with any certainty. One might therefore conclude that the question to what extent
Nietzsche succeeds to communicate mood is superfluous as the question itself
rests on a too shaky foundation. That conclusion would be as premature as the ques-
tion, because there is still one category of evidence that has not been examined yet
and which can help solve the problem concerning authorial intention; namely
Nietzsche’s notes and letters.
4.2.7 Evidence about Nietzsche’s use of mood in HH from his notes and letters
From the period surrounding the original publication of HH, spring-summer 1878,
there is a very short yet extremely suggestive notebook entry.⁴⁰ It is the metaphor
of mountain air [Höhenluft], which makes this note so interesting and so deserving
of attention. After all, it is precisely this metaphor that Nietzsche employs in EH to
characterize his philosophy; and specifically what his writings communicate
(KSA 6, 258–259). Already in this early note, Nietzsche understands his own philos-
ophy as a philosophy of mountain air. Substantially, he establishes an analogy be-
tween those who seek out the alpine air of the Engadine in search of a cure for
their ailments and those “patients”, presumably his readers, whom he would send
to his own air; to the heights of his philosophy. The implication is that his work
has a therapeutic aim. This is not to say that a therapeutic aim would be the only
aim of his philosophizing at this stage, but that he clearly sees his thinking as having
therapeutic potential. So what is the illness that his patients suffer from and who are
the patients? Given Nietzsche’s preoccupations in the period and considering the
content of HH, it is safe to say that whatever one calls the disease its main symptoms
are false interpretations of the human predicament in general and metaphysical in-
 “Auf ihm, als einem Buche ‘für freie Geister’, liegt Etwas von der beinahe heiteren und neugierigen
Kälte des Psychologen, welche eine Menge schmerzlicher Dinge, die er unter sich hat, hinter sich hat,
nachträglich für sich noch feststellt und gleichsam mit irgend einer Nadelspitze fest sticht” (KSA 2, 371).
 “Ich sehe die Leidenden, die in die Höhenluft des Engadin sich begeben. Auch ich sende die Patien-
ten in meine Höhenluft – welcher Art ist ihre Krankheit?” (NL 1878, 27[21], KSA 8, 490)
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terpretations of all human things in particular. One might conclude that all those for
whom he writes are potential patients, but the question is whether Nietzsche did not
have a more specific group in mind; namely the Wagnerians. In a remarkable pas-
sage of EH, Nietzsche seems to recall that his first discovery of and initial fascination
with the air of the heights coincided with his turn away from all that which the word
Bayreuth signifies, as he explicitly opposes the Wagnerian swamp with the air of the
Engadine, where one dwells “6000 feet above Bayreuth”.⁴¹ That there indeed is an
intimate connection between the anti-ideal, or idealization of the air of the heights,
and his Bayreuth-crisis finds support from Nietzsche’s letters, in which he mentions
this mountain air. These letters shed much light on Nietzsche’s intentions and leave
little doubt that he sought to guide his readers to this experience.
The first letter that merits attention is one that Nietzsche wrote to Heinrich Köse-
litz on 31 May 1878. The focus of the letter is on the reception of his latest work. As
HH philosophically meant a decisive break with Schopenhauer, it personally meant
an irreparable break with Wagner and his followers. In this sense, Nietzsche con-
trasts the reception of HH in the Wagnerian circle with that of Rée and Burckhardt.
Whereas the Wagnerians responded to his turn against Schopenhauer with lack of
understanding and outright distaste, a response Nietzsche likens to excommunica-
tion, the latter two scholars reportedly responded with joy (KGB II/5, Bf. 723). This
latter response, the letter reveals, has given him reason to think about the precondi-
tions for his work having an impact. Specifically, he writes, the response shows what
kind of readers are ready for his work.⁴² What makes the letter even more interesting
to us is that Nietzsche not only hints at what kind of reader would be the ideal reader
of his work, but also reveals what kind of a response he considers ideal. This he does
by imagining what the effect of the book would be upon one who would spend as
 In the passage, Nietzsche praises his purported ability to bring forth the best in those who come
close to him: “Whatever the instrument – even if it is as out of tune as only the instrument ‘man’ can
go out of tune – I would have to be ill not to succeed in getting something listenable-to out of it. And
how often have I heard from the ‘instruments’ themselves that they have never heard themselves
sounding like that… The finest example of this was perhaps Heinrich von Stein, who died unforgiv-
ably young: once, after carefully obtaining permission, he turned up in Sils-Maria for three days, ex-
plaining to everyone that he had not come for the Engadine. For those three days it was as though
this splendid man, who had waded with all the impetuous naivety of a Prussian junker into the Wag-
nerian swamp (– and the Dühringian one, too!), had been transformed by a storm-wind of freedom,
like someone who is suddenly raised up to his height and given wings. I always told him it was the
good air up there that was doing it and everyone was affected in the same way – we were not 6,000
feet above Bayreuth for nothing – but he wouldn’t believe me…” (Large 2007, 11; KSA 6, 269–270) The
comedy of this hyperbolic passage is only heightened by Nietzsche’s deliberate mixing up of the in-
fluence of the physical air of the heights with that of his own presence as a kind of being of the moun-
tain air. He wants to be understood as one with the elemental forces of the alpine nature.
 “wie die Menschen beschaffen sein müßten, wenn mein Buch eine schnelle Wirkung thun sollte”
(KGB II/5, Bf. 723). How does one create people with good temperament, “wie erzeugt man Menschen
mit gutem Temperament?”, Nietzsche also asks in a note, which was written in the summer of 1879
(NL 40[27], KSA8, 583).
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much time with it as his friend and editor Köselitz: new thoughts, new feelings and a
stronger mood, as if one would find oneself in lighter mountain air.⁴³
Directly after mentioning this powerful mood that he associates with the air of
the heights, Nietzsche expresses his joy at hearing Rée’s reaction to the book; namely
that it put him in a mood of productive enjoyment [Stimmung produktiven Genießens]
(KGB II/5, Bf. 723). Nietzsche then explicitly affirms that to inspire readers to think
independently and become productive was the best he hoped to achieve. Not only
does the letter testify of the importance he attached to enabling a specific mood
[Stimmung], it further points to mountain air, the air of the heights, as the key meta-
phor for a more encompassing affective ideal. Importantly, the letter suggests that
the ideal is not something that the reader can or should slavishly submit to. It is
not a mood that can be forced upon a reader. It is rather a mood that frees thinking.
As such, it is made up of feelings of independence, of distance, of being above. Be-
cause of this, it requires a lot from the one who would inhabit it. Not least does it
presuppose what Nietzsche calls a good temperament.We can nevertheless now con-
clude that his insistence that the effect of knowledge (cf. HH I 34, KSA 2, 53–55), var-
ies according to temperament doesn’t exclude the attempt to communicate a specific
mood. For there are individuals who are ready for this communication, and there will
perhaps be more in the future. It is for these free spirits that Nietzsche claims to
write, as the subtitle of HH states that it is a “book for free spirits”, and it is they
who will gain from being immersed in the fresh air of the heights.
The contention that Nietzsche indeed had a specific “ideal” in mind finds further
support in Nietzsche’s reply to a letter by Erwin Rohde, which he sent shortly after
receiving Rohde’s letter on 16 June 1878 (see KGB II/5, Bf. 727). This letter testifies
of the same concern with reception as the letter to Köselitz. One could even go so
far as to claim that it shows Nietzsche desired to control the way his work was
read, since he gives instructions to guide the interpretation. Justifiably fearing that
his friend’s sympathies are still with the Wagnerians, he bids Rohde to at least
take a look at the book and read some passages, in the hope that he might eventually
come to grasp it as a whole. Why would it be so important to grasp the work as a
whole? Nietzsche insists that if Rohde were to see the whole as a whole he would
finally be able to understand the experience that grounds the work, and thus he
could take part in the joy of the author. In fact, Nietzsche speaks of this experience
as the highest joy that he has thus far felt. In the process, he expressly forbids his
friend to ponder about how the book came to be.⁴⁴ After distancing his work from
 “Ja, wenn man soviel eindringenden Ernstes und auch soviel Zeit einem solchen Erzeugniß weihen
wollte wie Ihre Güte gethan, so käme wohl etwas dabei heraus: nämlich Neues an Gedanken und Ge-
fühlen und eine kräftigere Stimmung, wie als ob man in leichter gewordene Luft der Höhe gerathen
sei.” (KGB II/5, Bf. 723)
 “Grüble nicht über die Entstehung eines solchen Buches nach, sondern fahre fort, dies und jenes Dir
herauszulangen. Vielleicht kommt dann auch einmal die Stunde, wo Du mit Deiner schönen konstruk-
tiven Phantasie das Ganze als Ganzes schaust und an dem größten Glücke, das ich bisher genoß, teil-
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Reé, Nietzsche returns to mood at the end of the letter with an evocation of this
“highest feeling of joy”. He expresses the wish that Rohde could feel what he feels
since having established an ideal of life. And what is this ideal? That is left unspe-
cified, but he importantly associates it with the fresh air of the heights and a mild
warmth.⁴⁵ Perhaps it is nothing other than the mountain air-experience itself, trans-
lated into a philosophical mode of life. In HH, this ideal is to “live for knowledge”.
The least that can be said is that the ideal in question leaves metaphysical ideals and
associated experiences behind in favour of a more intense experience of life.
It is quite telling that when Nietzsche in a letter to Mathilde Maier, an acquaint-
ance from the Bayreuth-circle, tries to justify his attack on metaphysics, to make it
understandable, he does so with reference to the mountain air [Höhenluft] that he
dwells in. The most striking claim of the letter is the assertion that this new mood
allows him to be free of vindictiveness. Instead, he associates the air of the heights
with a mild mood [Stimmung] towards all those humans who still live in the haze of
the valleys; a rather thinly veiled reference to all those such as the Wagnerians, who
are in the grips of metaphysical philosophy. Furthermore, he writes that this new
mood allows him to be far closer to the Greeks than ever before and truly live the
pursuit of wisdom. Again, as in the letter to Rohde, he emphasizes the authority
of his feeling: if only Mathilde could through his words understand [nachempfinden]
the experience of his change, she would wish to experience something similar. Final-
ly, he foresees that he will have to dwell alone, in order to one-day return as a phi-
losopher of life. (Cf. KGB II/5, Bf. 734.)
Nietzsche does not only speak in this way, emphasizing mood, because he would
believe that the recipients of his letters value feeling above all. There is much more
reason to believe that Nietzsche honestly tries to speak if not of a decisive change in
his life then at least of something he considers of great value. Together, these letters
indicate that he had fixed his eyes on a specific affective ideal and wanted to com-
municate it. However, all of the letters were written after the publication of the fin-
ished volume. Therefore, their importance could be challenged by claiming that they
do not say that much about the philosopher’s intentions when writing HH as much
as of a changing interpretation of the work post-publication. Besides that, this pur-
ported ideal of mountain air remains obscure; the best that has been provided are
rather vague phenomenological descriptions. Both of these objections are worth con-
sidering, but they do not present a serious challenge to the plausibility of the thesis
advanced here. Much can be gained by considering Nietzsche’s first use of mountain
nehmen kannst.” (KGB II/5, Bf. 727) The real reason for this plea is revealed in the following para-
graph, in which Nietzsche insists that the philosophical outlook presented in HH is his own and
not that of Reé; an outlook that he embraced independently before becoming better acquainted
with his new friend in autumn 1876 (Ibid.).
 “Fühltest Du nur, was ich jetzt fühle, seitdem ich mein Lebensideal endlich aufgestellt habe – die
frische reine Höhenluft, die milde Wärme um mich – Du würdest Dich sehr, sehr Deines Freundes freuen
können. Und es kommt der Tag.” (KGB II/5, Bf. 727)
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air [Höhenluft] as a metaphor in a note from a notebook dated to the end of 1876 to
summer 1877.⁴⁶ Though the metaphor is not described in any more detail in this note,
the note provides important clues for interpretation. Even if the ideal mood were
phenomenologically as distant and unaccessible to the reader as before, the way
Nietzsche ties his discussion to a historical situation points directly toward what
Nietzsche had in mind. In a situation where religious notions of God, sin, salvation
and the like have been discarded, he here claims, a passing sickness will require re-
placements for the lost attachments.When he goes on to speak of philosophies that
serve as “transitional climates” for those not yet ready for pure mountain air, it is
near at hand to think of metaphysical philosophies such as Schopenhauer’s, in
which religious evaluations and intuitions are presented as rational philosophy.
Be that as it may, it seems clear enough that Nietzsche himself wants to show the
way onward from “transitional climates”. In this sense, the note can be used to un-
derstand how Nietzsche situates his own philosophical project historically. In HH,
Nietzsche deals coldly with those who would satisfy religious needs through philos-
ophy and put modern concepts in the place of God. Instead of serving as a transition-
al climate, the point of HH is to guide those who are ready toward the true mountain
air. In this sense, HH is but the first necessary step on a journey, and Nietzsche is
clearly aware of this.
This applies even more so to this first mention of the metaphor. Nietzsche even
seems at a loss to describe the mountain air at all. The analogy to the Greeks doesn’t
lead anywhere. A plausible way to make sense of this lack of precision from within
Nietzsche’s own thinking is to assume that this is precisely because the experience is
something new, something young. It does not derive from the past, but speaks of the
future. The new feeling, the new affective ideal is not something always and any-
where accessible, but is tied to the historical situation, which makes it possible.
This first metaphorical use puts the eponymous experience into the historical context
of the decline of Christianity, which Nietzsche is a few years thereafter to thematize
as the death of God. Although the note itself doesn’t provide a phenomenological de-
scription of the experience, it allows us to read Nietzsche’s philosophical project
from HH onward as a drive toward a real engagement with and proper appreciation
of mountain air. In this interpretation, Nietzsche’s message is that the philosophy of
the future will be characterized by a new kind emotional foundation. Against this
background, the objection that the concept is vague loses its edge.What is to be ex-
 “Geistige Übergangsclimata. – Wir haben uns freigemacht von vielen Vorstellungen – Gott ewiges
Leben vergeltende jenseitige und diesseitige Gerechtigkeit, Sünde Erlöser Erlösungsbedürftigkeit –;
eine Art vorübergehende Krankheit verlangt einen Ersatz an die leeren Stellen hin, die Haut schaudert
etwas vor Frost, weil sie früher hier bekleidet war. Da giebt es Philosophien, welche gleichsam Über-
gangsclimata darstellen, für die, welche die frische Höhenluft noch nicht direct vertragen. – Vergleiche,
wie die griechischen Philosophensekten als Übergangsklimata dienen: die alte Polis und deren Bildung
wirkt noch in ihnen nach: wozu soll aber übergegangen werden? – es ist wohl nicht gefunden. Oder war
es der Sophist, der volle Freigeist?” (NL 1876–77, 23[110], KSA 8, 442)
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pected of Nietzsche is not an exhaustive description but an engagement with this ex-
perience in his writings. On account of the evidence, one can conclude that Nietzsche
for the first time sought to express this idea and ideal of mood in HH. As an expres-
sion, it must perhaps be deemed incomplete and unsatisfactory, but then again HH
was not the last time Nietzsche sought to express his ideal.
4.2.8 Conclusion
The critical engagement with Jacob Golomb’s work has provided a clear view of the
methodological problems involved in questioning Nietzsche’s use of mood. The most
important lesson has been that it is crucial to reconstruct Nietzsche’s intentions and
to interpret the affective dimension of his writings in the light of his projects. In this
regard, the case of HH has shown that Nietzsche’s letters can provide invaluable evi-
dence when it comes to understanding what Nietzsche is trying to achieve through
his writings.
In HH, Nietzsche sought to communicate the experience of a crisis, which culmi-
nated in finding a new affective ideal. This intention is also reflected in the tone of
the work, which is for the most part distant and cool yet simultaneously joyful. That
Nietzsche has not fully recovered from or rather overcome his crisis is also apparent
from passages which betray an irritation that is hard to reconcile with what Nietzsche
writes of the new ideal. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s criticism of religion in HH is mis-
understood if it is read only as a negative rejection of religious feeling. It is much
more fruitful to recognize that Nietzsche admits the value of religious feelings, be-
cause reflection on such feelings has allowed him to find the way toward a new af-
fective ideal. In other words, Nietzsche’s destructive criticism is to be understood
through his productive intention. In this regard, one can indeed conclude that the
philosophical content of HH can be understood better, when one takes account of
the role that mood plays in the work. As to Nietzsche’s ideal mood, there are signs
in HH, but especially in the letters, that Nietzsche understood the engagement
with the new experience to be a momentous task. This idea of a task most probably
contributed to Nietzsche’s decision to leave his Basel professorship and to seek the
solitude of the mountains, as he suggests in EH (KSA 6, 324–326). The question is, to
what extent Nietzsche’s understanding of the air of the heights changes over the
years, and how it influences his writings. This is the question for the following chap-
ters. For now it must suffice to note, that there is a passage in The Wanderer and his
Shadow, which strongly suggests that when Nietzsche from now onwards contemplat-
ed the question of style, it was primarily as a question concerning the communica-
tion of mood:
88. Instruction in the best style. – Instruction in style can, on the one hand, be instruction on how
to find the expression that will let us convey any mood to the reader and hearer; or else instruc-
tion on how to find the expression for a human’s most desirable mood, the one that it is there-
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fore most desirable to communicate and convey: the mood of a human who is moved from the
depths of his heart, spiritually joyful, bright and sincere, someone who has overcome his pas-
sions. This will be instruction in the best style: it corresponds to the good human being. (Hand-
werk 2012, 197; HH II, WS 88, KSA 2, 593)⁴⁷
4.3 Religion and emotion in Daybreak
Commentators who focus on religion have not had much to say about Daybreak. A
notable example is Julian Young who devotes only 1½ pages to D in his comprehen-
sive overview study of Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion (Young 2006, 86–87). The
most likely reason for this neglect is that D is often considered a transitional work
and nothing more when it comes to the criticism of religion. This judgement is under-
standable; D certainly is a transitional work. Still, it is not merely a transitional work.
It is much more because of its foundational importance to Nietzsche’s mature psy-
chological thinking, which is comparable to that of HH. Not only does Nietzsche
here present that possibility of interpretation that has led to the debate about his
“drive psychology”, his ideal mood is also crystallized. Therefore, it is near at
hand to infer that a second reason for the neglect is that the relevance of Nietzsche’s
psychological thinking for his criticism of religion has been underestimated. In no
way do I thereby intend to challenge the obvious fact that the main focus of the
work is on moral prejudices as the subtitle suggests. Indeed, the published work is
restrained in its focus and surprisingly so when compared to other works of
Nietzsche (think of HH, GS etc.). But then again, moral prejudices are inextricably
tied to moral feelings and the history of religion, which makes both affectivity and
religion central concerns of the work. As I have already dealt with Nietzsche’s think-
ing on affectivity in D (see chapter 3), I will here limit the discussion to those aspects
which are of greatest relevance for understanding his criticism of religion. The dis-
cussion is guided by the conviction that carefully taking account of the development
of Nietzsche’s thinking as expressed in the published work is necessary in order to
understand what he sought to achieve in his next work, in GS, and with the state-
ment that God is dead which is found therein. I will therefore begin by examining
the concerns that guide his treatment of religion in D, as well as the most important
psychological statements, and then move on to the question concerning Nietzsche’s
possible “use of mood” in the work.
 It is interesting to note that Nietzsche in this aphorism opposes mood [Stimmung] and [Leiden-
schaft] in the sense that one still dwells in mood after one has “overcome” all passion. While this
single aphorism from WS should not be granted any special authority, it fits the interpretation that
Nietzsche never sought to free himself from all feeling.
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4.3.1 The problem of religious decline
The period between the publication of HH and GS is one in which there are important
developments in Nietzsche’s thinking on affectivity that directly impact his thinking
on religion. These developments, which more specifically concern the consequences
of religious decline, have been discussed extensively by Marco Brusotti. Since his
magisterial study Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis (1997) is not as well known in An-
glophone scholarship as it should be, it is necessary to give a very short summary of
one aspect of his research which is of direct concern here. The lasting value of this
study is to have convincingly shown that Nietzsche was preoccupied with religious
decline in the years following the publication of HH. In the notes from the period,
Nietzsche goes as far as to envision a substitute “religion”, an atheistic new religion
[religion nouvelle] (NL 1880–81, 8[94], KSA 9, 402–403) or a religion of boldness [Re-
ligion der Tapferkeit] (NL 1880–81, 8[1], KSA 9, 384), though at other times he explic-
itly states he does not wish to see the rise of an atheistic religion even if he considers
such a development probable (NL 1880, 7[111], KSA 9, 341). Brusotti’s interpretation
of this preoccupation is nevertheless far from unproblematic. According to Brusotti,
Nietzsche fears that he has underestimated the consequences of secularization.⁴⁸ As
a response to secularization, which here refers specifically to the crisis of the affects
and ideals that have sustained Christianity in Europe, Nietzsche struggles to find a
proper affective response. In trying to explain why Nietzsche thinks that the response
to secularization has to be above all affective, Brusotti relies on Nietzsche’s idea that
the fight against Christianity, which is indebted to a religious passion for truth, had
until then produced a productive affective tension in the European spirit. As a con-
sequence of a serious decline, this tension might disappear and the consequence
would be a catastrophic form of nihilism (Brusotti 1997, 647). While this interpreta-
tion is suggestive, it is hardly plausible as it relies more on Nietzsche’s later remarks
about such a tension (cf. BGE Foreword, KSA 5, 12– 13) than on the scattered remarks
that Nietzsche makes about such an affective tension in the period surrounding the
publication of D.⁴⁹ On the basis of the available evidence, all that can be said about
the matter with any certainty is that Nietzsche thinks the proper response to secula-
rization must avoid the danger of a general weakening of affect inherent in the proc-
ess (cf. Brusotti 1997, 195–212; cf. 385 and 647).
There is another way of reading Nietzsche’s preoccupation with religious de-
cline, in the light of which Nietzsche’s affirmation of affect is more understandable.
On this reading, Nietzsche sees religious decline not only as a threat but as an op-
portunity. The threat is simultaneously a creative opportunity. One can even ask if
he doesn’t play up the threat on purpose, in order to justify the need for a grand re-
 Nietzsche never himself used the German terms for secularization [Säkularisierung/Säkularisa-
tion], which means that I here follow Brusotti’s use of the term.
 These questions are most clearly addressed in Nietzsche’s comparison with Pascal in the Nachlass
of D (NL 1880, 7[262], KSA 9, 372; cf. Brusotti 1997, 385; Hödl 2009, 419).
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valuation. This revaluation would then be the new dawn, which the title Daybreak
[Morgenröte] symbolizes. Needless to say, this reading is not so much an alternative
to Brusotti’s as a necessary complement. Brusotti draws more on Nietzsche’s more
pessimistic assessments contained in the notebooks from the period surrounding
D than the affirming spirit of the published work. That the spirit of D is one of affir-
mation does speak volumes about how Nietzsche wanted to present himself. On this
point, Brusotti’s treatise can in fact be used to support the reading sketched out
above. On the basis of Brusotti’s investigations and the rather scant evidence provid-
ed by Nietzsche’s notes, it is near at hand to explain the emphasis on affect in terms
of that subtle change in Nietzsche’s self-understanding, which led him to re-evaluate
his former striving for peace as being a result of a violent passion for knowledge (cf.
Brusotti 1997, 168). Far from rejecting this affect, he affirms it and this affirmation
grounds his take on affectivity in D. So what is clear is that in D at the latest,
Nietzsche no longer strives towards a form of life freer from affects in the sense of
passion [Leidenschaft] (cf. Brusotti 1997, 642), and instead considers the weakening
of affects a positive danger. This does not mean, as I hope to show through textual
evidence, that he has become any less suspicious about feelings and especially “high
feelings”. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s disparaging of striving for emotion for its own
sake is a thing of the past and is replaced with a more pronounced, but nevertheless
conditional appreciation of the resources present in religion. Though Nietzsche vehe-
mently disagrees with the use to which they are put, Nietzsche values the higher feel-
ings cultivated in religious practice as potential building blocks for a future culture.
This future-oriented vision about the value of inherited feelings is far more explicit in
D than in HH.With this greater appreciation comes the insight that an intellectual
critique of religion is not enough to overcome the religious past, at least not if a di-
minishment of human life is to be avoided. Therefore, the key question of D is, what
will replace moral and religious feelings? What will ground a flourishing life instead
of moral and religious feelings?
4.3.2 Reinterpreting and transforming feeling
On the basis of his interpretation, Brusotti suggests that D can be read as having the
goal of transforming feeling (Brusotti 1997, 640–641). While this is a claim that I
think requires more textual evidence than provided by Brusotti, especially there is
a need to specify how Nietzsche would have mood transformed, it is certainly a
solid starting point to recognize that Nietzsche contemplates the possibility of getting
rid of certain moral feelings and the possibility of transforming feeling. This focus on
feeling is present already in the opening aphorism, in which Nietzsche rhetorically
asks whether not the good historian constantly contradicts, in the sense that any his-
tory that deals with origins contradicts the feeling that those things we think of as
rational can’t have an irrational origin (D 1, KSA 3, 19). This short opening aphorism
of D, which is reminiscent of the opening of HH, points out a conflict between the
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historical sense of the free spirit and inherited ways of feeling. The target is the entire
domain of morality. For those things “we” think of as rational, the rationality of
which things Nietzsche here sets out to question, are of course rules of morality
and associated moral feelings. The important explanatory aphorism on the “morality
of custom” is exemplary in this regard. There Nietzsche suggests that the advanced
moral sense [Gefühl der Sittlichkeit] of his own time derives from the distant past;
from fear for the commands of a higher power that must be obeyed without question
(D 9, KSA 3, 21–24) In effect, Nietzsche claims that even the morality of his own day
is based on a feeling for custom [Gefühl für die Sitte], obeying inherited rules without
question, which is destructive insofar as it works against revising moral rules on the
basis of experience (D 19, KSA 3, 32). Where is Nietzsche going with all this? Having
hinted at the possibility of revising customs and moral rules, how does he seek a way
forward?
The big picture, into which Nietzsche’s more specific discussions of moral feel-
ings fit, can be gleaned from his words about living in a moral interregnum. The basic
idea here is that of a power vacuum, in which it is not clear if there is any command-
ing morality. In this interregnum, he writes, the old moral feelings and judgements
have already lost much of their binding power but new ideals are yet to arise. There-
fore, he asks who could tell, what will one day replace moral feelings. There is no
explicit answer and the sceptical tone of the aphorism suggests that the answer is
no-one. Yet this does not mean that Nietzsche would forsake the task of striving
for a specific future. Quite to the contrary, he adds that only the sciences can one
day provide the groundwork for new ideals, if not the ideals themselves. Only against
this background does Nietzsche’s following assertion make sense: that living in the
interregnummeans that one can live either in a manner oriented toward the past or in
an anticipatory, forward-looking mode. That no one can tell what will replace moral
feelings, that the future is truly open from the human perspective, means that those
who would live for the future are fated to be experiments. In this sense, Nietzsche
bids the free spirit to embrace his fate and to desire the experimental life. (Cf.
D 453, KSA 3, 274.)
The alliance between scepticism and future-orientation, as in denying that the
shape of the future can be known while simultaneously showing the way towards
a specific possible future, that the aphorism espouses seems uneasy at best. On a
reading emphasizing the sceptical element, one could claim that Nietzsche in fact
advances an individualistic morality for free spirits. Indeed, he calls for the free spi-
rits to be their own masters in the interregnum (D 453, KSA 3, 274). Still, his emphasis
on the sciences suggests that the experimental life that he envisions is defined by the
task to devise ideals that take account of scientific knowledge. Importantly he singles
out physiology, medicine and what he calls the sciences of society and loneliness
[Gesellschafts- und Einsamkeitslehre]. This latter path of engaging with those sciences
that have most to say about human life is the one that Nietzsche himself pursues in D
and beyond, on the way to a new dawn; yet this is perhaps nothing more than his
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own path. How does religion relate to this task? Is the religious past only an obstacle,
or are there valuable resources in the religious inheritance?
4.3.3 Religion and the new dawn
When it comes to religion, D expands on the program of HH. Only against the back-
ground of HH can one fully appreciate what Nietzsche means when he speaks of his-
torical refutation as the final refutation of faith in God (D 95, KSA 3, 86–87). The his-
torical method, which as we have seen in the analysis of HH includes psychological
analysis, can be used to question the origin of faith in God. According to Nietzsche,
this new way is the tune of the day. Such questioning, he claims, renders a rational
proof of the non-existence of God unnecessary (D 95, KSA 3, 86). Unfortunately,
Nietzsche does not specify exactly why this is the case. This is one of those cases
in which the philosopher challenges his reader to fill the missing part and to
make up his/her own mind. Against the background of HH, it is plausible to see
the conclusion as following from a specific understanding of the historical method.
The historical method subjects its objects to time, which precludes any possibility of
a metaphysics of all that which is timeless, unchanging and immortal. If belief in
God requires accepting, as Nietzsche seems to think at least the Christian idea of
God does, that the idea of God comes straight from God (as revelation), then showing
that the idea of God has a natural origin and has developed gradually is tantamount
to a refutation. This argument is supported by Nietzsche’s concluding remarks that it
was a prejudice of the atheists of former times to believe that a certain kind of ration-
al refutation of theological proofs of God was enough. As the atheists failed to see
that new and better arguments for the existence of God could always be devised
in the future, they failed to clear the air (D 95, KSA 3, 87). So in a sense the atheists
that Nietzsche has in mind were caught up in a game that they could not win; a game
wedded to theological method; to methods of reasoning honed in theological schools
for centuries.Where they should have attacked the methods of theological reasoning,
they were content to refute the results of such reasoning, i.e. the proofs of the exis-
tence of god. Contrary to such an approach, Nietzsche trusts the historical method
itself to provide the best refutation of theological and metaphysical reasoning (cf.
HH I 9, KSA 2, 29–30).
The most important issue which Nietzsche left unclear in HH was what the con-
sequences of such historical and psychological philosophizing look like. What are
the emotional consequences and the consequences for values, when the foundations
of a dominant religion are eroded? This remains much the same in D, as aphorism 453
on the moral interregnum shows (D 453, KSA 3, 274). That the question did preoccupy
Nietzsche can be deduced from the fact that the aphorism following the one on his-
torical refutation, the final aphorism of the first book of D, deals with the issue.What
is remarkable is that it does so in a rather strange way. Nietzsche’s speculative com-
parison of the then current European situation with the Indian situation that led to
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the rise of Buddhism thousands of years ago does little to illuminate the future of
Europe. What happens when the old morality is abandoned, “– well, what will
come then?” (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 55). Although Nietzsche
bids the reader to wait and see, he specifies that one has to wait and see that Europe
first repeats the steps that India took. This means that after a significant number of
people have thrown away belief in God/s and traditional mores, as Nietzsche thinks
was the case in India before the rise of Buddhism and as he thinks is the case in the
Europe of his day, they should give each other a sign to recognize one another and
become a force to be reckoned with. (D 96, KSA 3, 87–88)
On the one hand, one can see the aphorism as a rather futile attempt by
Nietzsche to comprehend the situation facing himself and his time through analogy.
Read that way, it raises questions about Nietzsche’s historical sense. For who could
say in advance what the future will look like? (cf. D 453, KSA 3, 274). On the other
hand, one can see the analogy as an excuse for presenting the demand that those
who no longer believe in inherited notions such as “God” should become aware of
their historical situation and conscious of themselves as a force to be reckoned
with. This is nothing less than a vision of an international community of free spirits,
if not an atheistic religion. Nietzsche’s decision not to refrain from presenting a vi-
sion of the future development of European culture can thus be read in terms of
an attempt to actively influence the shape of the future. So here again, Nietzsche
is concerned with the new dawn to come and again he does not say anything specific
about this coming time. There is not much to be found on the topic in the passages
that directly deal with religion, but there are passages that reveal how the new vision
relates to that religiously sanctioned morality which it supersedes. If one were to sin-
gle out one passage, that above others helps to clarify Nietzsche’s position, it would
be aphorism 103.
In aphorism 103, Nietzsche clarifies in what sense he denies morality. He explic-
itly distances his view from a universal scepticism concerning moral motivations. So
it is not always the case that a person explaining his actions in moral terms is deceiv-
ing himself and others as to the true motivations of his actions.⁵⁰ This idea conforms
to the interpretation I developed in chapter three that Nietzsche thinks it is admissi-
ble to refer to conscious mental states as influencing action and doesn’t view all ac-
tion through a rigid drive theory. Because deception is still always a possibility, (after
all one cannot access the phenomenal world of another person), Nietzsche (invoking
the spirit of La Rochefoucauld) does go on to suggest that that a certain doubt regard-
ing the stated motivations of people is only healthy. His own position, however, is
 Clark and Leiter here read Nietzsche as rejecting the view he advanced in HH that all actions are
egoistic (Clark and Leiter 1997, xxiv–xxv). I think there is more reason to speak of clarification than
rejection, as Nietzsche nowhere in HHmakes a systematical case for the kind of psychological egoism
that Clark and Leiter presuppose. The perspective that he strives for is rather one that makes the dis-
tinction between selfishness and selflessness redundant. For a similar critique, see Franco 2011,
26–29.
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rather to question that moral actions would be based on any moral truth about the
world. According to Nietzsche there is no reason to question that people have moral
feelings, and act according to them. He specifically mentions that countless people
feel immoral, but criticizes them for thinking of their emotional state as expressing a
truth about themselves and about the world. A good example would be the jump
from feeling immoral to believing that one is immoral and depraved and that this
is the way the world is because of original sin. He also makes clear that critiquing
morality in this way does not mean to turn everything on its head. Many actions
deemed moral should be encouraged, but for other reasons than strictly moral
ones. This requires learning anew in order to feel anew: “We have to learn to
think differently – in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to
feel differently.” (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 60; D 103, KSA 3, 91–92)⁵¹
The aphorism shows beyond any doubt that one goal of the critique of morality
in D is to make it possible to feel differently about matters usually thought of as
moral. Since morality shapes so much of experience, this goal amounts to nothing
less than feeling differently about existence more generally. Is feeling differently
then the ultimate goal of Nietzsche’s criticism, the most important goal among
many goals, or perhaps just one goal among equally important goals? Because
Nietzsche’s explicit statements on the topic are so cursory in D, it is on their basis
next to impossible to ascertain whether Nietzsche here even considers feeling differ-
ently as a goal in its own right, or whether it is rather a sign of something else, e.g.
that one has internalized the idea that there are no moral truths. On the grounds that
Nietzsche already in the period surrounding the publication of HH understands his
philosophy as the pursuit of a mountain air ideal, and because his later thought cul-
minates in thinking what he deems the highest possible affirmation, an affective
stance toward the earth informed by the thought of Eternal Recurrence, it is justified
to assume provisionally that enabling the transformation of feeling was the most im-
portant goal of D. Before looking more closely at the evidence concerning authorial
intention, and what can be gained from an interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of mood,
there is one final issue that has to be sorted out. Any further discussion about
Nietzsche’s project of transforming feeling presupposes that Nietzsche does not sim-
ply reject the value of high feelings and strive for a general cooling down of affect.
In the discussion on HH, it was established that Nietzsche thinks that above all
those accomplishments, experiences and states of mind that are granted the highest
value are associated with a higher world. In short, all higher feelings are given a su-
pernatural origin. In HH, this knowledge led to a sceptical stance towards all extra-
ordinary feelings, especially those associated with religion. The free spirit neverthe-
less acknowledges the value of such feelings for contemplation, and perhaps even
 “umzulernen – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen” (D 103, KSA 3,
92).
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sees a role for them in the future. In D, Nietzsche repeats the same basic criticism,⁵²
concluding that: “wherever a man’s feelings are exalted, that imaginary world is in-
volved in some way” (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 24–25; D 33, KSA 3,
42). Furthermore, he writes:
It is a sad fact, but for the moment the man of science has to be suspicious of all higher feelings,
so greatly are they nourished by delusion and nonsense. It is not that they are thus in them-
selves, or must always remain thus: but of all the gradual purifications awaiting mankind,
the purification of the higher feelings will certainly be one of the most gradual. (Hollingdale
transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 25; D 33, KSA 3, 42–43)
While this passage, which echoes HH, clarifies that the attack on metaphysical inter-
pretations is not intended to be an attack on exalted states of mind, it simultaneously
points out that such feelings are through historical associations so entwined with re-
ligion and metaphysics that they must for the time being be viewed with suspicion.
The aphorism proves that Nietzsche is just as suspicious of high feelings in D as in
HH, and yet it also shows that he is even more aware of their value. That the free
spirit does not deny the value of high feelings is apparent from the regret that he ex-
presses at the necessity of viewing such emotional states with suspicion. Neverthe-
less, this regret does not speak of nostalgia nor does it imply that the free spirit seeks
to rid himself of such feelings; it is rather meant to point out that the purification of
feeling is a task that has only become more pressing. In contrast to HH, where puri-
fication is associated with calm contemplation which turns feelings into objects of
knowledge, purification in D is best understood as an active and creative process
of transformation. This interpretation finds support in the oft-cited aphorism 210:
210. The thing itself. – Formerly we asked: what is the laughable? as though there were things
external to us to which the laughable adhered as a quality, and we exhausted ourselves in sug-
gestions (one theologian even opined that it was ’the naivety of sin’.) Now we ask: what is laugh-
ter? How does laughter originate? We have thought the matter over and finally decided that there
is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but that there are
states of soul in which we impose such words upon things external to and within us. We
have again taken back the predicates of things, or at least remembered that it was we who
lent them to them: – let us take care that this insight does not deprive us of the capacity to
lend, and that we have not become at the same time richer and greedier. (Hollingdale transl./
Clark and Leiter 1997, 133; D 210, KSA 3, 189)
First of all, there is an interesting parallel here to the aphorism on the historical ref-
utation of faith in God. Today it is asked how laughter arises and one enquires into its
origin. In this case, however, applying the historical method does not result in a ref-
 “So verachtet der Mensch im Banne der Sittlichkeit der Sitte erstens die Ursachen, zweitens die Fol-
gen, drittens die Wirklichkeit, und spinnt alle seine höheren Empfindungen (der Ehrfurcht, der Erhaben-
heit, des Stolzes, der Dankbarkeit, der Liebe) an eine eingebildete Welt an: die sogenannte höhere Welt.”
(D 33, KSA 3, 42)
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utation of laughter. To the contrary, the aphorism emphasizes the value of the ability
to have states [Zustände], from which to value things. Losing the affective capacity to
value would indeed be a diminishment. So instead of removing emotion or turning
emotions only into objects of knowledge, the affects have to be transformed. To what
extent this is a matter of redirecting emotions is an interesting question, especially
when it comes to religious feelings. The affective configuration that supports belief
in God is something that has developed historically through religious practice over
a long time span. Does Nietzsche call free spirits to redirect those feelings that
have been directed at the idea of God? Such an endeavour sounds Feuerbachian,
in the sense of taking back the predicates of God and redirecting them at humanity
(cf. Feuerbach 1849).⁵³ While the analogy can initially help to grasp what Nietzsche is
after, it is not adequate to describe what Nietzsche is doing. Already in HH, Nietzsche
was extremely critical of efforts to transfer religious feelings to such domains as art
and politics. Instead of simply redirecting religious feelings for God, Nietzsche would
see such feelings transformed at the root. In D, such radical transformation goes by
the name of purification. Hödl (2009, 311 and 426) and Brusotti (1997, 408–409 and
423) have drawn similar conclusions, though they correctly note that Nietzsche’s vo-
cabulary at times comes deceptively close to suggesting the adoption of a Feuerbach-
ian perspective.
Now that it has been established that Nietzsche does not reject the value of high
feelings, and instead calls for a purification of exalted states, it is possible to turn to
the question, what role mood plays in the philosophical project of Daybreak.
4.4 Nietzsche’s use of mood in D
The very same questions that were asked about HH are worth asking about D. Does
Nietzsche make use of mood in his writing in D? And if yes, how and to what end?
How does this use of mood relate to the philosophical project of D? Is understanding
the mood or moods that are expressed in D essential to understanding its philosoph-
ical contents?
As was the case with HH, the most instructive evidence can be found in Nietz-
sche’s letters. A key difference between HH and D is that in the case of the latter
work there is far more evidence that directly bears on the question of authorial inten-
tion that precedes the publication of the book. The most interesting discussion in this
regard is the one that Nietzsche was having with Köselitz in February 1881. This dis-
 Nietzsche became acquainted with Feuerbach’s work The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des
Christentums], or at least the most important of its arguments, during his school-years in Schulpforta,
which can be seen in texts by the 17-year old student, as Hödl points out (Hödl 2009, 214–215; cf.
Young 2010, 36). Insofar as one can speak of lasting influence, it has to do with Nietzsche’s adoption
and development of Feuerbach’s idea that all conceptions of God are human creations, projections of
desires of the heart (cf. Hödl 2009, 221).
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cussion was above all concerned with the choice of title. In a postcard sent to Köse-
litz on 22 February 1881, Nietzsche explains why he has chosen to change the title of
the work (KGB III/1, Bf. 83). Despite what he takes to be the less good taste of the title
“Eine Morgenröte”, its too enthusiastic, too oriental connotations, he favours it be-
cause he thinks it leads the reader to expect a more joyful mood in the book. With
the title “Eine Morgenröte”, he suggests, one sets out to read the work in a different
mood than if the title would not raise the expectation of a new dawn. He even goes
as far as to suggest that without the promise of a glorious dawn the book would come
across as too bleak.⁵⁴ Whether Nietzsche here refers only to the title or also to the
numerous aphorisms suggesting that a new dawn is near cannot be said with any
certainty; let it nevertheless be said that there are good grounds to pay attention
to the matter: Indeed, I will argue that raising expectations is perhaps the single
most powerful trick that Nietzsche uses to enable a redirection of mood in D. For
now it is enough to note that these considerations of mood that spoke in favour of
the title outweighed all the downsides, and only for this reason do we know the
work with the title Daybreak. Already on account of this letter alone, one is tempted
to conclude that Nietzsche, by the time of D, was not only fully aware of the power of
mood but that he also put this knowledge into practice. The discussion with Köselitz
continues after the publication, and further strengthens that conclusion.
Writing to Köselitz about D, Nietzsche exhorts his friend to read it as a whole and
to try to make a whole out of it, as an expression of a passionate state.⁵⁵ What can be
made out of the fact that Nietzsche wanted his friend to read his newly published
work as expressing a passionate state? Whether this fact can be generalized, and
turned into the form that D expresses mood and Nietzsche meant it to do so, is a
more difficult question. There is of course the problem, which Brusotti has drawn at-
tention to, that Nietzsche seems to contradict himself (Brusotti 1997, 22). Indeed, only
about two months after the letter quoted above Nietzsche complains to Köselitz
about being an aphoristic human [Aphorismus-Mensch], bound to write in a fragmen-
tary mode that only suggests that the text makes up a whole, or even worse: that the
text only suggests the need for a whole (KGB III/1, Bf. 143). In addition to this letter,
there is also the digression inserted into the book itself, which states:
Digression. – A book such as this is not for reading straight through or reading aloud but for
dipping into, especially when out walking or on a journey; you must be able to stick your
 “Titel! Der zweite ‘E<ine> Morgenr<öthe>’ ist um einen Grad zu schwärmerisch, orientalisch und we-
niger guten Geschmacks: aber das wird durch den Vortheil aufgewogen, daß man eine freudigere Stim-
mung im Buche voraussetzt als beim andern Titel, man liest in anderem Zustande; es kommt dem Buche
zu statten, welches, ohne das Bischen Aussicht auf den Morgen, doch gar zu düster wäre! – Anmaaßend
klingt der andre Titel auch, ach, was liegt noch daran! Ein wenig Anmaaßung mehr oder weniger bei
solch einem Buche!” (KGB III/1, Bf. 83)
 “lesen Sie es als Ganzes und versuchen Sie ein Ganzes für sich daraus zu machen – nämlich einen
leidenschaftlichen Zustand” (KGB III/1, Bf. 119).
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head into it and out of it again and again and discover nothing familiar around you. (Hollingdale
transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 191; D 454, KSA 3, 274)
Nietzsche seems to contradict himself. Nevertheless, Brusotti argues that Nietzsche
meant the work to form a whole. According to Brusotti, each passage of D is
meant to express the passionate state that Nietzsche wanted his friend Köselitz to
grasp. In this view, it is the task of the reader to realize the entirety of the passionate
state behind each and every aphorism. On account of letter 119 (to Köselitz) and de-
spite the aphoristic form, Brusotti thus concludes (on behalf of Nietzsche!) that only
through the passion of knowledge is the work made a whole.⁵⁶ While the evidence of
Nietzsche’s letters is compelling, Brusotti does not back up his thesis with enough
textual evidence from within D. From Brusotti’s treatment of the issue it is still un-
clear exactly what role mood plays in D and what its philosophical status is. I will
delve deeper into these issues through engaging the work of Rebecca Bamford,
who has written in more detail on Nietzsche’s use of mood in D (Bamford 2014).
4.4.1 Rebecca Bamford’s thesis about Nietzsche’s use of mood
Apparently unaware of Golomb’s very similar efforts regarding HH, Rebecca Bamford
seeks to tease out an understanding of the way Nietzsche uses mood in D from the
aphorisms that make up the work.⁵⁷ In her paper “Mood and Aphorism in Nietzsche’s
Campaign Against Morality” she advances the thesis that “Nietzsche uses mood
(Stimmung) to identify, and counter, the highly problematic and deeply entrenched
authority of the morality of custom” (Bamford 2014, 56). Unlike Golomb, Bamford ex-
plicitly presents her thesis as a contribution to answering the question why Nietzsche
uses the aphoristic form (Bamford 2014, 55). Consequently, she not only pays atten-
tion to the content of the aphorisms but thematizes “performative” aspects of
Nietzsche’s writing as well. That does not mean that her work would be any less
problematic; to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is definitely worth interrogating.
Bamford is right to stress the affective dimension of D. As our brief discussion
has shown, there is ample evidence that Nietzsche considers feelings of utmost im-
portance to those problems of morality that concern him. Bamford’s recognition of
the philosophical importance that Nietzsche attaches to feelings is a welcome correc-
tive to the overtly cognitive perspective on D taken by Clark and Leiter in their influ-
 “Nur durch die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis ist Morgenröthe ein Ganzes: durch die Leidenschaft des
Autors und durch die des Lesers.” (Brusotti 1997, 22)
 This is not the only similarity between the two. Bamford’s remarks on Nietzsche’s use of mood in
D are best understood against the background of her reading of the work as a therapeutic narrative
(Bamford 2015). Likewise, Golomb’s thesis about Nietzsche’s use of mood in HH is part of his larger
argument about the therapeutic intentions of Nietzsche’s philosophy (cf. Golomb 1989).
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ential introduction that has defined the Anglophone reception of the book.⁵⁸ It is
however precisely there where Bamford goes beyond a mere recognition of the im-
portance of affects in Nietzsche’s thinking towards a positive thesis about Nietzsche’s
use of mood that the evidence that she presents has to be examined carefully. There
is good reason to begin by emphasizing a specific problem that Bamford downplays.
If one looks at Nietzsche’s statements on mood [Stimmung] in D one can detect an
ambivalence in his thinking on the use of mood; an uneasiness about the role of af-
fectivity in thought. This ambivalence is present in aphorism 28 (D 28, KSA 3, 38),
which Bamford grants a key role in her argument and which should be given careful
consideration in any interpretation of Nietzsche’s thinking on mood (cf. Bamford
2014, 66–67). For the sake of clarity, here is the entire aphorism:
28. Mood as argument. – ’What is the cause of a cheerful resolution for action?’ – mankind has
been much exercised by this question. The oldest and still the most common answer is: ’God is
the cause; it is his way of telling us he approves of our intention.’ When in former times one
consulted the oracle over something one proposed to do, what one wanted from it was this feel-
ing of cheerful resolution; and anyone who stood in doubt before several possible courses of
action advised himself thus: ’I shall do that which engenders this feeling.’ One thus decided,
not for the most reasonable course, but for that course the image of which inspired the soul
with hope and courage. The good mood was placed on the scales as an argument and outweigh-
ed rationality: it did so because it was interpreted superstitiously as the effect of a god who
promises success and who in this manner gives expression to his reason as the highest ration-
ality. Now consider the consequences of such a prejudice when clever and power-hungry men
availed themselves – and continue to avail themselves – of it! ’Create a mood!’ – one will
then require no reasons and conquer all objections! (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997,
22; D 28, KSA 3, 38)
The least that must be said on the basis of the aphorism is that Nietzsche is aware of
the possibility of using mood as a tool of manipulation; he is in other words aware of
the power of mood. To conclude on the basis of the aphorism, that he himself would
endorse this kind of use of mood is dubious, if not out of the question. It can reason-
ably be assumed, granted that one takes his emphasis on intellectual integrity [Red-
lichkeit]⁵⁹ at face value, that he would reject the use of mood in place of argument in
a philosophical context. I read Bamford as not necessarily falling into this trap when
she suggests that the aphorism leaves open the possibility of a positive use of mood
(Bamford 2014, 67). Indeed, there is no reason to assume that there is an unresolv-
able contradiction between this aphorism and any possible positive use of mood
by Nietzsche. What bothers Nietzsche most about the use of mood that he criticizes
 The deficiencies of the perspective adopted by Clark and Leiter will be shown in the following
discussion on the specific case of superstitious fear.
 See the similar aphorism 543. Do not make passion an argument for the truth [Nicht die Leiden-
schaft zum Argument der Wahrheit machen] (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 216–217;
D 543, KSA 3, 313–314). See also Brusotti on the concepts Redlichkeit and Leidenschaft der Redlichkeit
(Brusotti 1997).
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is that it rests on and supports metaphysical, “superstitious” interpretations of
mood. The key question is to what use mood is put: Perhaps mood can play another
role in philosophy than that of simply overriding arguments? Perhaps mood can be
used to provide an affective background sense against which an argument or series
of arguments can better be understood? Perhaps using mood is the only way to work
against an established mood that hinders free thinking about any number of issues?
Or perhaps mood can simply be used to compliment arguments and give them life?
Such questions might have crossed Nietzsche’s mind, but it is best to refrain from any
claims of the sort unless there is reasonably acceptable evidence to support them.
How exactly Nietzsche put his thinking on mood into practice has to be proven.
The next logical step is to look for passages in which Nietzsche in fact does make
use of mood. Before we examine the evidence for any positive use of mood by
Nietzsche, we must digress to consider the presuppositions that Bamford’s thesis
rests on.
4.4.2 The presuppositions of Bamford’s thesis
Bamford assumes that Nietzsche is using mood to counter another mood; the “mood
of fear” (Bamford 2014, 61). According to Bamford, he takes it that the mood of fear
supports morality by preventing new feelings from developing. Why would this be
the case? I will here expand on Bamford’s cursory remarks, since this issue is foun-
dational for her case. In this reading of Nietzsche, fear plays a decisive role in mor-
ality, as it is really fear that lies at the root of the prohibition to revise morals. So fear
begets unconditional obedience to custom, and obedience to custom prevents even
harmful customs from being corrected (cf. D 19, KSA 3, 32). This fear is deeply rooted
and therefore best understood as a mood, which means that it cannot be fought
against only through reason but also requires a reorientation of affect (cf. Bamford
2014, 74). Against this background, the idea of using mood against the mood of
fear is understandable. Such a use of mood against mood would not contradict
Nietzsche’s distaste against the way the power-hungry use mood as a tool of manip-
ulation, because it is a case in which mere rational arguments are not enough to de-
feat a harmful and false understanding of morality. This idea, that Nietzsche seeks to
use mood against mood, is the starting point for Bamford’s discussion of Nietzsche’s
use of mood in D. The sceptical reader might however ask: does such talk about a
mood of fear make sense in the first place?
Bamford’s talk of a “mood of fear” is not as problematic as it at first sounds, and
it is certainly no reason to dismiss her argument. That most philosophers (other than
Heideggerians)⁶⁰ do not consider fear a mood is irrelevant, as Nietzsche himself does
 Heidegger infamously treats fear as a mood [Stimmung] in Sein und Zeit (cf. Heidegger 2006, 140).
Quite a few phenomenologically inclined philosophers have followed in his footsteps, e.g. Lars
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not make any clear cut distinctions between affects, moods, and states. He does in-
deed repeatedly suggest, as Bamford rightly points out, that superstitious fear is one
of the pillars sustaining customary morality (cf. D 9, KSA 3, 22; D 23, KSA 3, 34; D 104,
KSA 3, 92). From Nietzsche’s discussion it is clear that this fear is ever-present in cul-
tures that rely on customary morality. Clark and Leiter also recognize that supersti-
tious fear supports the morality of custom, but write about it as a matter of supersti-
tious beliefs to be rid of through rational arguments (Clark and Leiter 1997, xxxiii and
xxxiv). This failure to acknowledge that Nietzsche clearly does not think rational ar-
guments to be enough is understandable given the misleading translation of D 103
that Clark and Leiter use to support their interpretation (cf. Clark and Leiter 1997,
xxxiii). The translation imputes that “We have to learn to think differently – in
order at least, perhaps very late on, to achieve even more: to feel differently”,
which implies that thinking differently is enough to feel differently in the future.
The original German edition speaks about the necessity to learn anew [umzulernen],
which can be understood in a much broader sense than merely thinking differently.
In particular, there is reason to believe that Nietzsche thought the process of learning
anew to be affective through and through and as much a matter of practice as of crit-
ical cognition. In any case, the evidence that Nietzsche believed that merely thinking
differently is not enough is overwhelming, which would seem to support Bamford’s
starting point. In the following, I will examine a particular case, which supports
Bamford’s reading against Clark and Leiter but also complicates the picture that
the mood of fear would be the only affective constraint that prevents a dawn of trans-
formed feelings.
According to Nietzsche, fear is not the only feeling preventing new post-moral
interpretations of feelings from developing. The aphorism The brake (D 32, KSA 3,
41) makes the case that pride also serves this function. In fact, Nietzsche quite a
few times indicates that as the archaic sense for the sanctity of all custom has
been weakened (D 9, KSA 3, 21–24), the role played by fear has also been diminished
even if moral fear is still active in and around us and not entirely a thing of the past
(cf. D 5, KSA 3, 20; D 10, KSA 3, 24; D 18, KSA 3, 30–32; D 551, KSA 3, 551). Most cer-
tainly, Nietzsche assumes that the free spirits he describes no longer think of them-
selves as bound by conventional morality. Why would people, including some who
think of themselves as free spirits, then in Nietzsche’s own time still act in accord-
ance with moral conventions, even when it harms themselves and perhaps even
when they no longer think that it is rational to do so? Nietzsche’s answer in aphor-
ism 32 is that these people would rather suffer because of their morality than be rid
of their self-imposed suffering, because this suffering provides the sublime feeling of
being in contact with a truer world, a higher or deeper reality. He sees pride at work
Svendsen whom Bamford mentions to justify her approach (Bamford 2014, 61). Of course, a sole ref-
erence to one contemporary philosopher is not much of a justification. In this case, however, I think
one need not look beyond Nietzsche’s own thinking for a sufficient justification.
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in this choice, pride resisting a younger yet more truthful understanding of morality.
The implication is clear: That there is a new understanding of morality that has at
least for some people already replaced older understandings of morality (presumably
based on obedience and fear) does not matter much if it remains a matter of the head
and not also a matter of the heart. Nietzsche ends the aphorism by asking what
power one should use to set aside this constraining pride; this brake. “More
pride? A new pride?”, he asks, clearly aware that an intellectual attack against
such pride is not going to be enough. (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997,
24; D 32, KSA 3, 41)
Unsurprisingly, Clark and Leiter overlook this important aphorism in their dis-
cussion on what it takes to get rid of superstitious beliefs (Clark and Leiter 1997).
More alarmingly, Bamford also ignores the aphorism. In the light of this aphorism,
Bamford’s starting point seems incomplete and her thesis consequently has to be ad-
justed. If Nietzsche indeed uses mood to counter the morality of custom, the mood in
question would have to be one that not only counters (superstitious) fear, but also
works against the kind of pride described in aphorism 32. Alternatively, there
would have to be at least two different moods at work, a first one that allows one
to move beyond fear and another that enables one to set aside a perverse pride in
one’s suffering for morality. This second alternative does not present any serious
problems as long as the moods in question are not thought of as entirely opposed
(cf. HH I 14, KSA 2, 35) because that would threaten the unity of the work, which
Nietzsche himself wanted his friend Köselitz to read as expressing one passionate
state of mind [einen leidenschaftlichen Zustand] (KGB III/1, Bf. 119). Now that the pre-
suppositions of Bamford’s thesis have been examined, it still remains to be seen
what evidence can be found that Nietzsche in fact makes use of mood in D to further
his ends.
4.4.3 Interruptions and expectations? Nietzsche’s techniques of communicating
mood in D
Bamford claims that in D 146, besides arguing against the morality of custom,
“Nietzsche shows how mood can be used performatively to campaign against mor-
ality” (Bamford 2014, 68). This claim rests on Nietzsche’s self-interruption at the
very end of the aphorism; his exclamation “but now not a word more! A glance is
enough; you have understood me” (Hollingdale transl./Clark and Leiter 1997, 92;
D 146, KSA 3, 138). According to Bamford, Nietzsche interrupts himself after having
criticized moralistic understandings of compassion just as he is about to present an
alternative moral vision. In this view then, Nietzsche interrupts himself when he is
about to “adopt problematic moral talk” and this interruption “performs” resistance
to the authority of morality (Bamford 2014, 68). Bamford is certainly right that some-
thing important about Nietzsche’s use of mood can be learned from aphorism 146,
and self-interruption does play an important role in some other important aphorisms
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of D, not least in aphorism 96 (D 96, KSA 3, 87–88). However, a closer look at both of
these aphorisms reveals that Bamford’s interpretation is problematic; in other words,
I will argue that Bamford is right about aphorism 146 being a good example of
Nietzsche’s use of mood for the wrong reasons.
The main problem in both cases is that Nietzsche actually gives a glimpse of his
alternative vision before interrupting himself, and there is no reason to read his in-
terruptions as repudiations. In aphorism 146 he triumphantly asks whether his desire
to move beyond a simplistic understanding of pity [Mitleid] towards a vision in which
great sacrifices that serve the future good of humanity are sanctioned is not itself al-
ready the expression of a higher and freer mood [Stimmung] (D 146, KSA 3, 138). In
aphorism 96, as we have seen, he even goes on to give specific instructions based on
his vision of the future (i.e. that nonbelievers should give each other a sign) (D 96,
KSA 3, 88). Strategic interruptions and sceptical cautions need not indicate anything
else than that the time is not yet ripe to give definite answers, as the aphorism on
living in a moral interregnum suggests (D 453, KSA 3, 274). In general, Nietzsche is
not as adverse to “moral talk” in D as Bamford suggests, at least not to all kinds
of speaking about morality. Vehemently objecting to a morality based on obedience
and metaphysical ideas in no ways rules out talk about desirable conditions, virtues
and actions.⁶¹ Indeed, an even more daring thesis about Nietzsche’s use of mood can
be advanced on the basis of the aphorisms in question. What unites all these three
aphorisms is that Nietzsche plays with the expectations of the reader; and by raising
expectations shapes the mood of the reader. In this perspective, Nietzsche’s naviga-
tion between scepticism regarding that which is to come and the affirmation of a spe-
cific vision of the future can be viewed as a strategic technique to communicate a
mood of joy without giving up scepticism. Bamford does not even consider this alter-
native explanation for Nietzsche’s self-interruption at the end of aphorism 146. In-
stead, she quickly moves forward and simply notes that “performative claims”
that serve the same end she thinks the self-interruption serves are found in numer-
ous aphorisms of D.
To further strengthen my interpretation, I will compare aphorism 96 with two
equally important aphorisms that exemplify Nietzsche’s “use of mood”. The final
aphorisms of books one, two and five, “In hoc signo Vinces” (D 96, KSA 3, 87–88),
Distant prospect (D 148, KSA 3, 139– 140) and We aeronauts of the spirit (D 575,
KSA 3, 331), all exhibit the same pattern. All of these aphorisms present visions of
a future to desire, a future to strive for. Aphorism 96 holds out the possibility of Euro-
pean free spirits becoming conscious of their collective power. Aphorism 148 ends by
suggesting that the revaluation of egoistic action will lend a perspective that purifies
the world of evil by abolishing the moral idea of evil. Aphorism 575, which closes the
entire book, finally presents the free spirit with a vision of more mighty spirits who
 After all, Nietzsche doesn’t shy away from assembling a list of his very own personal cardinal vir-
tues (see D 556, KSA 3, 325).
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will strive in the same direction and reach ever further. By presenting such visions,
Nietzsche is countering the idea that moving beyond conventional morality would
inevitably lead an individual or a community to a bleak wasteland. Of course, no
one can say with certainty that it does not. After all, Nietzsche presents the move be-
yond conventional morality as an experiment! What matters is that the experiment
cannot even begin as long as one is convinced that the end result is catastrophic.
Where do the birds that cherish the free air and open seas fly? What is their destina-
tion? Perhaps that matters little as long as they’re driven by their desire, worth more
than any other desire,⁶² this joy of striving ever higher in clear air. Any ultimate
“what for?” is replaced with a provisional answer: for the views, for the joy. By pro-
viding glimpses of a glorious dawn, through this mood of joy, Nietzsche arguably
seeks to inculcate the same desire in the reader.
4.4.4 Aphorisms for manipulation?
When Bamford continues her discussion on Nietzsche’s use of mood, she comes
close to the viewpoint that communicating joy is an important ingredient in this en-
deavour. Instead of speaking about Nietzsche’s play with expectations she introdu-
ces the idea that the tone of Nietzsche’s discussions about ideal moods and affective
states is itself a powerful transformation tool (Bamford 2014, 70). Bamford’s elabora-
tions are worth interrogating closely. If, in general, one can agree with Nietzsche’s
assessment in EH that D is a book of affirmation (EC, KSA 6, 329–330), it is all
the more true that the tone of those aphorisms in which Nietzsche touches upon fu-
ture feelings is especially elated. Unfortunately, Bamford goes unnecessarily far in
her interpretation when she theorizes D as an “environmental structure” that has
been “constructed to manipulate and transform our mental processes” (Bamford
2014, 70). What at first sight might seem only a strong statement of the thesis ad-
vanced here, turns out to be nothing less than an explanation for Nietzsche’s choice
of the aphoristic form. In this view, “the aphorism, in writing, becomes a feature of
the environment and as such, is able to facilitate the campaign to counter the pre-
vailing mood of superstitious fear” (Bamford 2014, 70).
The thesis is either banal in the sense that any piece of writing, whether in
aphoristic form or not, becomes a part of the environment and can in principle
serve the function that Bamford attributes to D, or then the thesis is extremely ambi-
tious if it is understood as a claim that Nietzsche chose the aphoristic form of D be-
cause it is particularly suited to serve as external support for his campaign against
morality. The first interpretation of the thesis is of no interest and the second one
is highly problematic. Bamford fails to provide any solid reason why the aphoristic
form should be particularly suited to this task; nor does she provide any evidence
 “dieses mächtige Gelüste, das uns mehr gilt als irgendeine Lust” (D 575, KSA 3, 331).
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concerning Nietzsche’s intentions that would support her thesis. In advancing her
reading, Bamford merely refers to contemporary thinking in philosophical psychol-
ogy, specifically the externalist theory of cognition of Mark Rowlands, according to
which some mental processes depend on external support (cf. Bamford 2014, 70).
As an externalized testament of the campaign against morality, to which one can re-
turn again and again, the physical book can be used as therapy whenever one would
stray from the goals one has set against morality (Bamford 2014, 70). Additionally,
the idea would seem to be that the aphoristic form is able to serve the attack on mor-
ality better than any other because it is more open-ended and engages the reader to
take in what he can and fill in what he deems missing; thus countering the a kind of
moral instruction that has to be obeyed. Instead of giving definite answers, the
aphoristic form would convey a mood that allows one to break free from the shackles
of the morality of custom.
While this approach can help illuminate the effect that D has for some readers of
the book, perhaps even the effect that Nietzsche thought it should have,⁶³ I think the
introduction of a theoretical perspective from contemporary philosophical psycholo-
gy only obscures the difficult and ultimately unanswerable question about what led
Nietzsche to adopt the aphoristic form and in no way illuminates Nietzsche’s use of
mood in D. In this regard, it is nevertheless interesting to compare Nietzsche’s 1877
plan for a travel book [Reisebuch] with his description of Daybreak in the Digression
[Zwischenrede] (D 454, KSA 3, 274). In his 1877 plan, he envisions a book purposely
composed for readers who lack the time and attention required to wade through a
systematic treatise from beginning to end. Such a book would not be read through
but opened and closed repeatedly and at each opening the reader would take in a
thought or two for reflection. Nietzsche even suggests that such a book would en-
courage free reflection, in contrast to the forced reflection involved in following a
longwinded systematic argument. Despite the unsystematic character of the book,
the free reflection that it promotes would result in a general realignment of views
[Umstimmung der Ansichten]. (Cf. NL 1876–77, 23[196], KSA 8, 473–474.) It is not at
all implausible that D serves a similar function, though there is no unambiguous evi-
dence to suggest that Nietzsche thought so. In any case, Nietzsche’s words about en-
abling free reflection can hardly be reconciled with Bamford’s talk of “manipula-
tion”. With this in mind, we can return one final time to the discussion on ideal
moods in D and the expectations that Nietzsche raises.
 In EH he presents the book as producing a “scheuen Vorsicht vor Allem, was bisher unter dem
Namen der Moral zu Ehren und selbst zu Anbetung gekommen ist” and emphasizes that this negative
effect is in no way contradicted by the affirmative tone of the work (KSA 6, 329).
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4.4.5 Ideal moods in D
In aphorism 551, Of future virtues, Nietzsche asks: where are the astronomers of ide-
als, where are the poets of that which could be? Where are those who would give a
foretaste of that which is to come, not to speak of those possibilities that will never
be reality on earth? (D 551, KSA 3, 321–322) If the poets do not speak of such ideals,
Nietzsche surely does. Thus far, we have seen that Nietzsche’s ideal mood is intimate-
ly associated with a scepticism that is indissociable from joy (in incessant striving
and expectation). For Nietzsche personally, this meant above all creative striving.
Aphorisms 473 of book five is especially instructive in this regard:
473. Where one should build one’s house. – If you feel yourself great and fruitful in solitude, a life
in society will diminish you and make you empty: and vice versa. Powerful gentleness, like that
of a father: – where you are seized by this mood, there found your house, whether it be in the
midst of the crowd or in a silent retreat. Ubi pater sum, ibi patria. (Hollingdale transl./Clark and
Leiter 1997, 196; D 473, KSA 3, 283)
That Nietzsche bids the reader to build his house where this mild mood of power sets
in is perhaps best understood against the background of his own experience of being
on the move. This point was already made by Stefan Zweig (Zweig 1925, 291), who
emphasized the South as that which allowed Nietzsche to de-Germanize himself. In-
deed, the aphorism lends itself to be read as a cosmopolitan rejection of provincial-
ism/nationalism based on birth and the affirmation of a different kind of fatherland,
but there is even more to it than that.What is most striking here is that Nietzsche in
effect asks one to find one’s home in a mood, not only through a mood. “Ubi pater
sum, ibi patria”, can freely be translated as “where you are creative, there is your
homeland”, due to the emphasis placed on where one feels fruitful and on the meta-
phor of paternity. That feeling Nietzsche had found to be strongest in himself in the
Engadine,⁶⁴ but it was by no means bound to any specific location. Indeed, much
could be said in favour of the case that Nietzsche thought he was carried on by
the air, with which he felt to be related, wherever he went. Be that as it may, what
matters most to us here is that Nietzsche unambiguously advices the reader to follow
his own way, but that this advice is based on thinking of a specific mood as greater
than others. Promoting this kind of individualism does not contradict promoting a
specific mood. In this regard, this aphorism can be used to argue against what I
take to be a major misunderstanding about Nietzsche’s philosophical project that re-
 Young writes beautifully about how Nietzsche upon his arrival in the Engadine in 1879 “immedi-
ately felt in tune with the valley which, from now until his final collapse, would be the nearest he
would ever come to a homeland” (Young 2010, 277). It is of course the case that Nietzsche did not
return to the Engadine for two years after his first visit, but this does not diminish the truth of Young’s
statement, as Nietzsche was himself very clear about the matter. Not only did he record his initial
experience of this feeling in strong words (HH II,WS 338, KSA 2, 699), he also incorporated the land-
scape of the Engadine into his philosophy through metaphors drawn from this unique valley.
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surfaces again and again in scholarship. It is not the case that Nietzsche would aban-
don all claims to instruct and instead promote a full-blown individualism, nor is it
the case that Nietzsche would have the reader accept his own revaluation of specific
moral customs as binding. These are not real options; the choice need not be thought
of as one between an individualistic and a communitarian Nietzsche. Although
Nietzsche wants his readers to go their own way, he would arguably have them do
this in order to dwell in that mood which most heightens their feeling of power,
which he understands to be at least related to the mood which he himself feels to
be the highest.With this in mind, we can begin to approach Nietzsche’s Gay Science.
4.4.6 Conclusion
Nietzsche can be said to “use” mood in D to activate a desire to live the experimental
life of the free spirit beyond conventional morality. He considers this affective reor-
ientation necessary, because a rational attack on the religious and metaphysical
forces sustaining customary morality is not enough to open the way towards a
new dawn. Both negative feelings such as fear and positive, sublime feelings of
being in touch with a higher world stand in the way. In order to overcome these af-
fective obstacles, Nietzsche invites the reader to join his project not only through ra-
tional persuasion but also by playing with expectations, by providing glimpses of a
sublime dawn. This technique is supported by the joyful tone of the work. By invok-
ing future possibilities, he still does more than just communicate a joyful feeling, he
also communicates his feeling of distance from his own time. This is the vertical di-
mension of the mood. Far from representing a diminishment, he thus means to sug-
gest that the purification of feeling leads to a heightening of feeling and to a feeling
of greater power. Nietzsche simply would have the reader trade the feeling of being
in contact with a higher world for the vision of a Daybreak and the “high” mood that
this vision opens up.
When Nietzsche writes about higher states of being it is not simply the curiosity
of the psychologist that we witness, since his words are meant to allow the reader to
enter into a mood in which he understands the joy of the philosophical life and is
encouraged to strive for a desirable future. The future, however, is open. Nietzsche
does not seem to write from a special position of authority, from the perspective of
one who has attained a higher state of being, but rather from the point of view of
one who himself is striving higher, and who has perhaps caught a glimpse of a
novel culture and had a foretaste of future moods. Further support for this conclu-
sion is found in a letter to Köselitz from the end of August 1881, in which Nietzsche
explicitly identifies D, his latest work, as containing numerous examples of indirect
persuasion [exhortatio indirecta] towards the most worthy goals that can be
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thought.⁶⁵ While Nietzsche’s words about “finding” this strategy at work in D might
suggest something less than intentional use of the strategy, one can at least surmise
that he speaks as much about his own work as that of his friend’s when he advises
Köselitz to use all means available to the artist in order to spur his audience (i.e.
those who he seeks to reach through his art) to reach for the highest goals. After
all, Nietzsche writes of “our task” [unsre Aufgabe], not only of the task of his friend.
To conclude, Nietzsche is at this stage not only aware of the possibility to make
creative use of mood, but he also can be said to “use mood” in his writings. Never-
theless, the readings of HH and D have shown that it is in general more proper to
speak of Nietzsche’s communication of mood than of his “use of mood”. Firstly,
there is an intimate relation between Nietzsche’s attempts to express mood and
his statements about mood. They support each other instead of conflicting. In
other words, both are part of Nietzsche’s communication of mood. Secondly, the
word “use” is prone to be interpreted in terms of manipulation, and is therefore un-
suited to describe what is going on in Nietzsche’s writings. This is not to say that
Nietzsche makes no such use of mood, but that in the end the idea of manipulating
mood conflicts with his far stronger emphasis on independence. This potential con-
flict is nevertheless good to keep in mind when approaching GS, for in that work
Nietzsche does not shy away from using artistic means to communicate mood.
 “Bekennen Sie sich ungescheut zu den höchsten Absichten! Menschen wie Sie müssen ihre Worte
voranwerfen und sie durch ihre Thaten einzuholen wissen (selbst ich habe mir bisher erlaubt nach dieser
Praxis zu leben) Benutzen Sie alle Freiheiten, die man dem Künstler allein noch zugesteht und bedenken
Sie wohl: unsre Aufgabe ist unter allen Umständen anzutreiben, ‘dorthin’ zu treiben – gleichgültig bei-
nahe, ob wir selber dorthin gelangen! (Die exhortatio indirecta finde ich zum Erstaunen oft in meinem
letzten Buche z.B. in dem Abschnitte § 542 ‘Der Philosoph und das Alter’ – die direkte Ermahnung und
Anreizung hat dagegen etwas so Altkluges.)” (KGB III/1, Bf. 143)
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5 On the communication of mood in Nietzsche’s
Gay Science
As I have shown, psychological observations on religion and mood were already pre-
sent and quite important in HH and in D, and the available evidence also suggests
that Nietzsche did attempt to “use mood”, i.e. he put some effort into showing
and leading the reader to a philosophically productive mood: a calm, detached
but also joyful mood of doubt in the case of HH and a more expressively joyful
mood of doubt and expectation in the case of D. The insights that Nietzsche gained
from these experiments arguably developed into something far more radical in GS.
This chapter presents a novel reading of Nietzsche’s Gay Science based on the
thesis that insofar as one can speak of GS as a unified whole, the work is held togeth-
er by its playful, joyful mood. In other words, the reading seeks to show that mood is
central to the project of GS. Moreover, and this follows from recognizing the central-
ity of mood to the entire conception of a joyful science, I argue that scholarly inter-
pretations of GS that are concerned with elucidating the text must take account of
Nietzsche’s attempt to communicate mood, and that philosophical interpretations
that seek to build on the aphorisms of the work ignore this at their own peril. Placing
mood at the centre of the investigation opens new and fruitful perspectives on key
issues that have troubled interpreters since the first publication of the book in
1882, not least those aphorisms that concern religion (“God is dead”).
If paying attention to mood is so crucial to the understanding of GS as I have sug-
gested, one might question how novel this reading can be, as surely scholars and
philosophers cannot altogether have overlooked anything so central? Indeed, I am
more than willing to concede that I am not the first to point to the importance of
mood, but there is a significant difference between pointing towards that importance
and actually placing mood at the centre of investigation; not to say rereading the
work and its key aphorisms in a light that recognizes mood. In her monograph-
study on the aesthetics of mood [Stimmung], Friederike Reents suggests that
Nietzsche’s GS should be read as an attempt to reorient affect [Umstimmungsversuch]
(Reents 2015, 236–238 and 240; cf. Reents 2014). In a similar vein, Bernard Williams
has emphasized that GS is meant to “convey a certain spirit” that could “defy the
’spirit of gravity’” (Williams 2006, 314). Both, to mention but two interesting exam-
ples, assert that one misses the point of GS if one looks only for “philosophical con-
tent”, for philosophical arguments in the work. However, neither Williams nor Re-
ents do much more than to point at the laughter [Heiterkeit], that they see in the
work. Although they certainly point in the right direction, mere suggestions based
primarily on subjective experiences of reading (Williams 2006) and/or on simplifying
interpretations of Nietzsche’s project of affective reorientation (Reents 2015)¹ do not
 Reents problematically fails to situate her discussion on mood [Stimmung] in Nietzsche’s works
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suffice. To establish that communicating a mood indeed is an essential element of
the philosophical aims of GS requires more robust evidence.
A thorough reading of Nietzsche’s “use of mood” in GS is still lacking. What is
required is a contextual interpretation, a close reading that pays careful attention
to evidence and problems related to what evidence is admissible. That which to
some scholars seems to be all too obvious, the joy of the joyful science, might
turn out to be more demanding, problematic and multidimensional than assumed.
Next, I explain why GS is of utmost importance to understanding Nietzsche’s philos-
ophy and his philosophy of religion in particular. Then I lay the groundwork of my
interpretation in dialogue with scholarship on GS in the following sections. After
that I proceed with the reading itself.
5.1 The need for a contextual reading of GS
Nietzsche’s GS is essential reading, if one wishes to come to terms with the philos-
opher’s reflections on religion. Indeed, the book contains one of the most famous
passages in his entire oeuvre,² the proclamation of the death of God through the
mouth of a Madman. One should however not be fooled by the fact that this single
passage seems to provoke endless commentary. Despite the success of the Madman,
GS has suffered (philosophical) neglect in Anglophone academia according to its
champions.³ I concur; the proliferation of questionable interpretations of GS 125
seems to have gone hand in hand with a certain neglect of the book as a whole, es-
pecially when compared to Nietzsche’s other major works. Still, the real problem is
this: what is lacking is quality not quantity. This problem is sadly not limited to pub-
lications on Nietzsche written in English, but seems to be universal.⁴
GSmost certainly deserves careful attention in its own right. Nietzsche’s thinking
on religion in GS, not least the Madman-passage, can only be understood contextu-
within Nietzsche’s broader psychological thinking. Given that her work is a history of the literary aes-
thetics of mood [Stimmung],it is especially problematic that she overestimates the importance of the
early unpublished essay “On Moods” from 1864 (cf. Reents 2015, 239–240) for Nietzsche’s under-
standing of mood and fails to mention that the concept disappears from Nietzsche’s published writ-
ings after GS. Otherwise, her discussion on Nietzsche’s affective reorientation [Umstimmung] draws
far too much on a one-sided reading of GS that only emphasizes the communication of laughter as
a corrective to too much seriosity.
 GS 125 is: “perhaps the most famous passage in all of Nietzsche” (Pippin 2010, 47; cf. Franco 2011,
133).
 See Schacht 1988, Abbey 2000 and Franco 2011. These eloquent apologies seek to defend and elab-
orate the philosophical merits of GS, but with the exception of Franco do not provide substantial in-
terpretations of the most difficult questions.
 Thus, it is the rule rather than the exception for serious scholars, irrespective of background, to
lament out-of-context interpretations of key passages such as GS 125 (cf. Pippin 2010, 47 and 50;
Hödl 2009, 363; Gentili 2010, 236).
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ally. The philosophical monographs of Higgins (2003), Langer (2010) and Stegmaier
(2012), to which I shall return in sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, point in the right direction
insofar as they (claim to) recognize the importance of context and therefore treat GS
as a unified whole. I will argue that a properly contextual approach requires more
than paying attention to the context of each interpreted passage within the whole
of the book, and that one cannot be content with an understanding of the historical
and personal context in which the book was created. Instead, one has to see how
Nietzsche’s thinking on mood permeates the whole (for what a contextual approach
should look like, see section 5.3 and the ensuing reading). Such an approach is es-
pecially fruitful when it comes to understanding those passages concerned with re-
ligious questions.
What I aim to achieve is to clarify the place of GS 125, the parable of the Mad-
man, in relation to the whole of GS and the whole of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion.
What makes this aphorism so important for the understanding of Nietzsche’s entire
critical project is that it suggests, as numerous scholars have noted, that Nietzsche is
not just one in a line of 19th-century thinkers who simply reduce religion to man and
think that all else will stay the same (e.g. Pippin 2010, 50). Precisely how this rejec-
tion of a specific form of unbelief is to be understood is the crucial question. Does
Nietzsche through the Madman, and in his later madness, recognize in himself an
otherwise repressed desire for the Christian God (e.g. Düsing 2010)? Or does
Nietzsche call for a new form of pantheistic religiosity (e.g. Young 2006)? Or does
he rather call for a more radical atheism? Perhaps an atheism that is rooted in the
instincts, i.e. an incorporated atheism, which bears a life-affirming mood? The an-
swers to these questions depend to a great degree on how one interprets GS 125. Be-
fore I proceed with the reading, certain questions concerning the editions and unity
of GS need to be sorted out. In the meantime, it will become clear how the reading
that I propose differs from previous scholarship.
5.1.1 The two editions of GS
The fact that there are two differing editions of GS, both of which were published
while Nietzsche was still alive, has created some unnecessary confusion in scholar-
ship. This confusion stems from the rather unfortunate tendency of not specifying
which edition is under discussion (e.g. Reents 2015). More alarmingly, even scholars
who do specify which edition is being used seldom provide reasons for their choice
(e.g. Langer 2010). In this regard, Stegmaier (2012) is the most notable exception in
that he carefully argues for his choice.
This is no trivial matter, because there are differences between the editions
which influence the interpreter’s vision of GS as a whole. The first edition, published
in 1882, begins with a motto, a quote extracted from Emerson, and a prelude of
rhymes (63 poems), which is followed by four books of aphorisms. The back cover
of the first edition states that GS is the last in a line of works beginning with HH,
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which aim to create “a new image and ideal of the free spirit” (Franco 2011, ix; cf.
KGB III/1, Bf. 251). The second edition, published in 1887, has a new subtitle (“la
gaya scienza”), an added foreword, begins with an additional motto written by no
other than the author himself, a fifth book, and ends with a collection of poems,
the Songs of Prince Vogelfrei. In effect, the 1887 edition is a work of the late Nietzsche;
published in the same year as On the Genealogy of Morals and only one year before
the last authorized publications. As Wolfram Groddeck put it: there are after 1887 two
different works with the same title.⁵
The second edition has hitherto received far more attention than the first. The
simplest explanation is that this is the version that the reader is presented with in
the KSA. It might also reflect the fact that philosophers have been more interested
in Nietzsche’s later philosophy than in that of the middle period (e.g. Stegmaier
2012). Of the most important scholars who have written on GS only Higgins consis-
tently keeps to the first edition in her analysis, while Franco deserves praise for clear-
ly separating the two in his study (Higgins 2000; Franco 2011, 106). There are very
good reasons to follow their example and focus on the first edition on its own. To
my mind, there is one reason above others that should give the sceptic pause, and
this is it: the 1882 edition best captures Nietzsche’s original vision!
I will discuss the nature of Nietzsche’s vision in more detail in section 5.1.2. In
the case of Nietzsche-scholarship, authorial intention is generally considered to be
of utmost importance, wherefore I find it unnecessary to provide a lengthy defence
of the foundation of my approach to GS.⁶ It suffices to note that whenever a scholar
writes that “Nietzsche writes/claims/argues” he or she at least implicitly accepts
some understanding of authorial intention. Critical questions rather concern how
to discern authorial intention and specifically what evidence should be relied on
as the discussions on the work of Jacob Golomb and Rebecca Bamford have
shown. In this case, emphasizing the original vision of GS is a necessity, simple be-
cause of the possibility that this vision is transformed by the time of the publication
of the second edition. Despite privileging the first edition in my reading, I am more
than willing to concede that the second edition can be considered a unified work in
itself, i.e. that one might argue that Nietzsche aspires toward unity in both editions.
At the end of the chapter, I will consider if and to what extent the second edition
changes the interpretation that is here advanced with regard to the first edition.
Now that we have decided on using the first edition, on the ground that it cap-
tures Nietzsche’s original vision, a short summary of the content of the aphoristic
books contained in this edition is required before we can proceed. The first book en-
gages questions concerning teleology and morality, in the context of historical and
scientific knowledge and Darwinian ideas in particular. The second book focuses
 “Es gibt nach 1887 zwei ‘Fröhliche Wissenschaften’.” (Groddeck 1997, 185)
 For a defence of authorial intention in the context of Anglophone scholarship see Higgins 2003,
9– 11.
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on art, artists and women, the third on religion and science. The fourth is more per-
sonal in character, discussing primarily the contemplative life and science, and ends
with the appearance of Zarathustra. Stated this way, GS truly seems to discuss
themes that seem to have little or nothing to do with each other. Strictly speaking,
there is also no unity of form, as the “aphorisms” that make of the bulk of the
work differ greatly in length; from sentences to pages. So without even mentioning
the poems that are also an integral part of the work, GS appears as a mixture of dis-
connected themes and forms. This appearance begs the question: Is GS a unified
work and if so, in what sense?
5.1.2 Coherence and unity in GS in the light of previous scholarship
Is GS a coherent, unified work? This question is of great importance because the an-
swer determines how one should approach the work. To put it simply, there are two
alternatives. If the work can’t be considered a unified whole, one can freely pick and
choose aphorisms for interpretation as one wishes. If, on the other hand, GS is a uni-
fied whole, one must pay close attention to the composition of the book and how se-
lected passages relate to the whole. From the latter perspective, the first approach
must be condemned for engendering out-of-context interpretations, while from the
former the second approach insists on a unity that is not to be found.
At one extreme are approaches to Nietzsche that see his texts as exemplary pre-
cisely because of their ability to resist attempts at systematic interpretation (e.g. Der-
rida 1979 and Kofman 1993, 115– 116). In this view, GS shows “little overall sense of
organization, thematic development, or extended philosophical argument” (Allison
2001, xi). It should come as no surprise that few Nietzsche-scholars who focus on
GS support Allison’s statement or other expressions of the sentiment it embodies. In-
deed, the approach is often derisively branded “postmodern” or “deconstructionist”
and dismissed without further reflection. As we will see, scholars convinced of the
coherence of GS should be careful to avoid the opposite danger, i.e. overstating
their case.
Scholars who have emphasized the coherence of GS have done so with strong
words, so much so that it raises doubts. Some scholars swear on the “fundamental
coherence” (Schacht 1988, 70; Langer 2010, xvii) of GS, and more recently the book
has been called “a profoundly imagined artistic and philosophical whole” (Franco
2011, 106). Efforts to prove this supposed coherence do not strike me as entirely con-
vincing. The most obvious reason is that each interpreter, irrespective of edition
used, tends to see the coherence and unity of GS in a different way. Monika Langer’s
monograph is a good place to start the discussion, since Langer places such weight
on the coherence of GS as to include the assumption in the title of her study Nietz-
sche’s Gay Science: Dancing Coherence (Langer 2010). Langer contends that the co-
herence in question has been perceived as a coherence of themes, and she seeks
to refine this heritage (Langer 2010, xiv). While it is certainly true that interpreters
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of the work tend to concentrate on a few themes, it is not quite clear to me to what
extent this reveals a deeper methodological commitment to thematic unity as Langer
suggests. Even if one ignores the possibility that there could be other ways of reading
the scholarly literature, one cannot deny that there are exceptions, i.e. scholars who
do not think that the unity of the work is to be found on the level of themes. Still
Langer is correct in a certain sense: the unity of GS most often appears in scholarship
to be guaranteed by the coherence of its themes.⁷ Therefore, I find Langer’s claim
useful and worth interrogating.What themes have scholars identified as being of cen-
tral importance in the composition of GS?
Surveying the themes identified by scholars as central, one is immediately struck
by the fact that there are subtle yet clearly noticeable differences. These differences
cannot be overlooked. For Richard Schacht the unity of GS derives from its reflection
on two connected themes; “what we are” and “what we might become” as individ-
uals (Schacht 1988, 71). Julian Young’s claim about the “systematic central argu-
ment” of GS is superficially similar to Schacht’s, but he emphasizes what he takes
to be the collective nature of Nietzsche’s endeavour. According to Young, GS con-
cerns the cultural health of a people; what cultural health is for a people, where
“we” are now as a people and how to lead the people in the right future direction
(Young 2010, 327). These views can be contrasted with Franco’s, who identifies the
notion of incorporation as being at the heart of the book’s argument, an argument
that advances as a chain of thoughts and which deals with the possibility of a sci-
ence that enhances life (Franco 2011, xi and 102).
Langer’s own approach differs only superficially from that of her predecessors
and the approaches of Young and Franco outlined above, in that she does not extract
a few chosen themes from the aphorisms for further elaboration, but instead works
through the entire 1887 edition from beginning to end and tries to pay close attention
to the interconnections between the aphorisms. This approach is especially problem-
atic, since the 1887 edition begins with the foreword written years after the following
four books. The interpretation of the foreword, which “introduces the Gay Science’s
main themes” (Langer 2010, 1) unduly influences the interpretation of the whole.
As a result of this procedure Langer herself identifies three interconnected themes
that account for the coherence of the book. These are de-deification, naturalization
and beautification. (Langer 2010, xv)
Langer’s frank admission that her themes do not appear explicitly throughout
the text brings us to the core of the problem, which applies to all attempts to
think of the unity of GS as being based on thematic coherence (cf. Langer 2010,
xiv–xv). One simply cannot identify a theme or even a number of interconnected
themes that would run through the entire text; there are simply far too many aphor-
 E.g. in his article introducing GS in the Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche Christopher Janaway asserts
that the book will “never cohere into a single statable philosophical position and cannot be ’summed
up’”, and then simply proceeds to discuss the “book’s themes” (Janaway 2013, 252–253).
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isms that do not fit in. Nonetheless, one can unreservedly agree with Langer that
Nietzsche often eschews direct communication and that many aphorisms implicitly
rely on and relate to others. This is however not always the case nor is it a convincing
argument for the specific themes identified by Langer or other scholars for that mat-
ter. It would certainly be misleading to say that various themes laboriously identified
by scholars play no part in the composition of GS. Indeed, it is hard not to identify
one theme or some themes as central at the expense of others.⁸ A charitable reading
of the scholarly literature might conclude that even as scholars approach GS through
different eyes and therefore emphasize different themes, they all contribute to the
understanding of the underlying unity of the work. There is nevertheless good reason
to question the emphasis on the thematic coherence of the work; not because it in-
stead would contain a “discussion of everything under the sun” (Young 2006, 88 and
2010, 326), but rather because thematic coherence is not the only way to create unity
within a book. This is especially important to keep in mind, when the book in ques-
tion is as much a work of art as a work of science and philosophy.
In fact, not a few of the scholars mentioned above seem to suggest that GS is
characterized by an underlying structure. They notice a movement from here to
there, from reality to possibility. This might be considered the hard core behind
the talk of an “argument of GS” by Young and Franco (Young 2010, 327 and Franco
2011, xi).While a certain motion of back and forth between realities and possibilities
is certainly present in the book, there is no clear linear development connecting the
beginning of the book to the end, i.e. no straightforward narrative structure. Reality
and possibility, as in desirable and undesirable possibilities and realities, alternate
and need not be seen as moving in any definite direction. Therefore, looking at
the structure of GS also does not provide a satisfying solution to the problem of unity.
The related idea that the unity of GS is based on interconnected chains of
thought is equally problematic, even though it has been thought to find some sup-
port in Nietzsche’s own notes and letters.⁹ The same criticism applies to the idea
as to those views emphasizing thematic coherence. The chains of thought do not
 E.g. when Stegmaier asserts that the book has no basic theme he directly adds that the artistic and
joyful reinterpretation of science and philosophy might itself be considered the basic theme: GS “hat
kein Grundthema … es sei denn die künstlerisch-fröhliche Selbstaufklärung der Wissenschaft und Phi-
losophie” (Stegmaier 2012, 52).
 E.g. “Eine Sentenz ist ein Glied aus einer Gedankenkette; sie verlangt, dass der Leser diese Kette aus
eigenen Mitteln wiederherstelle: diess heisst sehr viel verlangen. Eine Sentenz ist eine Anmaassung. –
Oder sie ist eine Vorsicht: wie Heraclit wusste.” (NL 1876–77, 20[3], KSA 8, 361) On the basis of this
early note it is certainly possible to suggest that Nietzsche leaves it to the reader to make out the
unity in the chains of thought that characterize his aphoristic works. However, one has to stretch
the meaning of the note beyond recognition in order to come to the conclusion that the aphoristic
works themselves would form wholes that the reader should recreate in a similar manner. Cf. the dis-
cussion on Sentenz and Aphorismus by Joel Westerdale (Westerdale 2013, 23–24), as well as his strong
criticism of attempts to read coherence (in the sense of interconnected chains of thought) into the
works of Nietzsche’s middle period (Westerdale 2013, 85–96).
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form a sensible whole on their own, nor are the interconnections between the chains
particularly strong. On top of that, there are always aphorisms that are hard to fit into
any chain of thought. I have mentioned these two possibilities of thinking about the
unity of GS, i.e. underlying structure and organization as chains of thought, because
they prepare us to look at the book as an artistic whole rather than as a straightfor-
ward philosophical argument.
A bit closer to the approach pursued here is Higgins who, contrary to what Lan-
ger claims (Langer 2010, xiv), does not take a thematic approach to the unity of GS.
Despite initially suggesting that the unity of GS is to be found in thematic coherence
(Higgins 2003, viii), Higgins is primarily interested in the “vision which unifies the
original work” (Higgins 2003, 5). Higgins has taken to heart that one has to pay as
much if not more attention to the how as to the what, i.e. Nietzsche’s mode of pre-
sentation in relation to the thoughts presented.¹⁰ According to her, GS cannot be con-
sidered systematic in any traditional sense but it is nevertheless “very carefully orch-
estrated” (Higgins 2003, 8). Taking her cue from Eugen Fink, Higgins notes that this
orchestration functions in the manner of “leitmotifs” (Higgins 2003, 11– 13). In the
resulting view, GS is seen as purposively theatrical for dramatic effect: tragic and
comic perspectives take turns to force the reader into experientially encountering
the thoughts presented (cf. Higgins 2000, 5– 13).
How does this flow from tragic to comic and back again create the unity which
Higgins (e.g. Higgins 2003, 50) implies it does? The perspectives are supposedly com-
plementary but reading Higgins’ work one cannot escape the impression that one has
to choose between the tragic and the comic. This is exactly what Higgins herself
does, choosing to focus on the comical aspects of the book, since scholars have ac-
cording to her already emphasized the tragic aspects too much (Higgins 2003, 6–7).
It is certainly a correct observation that tragic readings of GS abound, but the under-
lying implication that there are clearly distinct comic and tragic aspects in the work
is questionable. One might ask if it is not rather the case that the reader interprets the
text as comic or tragic, and that readers might disagree on which aphorisms are
comic and which tragic. In any case, the apparent need to choose between emphasiz-
ing comedy or tragedy leaves the prospect of unity in tatters, giving place to an alter-
nation of tragic and comic perspectives without any greater purpose.
Against this view, I argue the thesis that Nietzsche in GS upholds the possibility
of uniting his aphoristic experiments in a higher mood; one which is beyond comedy
and tragedy.¹¹ Tragic and comic perspectives could then be viewed as expressions of
the same underlying joyful mood. They could both be seen as nothing but surface
 In Anglophone scholarship, the importance of this hermeneutic principle was first and most
forcefully argued by Alexander Nehamas (cf. Nehamas 1985, 39). While it might be argued that
more recent “analytic” work on Nietzsche does not fully appreciate the significance of this principle,
most scholars at least pay lip service to it (e.g. Clark and Dudrick 2012).
 Cf. “Es giebt Höhen der Seele, von wo aus gesehen selbst die Tragödie aufhört, tragisch zu wirken”
(BGE 30, KSA 5, 48).
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phenomena that the creative artist disposes of as he pleases, as he plays. Perhaps
only understood with reference to the possibility of this peculiar mood do the aphor-
isms and chains of thought emerging from them make sense, take their proper place
and form a sensible whole. For it might be argued that Nietzsche thinks that this
ideal mood unites art and science into serving the task of philosophy, and the
task to become who one is. Furthermore, it might be argued that Nietzsche’s concep-
tion of this mood draws on and seeks to combine experiences that are characteristic
of both science, art, and even the history of religion, which would explain why these
three “themes” are all discussed in GS. Only from within this mood can (what
Nietzsche means by) joyful science, perhaps, be fully understood. Fortunately, the
text of GS does not presuppose a joyful scientist as reader, but seeks to communicate
a sense of this joyful mood; it shows a sceptical, playful mood that among other
things suggests the possibility of a yet higher mood.¹² These claims, which will be
backed up with evidence in the ensuing reading, importantly require no claims
about Nietzsche as person, only as artist.
Again, it is necessary to recall the distinction between Nietzsche as author and
Herr Nietzsche, the person. The thesis advanced here should not be misconstrued as
some naïve claim about the state in which Nietzsche wrote GS, e.g. that Nietzsche
wrote each and every aphorism in the same mood. Quite to the contrary, the thesis
is not in the least touched by the fact that the writing of GS coincided with a turbu-
lent period in Nietzsche’s life. His mood was anything but constant, despite the fact
that most of the work that went into GS preceded his acquaintance and tempestuous
affair with Lou von Salomé.¹³ He was namely at the time engaged in a constant strug-
gle for physical health as evinced by his search for beneficial climatic conditions and
a fitting diet. Julian Young is most probably right to suspect that Nietzsche’s self-doc-
toring was not always beneficial to his physical health and to emphasize that what
mattered even more to him was spiritual health, and that in this but only this regard
things were starting to look better for Nietzsche since his arrival in Sils-Maria in 1881
(Young 2010, 316–317). One is therefore tempted to provisionally accept Stegmaier’s
assertion that Nietzsche was able to keep the basic tone of the work joyful despite the
extreme changes that his mood underwent during the creation process.¹⁴ However,
even this statement is problematic if read in the sense that there would generally
 Werner Stegmaier notes that Nietzsche never defines the joyfulness of GS, that it is rather a Stim-
mung that must show itself (Stegmaier 2012, 46). He does not connect this idea to that of the unity of
GS nor does he follow up on it to the extent that one would wish in his commentary on the aphorisms
of book five. Nevertheless, Stegmaier’s work is currently the most significant contribution to the dis-
cussion of Stimmung in GS.
 In a letter to Köselitz, Nietzsche assures his friend that GS essentially took shape before his ac-
quaintance with Lou [vor meiner Bekanntschaft mit L(ou)], though he does see a premonition [Vorah-
nung] of that relationship in the work (KGB III/1, Bf. 272).
 “Trotz der extremen Stimmungswechsel während der Entstehungszeit hat er den Grundton heiter ge-
halten.” (Stegmaier 2012, 52)
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have to be a close connection between the mood of a work of art and the mood of its
creator. Precisely as artist, Nietzsche is able to suggest and express moods that he
himself need not have had more than a distant premonition of. I will therefore
here assume a more modest and cautious proposal as starting point: The composi-
tion of GS suggests the possibility of a mood, which could unite art and science as
well as philosophy into a new endeavour. Thus, the text presents a joyful science
pondering its own possibility.
Next, I will review the evidence that relates to the question of authorial intention
under the assumption that it might provide a good foundation for the reading of GS
and some initial support for the thesis that mood is central to the conception of a
joyful science. A general methodological problem with most if not all of the ap-
proaches to the unity of GS hitherto covered is that they try to find the answer to
the question concerning unity by going straight to the text; to find that which creates
unity without considering other evidence than the text itself. This is especially prob-
lematic if one also assumes that one can interpret authorial intention by looking only
at the text, as the preceding discussions about HH and D have already shown. To put
the discussion about authorial intention on a more solid footing, I begin by examin-
ing letters that pertain to the question.
5.2 Authorial intentions
There is strong evidence to support the view that Nietzsche himself wanted to present
the 1882 edition of GS as a unified work. There are, however, serious problems with
the ways in which evidence in favour of such an interpretation of authorial intention
has hitherto been presented by scholars. I will here engage the issue in dialogue with
previous scholarship. In doing so I seek to emphasize where prior scholarly efforts
point in the right direction, in order to build a solid foundation for the reading of
the text proper. As I have already suggested, a particularly fruitful starting point
for the task at hand is to be found in the oft repeated assertion that one must pay
as much attention to the how as to the what when approaching Nietzsche’s writings
and that consequently GS should be viewed as much as an artwork as a work of phi-
losophy (cf. Franco 2012, 106).When one examines the assertion with the question of
authorial intention in mind, the key question takes this form: what did Nietzsche
himself think about the unity of GS?
First of all, Nietzsche considered unity essential for an artwork. Marco Brusotti
thus sums up Nietzsche’s view of a successful artwork in the period prior to and
around the publication of GS: a work only becomes a lasting monument if it is a
whole and expresses a mood, a passionate state, in its entirety.¹⁵ Essentially, art is
 “Zu einem Denkmal wird ein Werk erst, wenn es ein Ganzes ist und eine Stimmung, einen Leiden-
schaftlichen Seelenzustand in seiner Ganzheit mitteilt.” (Brusotti 1997, 21) Brusotti curiously writes that
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in this view expression of mood. Secondly, and more importantly, Nietzsche’s con-
cern with unity is seen in his letters from the period before and after publication.
The letters show that Nietzsche applied the same aesthetic criterion to his own
works. I will now turn to examine the evidence provided by these letters in detail,
because they have all too often been misused. In this regard, one letter from the pe-
riod prior to the publication of GS deserves particular attention. Indeed, this letter
cannot be overlooked, since it has caused a great deal of confusion in scholarship.
5.2.1 A deceptive letter
In an intriguing letter to Paul Rée from late August 1881, Nietzsche mentions an un-
specified unpublished work, the identification of which is the cause of the scholarly
confusion referred to above. He writes in joy that in the same year that Köselitz’s, i.e.
Peter Gast’s, opera Scherz, List und Rache was completed, another great work is yet to
be completed. The year, he goes on, will still bring forth another work, which due to
its unity, its perfection of form, will make him forget about his fragmentary philoso-
phy (KGB III/1, Bf. 144).¹⁶ In Anglophone scholarship one comes across the view that
this “other work” would refer to Nietzsche’s own work in progress, i.e. a work
Nietzsche himself intended to publish (e.g. Bishop and Stevenson 2005, 75). Franco
goes the furthest, identifying the work in question with GS and using the letter to bol-
ster his claims concerning the unity of the work. According to Franco the letter ex-
presses Nietzsche’s hope to finally create a unified work with GS, a hope that was
fulfilled as the book forms a “profoundly imagined artistic and philosophical
whole” (Franco 2011, 106).¹⁷ Not only do said interpretations fail to provide reasons
for their identification of the “other work” with a work of Nietzsche’s, they also fail to
take account of a conflicting interpretation with a long tradition.
Both the context of the passage quoted above and a long line of scholarship
speak against the interpretation according to which the “other work” should be at-
tributed to Nietzsche. Let us first examine the letter more closely. After adressing
Rée as his dear, dear friend [lieber, lieber Freund], Nietzsche expresses joyful surprise
at the sudden intellectual flowering of both Rée and Köselitz [bei Ihnen und bei un-
serem Freunde Köselitz]. Then Nietzsche briefly praises the new opera of the latter,
only to return to Rée, naming Rée his fulfiller [Vollender] directly after speaking of
the clearest expression of this view is to be found in a note from 1876–7 (NL 1876–77, 23[104], KSA 8,
440). This is problematic because the time Nietzsche wrote down the note is not exactly close to the
publication of GS nor does the note have anything to say about the role of mood [Stimmung]. In my
view, Nietzsche’s letters provide better evidence that mood is of utmost importance to Nietzsche’s un-
derstanding of the artwork, so I will therefore in the following discussion focus more on them.
 “soll nun auch das Andre Werk an’s Licht bringen, an dem ich im Bilde des Zusammenhanges und
der goldnen Kette meine arme stückweise Philosophie vergessen darf!” (KGB III/1, Bf. 144)
 Needless to say, this scholarly blunder does not fatally compromise Franco’s entire reading.
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that other work, which is to appear. From the context, it is clear enough that
Nietzsche speaks of Rée as if his friend were bringing to completion a work that re-
flects not only the nature of its author but also that of Nietzsche: reading Rée’s work
allows Nietzsche to forget his own disparate thoughts and to see his own nature re-
flected in an elevated form.¹⁸ Furthermore, he attests to being incapable of a compa-
rable feat and even calls himself an impossible and incomplete aphoristic philoso-
pher. (KGB III/1, Bf. 144)
Nietzsche’s exercise in self-deprecation cannot be overlooked. It would make no
sense for him to first announce that a new work of his will provide an image of co-
herence and to liken this coherence with a golden chain and simultaneously in the
very same letter complain about his inability to create coherent works. To this can be
added that he had no plans to either publish or finish anything more in 1881, having
already gone through the painful process of getting Daybreak published.¹⁹ That
Nietzsche himself does not identify the work in question, e.g. by mentioning a
title or even something about its contents, can be explained by the circumstance
that the letter can with reasonable certainty be presumed to be a reply to a letter
by Rée, in which Rée must have hinted at a possible publication or at least written
about his work-in-progress. Unfortunately, the letter of Rée, to which Nietzsche is re-
sponding, has not been preserved. There is nevertheless enough historical evidence
to identify the “other work”.
This interpretation, that the “other work” refers to a work by Rée, is supported by
historical scholarship (cf. Stummann-Bowert 1998, 98; Brusotti 1997, 22–23). It is of
no small importance that the first interpreter to explicitly mention and make a point
out of this connection was herself intimately acquainted with both Rée and
Nietzsche. For it was none other than Lou von Salomé who first identified the
work in question with Rée’s Die Entstehung des Gewissens, which he was working
on at the time the letters were written (Andreas-Salomé 1894, 140). On Salomé’s ac-
count, Rée had let Nietzsche know that he intended to complete his work before the
end of the year. Eventually, as it happens, that book was not published before the
year 1885, i.e. almost four years after the letter was sent. According to Salomé,
Nietzsche expressed great interest in Rée’s work and she directly connects this inter-
est to what she interprets as Nietzsche’s own desire to devote himself to studies of a
more systematic character; studies that might eventually lead him beyond the limi-
tations of the aphoristic form (cf. Andreas-Salomé 1894, 140– 141).While Salomé can
be considered unreliable precisely as an interpreter of Nietzsche’s desires, her close-
ness to Rée even after the break with Nietzsche must be taken into account when it
comes to the bare facts of the matter. Most importantly, Salomé had access to at least
some of the letters Nietzsche wrote to Rée in the period that is of concern here. This is
 Cf. the similar words in a letter to Köselitz (KGB III/1, Bf. 143).
 That Nietzsche after the publication of D planned to add more books to the work (see KGB III/1,
Bf. 180; also KGB III/1, Bf. 190) has no bearing on this matter. There is no evidence that he had any
plans to publish anything more in 1881.
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apparent from the fact that she not only quotes letter Nr. 144 (Andreas-Salomé 1894,
16 and 140), but a great many of Nietzsche’s letters to Rée (e.g. Andreas-Salomé 1894,
99– 100). It is not unreasonable to assume that she discussed these letters with Rée.
In any case, there is no reason to challenge her identification of the “other work”. In
lack of contrary evidence, her version about the facts of the case must therefore be
judged the most trustworthy.
It should be clear by now that this particular letter (Nr. 144) cannot be used to
argue the thesis that Nietzsche aspires toward unity in his works or in GS in partic-
ular; not at least in the way as it has been used in Anglophone scholarship. The
greatest confusion surrounding the letter having been dispelled, it is worth asking
what if anything can be gained from it for our endeavour, for without a doubt it is
an intriguing letter. Interestingly, Salomé herself opens this possibility by connecting
the letter to Nietzsche’s declared plans to re-enter the academic world as a student of
the natural sciences and by interpreting these plans as expressions of a desire to
form his own thoughts into a coherent philosophical system (Andreas-Salomé
1894, 141). Even though one might want to question Salomé’s interpretation of
Nietzsche’s plans, it is certainly useful to follow her attempt to interpret the letter
as having something to say about Nietzsche’s desires. In this regard, it could indeed
be argued that the letter reveals an important value-judgement; the judgement that
unity is a desirable quality in a philosophical work. Rather than confirming Nietz-
sche’s confidence in his ability to create a unified work, as Franco would have it,
the letter, among other things, expresses Nietzsche’s frustration of being incapable
of creating such a whole. Compared to his own fragmentary efforts, Rée’s writing ap-
pears to him as a golden chain.²⁰ That Nietzsche expresses himself in such strong
words has justly raised the questions whether he is absolutely serious (cf. Brusotti
1997, 23), but his choice of words is wholly understandable against the background
of the letter. Although the correspondence cannot be reconstructed, Nietzsche’s own
letter contains a striking clue for interpretation.
Nietzsche’s letter to Rée indicates that his friend was having a hard time in 1881
(cf. KGB III/1, Bf. 144): an earlier letter that Nietzsche sent to Köselitz shows Nietz-
sche’s concern for the health of his friend and reveals that Rée was suffering from
the loss of his father and that his mother was sick (KGB III/1, Bf. 83). He had also
lost a foster sister, which further weakened his and his mother’s health (cf. Janz
1978 II, 51). This circumstance certainly puts Nietzsche’s words of praise for Rée’s
work in a more clear light; perhaps they should best be interpreted as encourage-
ment? (cf. Stummann-Bowert 1998, 98) Though Nietzsche’s words of praise for Rée
should at least partially be interpreted as a compliment to his friend, there are
good enough reasons to assume that Nietzsche is being sincere, especially when it
 A letter to Köselitz from the same month is written in the same spirit. Here Nietzsche describes
himself as a suffering, incomplete aphoristic human [Aphorismusmensch] and states that his own
writings at best suggest unity and allow the reader to intuit the need for unity (KGB III/1, Bf. 143).
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comes to his doubts about his own abilities. That there is more than a grain of truth
behind his complaint is apparent, given the composition of his previous works.²¹
Nietzsche in no way here or elsewhere denies the desirability of unity; that it is some-
thing worth striving for. To the contrary, one might go as far as to claim that
Nietzsche expresses the wish to create a unified work. Namely, Nietzsche expresses
the wish to create an own sun to shine over Rée.²² While this might be nothing more
than a friendly wish, it can also be interpreted as expressing his desire to be able to
create a work for Rée which would serve the same function he thinks his friends work
does for him. But does Nietzsche’s wish imply creating a unified work? Could the
metaphor of a golden chain be used to describe Nietzsche’s own writing?
5.2.2 Nietzsche’s writing: A golden chain?
I think this is a case where one must be especially careful of words. The temptation is
near at hand to link Nietzsche’s metaphor of a golden chain with the chains of
thought that are characteristic of his aphoristic works. Such a move would be mis-
leading if perhaps not completely mistaken. Only once more in his entire oeuvre
does Nietzsche employ the metaphor. Brusotti has drawn attention to the remarkable
circumstance that only a couple of months after writing the letter to Rée, Nietzsche
uses the very same metaphor of a golden chain; this time referring to himself (Bru-
sotti 1997, 23). The big problem with this note from the Nachlass is that the golden
chain does not in this case refer to the form or composition of a specific book or
any other work of art or science for that matter. Instead, the “artwork” is here the
self and the question the unification of the self.²³ The note does suggest that for
 Brusotti states that he leaves the question open, to what if any extent Nietzsche’s words in the
letter to Rée and in other letters lamenting his inability to create unity are to be understood as ironic
(Brusotti 1997, 23). I think Brusotti underestimates the importance of solving the question for inter-
preting Nietzsche’s intentions. There is certainly some irony in his complaints, but does it serve
any other purpose than to distance himself from his fear of failure? I think that what really is decisive
is that Nietzsche most certainly was insecure as to whether he was able to communicate the unity
that he sought to create in his works, and not only a sense of the need for unity.
 “eine eigne Sonne schaffen können, die über Ihnen und dem Wachsthum Ihres Gartens allein zu
scheinen hätte” (KGB III/1, Bf. 144).
 “Werde fort und fort, der, der du bist – der Lehrer und Bildner deiner selber! Du bist kein Schrift-
steller, du schreibst nur für dich! So erhältst du das Gedächtniß an deine guten Augenblicke und findest
ihren Zusammenhang, die goldne Kette deines Selbst! So bereitest du dich auf die Zeit vor, wo du spre-
chen mußt! Vielleicht daß du dich dann des Sprechens schämst, wie du dich mitunter des Schreibens
geschämt hast, daß es noch nöthig ist, sich zu interpretiren, daß Handlungen und Nicht-Handlungen
nicht genügen, dich mitzutheilen. Ja, du willst dich mittheilen! Es kommt einst die Gesittung, wo viel-
Lesen zum schlechten Tone gehört: dann wirst du auch dich nicht mehr schämen müssen, gelesen zu
werden; während jetzt jeder, der dich als Schriftsteller anspricht, dich beleidigt; und wer dich deiner
Schriften halber lobt, giebt dir ein Zeichen, daß sein Takt nicht fein ist, er macht eine Kluft zwischen
sich und dir – er ahnt gar nicht, wie sehr er sich erniedrigt, wenn er dich so zu erheben glaubt. Ich
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Nietzsche this unification of the self takes place through the work on texts, but Bru-
sotti goes on to use the note to make a far more radical claim. Through a rather con-
voluted procedure, he arrives at the conclusion that Nietzsche aspired to unity in his
writings of the free-spirit period. Before we look closer at the claim, and in order to
be able to evaluate it properly, it is necessary to provide some further background as
to why the note is worth any attention at all.
The note deserves special attention, and not only because it contains an early
expression of that Pindarian motif (cf. Hödl 2009, 532), “become, who you are”,
which perhaps more than any other sentence could be said to summarize Nietzsche’s
entire philosophy. According to Brusotti, the note shows that Nietzsche ascribed to
himself the ability to make himself complete though Brusotti admits it is still unclear
whether the unification is accomplished through the entirety of his works or through
a single work (Brusotti 1997, 23). On the grounds that Nietzsche in an unrelated letter
to Erwin Rohde (KGB III/1, Bf. 345) writes that one must put oneself into a whole in
order not to become divided,²⁴ Brusotti then concludes that for Nietzsche to form a
unified self is only possible by creating a work that is itself a whole. Brusotti further-
more asserts that this conception would have informed the creation of GS (Brusotti
1997, 24).
While Brusotti’s interpretation is suggestive, its underlying logic is oddly circular
and not entirely sound. To simplify, the interpretation is based on a set of interrelated
claims:
1) Nietzsche ascribed to himself the ability to unify his self.
2) Unification of self can in Nietzsche’s case only happen through writing.
3) The writing that unifies the self must itself form a unity: an artwork has to be a
unified whole.
Combining such statements, Brusotti makes the inference that Nietzsche aspires to
unity in his writing. First of all, one might ask if Nietzsche really ascribes to himself
the ability to unify his self: is it not rather the case that Nietzsche presents unifica-
tion as a task for himself [werde der, der du bist]. Even more problematic is the sud-
den shift by Brusotti from 2) to 3), from creating works that allow one to become com-
plete to the idea that only complete works can make one complete. There is no
justification for the interpretation that Nietzsche would accept premise 3) within
the Nachlass-note. Brusotti’s interpretation is a bit more palatable when one takes
account of the fact that Nietzsche in his letters seems to connect Rée’s ability to cre-
ate complete works with his being one of the “whole and complete natures” [die gan-
zen und vollständigen Naturen] (KGB III/1, Bf. 144) and his own inability to do so with
being an aphoristic nature (KGB III/1, Bf. 143). Yet accepting this view only results in a
kenne den Zustand der gegenwärtigen Menschen, wenn sie lesen: Pfui! Für diesen Zustand sorgen und
schaffen zu wollen!” (NL 1881, 11[297], KSA 9, 555–556)
 “Wir müssen uns in etwas Ganzes hineinlegen, sonst macht das Viele aus uns ein Vieles.” (KGB III/1,
Bf. 345)
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paradox: If only a complete nature can create complete works, then Nietzsche’s as-
piration to form a unified self through his writing is bound to end in disappointment.
What matters in the end is of course Nietzsche’s intention.While I agree in principle
that Brusotti’s interpretation points in the right direction, it certainly requires more
evidence. Saying anything definitive about Nietzsche’s authorial intention regarding
GS requires a more robust defence than Brusotti provides. It requires a defence that
takes into account the ambiguity in Nietzsche’s thinking. Brusotti does not pay
enough attention to the ambiguity of the note, and therefore too hastily proceeds
with his argument.
There is something almost uncanny in this glaringly contradictory note, in which
Nietzsche writes to himself in you-form [du] and exhorts himself to write for none
other than himself. He seems to be concerned about what writing for himself
means for the value of his writing but comforts himself that it does have value;
namely, it has value for himself. Through writing, Nietzsche contends that he can
connect the good moments of his life into a golden chain, into a unified self.
There is no suggestion that what Nietzsche himself writes would have to be a unified
whole in any traditional sense, as long as he himself can make out the whole and
gather the good moments of his life in his memory. In this sense, however, Nietz-
sche’s writings would be little more than self-help for himself. That is hardly a sat-
isfactory conclusion, and one that Nietzsche apparently would reject. If we look clos-
er at the note we find that the very reason for his “resolution” to write only for
himself lies in his distaste with and rejection of what he takes to be the role of an
author [Schriftsteller] in his time, a role he associates with writing for a specific
kind of reader, with whom he associates a specific state. Nietzsche does not describe
this state but there is no better expression of his disgust at it than the exclamation
[Pfui!] at the end.²⁵ This idea of writing only for himself and his concomitant rejection
of the role of author is half-hearted to say the least, because he most certainly has
future readers in mind: “Yes, you want to communicate” [Ja, du willst dich mittheilen],
he affirms. (Cf. NL 1881, 11[297], KSA 9, 555–556.)
5.2.3 Nietzsche’s desire to communicate and the question of mood
It is best to leave talk of golden chains behind and instead follow another lead from
the note, namely Nietzsche’s desire to communicate. After the publication of GS,
 It is near at hand to connect the state that Nietzsche writes of with boredom and the will to be
entertained. Nietzsche would later similarly complain about Z being presented to the world as enter-
tainment. He writes to Köselitz that no one can save him anymore from becoming associated with
popular writers [Belletristen]. The “Pfui!” has become a “Pfui Teufel!” (KGB III/1, Bf. 401). To Overbeck
he likewise writes to assure “wie unsäglich fern ich mit diesem Z(arathustra) von allem eigentlich Lit-
terarischen bin” (KGB III/1, Bf. 473). In other words, Nietzsche feared to be read in the wrong way as
much as he feared not being read at all, as proven by his attempts to give instructions to his friends.
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Nietzsche writes to his erstwhile mentor Jacob Burckhardt, having sent him a copy of
his new book. This curious letter echoes the playful mood of the book. After first im-
ploring Burckhardt to approach the work with an anticipated goodwill, Nietzsche lets
his esteemed friend know that he has reached the point where he lives as he thinks.
The decisive part comes next as he follows up his assertion with a more sceptical
suggestion that he perhaps also has learned how to express what he thinks. There-
fore, he asks about his ability to communicate his thoughts, and specifically asks
Burckhardt to read book four of GS, Sanctus Januarius, with the question of unity
in mind (KGB III/1, Bf. 277).²⁶ What is relevant here is not to what extent Nietzsche
is honestly suspicious whether he really has learned to express his thoughts in a uni-
fied manner or whether the sentiment is feigned. No amount of scholarship can give
any definite answer to such a question. It is in any case worth noting that Nietzsche
was interested in hearing Burckhardt’s answer to his question.²⁷ From the discussion
on HH, we know that Burckhardt was one of those readers who Nietzsche presented
as capable of hearing his words (cf. KGB II/5, Bf. 723). Still, the most interesting ques-
tion is rather why Nietzsche would single out Sanctus Januarius. Notably, Nietzsche
here speaks above all of Sanctus Januarius as an intended whole: there is no word of
GS in its entirety forming a whole. So the question why he singles out that book is so
interesting, because of what the answer can tell about in what sense if any he
thought of GS as a whole. Another letter goes a long way towards answering the
question.
The answer can be found in a letter to Köselitz. This letter is already important
for the reason that it indicates that Nietzsche made revisions to the preceding books
after finishing Sanctus Januarius. This further proof serves to cement the perception
that Nietzsche actively sought to form a whole out of GS. Even more important than
that is how the letter connects the unity of GS with mood. After recommending his
friend to take a look at the 2nd and 3rd books, to which he has made some final
changes, Nietzsche asks the crucial question about unity as a question of mood
and once again he singles out Sanctus Januarius, asking if that particular book
can be understood (KGB III/1, Bf. 282).²⁸ The first lines of the question provide as
clear an indication as there is to find that Nietzsche wanted to present GS as forming
a whole in its entirety. Moreover, Nietzsche’s emphasis on mood [Stimmung] strongly
suggests that a specific mood had something to do with it being a whole. In its turn,
Nietzsche’s question concerning Sanctus Januarius indicates that the fourth book
takes a special place in this regard.
On the basis of the letters referred to above, one can cautiously surmise that in
Nietzsche’s own understanding there is a strong connection between the mood of the
 “ich wünschte namentlich, daß Sie den Sanctus Januarius (Buch IV) im Zusammenhang lesen
möchten, um zu wissen, ob er als Ganzes sich mittheilt. – Und meine Verse?” (KGB III/1, Bf. 277)
 “In Hinsicht hierauf höre ich Ihr Urtheil als einen Richterspruch” (KGB III/1, Bf. 277).
 “Und auch über das Ganze und die ganze Stimmung: theilt sie sich wirklich mit? Namentlich: ist
Sanctus Januarius überhaupt verständlich?” (KGB III/1, Bf. 282)
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whole of GS and that of Sanctus Januarius. Perhaps what Nietzsche is trying to ac-
complish through GS, if indeed that has something to do with communicating a spe-
cific mood, relies on Sanctus Januarius to be understood? Perhaps it could be argued
that of the four books that comprise the work Sanctus Januarius most embodies the
mood of joyful science?²⁹ These questions, with the bolder interpretations they sug-
gest, can only conclusively be settled through an engagement with the work proper.
For now, it is enough to give a provisional answer to the problem at hand, i.e. why
Nietzsche asks his friends (both Burckhardt and Köselitz) specifically about Sanctus
Januarius. The most plausible answer is that the Stimmung of GS is most easily rec-
ognizable in Sanctus Januarius.Why then is this mood so important to what he want-
ed to communicate? Anything close to a final answer can only be provided through a
reading of GS, but one can and should provisionally note that Nietzsche insisted that
the book tells about himself; something about himself that he wanted to communi-
cate.
In a letter to Rée following the publication of GS, Nietzsche for the first time calls
GS the most personal of his books, a claim that he is to repeat (cf. KGB III/5, Bf. 1050),
and specifically bids Rée to read Sanctus Januarius as a whole because of what it tells
about himself (KGB III/1, Bf. 292). It is remarkable how Nietzsche here, after the break
with Lou and Rée, uses Sanctus Januarius as a justification of his own actions. To be
precise, Nietzsche writes that Sanctus Januarius reveals his private morality [Privat-
moral], which stipulates that there is only one “thou shalt” for him, if he wills himself
[falls ich mich selber will] (KGB III/1, Bf. 292). In other words, Nietzsche justifies his
break with Rée with the maxim “become, who you are”; if he is to become who he
is, he can do nothing else. It cannot be emphasized enough that what Nietzsche
wants Rée to understand about himself is not his mundane self, but the ideal to-
wards which he strives, the vision of a supremely joyful and productive mood. Not
without a hint of sarcasm, Nietzsche in fact suggests that he already dwells above
all petty human quarrels when he quotes the motto of GS and wishes Rée that he
too might come to see all events as profitable, all days as holy, all humans as divine
(KGB III/1, Bf. 292).
Likewise, Nietzsche writes that his books speak about himself in a letter to Carl
von Gersdorff. He specifically asks Gersdorff to read Sanctus Januarius with that in
mind.³⁰ Gersdorff ’s reaction to Nietzsche’s letter is quite intriguing. Having read
GS, Gersdorff writes that there is a mood in the work that reminds him of the air
 Werner Stegmaier has identified the fifth book of GS as expressing the mood of Gay Science at its
most mature (Stegmaier 2012, 46). I see no reason to object to this claim, as long as one distinguishes
the most mature expression of the mood from its most evident expression. Since the fifth book was
published later, Stegmaier could hardly object to the thesis that of the four original books the fourth
contains not only the clearest but the most mature expression thus far.
 “Im Übrigen ist Brief-schreiben Unsinn für mich, das weißt Du ja! Dafür erzählen meine Bücher so
viel von mir, als hundert Freundschafts-Briefe nicht könnten. Lies namentlich den Sanctus Januarius in
diesem Sinne.” (KGB III/1, Bf. 294)
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of a clear and beautiful September day.³¹ Is it a mere coincidence that Gersdorff em-
phasizes this mood of GS and describes it in terms that Nietzsche himself might have
used? Arguably, Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for clear air, and an autumnal mood sug-
gesting the ripening of fruits (of the mind) cannot have escaped Gersdorff. Be that
as it may, these letters again point to the intriguing yet hardly penetrable connection
between self and mood in Nietzsche, between communicating himself and commu-
nicating a specific mood.
Following Brusotti, one could argue that Nietzsche is in letters such as these
eager to hear whether he has been able to put himself into a whole and thus to be-
come complete. This interpretation would certainly give even more gravity to Nietz-
sche’s pleas to his friends to read specifically Sanctus Januarius as a whole. For if
Sanctus Januarius is the most personal of the books of GS, it would more than any
of the other books testify of Nietzsche’s ability to form himself into a whole, his ability
to express his most own mood.While the letters can be read to support Brusotti’s con-
clusion, such a reading remains highly speculative. By noting what role mood had for
Nietzsche’s original vision of GS, I nevertheless maintain that Brusotti hits the nails
head, even if he doesn’t present conclusive evidence. Brusotti, however, does not
go on to reflect on the implications for readings of GS, i.e. how one should approach
the work, given that mood is central to its functioning as a whole. Nor does Brusotti
provide a reading of GS showing exactly how this mood is expressed in the text. This
is understandable since his primary interest is the conceptual history of Nietzsche’s
idea of passion for knowledge (cf. Brusotti 1997). As far as I know, no one has explic-
itly reflected on the hermeneutic implications of acknowledging the centrality of
mood for readings of GS, nor has a reading attentive to mood been attempted. That
is the direction we turn next. Inspired by Brusotti’s insightful work, I take his conclu-
sion about the central role of Stimmung for GS as the starting point for my reading:
“Also The Gay Science and specifically its fourth book are despite the aphoristic
style meant to communicate Nietzsche’s mood as a whole.”³² For this is arguably a
fruitful starting point as long as one keeps in mind that it is the mood of the Nietzsche
of the text that matters, and not that of the all too human person.
5.3 Towards a contextual interpretation of GS
Whatever unity is to be found in GS, it does not primarily derive from the coherence
of the book’s themes or a sustained philosophical argument. The work is not coher-
ent in any traditional philosophical sense, yet it can be argued that it forms a unified
whole. Returning to the claim that GS forms a “profoundly imagined artistic and phil-
 “Es ist eine Stimmung darin, die mich anmuthet wie die Luft eines schönen klaren Septembertages,
wo man sich gerne sonnt und dem Lichte nicht mehr ausweicht.” (Reich 2013, 575; KGB III/2, Bf. 142)
 Own translation of: “Auch die fröhliche Wissenschaft und insbesondere deren viertes ‘Buch’ soll
dem aphoristischen Stil zum Trotz Nietzsches Stimmung als ein Ganzes mitteilen.” (Brusotti 1997, 21)
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osophical whole” (Franco 2011, 106), one can at least wholeheartedly agree that this
was attempted, and that the means to the goal were artistic. Nietzsche sought to
unite his sceptical, aphoristic experiments and fragmented thoughts in a joyful
mood, and thereby suggest a union of philosophy, art and science. One can of course
ask, whether Nietzsche succeeds or fails in his endeavour to create a unified whole
with GS. After all, Nietzsche’s letters certainly express a nervousness about his ability
to communicate or at the least a nervousness whether his contemporaries are able to
hear him. I will return to the sceptical question about Nietzsche’s communication of
mood through a discussion of the 1887 edition of GS (see section 5.8). Now, however,
the most pressing and most important question is rather how GS should be ap-
proached when one recognizes that whatever unity there is in the work, it depends
on the possibility of a unifying mood.
What does it then mean to interpret GS contextually? It is not enough to note that
the aphoristic text forms chains of thought or that many aphorisms relate to and rely
on each other. The same can be said about noting intertextual references and re-
searching sources, however valuable clues this might yield. These are important
tasks, but only if one treats GS as a whole, as a specific attempt at communication,
can one speak of a truly contextual interpretation. However, and this is critical, it still
does not suffice to be attentive to how parts relate to the whole, if the whole is under-
stood to be made up of themes, ideas or arguments. Instead, the crucial issue is to be
attentive to how Nietzsche’s understanding of a joyful mood of affirmation permeates
the text of GS and how the most important aphorisms relate to the overriding mood.
To conclude, it remains to be shown that paying attention to mood gives a priv-
ileged background from which to approach GS. The crucial test in this regard is
whether this approach can cast more light on the most difficult interpretative issues
that the text of GS confronts the reader with; above all that aphorism that has caused
most trouble for interpretation, GS 125, the Madman. I will however begin by discus-
sing the title of GS, move onward to the motto, from there to the collection of poems
and only then will I approach the aphoristic text, because these are arguably not triv-
ial additions but play an important role in the composition of GS.
5.3.1 The title “Gay Science”
What job does a title perform? A title gives an impression of a book, all the more im-
portant as it is a first impression. A title can suggest what to expect from a book.
These expectations in turn can influence how one approaches a book and therefore
how one interprets it. Nietzsche himself suggested as much when discussing the title
of Daybreak (KGB III/1, Bf. 83). There is no comparable discussion about the title of
GS, but Nietzsche’s plea to Burckhardt that he approach the work in a sympathetic
frame of mind can be read as an indication that Nietzsche still was very concerned
about the manner in which one approaches his text. It is worth noting that what
came to be GS was originally not planned as an independent work but as a contin-
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uation of D. It is not possible to say exactly when Nietzsche changed his plans and
came up with the title for his next work (cf. Kaufmann 2015, 9– 10). In January 1882,
Nietzsche still speaks of having finished writing books 6, 7 and 8 and planning to
work on the 9th and 10th books of Daybreak (KGB III/1, Bf. 190 and KGB III/1,
Bf. 192), but already in May he writes to his publisher Schmeitzner that he has almost
finished a new work entitled The Gay Science (KGB III/1, Bf. 224). This means that he
chose the title after his experience of health in January 1882, which again indicates
that the entire work is best seen in the light of the mood that is above all expressed in
Sanctus Januarius.³³ In any case, there is no reason to assume that Nietzsche had
completely changed his mind about the importance of choosing a fitting title.
Since there still is no evidence about what effect Nietzsche intended the title to
have, the only way forward in this line of inquiry is to ask what effect the title has
had on scholars. Gersdorff attests that the title and motto put him in a joyful
mood (Reich 2013, 575; cf. KGB III/2, Bf. 142), but what about contemporary scholars?
The effect of the title on scholars seems to be one of bewilderment. Commenta-
ries invariably point out that it is not at all clear what the joyful science means.³⁴
Scholars have noted Emerson’s use of the phrase “joyful science” and investigated
the connection to the gaya scienza³⁵ of the troubadours. Besides far-fetched conjec-
tures, many interesting and enlivening details have been uncovered this way (e.g.
Pippin 2000 and Babich 2006), but in the end the search for precursors and models
has not provided any definitive answers as to the nature of the title nor has it given
clues that could guide the interpretation of the work.³⁶ It is certainly understandable
 This claim can be supported by drawing on scholarship, in which Nietzsche’s plans for titles are
discussed. Building on the work of Figl, who analysed Nietzsche’s title-sketches for unpublished Na-
chlass-notes and found that the titles evolve as the work on the notes evolves (Figl 1982, 39), Hödl
argues that since Nietzsche considered many different titles his final choice of title reflects his
most mature intentions about the program of the work: that the title gathers the work as a whole
as a kind of summarizing aphorism (Hödl 2009, 516–519). While this is a quite speculative interpre-
tation, as Hödl is aware (cf. Hödl 2009, 519), it is very instructive in the case of GS, as it fits the evi-
dence about the change of plans that led to there being a Gay Science instead of more books of Day-
break.
 For a summary of approaches to the title of GS, consult Stegmaier 2012, 47–49.
 Nietzsche added the subtitle (“la gaya scienza”) to the second edition to make the connection to
the troubadours more apparent. He also sought to emphasize this connection in EH (cf. KSA 6, 333).
What is most interesting about this matter is how Nietzsche thinks of the troubadour as a unity of
singer, knight and free spirit in one, i.e. one who can unite his multifaceted nature in one spirit or
mood.
 The same conclusion can be drawn about Nietzsche’s own discussions that link joy and science in
his previous works. The most interesting aphorism that would seem to prefigure GS is certainly The
allurement of knowledge, where Nietzsche speaks of the glad tidings [frohe Botschaft] of science and
exemplifies what he means by quoting Marcus Aurelius to the effect that “’Let delusion vanish! Then
“woe is me!” will vanish too; and with “woe is me!” woe itself will be gone.’” (Hollingdale transl.
Clark and Leiter 1997, 189; D 450, KSA 3, 273) Though one might claim that this aphorism has not re-
ceived the attention it deserves, it too provides no key to the title, since the characterization of the joy
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that scholars would exhaust all possibilities of determining possible influences on
the title; after all, here’s something to grab and expound, an opportunity to practice
some conceptual archaeology and detective work. There is however a real danger
here that such historical investigations divert attention from the fundamental orien-
tation toward the future which is so characteristic of Nietzsche’s joyful science.
Another slightly more fruitful approach to the title is to compare it with the titles
of Nietzsche’s other publications. This approach is taken by Stegmaier who asserts
that Nietzsche’s titles are not only more poetic than descriptive, but also inherently
irritating and that of all the titles GS is the most irritating (Stegmaier 2012, 41–43).
Indeed, many of Nietzsche’s titles both irritate and fascinate, and thus above all
raise expectations. In the case of GS, Stegmaier perceptively draws attention to the
grounds of the irritation that he claims the title raises. The irritation stems from a
historical constellation worth looking into.What strikes Stegmaier as particularly ir-
ritating about GS is that the title combines two terms that appear to be almost mu-
tually exclusive in the European tradition. Science deals with truth and is therefore
grave and serious. Consequently, science has little or nothing to do with joy, which is
associated with play, light-heartedness and carelessness. Not only in the context of
19th-century science would freedom from care suggest irresponsibility. Ever since
its philosophical foundations in antiquity, the pursuit of truth has been indissociable
from a specific seriousness that at least in part stems from knowledge of death and a
peculiar relation to death, exemplified in Socrates’ willingness to die for truth (cf.
Stegmaier 2012, 43–47). To this could be added that the experiences of the
20th century, and the self-destructive possibilities opened up by physics and bio-
chemistry, have only served to strengthen the association of science with an ethic
and pathos of seriousness.
The apparent, and perhaps merely apparent, incompatibility of science and joy
is an important issue, one that recurs in the text of GS and in Nietzsche’s Nachlass-
reflections. In a sketch for the foreword to the second edition of GS Nietzsche later
noted about the reception of his work that some scholars took offence at the combi-
nation of the words joy and science.³⁷ It could then be argued that one of the main
goals of the work was precisely to untangle the connection between science and sci-
entific seriousness, and that the title refers to this intention. One could think of sci-
entific seriousness as a moral ideal that gives gravity to the search of truth. In this
vein, one could see Nietzsche as trying to reinvigorate the search for truth on the
basis of a different, more joyful relation to truth. An intellectual shift in perspective
is not enough; what is also required is an affective change. I find Nietzsche’s conten-
tion in HH I, that “we” are unable to fully understand, that is feel, combinations of
feeling that were known in the past, very instructive in this regard (cf. HH I 112,
of science is purely negative, as absence of woe. If Nietzsche had meant only this by joyful science, he
would not have had to write GS at all.
 “sie gaben mir zu verstehen, Das sei ‘fröhlich’ vielleicht, sicherlich aber nicht ‘Wissenschaft’”
(NL 1885/86, 2[166], KSA 12, 151).
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KSA 2, 116). Reasonably, the same logic applies to the future and emerging affective
constellations: we are unable to fully understand combinations that will be felt and
thought of as natural by following generations. Against this background, Nietzsche’s
GS can be read as an intervention in the history of emotion and science. Such a read-
ing would show how far beyond the tradition Nietzsche aimed with his conception of
a joyful science. It suffices to take Nietzsche’s ambition seriously, and to admit the
possibility of such a reading, in order to reject Stegmaier’s suggestion that the title
must remain irritating out of necessity (cf. Stegmaier 2012, 45). When one takes ac-
count of Nietzsche’s understanding of the historical nature of emotions and his ori-
entation to the future, the title (though perhaps still irritating) no longer seems so
startling, so surprising, so irritating.
That Nietzsche’s writings are indeed marked by a fundamental orientation to the
future can be established as a fact by an overview of the content of his philosophical
works. From BT to the very last writings, Nietzsche’s primary concern is to open up
the present to future possibilities. This opening of possibilities of course also serves
the present or emphatically the earthly present, as there is no escapism, no “other
world” involved. After all, in what light the present moment and the past are seen
and life is lived depends in great part on expectations, on the future horizon and spe-
cifically on what kind of futures are opened. Whether Nietzsche is really more con-
cerned with the changes of perspective and affect that visions of both desirable
and detestable futures have for this life or is genuinely concerned with future lives
is an interesting problem of interpretation, but one that is not of concern to us
here. What matters here is Nietzsche’s praxis of opening possibilities through his
writings. In BT Nietzsche bids farewell of philological-historical research and turns
to future-oriented philosophy. What is at stake is not primarily the correct historical
interpretation of the development of tragedy in Ancient Greece but the possibility of
a birth of tragedy in his own time. The untimely meditations follow the pattern estab-
lished by BT.³⁸ Nietzsche’s turn to science in HH can be interpreted as a revaluation
of scientific thinking as providing the most promising model on the path to a higher
culture. Daybreak expects a new dawn.With the culmination of the free spirit -period
in GS Nietzsche’s play with expectations reaches a new height, only to be outmatch-
ed by the future-drunken rhetoric of the prophetic Zarathustra. This fundamental ori-
entation is in no way weakened by the sobering up that followed the pathos of Z. The
book that is entitled Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future is a
case in point. Even the genealogy of morality is no mere historical work, but serves
the future. The last writings explicitly affirm this orientation, as exemplified by his
 E.g. Nietzsche’s fierce rejection of David Friedrich Strauss’ later thinking derives in large part be-
cause Nietzsche finds there a rival ideal and idea of the future. In an unsent draft of a letter to an
unknown recipient, dated August 1885, Nietzsche calls his untimely meditations promises (“Verspre-
chungen”, KGB III/3, Bf. 617), and adds that he has ever since been fulfilling his promises, which
should perhaps be interpreted in the sense that he has been reaching for his “higher self” and
that his books are testaments of his development.
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bold statements that he writes for future readers, by which he means both temporally
distant readers in a time yet to come as well as readers with future in them (A Fore-
word, KSA 6, 167; cf. KSA 6, 298).
To conclude, Nietzsche’s GS is above all concerned with the future. Because of
this fundamental orientation, Emerson and the troubadours serve Nietzsche at
best only as precursors. Looking to the past does not help to fathom the joyful sci-
ence. Instead, we should look to the radically new in Nietzsche’s conception. Put dif-
ferently: the text interprets the title (cf. Hödl 2009, 518). The combination of the
words joyful/gay [fröhlich] and science [Wissenschaft] gains meaning only through
the text. What should be pursued further, however, is not Nietzsche’s use of these
words in the text, but how the text as a whole embodies his understanding of joyful
science. The next logical step is therefore to move forward to the motto.
5.3.2 The Emersonian motto
“Dem Dichter und Weisen sind alle Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Erlebnisse nützlich, alle
Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.” – Emerson (as Nietzsche quotes him in the motto, GS
Title page, KSA 3, 343)
“To the poet, to the philosopher, to the saint, all things are friendly and sacred, all events profit-
able, all days holy, all men divine.” – Emerson (the original, from Emerson’s essay “History”, cf.
Emerson 1979, 8)
Why does Nietzsche open the joyful science with such a motto? What purpose does it
serve? Perhaps it is enough to hear the question properly to find the answer. For is
not the answer there? Does the motto not open the “joyful science”; its meaning and
goal? A joyful mood of affirmation. Be that as it may, let us not jump to conclusions.
Following the tradition of Nietzsche-scholarship, the first thing to do is to turn to
the source of the motto. As was the case with the pairing of the words joy and sci-
ence, one can and must also in this case refer to Nietzsche’s reading of Emerson. Al-
though no certain clues can be gained thus, two issues about Nietzsche’s relation to
Emerson strike me as in need of further clarification. The first has received ample at-
tention in scholarship, while the second has received none. Firstly, it is worth point-
ing out that the motto is not an exact rendering of the original. According to Brusotti,
the differences are not insignificant; the most important difference being that instead
of Emerson’s three figures (poet, philosopher and saint), Nietzsche presents us with
one figure, who is both poet [Dichter] and sage [Weiser]. Brusotti furthermore sug-
gests that the merging of these two figures represents the union of joy (art) and sci-
ence in the title, and that this explains why Nietzsche did not mention the saint (Bru-
sotti 1997, 382). Given the resulting union of joy and science and considering the
disparaging portrayal of saints in HH and D, it is tempting to think that Nietzsche
intentionally chose not to replicate the exact wording and to leave the saint unmen-
tioned instead. Though the difference is minimal, it is striking. If indeed GS is to a
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great degree an attempt to establish the possibility of a post-Christian, post-religious
mood of affirmation, then the exclusion makes even more sense. The motto could
then be read as suggesting a possibility open only to those who, like Nietzsche,
are willing to break new ground. Since the exact circumstances will forever remain
unknown, there is not enough evidence to conclude with absolute certainty that
Nietzsche’s wording was intentional. After all, it might just as well have been a
lapse of memory.³⁹ Whether or not one considers the omission of the saint in
Nietzsche’s motto significant, the inexactness is once again a reminder to be alert
to the radically new in Nietzsche’s appropriation of his sources.
Secondly, and this might add plausibility to the contention that the motto is
“about” mood both in the sense that the motto speaks of an ideal mood and that
this speaking of is meant to raise mood, Emerson had a highly original understand-
ing of mood that guided his essayistic writing. Indeed, it is an understatement to say
that mood played a major role in his thinking.⁴⁰ The decisive question is to what ex-
tent Nietzsche not only understood but was inspired by Emerson’s thinking on mood
through his intensive reading of the American thinker.⁴¹ Again, it is impossible even
to reconstruct to what extent Nietzsche understood the specifics of the Emersonian
conception of mood, as expressed most clearly in the essay “Experience”, namely
what has been called his “epistemology of moods” (Cavell 2003b, 11). All that is cer-
tain is that Nietzsche found Emerson related to him in the same way as he found the
Upper Engadine, as a note from autumn 1881 attests. In this note he writes that he
has never felt so at home in a book as with Emerson’s essays.⁴² That this judgement
was more than an exaggerated outburst of joy is proven by the fact that even when
he has in 1883 become sceptical of Emerson’s worth as thinker he still recognizes a
brother-soul in the American (KGB III/1, Bf. 477). Suffice it to say that the Emersonian
 In a note dated February–March 1882, Nietzsche quotes Emerson and does not fail to mention the
saint: “Emerson sagt mir nach dem Herzen: Dem Poeten dem Philosophen wie dem Heiligen sind alle
Dinge befreundet und geweiht, alle Ereignisse nützlich, alle Tage heilig, alle Menschen göttlich.” No far-
reaching conclusions can be made on the basis of this note. On the one hand Nietzsche writes that
Emerson speaks “mir nach dem Herzen”, which suggests that Nietzsche endorses the entire sentence,
but on the other hand the note is to be found under the title “500 Aufschriften / auf Tisch und Wand /
für Narrn / von / Narrenhand” (NL 1882, 18[5], KSA 9, 673).
 Cf. Stanley Cavell’s characterization, which also is a masterpiece of understatement: “Emerson
may be said to be a philosopher of moods” (Cavell 2003a, 26). In fact, Cavell places Emerson along-
side Heidegger and himself as the only philosophers to have seriously considered the foundational
role that moods play in understanding reality and consequently as the only philosophers to have un-
derstood the role that moods play in doing philosophy (Cavell 2003b, 11).What I suggest in this study
is that one should at least consider adding Nietzsche to the list.
 Nietzsche read both the first and second series of Emerson’s essays in the German compilation
and translation Versuche (Essays) by G. Fabricius, published in 1858. Nietzsche lost his first copy
of the work, but bought another one in 1874, and in this surviving copy, all essays except “Liebe”
are heavily annotated (Brobjer 2008, 119).
 “Emerson / Ich habe mich nie in einem Buch so zu Hause und in meinem Hause gefühlt als – ich
darf es nicht loben, es steht mir zu nahe.” (NL 1881, 12[68], KSA 9, 588)
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view that all experience is filtered through moods⁴³ certainly has its parallels in
Nietzsche’s psychological thinking about felt experience and the perspectival nature
of all knowledge. Besides that, both Emerson and Nietzsche understand their think-
ing as striving for a higher self, which is defined by a mood of supreme affirmation.
In Emerson’s essays, this idea of a higher self is the focus of the essay “Self-Reli-
ance”, but it also appears in the essay from which Nietzsche extracted the motto
of GS. In that essay, entitled “History”, that which all wisdom (all history, all nature)
speaks of is the “unattained but attainable self” (Emerson 1979, 5). Finally, Emerson
like Nietzsche, considered playfulness essential to his ideal: his genius “knows how
to play” with the changing forms of life (Emerson 1979, 8).When one takes account of
these parallels, one might be tempted to read the motto as expressing Nietzsche’s
agreement with the Emersonian ideal, yet that is precisely what one should not
do. The motto is certainly an admission of kinship with Emerson, yet the ideal
mood that Nietzsche has in mind cannot be equated with Emerson’s, because his
playfulness is something quite different from Emerson’s. That which in my view
most attests to the Emersonian background of the motto, yet also hints of this darker
and more sinister playfulness, is how it begs the question: is that supreme state of
affirmation really attainable, and if yes, at what cost?
At first glance, the motto might precisely for this reason seem unreasonable to
one unaccustomed to Nietzsche’s philosophy. But even a newcomer to Nietzsche
should be able to note that there is more going on here than mere rhetorical embel-
lishment: the motto is an invitation to entertain the possibility that there is a perspec-
tive, experience or mood, through which everything appears divine, and to read the
work with this possibility in mind. The seasoned reader acquainted with the second-
ary literature, on the other hand, might think of Nietzsche’s notorious use of hyper-
bole and then especially of self-aggrandizing hyperbole. Indeed, much of Nietzsche’s
writing relies on the skilled use of hyperbole, of exaggeration: his philosophy is “es-
sentially hyperbolic” as Alexander Nehamas would have it (Nehamas 1985, 31) and
this is nowhere more clear than in his self-depictions (cf. Hödl 2009). In this regard,
one might question whether Nietzsche in the motto presents an ideal worth striving
for or simply announces that this is the perspective, experience or mood that he has
attained and from within which he writes. Precisely in this in-between movement,
which continues in the text of GS, one can detect an element of play that comes
close to mockery. The motto certainly has a playfulness to it that seems to shout:
“be on your guard!”
Despite or rather because of this playfulness, the motto demands to be taken as
seriously as anything in the book. In interpreting the motto, there are two credible op-
tions. Firstly, it can be read as a statement concerning a special, blessed moment in
 See e.g. the oft-quoted passage: “Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and, as we pass
through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their own hue, and each
shows only what lies in its focus.” (Emerson 1983, 30)
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which the world appears perfect, without blemish. One could think of this as a mo-
mentary enlightenment, as an epiphany or even as a transportation into Dionysian
ecstasy. Secondly, it can be read as referring to a (at least in principle) lasting perspec-
tive, felt as a life-affirming mood, inhabited by the one in whom joy and science are
united. GS itself does not provide an unambiguous answer in the form of a decisive
statement; one might even go as far as to claim that there is a conflict on this point in
Nietzsche’s thinking more generally.⁴⁴ I think the safest answer is that the two need
not be thought of as mutually exclusive. Provisionally it is worth holding open the
possibility that the motto speaks about more than a singular moment of affirmation,
a blessed point in time. Such moments certainly play a role in Nietzsche’s philosophy,
but they too have value only insofar as they change one’s being. In other words, it is
plausible to assume provisionally that Nietzsche holds out a lasting change as possi-
bility, though this need not be thought of as a constant habitation of a high mood. The
motto certainly seems to suggest that striving towards such change is what the joyful
science is about. As we shall soon see, one of the questions raised by the text itself is
whether and under what conditions such a mood is attainable.
5.3.3 “Joke, Cunning and Revenge”
What role do the poems that follow the opening motto serve? As with the motto, one
cannot avoid really thinking through the question why Nietzsche would include a
collection of poems in a work that ostensibly has to do with science. As I have indi-
cated earlier with respect to the title, traditions of scholarship strong in Nietzsche’s
day and arguably even stronger in ours predispose one to view the inclusion as prob-
lematic. One might think of the poems as added to the main body of the text as if
they were not an important part of the text. Philosophers who write on GS tend to
ignore the poems, and this is certainly reasonable if one is interested only in extract-
ing and discussing particular ideas expressed in GS. If on the other hand one is in-
terested in a contextual interpretation of the work or aspects of the work, the poems
cannot be overlooked. In what way should the poems be recognized? There is reason
to caution against taking the poems all too seriously in the sense of thinking that
their value lies in their philosophical content.⁴⁵ Having sent some rimes (including
 See the entry “Augenblick/Moment” in the Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (Nietzsche Research Group
2004, 181–216; cf. Brusotti 1997, 522–523)
 E.g. Langer only focuses on the supposed philosophical content and symbolism of the poems (cf.
Langer 2010, 14–25) Higgins is quite exceptional among Anglophone interpreters in her willingness
to engage the poems as a special form of communication. Although she also comes close to treating
the poems as arguments, she finally compares them to nursery rhymes and concludes that their aim
is to lead the reader to a childlike state, a state of openness. The idea would seem to be that the read-
er first has to be lead back to a childlike state before being ready to embrace Nietzsche’s philosophy
(Higgins 2003, 14–41). While Higgins’ reading is suggestive, and does pay attention to Nietzsche’s
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poem 13) to Köselitz, Nietzsche writes that he amuses himself with such things on his
walks.⁴⁶ If the value of the poems is perhaps not to be found primarily in the phil-
osophical content that they can be seen to express, might their value be found in
the way they set the tone in which the aphorisms that compose the rest of the
work are to be approached?
In the perspective opened up by the above question: the jocular poems serve as
attunement, and in doing so they prepare the reader for the aphorisms that make up
the rest of GS. They are an introduction,⁴⁷ in the musical sense. Just as a prelude [Vor-
spiel] of Wagner prefigures the dramatic action of the operatic acts, Nietzsche’s intro-
ductory poems are filled with intratextual references to the aphorisms that follow.
There is however even more to the prelude than that. One need but remind oneself
that the German word for play is Spiel. In this sense, the poems are arguably not only
to be seen as lighthearted play before start of the serious philosophizing, but as fore-
taste of the play proper. They give the reader a taste of things to come, of the style
one is to expect. From this perspective, the aphoristic style of the following text ap-
pears as a continuation of the poetic. Although one might argue that the playfulness
is more pronounced in the poems than in most of the aphorisms, it is hard to deny
that the poems and the aphorisms partake of the same spirit, express the same sense
of freedom that is indissociable from a certain fascination with irresponsibility and
display the same self-conscious arrogance that borders on the insane. The first poem,
entitled Invitation [Einladung], exemplifies this mood.
Take a chance and try my fare;
It will grow on you, I swear;
Soon it will taste good to you.
If by then you should want more,
All the things I’ve done before
Will inspire things quite new.
(Kaufmann 1974, 41; cf. GS Prelude, KSA 3, 353)
The mocking tone of the poem is evident from the start as it challenges the reader to
dare to consume that which has been prepared. It is implied that the reader might
not be quite up to the task (cf. Higgins 2003, 26; Langer overlooks this hint: Langer
2010, 15). Yet the reader might get used to the food being served, the diet prepared by
Nietzsche, in which case there shall be more of it! What then, one is tempted to ask,
metaphors one might object to the direction that she leads these metaphors in her own argument by
asking: does a child have a good bite in the sense that Nietzsche demands of his reader? (Cf. Poem 54,
GS Prelude, KSA 3, 365.) Is a child independent?
 “Mit dergleichen unterhalte ich mich auf meinen Spaziergaengen.” (KGB III/1, Bf. 202)
 In a letter to Salomé Nietzsche writes: “Ich bringe die Einleitung mit nach Berlin, welche als Über-
schrift hat ‘Scherz, List und Rache’ Vorspiel in deutschen Reimen.” (KGB III/1, Bf. 241) Nietzsche wanted
to present the poems as an introduction [Einleitung] literally leading into the aphorisms. They argu-
ably do this as much if not more by leading into a mood than by introducing themes.
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if one dares to taste Nietzsche’s delicacies? Could it be that if one eats and manages
to digest the food one can come to that all-embracing perspective that the motto
speaks of, or at least approach it? Perhaps so, but is it not also the case that the re-
action to food as to knowledge varies from individual to individual, i.e. that not ev-
eryone can digest everything? That some might be allergic to Nietzsche’s goods? This
recognition is the dark undercurrent of the joyful science; that which makes under-
standing the mood (joy) of the joyful science so crucial to understanding his critical
project. Only when approached through a joyful mood does Nietzsche’s project make
sense. The element of play appears in a clearer light, when one takes into account
Nietzsche’s belief that the ingredients of his food can also lead to utter horror, repul-
sion and finally suicide (e.g. GS 107, KSA 3, 464; cf. HH I 34, KSA 2, 53–55). Therefore,
the poem is mocking in an even more significant way. Nietzsche tempts the reader to
dangerous experiments with himself, and in this sense Nietzsche here appears more
as tempter than in any of his previous writings.
Invitation is not the only poem that builds on metaphors of consumption, food
and digestion. Poems 1, 8, 24, 35, 39 and 54 all deal with such issues in one way or
another. On the surface of it, these poems do not have much in common. However,
they can all be read as referring intratextually to the idea of incorporation. Incorpo-
ration has rightly been identified as one of the most important philosophical issues
in GS, specifically as the question to what extent one can incorporate knowledge in a
way that allows life to flourish (cf. Franco 2011, 101– 102). I will discuss incorporation
in more detail in the next section. For now it suffices to note that Nietzsche requires
of his readers the capacity to incorporate his message, namely to take time to read
him carefully, to reread, to digest his words. Poem 54, To my reader, is directly ad-
dressed to the reader. Once again, the tone is mocking: Good teeth and a good stom-
ach is what Nietzsche wishes his reader. This does not mean following Nietzsche
blindly, as poems 7 and 23 make clear, but to turn Nietzsche’s food into a source
of energy for one’s own development. If one thinks about the issue from the perspec-
tive of incorporation one comes to the conclusion that merely to ape Nietzsche, to do
no more than repeat his words without thinking, does not speak of successful incor-
poration. It is not a sign of good digestion. In short, it is akin to throwing up.
Although Nietzsche thus suggests that successful incorporation does not lead to
the creation of a cult of Nietzsche-followers, this does not mean that there would be
no common effects to the incorporation of Nietzsche’s thinking. One such effect is
arguably the purification of feeling, which was an important goal in D. Since each
individual has a different history and emotional constitution, this goal will result
in widely differing trajectories. Therefore, the only fitting morality for those who ac-
cept Nietzsche’s invitation to an experimental life is the star morals [Sternen-Moral]
of poem 63, which concludes the poems: “But one command is yours: be pure!”
(Kaufmann 1974, 69; GS Prelude, KSA 3, 367) The journey to one’s own self, though
it differs from the journey of all others who pursue their own selves, will perhaps
eventually lead to a high mood of joyful affirmation, and though the exact nature
of the mood will differ from person to person, all of Nietzsche’s descriptions of
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such a state suggest that it is in every case associated with a heightened feeling of
power.
Now, we can conclude the preliminary examination and begin approaching the
aphoristic text itself. As the main focus of the reading is on religion, the third book of
GS is granted most attention. However, I will begin the examination with a broader
overview starting from aphorism 1 and the notion of incorporation, which the pre-
liminary investigation has suggested is important to the work as a whole.
5.4 On incorporation and joyful science
The very first aphorism of GS, entitled The teachers of the purpose of existence, not
only contains the first mention of “incorporation” but also of “joyful science”. Un-
doubtedly, this coincidence can be used to defend the centrality of the notion of in-
corporation to the work. Yet it must not be overlooked that the first mention of “in-
corporation” appears suddenly and without further clarification in the context of a
sarcastic discussion of those “teachers” who would have one believe that all of ex-
istence has a definite preordained telos. The perspective entertained by Nietzsche
subsumes all efforts to direct human action toward a single goal under a drive to pre-
serve the species [Trieb der Arterhaltung]. Nietzsche jokingly suggests that whatever
in us that could really harm the species has perhaps already died out, and that there-
fore even the most life-denying teachings cannot but help serving this drive. Now the
main concern of the aphorism is clearly not with providing unshakeable evidence for
this “truth”, but rather to show what would follow if we were to accept this truth and
let it guide our being; if this truth were to become conscious in us. If all of humanity
would take this thought to heart, and would have incorporated⁴⁸ the idea that “the
species is everything, one is always none”, then Nietzsche surmises that there might
perhaps only be “gay science” left. (Kaufmann 1974, 73–76; GS 1, KSA 3, 369–372)
The suggestion is that if laughter and wisdom were to be united into a new
mood, which might follow from the incorporation of a single shocking idea, then in-
deed all events would appear profitable, and a joyful irresponsible experimentation
would be made possible. So the aphorism establishes a connection between the in-
corporation of specific ideas and joyful science. There is nevertheless not much to be
learned about incorporation on the basis of the first aphorism: indeed, if the notion
were not present in other aphorisms, it would remain entirely mysterious. The only
certain conclusion that can be drawn is that Nietzsche ascribes incorporated ideas
the power to change affect. So even if all purposive human behaviour would in
fact serve the preservation of the species, the incorporation of at least some ideas
can shape mental life in a dramatic way. The aphorism begs the question: Is the sen-
 “sich der Menschheit einverleibt hat” (GS 1, KSA 3, 370).
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tence “the species is everything, one is always none” what Nietzsche really wants hu-
manity to incorporate? Is this what GS is about?
There is something curious and playful, if not outright inconsistent, about the
way in which Nietzsche presents the idea of incorporation in the first aphorism.
Even as Nietzsche mocks those who teach that life has a telos, he presents his cri-
tique within a teleological framework; namely within an objective teleology of spe-
cies-preservation [Arterhaltung].⁴⁹ Of course, Nietzsche insists that such preservation
happens by itself and without final goal (GS 1, KSA 3, 371), simply because preserving
the species is the oldest of our drives. So it would seem that what Nietzsche is doing
here is to replace misinterpretations of the drive to preserve the species with a more
scientific interpretation, in the spirit of HH and D. This impression is complicated by
Nietzsche’s assertion that misinterpretations of said drive by ethical teachers has
made humans “fantastic animals” that have developed a “need” for such teachers
(GS 1, KSA 3, 372), a need for answers about ultimate questions regarding the purpose
of existence. Importantly, Nietzsche does not even raise the question whether this
presumably incorporated need is something that humanity can be rid of. Instead,
he emphasizes that the need is not felt constantly, but takes hold of humanity
from time to time. Furthermore, he identifies interpretations that give individual ex-
istence purpose as tragic, and interpretations of the human condition that do not as
comic. On the one hand there is comic irresponsibility, on the other tragic serious-
ness. The result, with which the aphorism ends, is a vision of an ebb and flood of
tragic and comic interpretations of existence (GS 1, KSA 3, 372).
Because Nietzsche presents his vision of a historical ebb and flood of tragic and
comic interpretations in the opening aphorism, the idea has taken root in scholarship
that GS itself would oscillate between tragic and comic perspectives. Not only do
such interpretations ignore the fact that Nietzsche is speaking of entire historical ep-
ochs, they also fail to note how Nietzsche defines tragedy and comedy in the aphor-
ism. Unlike interpreters who see an ebb and flood of tragic and comic perspectives
within GS (Franco 2011, 109 and 127; Higgins 2003, 50), I do not think that one
can contest the claim that the entirety of GS is comic following Nietzsche’s under-
standing of comedy in aphorism 1.⁵⁰ Nietzsche is simply not in the business of pro-
viding ultimate goals for existence. As I will show, the first aphorism rather serves as
a prime example of what could be called Nietzsche’s “what if-style” in GS, which is
closely related to the mood of the work.What characterizes this style is that there are
no final answers to be found, and that one might be well advised to place a question
mark even after those statements, where he himself does not. Instead of giving the
reader clear directions or a sense of solid foundations, he bids the reader to provi-
sionally inhabit perspectives that might provide fruitful, but which must be thrown
 Cf. Nietzsche’s critique of unnecessary teleological principles (BGE 13, KSA 5, 27–28).
 One can of course even interpret GS as tragic through and through but then one has to employ an
understanding of tragedy that differs greatly from Nietzsche’s.
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away once they have served their purpose.Werner Stegmaier has diligently and con-
vincingly argued for the importance of this style for the entirety of GS and described
how Nietzsche brings this method of questioning and tempting to perfection in the
fifth book of GS (Stegmaier 2012). I here follow Stegmaier’s lead when examining
what Nietzsche seeks to achieve through his discussion of incorporation.
Nietzsche’s “what if-style” is apparent in aphorism one, where one encounters
the perspective of a narrative I, who again and again qualifies his words with a cau-
tionary, yet tempting perhaps [vielleicht]. So instead of concluding that Nietzsche se-
riously suggests that the sentence “the species is everything, one is always none”
should be incorporated, it is more plausible that he merely provisionally bids the
reader, as a starting point, to entertain a perspective that allows one to view
human life in a non-moral way.⁵¹ There could perhaps be many other ways to “gay
science”, other ways to the feeling of freedom that is required.⁵² Be that as it may,
it is important to examine Nietzsche’s use of the notion of incorporation carefully,
in order to ascertain what function it serves in the critical project of GS. First, it is
of course necessary to establish that the notion of incorporation indeed plays an im-
portant role in GS.
I emphasized that the idea of incorporation appears “out of the blue”, suddenly
and without clarification. In no way do I by that mean to suggest that the idea would
be unimportant. Quite to the contrary, I find it plausible that the manner in which the
idea is introduced reflects the importance Nietzsche attached to it. Instead of forcing
the idea upon the reader through a sustained discussion at the start, Nietzsche is
careful to introduce the idea gradually; to let the reader chew on it. Perhaps the ra-
tionale behind this manner of presenting has to do with an intuition on Nietzsche’s
part that one first has to accept the premise that ideas have such power before one is
ready for all the implications that follow. In any case, the notion of incorporation re-
appears in aphorism 11; now as a grand task to incorporate knowledge (GS 11, KSA 3,
382–383). After this Nietzsche returns to the question now and then in book one. Be-
sides aphorisms explicitly mentioning the notion (GS 21, KSA 3, 392 and GS 43, KSA 3,
410) other aphorisms express the same idea in other words (GS 9, KSA 3, 381 and
GS 54, KSA 3, 417) or implicitly rely on the idea to make sense (e.g. GS 18, KSA 3,
389–390 and GS 44, KSA 3, 410– 11). What has been said about book one also ap-
plies to book two. Aphorism 57, the opening aphorism of book two, provides the
foundation for the remainder of the book with its discussion of the proper way to en-
gage incorporated errors (GS 57, KSA 3, 421–422). The reader has to wait until book
 Higgins also suggests that Nietzsche merely provisionally presents that perspective but gives no
convincing explanation why the aphorism should be read that way, other than that it is an example of
Nietzsche’s perspectivism (cf. Higgins 2003, 45–46).
 Arguably, art is precisely for this reason an important ally and component of joyful science. In
aphorism 107, Nietzsche writes of his indebtedness to all joyful arts, because he sees in art the
same freedom of rising above morality: “Freiheit über den Dingen … welche unser Ideal von uns for-
dert”, specifically “über der Moral stehen können” (GS 107, KSA 3, 465).
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three for a more revealing elaboration of the notion: this is accomplished in aphor-
isms 110, 111 and 113 (GS 110, KSA 3, 469–471; GS 111, KSA 3, 471–472; GS 112, KSA 3,
472–473). It is also in book three that the idea is at its most important; many an
aphorism can only be misunderstood if one doesn’t take the notion of incorporation
into account. This is most importantly the case with the parable of the Madman
(GS 125, KSA 3, 480–482), which I discuss in detail in section 5.5. While the notion
is not as present in book four as in the previous books, it returns with force in aphor-
ism 341 with the challenge to incorporate the idea of Eternal Recurrence (GS 341,
KSA 3, 570).
In light of this evidence, it has to be concluded that incorporation plays an im-
portant role in GS, but one should be careful not to exaggerate the originality of the
notion.⁵³ The ideas that go into the concept of incorporation are nothing new for
Nietzsche: the idea of incorporation is not what is special about GS. Essentially,
Nietzsche’s discussion of incorporation is a continuation of his thinking in HH
and D about the power of historical forces to shape our lives. As such, the concept
is nevertheless of great interest to the question of affective reorientation. I therefore
provisionally treat incorporation as a key to the text. There is also another reason to
consider incorporation a key to GS: Nietzsche’s discussions of incorporation can be
interpreted as a commentary on the text within the text, i.e. as meta-commentary.
Through his discussions of incorporation, Nietzsche reminds the reader of the possi-
bility to incorporate the knowledge that he presents in his text. A case in point would
be the thought of “Eternal Recurrence”, which I discuss in section 5.6. Besides being
invaluable as a key to understanding GS, the possibility of incorporation is intriguing
in itself as a new metaphor to grasp the relation between conscious thought and the
body. Neither HH nor D provided any clear answers on that issue, so it is worth pay-
ing attention to how Nietzsche’s thinking has advanced in GS.
Aphorism 11, Consciousness, at first sight presents us with a puzzle. Conscious-
ness, Nietzsche claims, is weak. As the most recent development of organic nature,
its power is very limited indeed compared to the instincts (= drives), many of which it
is implied have structured our lives for countless years. However, the task to incor-
porate knowledge is presented as a task that is dependent on developing and utiliz-
ing consciousness. There is a tension between these statements, but there is no fun-
damental contradiction here. In fact, the aphorism itself provides the necessary clues
to solve the puzzle. For the task which is described as requiring requires conscious
effort and involves “making knowledge instinctive” is also presented as a task that is
as of yet only grasped by an avantgarde, who perceive that only errors have been in-
corporated thus far. Thus far, Nietzsche muses, the organism has protected itself from
the dangers inherent in the development of consciousness.⁵⁴ In a move not lacking
 Arguably, this is what Paul Franco does (cf. Franco 2011, 101– 102).
 Nietzsche here relies on the idea that any specific function is a danger to the organism until it is
fully developed, “ausgebildet und reif” (GS 11, KSA 3, 382).
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irony, Nietzsche particularly singles out pride as having served this protective func-
tion. Pride in being conscious, in possessing consciousness, has led to overestimat-
ing the power of consciousness and thus prevented humanity from feeling a need to
actively develop consciousness (GS 11, KSA 3, 382–383).
That too much consciousness too soon could have catastrophic consequences in
the sense that it would not serve life is an assertion that forms the background of the
more informative aphorisms in book three. In aphorism 110, Origin of knowledge,
Nietzsche explicitly states that the key question of thinking life is now to what extent
truth can be incorporated (GS 110, KSA 3, 471). Are there truths that cannot be incor-
porated? Are some errors necessary? To answer what Nietzsche specifically had in
mind when raising such questions one has to look beyond his hyperbolic statement
that only errors have been incorporated thus far. What are the errors like that have
been incorporated? Nietzsche identifies a handful of basic errors [Grundirrthümer]
that the intellect has produced, among them: “that there are enduring things, that
there are equal things, that there are things, substances, and bodies, that a thing
is what it appears, that our will is free, that what is good for me is also good abso-
lutely” (Kaufmann 1974, 169; GS 110, KSA 3, 469). He then advances what could be
called an evolutionary explanation: errors are incorporated insofar as they serve
the survival of the species and those errors, which prove their value over generations,
become a part of us. Nietzsche provides an example of such incorporation in the fol-
lowing aphorism, which deals with the origin of logic. There he speculates that those
individuals who did not perceive change acutely had an advantage over those who
saw everything as flux (GS 111, KSA 3, 472).
The point is that even errors can serve life, but Nietzsche’s talk of errors should
not be taken without a grain of salt. Far more than making factual claims, Nietzsche
is in these aphorisms trying to cultivate a certain sensibility; a sceptical awareness.
This is clear from the emphasis of aphorism 121, in which Nietzsche lists phenomena
such as cause and effect or movement and rest as articles of faith [Glaubensartikel]
that serve life. The emphasis is here not on the supposed errors but on the conclusion
that it could be the case that such errors are a necessary condition of life as we know
it (GS 121, KSA 3, 477–478).⁵⁵ The word “could” [könnte], must not be overlooked.
Nietzsche’s extreme examples about perception are apt to raise the question: if
our perception of nature is so distorted, what about our cherished values? In this
sense, Nietzsche’s historical narrative tempts the reader to embark on a philosoph-
ical journey to himself. According to Nietzsche, the pursuit of knowledge and truth
arises only later against the background of error; and only becomes a powerful
force once it proves that it too can serve life. It is now in the thinker that the life-pre-
serving errors and the equally life-advancing drive for truth clash; hence the task to
incorporate knowledge and the question to what extent truth stands [verträgt] to be
incorporated (GS 110, KSA 3, 470–471).
 “unter den Bedingungen des Lebens könnte der Irrthum sein” (GS 121, KSA 3, 477–478).
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If Nietzsche indeed would seek to replace the kind of incorporated errors he has
described with truths, on what grounds could he possibly base his task? If our every-
day perceptions are always already shaped by past incorporated errors, how could
truth be distinguished from error? An important clue can be found in aphorism 112,
which immediately follows the discussion on incorporation in the preceding aphor-
isms. There, amidst a discussion of cause and effect, Nietzsche writes that it is
enough to consider science an attempt to provide as good a picture of the world
as it appears to humans (GS 112, KSA 3, 473),⁵⁶ which at least allows us to describe
ourselves better. Nietzsche seems to suggest that there is no way to correct the basic
errors that influence perception, but there could be a path leading to a more true per-
spectival understanding of ourselves and the world. To pursue this idea further, it is
best return to book two, which contains the clearest statements in this direction.
The critique of realists, in aphorism 57, the opening of book two, is instructive in
this regard (GS 57, KSA 3, 421–422). Nietzsche’s target is a kind of common-sense re-
alism in the sense of a sober view on the world. Some scholars have sought to specify
the target of Nietzsche’s criticism, and indeed it is near at hand to mention the realist
trend in literature and the arts, but such efforts essentially lead nowhere. There were
certainly a great many men and almost as many women in the 19th century who con-
sidered themselves realists and this is what Nietzsche aims at.⁵⁷ So Nietzsche in his
playfully mocking way puts the self-understanding of those who deem themselves
realists to the test. This he does by suggesting that for all their love of truth and
all their desire to see reality as it is, these realists remain trapped in the passions,
errors and valuations of past centuries. It is above all else in the love of reality, a
love which Nietzsche assumes animates even the most sober realist, that the real
trouble lies; the trouble with the real. This love is an archaic drunkenness, which col-
ours every sensation, every perception of the realist (GS 57, KSA 3, 421). This point is
phenomenological: our reality is a felt reality, our very sense of reality is always
shaped by our affects. There is no escape from this condition, unless it were possible
to shed the entire history of one’s animality and humanity, which Nietzsche of course
does not think is the case, as his mocking challenge to the realists reveals: if only
they could arrive at pure knowledge! [Ja, wenn ihr das könntet!] Where does this
lead Nietzsche? The comparison with common-sense realism is not meant to be a
mere feast of mockery, but is crucially meant to point out the direction of his own
project of incorporation. The final sentences of the aphorism are revealing in this re-
gard, as they contend that perhaps the will to move beyond a drunken love of reality
should be considered as venerable as the realist’s belief of being incapable of any
drunkenness (GS 57, KSA 3, 422). How should this will be understood?
 “möglichst getreue Anmenschlichung der Dinge” (GS 112, KSA 3, 473).
 “ihr nennt euch Realisten und deutet an, so wie euch die Welt erscheine, so sei sie wirklich beschaf-
fen” (GS 57, KSA 3, 57).
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It should be clear by now that Nietzsche’s task of incorporating knowledge
should not be envisaged as an attempt to view reality “as it is” by stripping away
illusions and replacing them with a “realistic” picture of the world. Admittedly, an
important first step in the process is to become aware of the extent to which basic
errors might shape our sense of “truth”. Perhaps one could go as far as to venture
the claim that it is a call to cultivate a conscious way of being in which the world
as it appears to us is not taken for granted as a solid foundation for knowledge.
This is already a heroic task. The incorporation of knowledge would however not
be the key task of the gaya scienza if it were also not a joyful task. The destruction
of one’s basic trust in the world as it appears in one’s consciousness is only the be-
ginning. Only as creators, Nietzsche insists, can we destroy (GS 58, KSA 3, 422). To
simplify: instead of only taking illusions away from a thing, one has to put some-
thing new into it. He presents this general argument in a manner that allows him
to draw on his philological expertise. He specifically pays attention to the way we
speak of things and compares the words we use to designate things to clothes that
do not necessarily fit. The name itself might already reveal a valuation; in the way
we speak about things different words carry a different weight. As language is trans-
mitted from generation to generation, Nietzsche claims that it is as if valuations be-
come a part of the thing itself. He then concludes that giving new names, attaching
new valuations to names, associating words with new probabilities will in due time
produce new “things” (GS 58, KSA 3, 422).
In other words, one cannot do away with reality by pointing to the distant and
dubious origins of our current understanding of reality. What is required is creative
reinterpretation, more fitting descriptions, out of which new “things” are born. Cre-
ative reinterpretations, whether they are of a scientific, moral or artistic character,
must be incorporated in order to survive.While neither Nietzsche’s own elaborations
nor the scholarly literature (e.g. Pippin 2010, Brusotti 1997, Franco 2011) are of much
help in determining how exactly the task of incorporating knowledge is to be under-
stood, Nietzsche’s own examples that I have been discussing imply a long-term proc-
ess of cultural transmission over generations. At times he does however use the term
incorporation in a far less demanding sense, e.g. he speaks of translations of liter-
ature as attempts at incorporation (GS 83, KSA 3, 438–439). All in all, it is question-
able whether Nietzsche wants us to think that incorporating knowledge can have any
significant impact on the basic errors that supposedly distort perception, because
those errors could be argued to be part of our “nature” in a different sense than spe-
cific names for things. Instead of once more raising the question about Nietzsche’s
possible Lamarckianism, I find it more useful to return to the first aphorism and
the question, what use Nietzsche makes of the notion of incorporation.
In aphorism 1, Nietzsche is concerned with the incorporation of a specific idea
for its putative effect; it might enable a union of laughter and wisdom. Nietzsche
uses the notion of incorporation insofar as it supports a specific joyful mood,
through which the idea of life as an experiment appears eminently desirable.
Nietzsche is not concerned with incorporation in itself and therefore it is no wonder
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that no theory can be drawn from his discussion. It is not a theoretical interest that
guides his discussion, but a practical one. Nietzsche is above all concerned with in-
corporation, when it facilitates affective reorientation. Therefore, it is only to be ex-
pected that he concentrates more on errors that are easier to be rid off than the basic
errors, but still make a big difference. One need only be alert to how the discussion of
incorporated errors in book three seamlessly turns from the domain of nature to
questions of morality and from there to religion, a transition which I will reflect
on in more detail in the following section, to see that Nietzsche in fact follows
such a strategy. Incorporation is just another word that Nietzsche uses to describe
the power of historical forces. As such, the notion is certainly of utmost importance
for a proper understanding of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion and specifically his at-
tack on Christianity. Since Nietzsche thinks that Christianity has been incorporated,
his criticism of religion takes the peculiar form that it does in book three of GS.
5.5 Book three and the Madman
The third book of GS is well-known for its criticism of religion; which focuses specif-
ically on European Christianity and its legacy in atheism. As such, book three might
mistakenly be taken to be “dead serious”. There is no small risk that “tragic” inter-
pretations of the parable of the Madman and the death of God are allowed to inform
the reading of the entire book. In this sense, Paul Franco characterizes the book as a
“return from art and gaiety to science and tragedy” (Franco 2011, 127). While book
three might at first sight seem graver in comparison with the preceding book, it
does remain playful throughout (cf. Higgins 2000, 95). In other words, the playful el-
ement is not only present in the latter part of the book, which begins with aphor-
ism 153 and consists of shorter aphorisms, but is rather constitutive of Nietzsche’s
style of presentation. More importantly, book three is comic in the sense of aphor-
ism 1, as Nietzsche evidently does not seek to provide human life with any general
meaning. That this is indeed the case is clear from the nature of the task presented
in the opening aphorism,⁵⁸ which for the first time mentions that God is dead:
108. New struggles. – After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a
cave – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may
still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still
have to vanquish his shadow, too. (Kaufmann 1974, 167; GS 108, KSA 3, 467)
Whether one considers Nietzsche’s imagery comic in the more common sense of the
word is a matter of taste.What is of greater significance is that the task to defeat the
 One can say that the first aphorism presents the program of book three, in the sense that the en-
tire book is best read as being about the fight against the shadows of God (Schellong 1989, 343; cf.
Hödl 2009, 407).
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shadows of God is above all the task to fight against attempts to replace God with a
new instance that would give objective meaning to existence. In aphorism 109, Let us
beware, Nietzsche explicitly warns against treating the world as if there were more
meaning in it than that which humans put into it, i.e. as if there were objective
meaning in it. Imbuing the world with objective meaning, Nietzsche insists, is
akin to divinizing nature. There is undoubtedly something comic in the manic
tempo in which Nietzsche lists a great variety of misleading metaphors through
which we view the chaos that is the world, though it is hard to say if the comic effect
is intentional. One example must suffice to illustrate how far Nietzsche goes in his
criticism: He writes that we should beware of speaking of laws of nature as there
is no lawgiver in nature, only necessity. Nietzsche’s problem with such metaphors
would seem to be that they contain evaluations, either praise or blame. Such meta-
phors are in his words shadows of God, and it is clear from his litany that he sees
them everywhere. The discussion in the following aphorisms on incorporation
does suggest that there might be errors that are necessary for life, but Nietzsche no-
where suggests that seeing purpose in nature is one of them. Instead, he ends the
aphorism by looking forward to a time when this new view of nature bereft of mean-
ing will be used to naturalize “us humans” (GS 109, KSA 3, 467–469).
Much has been made of Nietzsche’s choice of words; of the fact that he speaks of
naturalizing humanity.⁵⁹ It follows from the context of his use of the word that he is
here primarily referring to the task of removing excess meaning from “the human”.
Nietzsche’s task could thus be understood as a logical extension of the scientific pic-
ture of nature that he has painted to the picture that is humanity. As there is no ab-
solute meaning in the universe, there is no absolute meaning in human life (cf.
Schellong 1989, 343). Consequently, there is also no absolute certainty. Least of all
is there certainty in moral or religious matters. Though Nietzsche rhetorically asks
when that time will come when one is allowed to start naturalizing humanity, he
himself doesn’t wait (for permission), but quickly moves on to anthropological ques-
tions. It is as if the mere suggestion of nature as chaos without a higher purpose is
enough to begin the task.
Indeed, it is worth noting the structure of the discussion that leads up to the
Madman’s announcement that God is dead, which in dramatic form confronts the
reader with the new meaningless world by juxtaposing it to the orientation that
used to be provided by God. Initially Nietzsche gives a foretaste of that which is to
come in the opening aphorism of book three, in which he suggests that there are
new battles to be fought. After the discussion on incorporation that follows the the-
matization of the shadows of God, Nietzsche stealthily turns the discussion to mor-
ality through aphorism 114 and those aphorisms that follow it. Here we finally seem
 E.g. Nietzsche’s words about naturalizing humanity here and in his other writings are used by
Brian Leiter as justification for his view that Nietzsche was a naturalist who thought that all
human action should ideally be explained in terms of type-facts (Leiter 2002, 6–8 and 26).
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to approach the main target of Nietzsche’s discussion of the incorporation of errors,
namely Christian morality and belief in God. In other words, there is a steady pro-
gression from nature to a naturalized morality and finally to the announcement by
the Madman that God is dead.
Nietzsche effectively pauses the preceding discussions on nature and morality in
aphorism 124, in order to show where the search of knowledge has led,where the free
spirit stands, which is In the horizon of the infinite. The free spirit is faced with an
open horizon, with an endless sea. Here begins the test of the character of the free
spirit, as Nietzsche suggests that there will come a time when the free spirit who
had felt so free realizes that there is nothing as terrible as infinity, and feels his free-
dom diminished. Nietzsche does not specify what is so terrible about infinity, but it is
plausible to think that he wants to draw attention to how his or the free spirit’s thirst
for knowledge will never be stilled, his quest never comes to an end, there is no har-
bour in which to dock – and this might be felt as being compelled to move onward –
as lack of freedom, not as a freely chosen movement. That this is indeed the case,
and that it is a test of character is proven by Nietzsche’s final words of mockery:
“Woe when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom –
and there is no longer any ‘land.’”⁶⁰ (Kaufmann 1974, 180–181; GS 124, KSA 3, 480)
Against this background, GS 125 might fruitfully be approached as another test.⁶¹
For there the reader is confronted with the thought of what used to be infinity, what
used to be the horizon and consequently with the question, whether his journey truly
is taking him towards heightened feelings of freedom and power or whether he will
not fall into despair when he fully understands what he has lost. In this regard, it is
tempting to think of the aphorism not as a free-standing oddity but as a direct con-
tinuation of the preceding discussions and the test that GS 124 presents. Such a per-
spective would also reveal a new connection between GS 125 and the greatest of the
tests in the whole work; namely the test that is the thought of Eternal Recurrence
(GS 341).⁶² Be that as it may, there is still something about these tests that has to
be clarified before moving on to the Madman. Why does Nietzsche test himself
and the reader thus? That Nietzsche devises such tests is only fully understandable
when one takes account of the role that mood plays in Nietzsche’s thinking and in
the composition of GS. One could think of them as experiments, which allow himself
 This is one of those cases where Kaufmann’s translation (nearly) fails to capture Nietzsche’s
sense, as the original final sentence ends with an exclamation mark (!), i.e. a more clear challenge
to the reader.
 Dieter Schellong has emphasized that the passage is meant to provoke and that the words of the
Madman should be read as a challenge to the reader (cf. Schellong 1989, 341). I will here refine this
idea.
 Hödl has in some detail explored what he interprets as a thematic connection between GS 125 and
Eternal Recurrence from the perspective of their history of creation [Entstehungsgeschichte], which
means that Hödl shows, by drawing mostly on unpublished notes and plans, that the announcement
that God is dead is intimately related to Nietzsche’s reflections on the possibility of a new kind of
teaching that enhances life without relying on absolute authority (Hödl 2009, 400–408).
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and the reader to test to what extent they are capable of affirming their free spirited
existence, to what extent they are carried onward by a mood of joyful affirmation to-
wards yet higher moods.
5.5.1 Introduction to GS 125, The Madman
“Have you not heard of that Madman”, are the opening words of GS 125, The Madman
[Der tolle Mensch] (GS 125, KSA 3, 480). One should mark these first words carefully,
for they do not simply invite the reader to listen to a story. They also draw the reader
into a fictional situation, in which the reader listens to a narrative as if he or she were
a contemporary of the narrator. The narrative voice is part of the world of the Mad-
man, but is it the Madman himself who recounts his story? The opening words cer-
tainly suggest a subtle difference between the voice of the narrator and that of the
Madman, but more important than establishing a clear difference is to note the fic-
tionality of the narrative voice. It is of course ultimately Nietzsche who speaks, but
through a mask. Any interpretation that does not take the fictionality of the situation
into account necessarily becomes a retelling or continuation of the story. To a certain
extent all interpretation are continuations of the story, but there is a fundamental dif-
ference between the meta-perspective of a properly critical approach that recognizes
the narrative as narrative fiction (cf. Hödl 2009, 363)⁶³ and more direct or naïve ap-
proaches.With this in mind, we are ready to move on through a summary of the orig-
inal story in GS:
The Madman goes to the market place and cries, “I seek god! I seek god!”, and as
it happens there are quite a few of those present who do not believe in God. These
respond mockingly to the Madman’s cry, they make fun of his search for God,
until he jumps right into their midst and interrupts their fun by launching into a pa-
thetic speech in which he most importantly 1) accuses his hearers and himself of hav-
ing murdered God, 2) seeks to affect his hearers with a sense of loss and finally 3)
hints at what is to be done to move onward and falls silent. At this point his hearers
also fall silent. Thereupon the Madman announces that his time has not yet come,
and the narrator recounts that it is told [Man erzählt noch] that the Madman broke
into churches on that day to sing his Requiem aeternam Deo. When thrown out,
the Madman reportedly answers by asking what all churches are now other than
graves of God. (GS 125, KSA 3, 480–482)
 Much has been made of the sources Nietzsche potentially used in crafting the narrative. Once
again, no single source provides a key to the interpretation of the passage, nor does dwelling on pas-
sages in Nietzsche’s earlier works that purportedly express the thought that God is dead through nar-
rative fiction (cf. Hödl 2009, 394) lead to any significant clues (cf. Hödl 2009, 400 and Brusotti 1997,
389). In this regard, it is arguably far more instructive to carefully follow the general trajectory of
Nietzsche’s criticism of religion and read the passage in that context.
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The secondary literature has rightly paid much attention to the dramatic tension
between the Madman and the atheists of the marketplace. Unfortunately, there has
also been an obsession to identify both the atheists and the Madman to make
them more graspable. The atheists are most often read as representing enlightenment
atheism (Pippin 2010, 51). Perhaps a bit more true to Nietzsche, Higgins writes that
the atheists represent “contemporary atheistic society” or simply “modern” men
(Higgins 2003, 101– 102). All of these attempts to specify who the atheists are, to
give them an identity, involve overinterpretation.⁶⁴ I think it is far more fruitful to re-
spect the fictional character of the atheists and to analyse what role they play in the
story. So let us simply call them the marketplace atheists and see how Nietzsche him-
self portrays them. As has been pointed out by scholars, the Madman directs his
words at an audience with which one does not need to argue whether God is dead
or not (Schellong 1989, 341; cf. Hödl 2009, 462). What is important to the narrative
is that there is still something that is lacking in these atheists, but precisely what
that is can only be answered through an analysis of that enigmatic figure who
through his deeds make their lack apparent. The decisive moment in this regard is
when the atheists fall silent and look at the Madman with bewildered eyes. What
is the lack that the Madman has made apparent? Is it perhaps the lack of God and
a hidden desire for God that the Madman has made them feel with his invocation
of the search for God? Or is it perhaps a deficient understanding of the consequences
of the death of the Christian God? The only certain thing is that it is suggested that a
mere denial of the existence of God is not satisfactory.
It is even more problematic when one does not recognize the fictionality of the
figure of the Madman. “The Madman is Nietzsche and expresses Nietzsche’s inmost
thoughts.” Thus, scores of readers have without a doubt reasoned when faced with
the words of the Madman.⁶⁵ I here intend to show that equating the Madman to
Nietzsche in any straightforward manner is to make things easier than they are
and that accepting that presupposition does away with much of the challenge in-
volved in interpreting the passage. Specifically it goes against the grain of contextual
interpretation. Consequently, I will argue that interpretations that are premised on
the interchangeability of Nietzsche and the Madman ignore the context of GS 125
within the work and therefore suffer from distortion. To be absolutely clear, I do
not mean to deny that scholars who have made such claims have made important
contributions to the discussion about the passage. To the contrary, much can be
gained by taking interpretations that do not distinguish the Madman and Nietzsche
seriously. I will therefore emphasize what I take to be the relative merits of two theses
of the kind alluded to above.
 To be strict, even using the word atheist is questionable, since it is only spoken of people who do
not believe in God. I take it to be fairly uncontroversial to use that term, as long as one leaves the
precise identity unspecified.
 Karl Jaspers espoused this view (Jaspers 1981, 431) and it echoes forth in scholarship to this day
(e.g. Janz 1978 II, 108 and Düsing 2010, 44–45).
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I will begin by examining a thesis that most blatantly contradicts my own inter-
pretation; namely that the Madman’s words are an expression of Nietzsche’s desire
for God. Then I will examine a more subtle thesis that also rests on the premise that
the Madman speaks directly for Nietzsche; namely the thesis that GS 125 expresses
his desire to be God. Though these theses have much in common and are often pre-
sented in tandem,⁶⁶ they can be presented as rivals, so I will treat them separately in
their pure forms. Only after having weighed the merits and drawbacks of these relat-
ed theses,will I finally present an alternative interpretation, premised on the fictional
nature of the narrative and centred on the claim that Nietzsche strategically uses the
“death of God” as a test.
5.5.2 Nietzsche, the Madman and desire for God
The Madman, as Nietzsche presents him, does indeed appear to be an agitated being.
On a not uncommon reading, the Madman expresses Nietzsche’s sincere devastation
at having lost God (e.g. Düsing 2010, 44–45). Karl Jaspers explicitly speaks of the cry
“God is dead!” as an expression of Nietzsche’s shock [Ausdruck seiner Erschütterung]
(Jaspers 1981, 431). This devastation is then linked with desire for God, for in the view
that is of concern here there can be no other explanation for the sense of loss that the
Madman embodies than a strong yet frustrated desire for God. Again, Jaspers pro-
vides a good albeit extreme example of this point of view when he writes that
even when Nietzsche resists the impulse toward transcendence, he in fact cannot
help but seek transcendence (Jaspers 1981, 432). Based on this assertion, Jaspers fi-
nally concludes that Nietzsche’s atheism is the expression of a search for God that no
longer recognizes itself for what it really is (Jaspers 1981, 433).⁶⁷ Such interpretations,
according to which Nietzsche was and remained a God-seeker [Gottsuchender], can
for textual support point to the Madman’s cry “I seek God! I seek God!” on the
one hand, and his evocation of a sense of loss that culminates in his Requiem aeter-
nam Deo on the other. One can of course question whether the emphasis on these
aspects of the passage at the expense of others is justified, but the most important
critical question is whether the presuppositions about Nietzsche and the Madman’s
condition that the interpretation relies on are defensible.
There are two major problems with the “Desire for God-interpretation”. The first
and most serious problem is that the interpretation is inextricably tied to a strong
claim about Nietzsche as person. Though scholars who support the interpretation in-
variably refer to Nietzsche’s biography, there are reasons to question whether the
claim can be based on biographical facts. Note that it would not be enough to estab-
 E.g. a presumed desire to be God can be read as misinterpreted desire for God (e.g. Düsing 2010,
64–65).
 “Daher ist Nietzsches Gottlosigkeit die sich steigernde Unruhe eines sich vielleicht nicht mehr ver-
stehenden Gottsuchens.” (Jaspers 1981, 433)
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lish that Nietzsche now and then felt a longing to return to the faith of his youth or
anything of that sort. The claim presupposes a much stronger affective orientation,⁶⁸
if it is to do the work required of it, i.e. if it is to guide the interpretation of GS 125 in
particular and Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion in general. Just how problematic in-
terpretations of the passage that rely on the idea that the Madman expresses
Nietzsche’s desire for God are, can be seen when one instead of basing one’s inter-
pretation on that idea asks the question: Did mister Nietzsche have an acute desire
for God that defines his philosophical pursuits? The only scholarly answer that can
be given to the question is that this cannot be known for sure, since it is ultimately a
question of interpreting Nietzsche’s inmost desires. In this case it is not even of much
use to point out that neither Nietzsche’s philosophical writings nor his own self-in-
terpretations suggest that his philosophizing could be subsumed under a religious
impulse, if Jaspers really is onto something when he claims Nietzsche no longer rec-
ognized his driving impulse for what it was. In that case, nothing that Nietzsche him-
self writes about issues relevant to the question really matters in the end. Therefore,
what one has to ask is this: is Jaspers a better interpreter of Nietzsche’s desires than
Nietzsche himself? Though Jaspers might be right, after all that possibility cannot be
excluded, his assumption is unwarranted. The primary issue would here not seem to
be whether the available evidence supports his interpretation or not, but whether
any amount of evidence could either verify or falsify it. His hermeneutical procedure
is rather reminiscent of certain philosophical and theological perspectives that see
desire for God in each and every human action. Or as Nietzsche himself bluntly
put it: through a false psychology one can turn everything into metaphysical need
(NL 1877, 22[107], KSA 8, 399).
If the decision that grounds Jaspers’ interpretation and other interpretations that
rest on the same premise is such a fundamental philosophical commitment that it
seems to be, how should we who are concerned with the interpretation of GS 125
move onward? If the question cannot be settled by referring to Nietzsche’s writings,
it would seem that an engagement with Jasper’s claim falls outside the domain of
Nietzsche-scholarship proper. There is, however, no need to start a fundamental dis-
cussion concerning philosophical anthropology. Instead of rejecting such interpreta-
tions of GS 125 on philosophical grounds, however untenable their foundations seem
to us, one can ask about their consequences for understanding the rest of GS. More
than any other approach, this strategy is apt to show that interpretations that identify
Nietzsche with the Madman and diagnose both with a misunderstood desire for God
are implausible. Before I advance an alternative contextual interpretation of GS 125, I
will engage a second significant problem with the desire for God -interpretation.
 Although Düsing also refers to Nietzsche’s biography, she seems to be aware that this is not
enough to ground the claim. To supplement biographical trivia, she asserts that Nietzsche’s desire
for God must have been mostly unconscious and actively repressed by him until it finally broke
through simultaneously with his madness (cf. Düsing 2010, 65).
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The second major problem with the “Desire for God-interpretation” concerns the
exact nature of the devastation that the cry “God is dead!” is associated with, and the
link between this presumed devastation and desire for God. Could there not be a bet-
ter explanation for the pathos of the Madman than that it is an expression of
Nietzsche’s own devastation and desire for God? On what grounds can the Madman’s
response be associated with desire for God in the first place, irrespective of whether
one identifies the figure with Nietzsche or not? Can there be no reason to be alarmed
at some of the consequences of the death of God even if one is not moved by desire
for God? Perhaps there are other alternatives, but let us entertain the thought that
there are not, for a while, and begin by looking more closely at the Madman’s con-
dition. For whether we do or do not take the Madman to express Nietzsche’s own
devastation, the task to describe its nature is an important one for any interpretation.
It is after all possible that scholars who see desire for God in the Madman’s behav-
iour have diagnosed the Madman correctly, even if they then too quickly identify the
Madman with Nietzsche. Therefore, the task commands our attention.
5.5.2.1 A story of loss and grief?
Though much of the pathos of the Madman’s speech derives from his claim that he
and those he directs his words at have murdered God, the accent is still squarely
placed on the loss and not on the murder. This is clear when the Madman asks
how on earth the murder was committed, as he then goes on to impart a sense of
loss on his hearers through rich metaphors that all express the centrality that the no-
tion of God once had; especially for orientation (cf. Hödl 2009, 428). The key meta-
phors here are the sea, which has been drunk dry, the sun, from the gravity of
which the earth has liberated itself, and the horizon, which has been wiped away.
The Madman concludes this litany by one last time emphasizing that the holiest
and mightiest that belonged to the world has bled to death (GS 125, KSA 3, 481).
Whereas the Madman fails to describe how God was murdered, he does not fail to
communicate a sense of loss (cf. Hödl 2009, 447). To this can be added that the end-
ing of the passage (Requiem aeternam Deo) at least suggests the possibility of rituals
of mourning for the dead God (GS 125, KSA 3, 482). It is therefore understandable that
the passage has been read as a story of grief. To mention one prominent and telling
example, even Higgins who otherwise emphasizes the comic aspects of book three
reads Nietzsche/the Madman as calling for a “period of grieving” following the
death of God (Higgins 2000, 95). If the passage is read as a story of loss and grief,
how should the grief of the Madman be understood? Does Nietzsche actively call
for a period of grieving or will those confronted by the knowledge of the Madman
inevitably fall into grief? Is the response represented by the Madman paradigmatic
for all of humanity or only one alternative among others?
In order to cast light on the scholarly discussion about the Madman’s grief, I will
draw on contemporary research on loss, grief and resilience. The point is not to ad-
vance some anachronistic claim about Nietzsche’s intentions, but to problematize
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what has been written about the Madman’s response to the death of God. The most
important finding of the scientific study of grief is that there are many ways that hu-
mans respond to loss (Bonanno 2004, 20; cf. Bonanno,Westphal and Mancini 2011).
Crucially there is no such thing as an ideal pattern of coping with loss, which would
set off with shock and move through a set of stages until grief is slowly but surely
overcome. The story used to be that the death of a loved one is always a devastating
loss: not only grieving too much but showing too little grief was deemed rare and
pathological. However, most people simply do not respond to the death of a signifi-
cant other in the way that a vast pop-psychological industry would have us believe
(Bonanno 2004, 21). Quite to the contrary, many or perhaps even a majority of those
who are faced with a potentially debilitating loss such as the death of a loved one
manage to continue their lives without any serious disruptions (Bonanno 2004,
23). These individual have a capacity to thrive in the face of loss and other adverse
events. This is called resilience, and it is a healthy response that has nothing to do
with a failure to recognize loss. Those who exhibit resilience are not unaffected by
loss, but the loss nevertheless has no long-term negative psychological consequences
on them, such as depressed mood (Bonanno 2004, 23–24). Researchers in the field
emphasize that taking account of resilience is not to deny that some people grieve
over a period of years before recovering and that some never fully recover and in-
stead develop chronic grief, which is indistinguishable from depression. What
makes resilience so interesting is rather, besides it being surprisingly common,
that it forms a distinct trajectory from grief, i.e. that it is different from recovery (Bo-
nanno 2004, 20–21). Most interestingly, the available evidence strongly suggests that
one of the ways resilient individuals cope is through positive emotion and laughter,
and that instead of necessarily representing an unhealthy denial of reality, such a re-
sponse can be a sign of health (Bonanno 2004, 26; cf. Bonanno,Westphal and Man-
cini 2011, 1.12). This is good to keep in mind when one approaches what has been
written about GS 125 and responses to the death of God, for quite a few interpreters
have read the aphorism as a story about a loss comparable to the loss of a loved one.
Specifically it has been read as a loss that, for reasons seldom articulated, requires a
response akin to grief.
Nietzsche never explicitly thematizes the death of God in terms of grief [Trauer]
nor does that term appear in GS 125. There are indeed good reasons to differentiate
the Madman’s condition from grief, at least of the kind of grief that passes by of its
own accord, i.e. the grief-pattern known as recovery. This is in fact what the more
perceptive commentators who emphasize the loss evoked by the Madman have
done. Reinhard Gasser has proposed that what the Madman is meant to express is
not temporary grief [Trauer], but more akin to melancholia as defined and theorized
by Freud (Gasser 1997, 498). As opposed to the presumed passivity and reactivity of
grief, Freudian melancholia is characterized by the active despair of destruction. So
interpreting the Madman as expressing melancholia fits in neatly with his ravings
about murder. Gasser is careful to point out that his interpretation involves imposing
a Freudian framework on Nietzsche’s text, but one can agree with Gasser that this
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framework casts light on the passage at least insofar as it helps rule out that the
Madman would express any common form of grief and instead points in the direction
that the Madman’s condition is perhaps something more pathological. Still one
might ask whether diagnosing the Madman with melancholia does not create
more problems than it solves.
On philosophical grounds one might object that the Freudian framework can
hardly be reconciled with a 21st-century scientific understanding of grief (e.g. Bonan-
no 2004),which in this case means that adopting it threatens what one might want to
see as the enduring relevance of GS 125. This is not to say that a contemporary under-
standing of responses to loss should instead be applied, and that one should speak
of the chronic grief of the Madman. To the contrary, outside perspectives can only aid
interpretation, not guide it. I merely want to draw attention to this drawback to view-
ing the Madman’s actions in terms of Freudian melancholia. Needless to say, the
wish to find the passage relevant even in our day is no admissible reason to reject
Gasser’s interpretation. One might rather, on philological grounds, question Gasser’s
claim that Nietzsche thinks that the melancholic reaction of the Madman is paradig-
matic for the reaction of all men [Reaktion des Menschen] (Gasser 1997, 498), until a
new type of human eventually arises after a process of revaluation spanning several
centuries (Gasser 1997, 498–551). The problem is not primarily that Gasser places
Nietzsche’s thinking within a fairly rigid historical schema, because such ideas are
certainly to be found in the corpus. That aspect of Gasser’s interpretation actually
fits Nietzsche’s psychological thinking about incorporated ideals and historically in-
culcated emotions perfectly. The problem is rather that he fails to note that revalua-
tion can itself be a joyful project, especially for those who would prepare the way
toward that future in which the old ideals have been overcome. For is that not
what the joyful science is all about? If and when the open horizon seems so enticing,
abandoning the old ideals need not appear as a melancholic necessity but as a joyful
destruction.
As the entire issue is of secondary importance to his scholarly goals, Gasser him-
self does not argue for his interpretation in great detail, but fortunately Edith Düsing
has expanded on Gasser’s insights. Unlike Gasser, Düsing emphasizes that Nietzsche
counts with at least three different responses to the “melancholic darkening of hori-
zons” that is the death of God:
1) a passive grief, in which no hope nor love nor desire is possible any more, 2) a despairing
liberation of destructive energies (represented by the Madman) and 3) finally and ideally a
slow but steady overcoming of grief through revaluation (Düsing 2010, 57).
Although she places all reactions within a melancholic framework, Düsing is careful
to distinguish the Madman’s condition from melancholia of any known kind, i.e.
melancholia as response to any other loss. Instead, she writes of a “new kind of mel-
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ancholy”.⁶⁹ There are indeed good reasons to assume that what the Madman is
meant to express is a new feeling. Though Düsing does not draw on Nietzsche’s
sketches for GS 125 to support her interpretation, it is noteworthy that Nietzsche in
the notebooks of 1881 specifically writes of the feeling that humanity has murdered
God as a new feeling.⁷⁰ In the final version that we know from the published work,
the identification of the state of the Madman with a new feeling is lacking.
Did Nietzsche radically change his mind about the state of the Madman? It is
more plausible to assume that Nietzsche sought to give expression to this imagined
feeling, instead of naming it. The result is less analytic and more visceral. Of course,
Nietzsche’s strategical choice makes it harder to identify the exact components of the
feeling than if he had named them too. I concur with Düsing’s reading that the new
feeling is composed both of pain and exultation [Schmerz und Jubel] (Düsing 2010,
47; cf. Brusotti 1997, 409). The pain of loss which is heightened by a sense of guilt
at having caused the loss is inextricable from a heightened sense of power, i.e. it
also betrays a pride. While the pain of the Madman might reasonably be thought
to spring from desire for God, how does such exultation fit into the picture? Düsing
solves the problem by asserting that the Madman’s joy derives from getting rid of God
as judge, whereas his melancholy derives from losing the God of love that he still
seeks (Düsing 2010, 47). Though this explanation is hardly plausible,⁷¹ one might
just as well concede that the Madman, as Nietzsche presents him, appears still to
be bound to the religious tradition and to the God that he would mourn in the
churches into which he forces his way. The main reason for this is that the guilt of
the Madman, expressed in his questions implying the need for rituals of purification
(GS 125, KSA 3, 481), certainly seems to be religious (cf. Franco 2011, 135). Be that as it
may, there is no reason to deny that Nietzsche thought that the Madman’s response,
or the response the Madman performs, to the death of God is one possible alterna-
tive. The question is rather what emphasis is to be put on this alternative and how
it fits into the general picture of GS.
5.5.2.2 A non-melancholic response?
Though it is not quite clear to what extent Düsing follows Gasser in thinking that
people will generally react to the death of God in a way that does not differ greatly
from that of the Madman, she certainly emphasizes that the loss is dramatic and that
all alternative reactions will be in one way or another melancholic (cf. Düsing 2010,
57). The initial response would always be what in contemporary research is called
 “neue Art der Melancholie” (Düsing 2010, 39).
 “Dies Gefühl, das Mächtigste und Heiligste, was die Welt bisher besaß, getödtet zu haben, wird noch
über die Menschen kommen, es ist ein ungeheures neues Gefühl!” (NL 1881, 14[26], KSA 9, 632)
 Nietzsche’s comments on God and love (GS 140 and GS 141, KSA 3, 489) do point to the contra-
diction between loving and judging but in no way suggest that Nietzsche would only have a problem
with God as judge.
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chronic grief, which encompasses a variety of pathological forms of grief. In other
words, the reaction to the death of God cannot be done away with through a “period
of grieving” (Higgins 2000, 95). According to Düsing, what is instead required is ther-
apy (Düsing 2010, 31 and 59). There is a strong hint in Düsing’s elaborations, which
above all concentrate on the ideas of Eternal Recurrence and the Übermensch, that
this therapy necessarily amounts to a godless divinization of the human (Düsing
2010, 47); a divinization which involves a misdirection of religious desire for God
(Düsing 2010, 64–65).⁷² Although one might instantly object that such divinization
seems to blatantly contradict Nietzsche’s project of naturalizing man (cf. GS 109,
KSA3, 469), I will for now ignore this latter claim about desire to be God and concen-
trate on the idea that the death of God requires therapy.
A crucial unexamined presupposition behind Düsing’s reading is that all possi-
ble responses to the death of God are best interpreted within the framework of a
novel form of melancholia, the paradigmatic example of which is given by the Mad-
man.What if there is an affective response to the death of God that doesn’t start with
devastation? What I am suggesting is that there could be an entirely different trajec-
tory, analogous to the way in which resilience has been found to differ from recovery
in scientific research on grief. In the following, I will argue that Nietzsche in fact held
such a response both possible and desirable.
Among the most interesting issues that has emerged from scholarly commentary
on GS 125 is that Nietzsche most probably meant the Madman to express a new feeling
(e.g. Düsing 2010, 47 and Brusotti 1997, 409).While the Madman’s response is perhaps
best described as melancholic and pathological, one might ask if the death of God
doesn’t also make other new feelings possible. After all, Nietzsche’s first reflections
on mountain air in the latter half of the 1870s suggested precisely that possibility
(see sections 4.2.7 and 4.2.8). Shouldn’t the feelings associated with “joyful science”,
feelings of free air and open horizons, be read this way? In this sense, Franco con-
trasts the “terrified, guilt-obsessed response of the madman” with the “cheerful re-
sponse of the free-spirited seeker after knowledge”, which he perhaps also too quick-
ly⁷³ identifies with Nietzsche’s own response (as a biographical matter, see Franco
2011, 140). As a whole, GS is a testament to this joyful response, though book four
can be claimed to most embody it, as I will seek to show soon enough (cf. section 5.6).
The Madman’s ravings, if read in the tragic key that they so often are read, seem to be
wholly out of tune with this general mood of GS.
I have already suggested that directly identifying the Madman with Nietzsche
and diagnosing both with desire for God can hardly be reconciled with the rest of
 “Gottlose Vergöttlichung des Menschen” (Düsing 2010, 47). Düsing’s own standpoint is clearly ar-
ticulated in her monograph study, in which she presents a return to Jesus, to the love of Christ, as the
only viable therapy for nihilism (Düsing 2006, 553).
 Because that which matters is not Mister Nietzsche’s own response, but the response he presented
as desirable or in other words as an ideal throughout his writings. So what matters again is the
“Nietzsche” constructed within the text.
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GS. Likewise, the most important reason to reject the idea that Nietzsche wants to
infect the reader with the Madman’s melancholy has to do with the consequences
of that idea for interpreting GS as a whole. If one places much stress on GS 125
and the Madman’s devastation and supposed desire for God, it would seem to me
that the inevitable consequence is that the entire project of GS is obscured. In
order to give a definite interpretation of GS 125 in that direction, one has to sacrifice
the rest of GS.What is gained in clarity when approaching this single passage, is lost
when one moves either backward or forward in the pages, because the whole of GS
simply cannot be made to conform with interpretations of that kind. From the point
of view of contextual interpretation, the interpretation that both equates Nietzsche
with the Madman and interprets the Madman’s condition as expressing desire for
God has to be deemed implausible.
I am willing to concede that emphasizing the devastation of the Madman need
not lead to a rigid view on GS as tragic at its core. A case in point would be the in-
terpretation of Curt Paul Janz. Janz, who equates Nietzsche and the Madman ([Der
tolle Mensch – Nietzsche], Janz 1978 II, 108), and assumes that the aphorism express-
es sincere devastation is careful to point out that this regret represents only one side
of the philosopher’s experience, the stronger side being one of affirmation (Janz 1978
II, 108– 109). The problem with this view is that it renders GS oddly inconsistent; one
simply has to accept that GS 125 is out of tune with the rest of the work. The critical
question can be formulated thus: Is there perhaps a way of reading the passage
which does not contradict the mood of joyful science? To begin with, I will show
through a discussion of the most relevant passages from book three that there is
no basis in the rest of the text of GS for the interpretation that the Madman expresses
Nietzsche’s own devastation, and that neither does the assertion that the driving
force of the project of GS would be desire for God find any support. In the following,
I am not concerned with Nietzsche’s inmost desire, but with the Nietzsche that
emerges from the text, i.e. the Nietzsche that is of consequence.
5.5.2.3 Metaphysical need, aesthetic taste and desire for God
If Nietzsche/humanity is left with desire for God, but there is no God or intellectual
integrity forbids worshipping a God, then the result might indeed be despair. That
there is no textual support for the view that Nietzsche held such a dismal prospect
to be inevitable, and that interpretations that claim otherwise are unfounded, can be
shown by carefully heeding what he has to say about the “metaphysical need” in GS:
151. “Of the origin of religion”. – The metaphysical need is not the origin of religions, as Schopen-
hauer supposed, but merely a late offshoot. Under the rule of religious ideas, one has become
accustomed to the notion of “another world (behind, below, above)” – and when religious ideas
are destroyed one is troubled by an uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation. From this feeling
grows once again “another world,” but now merely a metaphysical one that is no longer reli-
gious. But what first led to a positing of “another world” in primeval times was not some im-
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pulse or need but an error in the interpretation of certain natural events, a failure of the intellect.
(Kaufmann 1974, 196; GS 151, KSA 3, 494–495)
The consequence of Nietzsche’s claim that the metaphysical need is not the immut-
able source of religion is that it too will pass away. There is nothing in the aphorism
to suggest that Nietzsche would have revised his understanding in this respect, which
means we are dealing with “an acquired and consequently also a transitory need”
(Handwerk 1997, 99; HH I 131, KSA 2, 124). In fact, Nietzsche goes even further
than in HH and D when he now more confidently claims that religion does not
have its origins in any one drive or need but in misinterpretation (GS 151, KSA 3,
495). It is important to note that this claim does not amount to denying that the mis-
interpretation in positing another world was and is guided by affect, but that there is
not one single, innate and immutable metaphysical need that would explain all re-
ligion and metaphysical philosophy. Metaphysical philosophy must in this view in-
stead be understood as a late flower that grows when religious ideas have been re-
futed or can no longer be believed. Since religious belief in another world has been
incorporated, i.e. one has become accustomed to the idea of another world, parting
from it is not necessarily easy. It can be felt as loss. Metaphysical philosophy offers
an easy replacement, a metaphysical idea of another world. Consequently, there is
reason to assume that Nietzsche’s willingness to move beyond metaphysical philos-
ophy necessarily requires overcoming those feelings of lack and loss that sustain
metaphysics.⁷⁴ Nietzsche’s thematizations of loss, above all through the Madman,
could thus be read as pointing to a condition that is undesirable to say the least,
against which the alternative opportunities presented by Nietzsche appear more de-
sirable. It could of course be objected that the aphorism referred to above advances a
general theoretical claim and nothing more. It tells us nothing about Nietzsche’s per-
sonal struggles. Be that as it may, an earlier aphorism that is both as “personal” and
as philosophically illuminating as it gets speaks a harsh language about Nietzsche’s
rejection of the religious tradition he was brought up in:
132. Against Christianity.What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer our rea-
sons. (Kaufmann 1974, 186; GS 132, KSA 3, 485)
There are very good reasons to think that this kind of rejection is not merely an intel-
lectual pose and instead goes to the heart of the issue. These reasons, which I will
shortly present, are strong enough to utterly reject Janz’s view that Nietzsche’s aesthe-
ticization entails a devaluation of the existential question of belief in God. Janz writes
that it is a terrible devaluation, when Nietzsche “reduces” the question of faith to an
 Carlo Gentili has similarly argued that precisely in the rejection of an absolute need for God one
finds the meaning of gay science (Gentili, 2010, 242–243).
5.5 Book three and the Madman 165
aesthetic judgement.⁷⁵ Instead of representing a devaluation, I argue that Nietzsche’s
statement is best interpreted as reflecting the maturity of his philosophical rejection
of Christianity.⁷⁶ Read against the background of what Nietzsche writes about meta-
physical need it should be clear that what is at stake is not an aesthetic judgement
in any trivial sense, but rather a more general affective orientation; or “wishes of
the heart”. As I have already shown (see chapter 2, section 2.2), Nietzsche inherited
and radicalized an already existing tradition of thinking about religion in aesthetic
terms. If Nietzsche’s judgement of taste against Christianity is to be seen as a deval-
uation of a serious existential question, the real culprit is Schleiermacher, who de-
fined religion as feeling and taste for the infinite.⁷⁷ In this context, Nietzsche’s aesthet-
ic rejection of Christianity is above all feeling and taste for the earth. As such,
Nietzsche’s philosophy represents a tremendous revaluation of matters of taste and
of aesthetics broadly conceived.⁷⁸ That Nietzsche thinks of religion in aesthetic
terms follows naturally from his privileging the perspectives of this life, which are
the only perspectives left once one abandons the idea of a universal perspective (a
God’s eye view).
A good example of Nietzsche’s revaluation of taste can be gained from what he
says about changes in taste in GS; namely, that changes in (general) taste are far
more important than the change of opinions (GS 39, KSA 3, 406–407). To justify
his claim, Nietzsche suggests that aesthetic and moral opinions are merely symptoms
and that instead the real causes are most often a matter of physiology. In short, dif-
ferences in ways of living result in differences in taste (GS 39, KSA 3, 407). While the
physiological language in which Nietzsche tries to make his point is characteristical-
ly hyperbolic, the aphorism need not be read in a manner that undermines Nietz-
sche’s efforts to consciously change tastes. Perhaps the most important claim under-
girding Nietzsche’s talk about incorporation is after all that incorporating ideas can
cause physiological changes. In fact, Nietzsche’s elaborations in GS 39 support that
view: when a new taste is successfully introduced, people first have to become accus-
 “Die furchtbarste Abwertung vollzieht er damit, dass er das ganze Problem auf ein ästhetisches Ur-
teil reduziert” (Janz 1978 II, 108).
 Dieter Schellong has also argued that Nietzsche’s judgement of taste reflects an advance in under-
standing. His interpretation that Nietzsche thinks Christianity is no longer a living faith, i.e. only a
shadow, and that Nietzsche therefore finds no reason to argue against Christianity, is nevertheless
questionable. The main problem is that it ascribes to Nietzsche the view that one cannot argue
about matters of taste (Schellong 1989, 343–344).
 The aestheticist tradition as a whole can and has of course been criticized for its anthropocen-
trism, e.g. for trivializing Christianity, but even critics should and often do acknowledge that Schleier-
macher’s influence on Protestant theology was immense and that he left a legacy that all later at-
tempts to ground theology in the modern world have to contend with. In other words, what
matters most to us here is that Schleiermacher was at the forefront of serious philosophical and theo-
logical thinking that dared to confront the challenge of modernity.
 As Nietzsche has his Zarathustra say to those who deem matters of taste not worth fighting about:
“But all of life is a dispute over taste and tasting!” (Parkes 2005, 101; KSA 4, 150)
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tomed to it, but finally they feel it as a necessity. Thus, the new taste becomes a need
[Bedürfnis] (GS 39, KSA 3, 407). Nietzsche gives no examples in that aphorism of how
a taste becomes a need, but in a discussion about learning to love new things
Nietzsche gives a phenomenological description of how one first learns to tolerate
a piece of music, then becomes accustomed to it and finally feels that one has to
hear it again and again (GS 334, KSA 3, 559–560). One could also think of the process
by which a style of clothing is adopted. First a few individuals dare to challenge the
reigning style, then people slowly adopt the new style and finally feel that you have
to wear it as a matter of respectability. In any case, a presupposition for there being
changes in taste is that there are always individuals who feel differently about the
reigning taste, but that is in no way enough. Those who feel differently about matters
of taste have to be alert to their feelings, listen closely to them and have the courage
to stick to their judgement in order to be able to resist the force of the general taste
and potentially change it (GS 39, KSA 3, 407).
Listening to one’s feelings is a matter of interpretation, which means that
Nietzsche’s elaborations are in no way bound to a view that only recognizes basic
physiological impulses. Read thus, the aphorism can be fruitfully employed to under-
stand what Nietzsche is trying to say when he presents himself as rejecting Christian-
ity on grounds of taste. Nietzsche listens to his own impulses, interprets his desires,
and concludes that Christian faith is out of the question for him. In other words, his
taste rejects Christianity. What remains is to live up to this feeling and to make it
known. In this light, Nietzsche would aspire to be one of those mighty individuals,
who without feeling shame proclaim their judgement of taste, their “hoc est ridicu-
lum, hoc est absurdum”, and thus influence the general taste in a population (cf.
GS 39, KSA 3, 406–407).
Contrary to what Janz’s interpretation suggests, the question is about what is de-
cisive, not about devaluing other than aesthetic grounds to reject Christianity.Walter
Kaufmann’s translation expresses this perhaps with even greater clarity than the
original German: “What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer
our reasons.” (Kaufmann 1974, 186) To be absolutely clear, this does not mean that
Nietzsche would have no reasons against Christianity, but that taste has become
more important. He presents himself as having reached a new stage: only now
does he fully dare to confront the tradition where it is most strong. He no longer
needs to rely solely on rational grounds to reject Christianity, but can count on the
judgement of his taste.What an overcoming he presents this to be becomes apparent,
when one compares this judgement of taste with what he has to say about the free
spirit in HH. There, the free spirit is still under the thrall of those religious/metaphys-
ical feelings [Stimmungen] that he encounters in the arts, and such experiences al-
most prompt him to wish that someone might lead him back to religion (HH I 153,
KSA 2, 145). That is clearly no longer the case. Henceforth, the attack on faith be-
comes more direct: as if he had gained in confidence, Nietzsche utters judgements
of taste against Christianity in increasingly harsh words.
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This is the Nietzsche that emerges from the text of GS and from his later writings.
In the end, it doesn’t matter that much, what Nietzsche’s personal reaction to the
“death of God” was. Enough doubt has been cast on the interpretation that Nietz-
sche’s writings could fruitfully be approached through the thesis that they speak
of his personal desire for God. Therefore, we can return to the question: What did
Nietzsche intend when writing the fictional narrative about the Madman? The
most plausible answer to be found in the scholarly literature is that Nietzsche
aims to draw attention to his view that the death of God presents a unique historical
opening of possibilities. Following Hödl, the narrative about the Madman is best read
as part of Nietzsche’s strategic communication concerning the possibilities opened
up by the death of God, possibilities that first and foremost concern what humans
can be.⁷⁹ In this sense, the Madman is a warning example, though also one who
warns about what might come. That the Madman does not represent Nietzsche’s
ideal is all too apparent, but the decisive question here is whether or not the Mad-
man hints at this ideal, when he asks if “we” do not have to become Gods now
that God is dead. Is the possibility that interests Nietzsche most perhaps after all
an expression of his desire to be God?
5.5.3 Nietzsche, the Madman and desire to be God
Though there are good grounds to emphasize the Madman’s evocations of loss, and
no small number of scholars have done so, it is also possible to read GS 125 with mur-
der in mind. In other words, the accent can be placed on the murder of God instead
of on loss. Though the Madman does not give reasons for the deed, reasons can ar-
guably be interpreted into his words. This is especially the case with the question
“must we not ourselves become Gods to appear worthy of it?” (Kaufmann 1974,
181). Could it be that this is the true message of the Madman, what Nietzsche
meant to communicate?
The thesis that this is indeed the message of the Madman and more significantly
also that of Nietzsche was first put forward by Lou von Salomé (Andreas-Salomé
1894, 38–40). In her classical formulation, however, Nietzsche does not want to mur-
der God but becomes convinced that God is dead, is consequently devastated and
finds no other way out of this feeling other than to direct all his power to the task
to become (a) God. In his influential polemic The Drama of Atheist Humanism,
Henri de Lubac takes the darker view alluded to above; that Nietzsche was out to
 Referring to the anthropological focus of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, Gerald Hödl writes: “In
diesem Kontext wird die Thematisierung des Todes Gottes als eines epochalen Verlustes strategisch
dazu eingesetzt auf die neuen Möglichkeiten, die damit eröffnet sind, hinzuweisen, aber die Gefahren
zu betonen, die in einer Abspannung der durch das alte Ideal angespannten Kräfte, ohne sich nach
den neuen Möglichkeiten hin zu orientieren, liegen.” (Hödl 2009, 463) Schellong also cursorily notes
that the passage points to such possibilities (Schellong 1989, 341).
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kill God (de Lubac 1983, 49–50) in order to put Man on the quest to become God.
Though these interpretations have different starting points, they converge in the con-
clusion that Nietzsche’s mature philosophizing was driven by a desire to be God.
Though no scholars have to my knowledge more recently argued in favour of a strong
version of the thesis that the Madman expresses Nietzsche’s desire to be God one
does find echoes of it here and there. As we have seen, Edith Düsing comes close
to suggesting that the death of God in Nietzsche’s view necessarily leads to a divin-
ization of man (Düsing 2010, 47). Likewise, Stephen Mulhall asserts that both
Nietzsche and his Madman cannot help repeating Christian structures of thought
and that a desire to be God might be the ultimate truth of Nietzsche’s philosophizing
(Mulhall 2005, 44–45 and 120– 122). It is therefore important to examine the evi-
dence that bears on the matter, if only to rule out the possibility that the interpreta-
tion has found the key to GS 125.
The most obvious place to look for evidence is book four, where Nietzsche pres-
ents enticing future possibilities. In aphorism 300, Nietzsche envisions enjoying the
self-sufficiency of a God as such a possibility. In the perspective that Nietzsche bids
the reader to entertain, the entire history of religion could be cherished as means to a
sublime end, specifically “the strange means to make it possible for a few single in-
dividuals to enjoy the whole self-sufficiency of a god and his whole power of self-re-
demption” (Kaufmann 1974, 240; GS 300, KSA 3, 539). It is indeed near at hand to
read the aphorism in the context of the death of God, as Nietzsche speaks from a
point of view where the history of religion is effectively understood to have come
to its conclusion if not to an end. Could such a vision be enough to inspire the mur-
der of God or enough to let a devastated Nietzsche forget what he has lost and
mourns? Perhaps so, yet it is the case that Nietzsche nowhere suggests that the
longed-for self-sufficiency would be anything else than a feeling. What is presented
as an alluring possibility is a god-like mood, not actually being a god in the sense of
wielding the powers of a god; other than that of self-redemption.
One has to look for evidence outside GS in order to find a stronger statement that
might be interpreted as expressing desire to be god. Zarathustra’s “confession” that
he “could not stand not being a god, if there were gods” is as good as it gets in
Nietzsche’s published writings.⁸⁰ The sceptical reader might ask, why this quote ex-
tracted from Z should be considered in any way relevant to the interpretation of
GS 125. It could then be argued that drawing on it is justified, because Nietzsche orig-
inally planned to have Zarathustra go to the marketplace and announce the death of
God (cf. KSA 14, 256). Two preliminary issues about using the sketch [Vorstufe] as evi-
dence have to be dealt with before drawing any far-reaching conclusions. Firstly, one
cannot overlook the fact that Nietzsche eventually decided not to let Zarathustra ap-
pear until the very last aphorism of GS. Therefore, it is problematic to conclude that
 “Aber dass ich euch ganz mein Herz offenbare, ihr Freunde: wenn es Götter gäbe, wie hielte ich’s
aus, kein Gott zu sein! Also giebt es keine Götter.” (KSA 4, 110)
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the Madman is Zarathustra, not to speak of continuing that the Madman is Zarathus-
tra is Nietzsche. Secondly, Zarathustra is not exactly a character whose words and
deeds are to be taken at face value (cf. Zittel 2011). To think that Nietzsche must
be dead serious when he speaks as Zarathustra leads only to a labyrinth of contra-
dictions and is therefore an unforgivable error. In this sense, introducing Zarathustra
only complicates the picture further, and arguably lessens the plausibility of the “de-
sire to be God” interpretation.
What better proof of this contention, that introducing Zarathustra is no solution,
could there be than the fact that Zarathustra in the very same speech in which he
makes his admission also cautions against striving for the impossible. He asks his
hearers, whether they can think or create a God and teaches them that they should
not desire something to be that they do not have the power to create; in short they
should focus on what really is possible (KSA 4, 109–110) Additionally, he says that
since he had a vision of the Übermensch gods are no longer of any concern to him
(KSA 4, 112). I would therefore suggest that what Zarathustra is jealous of is precisely
the feeling that he associates with being a god, not actually being a god, and definite-
ly not being God. Nietzsche’s writings do not suggest that he is interested in possess-
ing the attributes of the Christian God, but only that he strives for a mood that is per-
haps best described as god-like. This is an important distinction, to which I will return
in chapter 7, about Nietzsche’s late affective ideal. So if Nietzsche is above all inter-
ested in a state [Zustand], the possibility to dwell in a god-like state, this is yet another
reason to question whether the Madman directly speaks for Nietzsche. After all, the
Madman does pose his question in the form “must we not become gods…?”.
5.5.4 GS 125 as a test
126. Mystical explanations. – Mystical explanations are considered deep. The truth is that they
are not even superficial. (Kaufmann 1974, 182; GS 126, KSA 3, 482)
That so many differing interpretations of GS 125 have been presented over the years
seems to suggest that there is something mysterious about the passage (cf. Pippin
2010, 47). However, the simplest explanation for the proliferation of interpretations
is not that there is something mysterious about the passage but that it is carefully
crafted to provoke an affective response in the reader and therefore to be open to
a great variety of readings. In other words, GS 125 might best be read as a test.
The surface of the aphorism, its character as fictional narrative, cannot be em-
phasized enough. Announcing that God is dead through the mouth of a Madman,
within a fictional narrative, allows Nietzsche to step back from view, but still forces
the reader to react to the Madman’s words. In this regard, it is worth remembering
that Nietzsche is not concerned with proving that God is dead (cf. Schellong 1989,
341), whatever that might mean. Instead, he simply has the Madman announce
that this is a tremendous event that is yet to be heard, which forces the reader to
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try to hear it. In other words: the aphorism does not aim to impart propositional
knowledge, but to compel an affective reaction. The reaction that the aphorism pro-
vokes is necessarily affective, because there is no objective point of view from which
to judge to what extent the dramatic picture that the Madman paints is more than the
painting of his fear. Some might see the “same” event as a magnificent opportunity.
All depends on in what mood one is able to see the possibilities that the death of God
opens. What speaks in favour of this interpretation is first and foremost that that it
not only fits neatly into the context of the preceding discussion in book three, but
also goes well together with the joyful, playful mood of GS, and of course with the
general trajectory of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion. It therefore only remains to
be shown that this interpretation also makes better sense of the characters of the nar-
rative and the central interaction between the Madman and the atheists of the mar-
ketplace.
In emphasizing the fictionality of the narrative about the Madman and conse-
quently its broader context in Nietzsche’s strategy of communication, my interpreta-
tion aligns with and provides further support for recent interpretations that argue on
both philosophical and philological grounds that the Madman’s response cannot be
Nietzsche’s position (Pippin 2010, 47–54 and Sommer 2010, 18). In the view I defend,
the spectacle acted out by the Madman of the story represents one possible interpre-
tation of that event [Ereignis] that God is dead. Though the Madman is called mad for
a reason, one need not deny that there is some reason in his madness. Irrespective of
whether the Madman is deemed nostalgic of the religious past or not,⁸¹ he does draw
attention to something that Nietzsche thought was crucial about the European situa-
tion: Fully recognizing the death of the Christian God closes off certain possibilities
of feeling, while it opens up others. In his own mad manner, the Madman has recog-
nized that God is dead, but he is far better at invoking a sense of loss than at speak-
ing of new possibilities, as everything he says about the future is coloured by a sense
of loss.What is lost is that which guaranteed a sense of absolute certainty, the basic
trust that Being triumphs over Nothingness, and consequently the sense that human
life is meaningful becomes questionable. The Madman certainly feels in his own way,
what a note of Nietzsche from autumn 1881 speaks of: that unless “we” use the op-
portunity to make overcoming ourselves a constant struggle, we will have suffered a
loss.⁸² But coming from Nietzsche this note, which never found its way into the pub-
lished work, reads better as an exhortation to fight against the incorporated tendency
to interpret one’s experiences religiously, to fight against the temptation to see more
meaning in life than what one out of one’s own power puts into life, to fight against
 Brusotti is perhaps too quick to claim that there is no religious nostalgia in the Madman’s passion
since there is no evidence that could decide the question either way. Similarly, Brusotti’s talk of the
Madman’s intention [Absicht] is misguiding to say the least if the Madman cannot be identified with
Nietzsche (Brusotti 1997, 418).
 “Wenn wir nicht aus dem Tode Gottes eine großartige Entsagung und einen fortwährenden Sieg über
uns machen, so haben wir den Verlust zu tragen.” (NL 1881, 12[9]; KSA 9, 577)
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all shadows of God (cf. Brusotti 1997, 418), than as a statement of fact. The loss that
the note speaks of is a possibility. The death of God is in itself neither purely loss nor
gain, but an event that opens up future possibilities: all depends on what possibil-
ities one is able to see and this, my interpretation suggests, depends to a great
deal on mood. What about the atheists at the marketplace, then? What is it that
they lack?
In the light of this interpretation, the error of the atheists is not that they laugh at
and mock the Madman, that they are incapable of feeling his pain. Rather, they lack
the mood through which they could see the event that the Madman speaks of as prof-
itable; in other words, they lack an understanding of the death of God as opportunity
for themselves, to become what they are. That this might indeed be what they most
lack is indicated in their reaction when the Madman is done with his tirade invoking
the loss that he and they have suffered, done with accusing them and himself of kill-
ing God, and done with his insane suggestions of what must be done. They fall silent
and seem bewildered, as if they had witnessed something mysterious. It is as if all
their confidence, with which they had mocked the Madman, had been swept away.
Had they been joyful scientists, they would perhaps have laughed heartily at this
spectacle. Support for this interpretation need not be sought from outside the origi-
nal edition of GS, but can be found aplenty in book four.
5.6 Book four and heightened mood
Book four is above all a demonstration of that (kind of) life-affirming mood that
Nietzsche considers an ideal response to the message that “God is dead”. I claim
no originality for the general picture that I present, since it has already been suggest-
ed that the goal of the book is to put philosophizing in a new mood.⁸³ This view has
however not yet been sufficiently recognized in scholarship; therefore, it would be
misleading to claim that it is well established. What originality there is to be
found in my defence and development of this thesis lies in the detail of the presen-
tation, which on the one hand follows from the analytic distinction between the
mood that is generated through the text and Nietzsche’s statements about an emi-
 E.g.Wotling: “In der Hauptsache zielt das Buch also auf die Darstellung einer neuen affektiven Ton-
art und will zeigen, wie diese das philosophische Unterfangen verändert.” (Wotling 2015, 107) Wotling
also does not fail to connect this endeavour to the possibilities opened by the experience that God is
dead (cf. Wotling 2015, 109 and 112). However, Wotling does not thematize Nietzsche’s doubts about
his abilities to communicate this new mood nor does he focus enough on the evidence about these
moods, which means that the thesis requires a more robust defence.
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nently desirable mood,⁸⁴ and on the other from a strict focus on the evidence con-
cerning these moods.
Book four draws much of its inspiration from the experience of health that
Nietzsche had in January 1882 in Genoa, where the ships sail to sea. All the available
evidence also suggests that he at least began work on the fourth book that same
month, though he made corrections to the text until the final publication of GS
(cf. Kaufmann 2015, 9). For Nietzsche, Genoa is the city from whence Columbus
hailed; the Columbus who eventually set sail toward the New World.⁸⁵ The symbol-
ism is all too apparent, even though that name is never explicitly mentioned in the
book, as Nietzsche draws heavily on metaphors of open seas, of new lands or islands
to explore and to claim (e.g. GS 289, KSA 3, 529–530). This is not to say that these
metaphors would have supplanted those of the heights, of his beloved mountain
air (cf. GS 293, KSA 3, 533–534), which here is felt in the wind that would move
the ships towards the unknown.
The opening poem praising “Januarius” already places the following discussions
under the banner of that which is eminently desirable, the “highest hope”, towards
which the soul of the philosopher hurries (KSA 3, 521).What is this highest hope? It is
near at hand to connect it to a higher way of being made possible by the death of
God as the poem associates moving closer towards the goal with an ever higher,
lighter and healthier feeling [heller stets und stets gesunder].⁸⁶ It is here necessary
to distinguish the desired state from the mood in which it is approached. Whatever
the goal is, the key issue to note is that the movement towards this goal is expressed
as a joy in itself. The poem would then reflect what I take to be the defining charac-
teristic of book four; namely, that Nietzsche seeks to communicate the possibility of
the highest affirmation through a mood that he considers conducive to such affirma-
tion. In other words, there are two levels of mood. On the one hand there is the vision
of a high and supremely healthy mood that is presented as a goal, on the other a
mood of expectation through which the philosopher bids the reader approach the
yet higher mood. Traces of this same strategy can certainly be found scattered
throughout the entire work,⁸⁷ but it is most apparent in book four. Indeed, one
 The two are of course intertwined in the sense that Nietzsche’s discussion about an eminently
desirable mood contributes to creating the joyful mood of the text and can thus also be read as
part of his strategy to create mood.
 In his letters Nietzsche makes this identification of Genoa with Columbus known; he even goes as
far as to claim that for him Genoa is above all the city of Columbus (e.g. KGB III/1, Bf. 474 and KGB III/
5, Bf. 475 A). Besides that, he connects his own endeavours to Columbus’ fate to be a discoverer of a
new world (KGB III/1, Bf. 294 and KGB III/1, Bf. 490).
 In a letter to Köselitz from 6 April 1883 Nietzsche identifies the “highest hope” with becoming the
father of Zarathustra, i.e. with creating Zarathustra (KGB III/1, Bf. 401). This fits well into the picture
that Nietzsche’s ideal mood is one that makes productive, enables creativity in following one’s own
path. Like his father, Zarathustra is presented as a being of the heights, as mountain air incarnate (cf.
KSA 4, 375).
 Arguably, the motto begins this story.
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need not look far for additional support that such a strategy of communication is at
work in book four.
One can begin by noting that it is in a mood of expectation that Nietzsche in the
first aphorism, For the new year, presents his wish to be nothing but a yea-sayer. To
be able to see beauty in necessity, to make things that are the way they are beautiful;
that is the formula of amor fati (GS 276, KSA 3, 521). Instead of interpreting amor fati
as an abstract philosophical doctrine, it is more fruitful to read it precisely as a wish
and as an expression of a mood of affirmation.When read contextually the objection
that it is impossible to affirm the most painful and disagreeable states of mind in the
moment that they occur loses much of its sting. Of course, one can and should read
amor fati as a wish to dwell in a state that can at best overpower any pain. In this
sense, amor fati is directly related to the motto of GS and that super-human mood
in which every experience appears as sacred. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s main concern
in book four is not to give a phenomenology of such a state but to present joyful striv-
ing towards it in a mood of expectation. In what sense this joyful striving itself is an
approximation of the mood that gives the power to interpret everything for the best is
shown in the next aphorism.
Nietzsche describes how it seems to the free spirit, who has reached a certain
high point in life, as if all experiences that he goes through are for the good, whether
he interprets them as good or ill in the moment they happen. Here, Nietzsche is only
concerned with the interpretation of events after the fact. Nevertheless, the free spirit
has reached a new height and the danger is great that he will fall. In order not to lose
the freedom that has led him to these new heights, the free spirit has to resist the
temptation to interpret his feeling that all events eventually are good for himself
as proof of personal providence, i.e. that some God or spirit is watching over his
fate. Instead, the assumption must suffice that his own power of interpretation
has reached a new peak. (GS 277, KSA 3, 521–522)
Nietzsche still seems to fear, as he did in HH and D, that the experience of high
moods and of overflowing joy might lead to a return to metaphysics or a turn to some
kind of false religiosity. How and why does Nietzsche seek to guard himself and the
reader from such a fate? The textual evidence supports the answer that Nietzsche ex-
plicitly ties his vision of a higher way of being to a strict rejection of religious cus-
toms and metaphysical ideals. In other words, a feeling of freedom is indissociable
from Nietzsche’s affective ideal. Any return to religion or metaphysics would hinder
the attempt to move ever higher. To persuade the reader, Nietzsche can do nothing
but instill a mood of expectation in the reader, since the reader has to feel in himself
an increase of freedom in order to be convinced. The most perfect example of this
strategy is to be found in aphorism 285, Excelsior!, which more directly than any
other aphorism valorizes striving ever higher.
A voice, distinguished by quotation marks, tells what the free spirit who seeks to
live without God must renounce. He must never pray, never worship and never feel
absolute certainty. He cannot expect any absolute justice nor does he have the right
to assume a higher reason in what goes on in the world. Above all, there is no place
174 5 On the communication of mood in Nietzsche’s Gay Science
for his heart to rest, no final goal, where all striving comes to an end. Instead, he
must will the Eternal Recurrence of war and peace. The voice then calls the free spirit
an ascetic [Mensch der Entsagung], questions the viability of the renunciation in
question and states that as of yet no one yet had the power to live like that. After
this statement that ends the quote, Nietzsche presents a vision of a lake that does
not allow its water to flow away, but raises a dam and from that moment rises
ever higher. Finally, Nietzsche suggests that a similar fate perhaps awaits the
human [der Mensch], when s/he no longer flows into a God. (GS 285, KSA 3, 527–
528) Importantly, Nietzsche does not directly challenge the voice about what the
free spirit has to leave behind. In other words, he strategically agrees that the situa-
tion of the free spirit can be viewed as a renunciation. The point would rather be that
if one must view the free spirit as one who renounces the consolations of religion,
the renunciation itself generates a new feeling of power. Through this feeling of
power, man can rise ever higher, when his hopes and wishes are not spent on illusory
ideals. It is in this daring final suggestion that the meaning of the passage breaks
through in full force: the suggestion effects a radical shift from the language of re-
nunciation to that of affirmation. For what is the renunciation demanded of the
free spirit compared to the enticing vision of a higher way of being? As the following
Interruption [Zwischenrede], which refers as much to all of book four and perhaps
even to the entirety of GS as to the directly preceding aphorism, states: “Here are
hopes”. Here indeed are hopes, but can these hopes be communicated?
286. Interruption. – Here are hopes; but what will you hear and see of them if you have not ex-
perienced splendor, ardor, and dawns in your own souls? I can only remind you; more I cannot
do. To move stones, to turn animals into men – is that what you want from me? Oh, if you are
still stones and animals, then better look for your Orpheus. (Kaufmann 1974, 230; GS 286, KSA 3,
528)
The strictest possible reading of this aphorism would lead to the conclusion that only
those who have had similar experiences as Nietzsche, only those who are already ac-
quainted with high moods (cf. GS 288, KSA 3, 528), can understand his newfound joy.
Nevertheless, even this strictest interpretation does not speak against the interpreta-
tion of GS as involving an attempt to communicate mood. Rather, it supports the ar-
gument that this indeed is the case once one discards the idea that this communica-
tion is meant to reach everybody. Nietzsche has put the stakes high, and perhaps he
fears he has put them too high; all depends on communicating mood. Perhaps the
choice to let the reader approach the “highest hope” through a more easily accessible
mood of expectation is best understood against this background of doubt? He is fully
aware that even thus not everyone will be able to open up to his message, yet the
message that God is dead can only be misunderstood if one disregards this context.
Therefore, Nietzsche suggests that those who do not hear his words and see what he
means must first find their own Orpheus. That Orpheus here stands as a metaphor for
perfect affective communication needs no further proof than what is evident from
within the aphorism. Nietzsche ascribes Orpheus the power to effect radical transfor-
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mations though his art; the power to have himself heard by animals and even inan-
imate matter. In short, it is Orpheus’s power to communicate that Nietzsche denies
himself. To conclude, Nietzsche’s apparent scepticism about his ability to communi-
cate his experience solidifies the contention that the composition of GS is based on a
poetics of mood and that the philosophical content relies on affective communica-
tion.
Not only does Nietzsche voice scepticism about his power to have his words
heard but he also comes close to admitting that it is dangerous to raise expectations
about the future. He has the Wanderer state to his Shadow that he loves ignorance
about the future and doesn’t want to perish from impatience and from tasting prom-
ised things (GS 287, KSA 3, 528).⁸⁸ Such cryptic references to promised things of
course only raise more expectations. Indeed, there are no reasons to take a literal
reading of the aphorism as a guide to interpreting what follows. After all, neither
this professed preference of living in ignorance of the future nor the complaint
that it appears to him as if most people would not even believe in high moods pre-
vent Nietzsche in the following aphorism from presenting an enticing vision of a fu-
ture in which a constant high mood is the rule rather than the exception (cf. GS 288,
KSA 3, 528).
In the aphorism entitled Elevated moods [Hohe Stimmungen] Nietzsche goes as
far as to envision a human being, who would be the embodiment of a single great
mood. The experience of such a soul would be “a continual ascent as on stairs
and at the same time a sense of resting on clouds” (Kaufmann 1974, 231; GS 288,
KSA 3, 528). More remarkable than Nietzsche’s familiar metaphors of heights is
how his understanding of this possible mood combines the joyful movement of con-
stant striving with an image of inner peace. Peace is not sought in rest or in some
final goal, but is realized within the movement of striving. Although Nietzsche con-
cedes that all of human history provides no certain examples of such a being, he
contends that it is very well possible that such a being were born under the right cir-
cumstances. Most likely because of this reference to history and what might be his-
tory one day, the aphorism has been read in conjunction with what Nietzsche has to
say about “historical sense” in aphorism 337 of GS (cf. Brusotti 1997, 476–478). Such
a procedure is justified insofar as both aphorisms present enticing visions of future
possibilities, visions that are hard not to read as promises of heightened feeling.
Aphorism 337, The humaneness of the future [Die zukünftige “Menschlichkeit”], at-
tempts to convince the reader that though it would seem that the historical sense that
has been growing in Europe is a sign of old age, of the weakening of all old feelings,
it is in fact itself a sign and symptom of a new feeling that is growing from generation
to generation (GS 337, KSA 3, 564). This feeling grows from an ever-increasing capaci-
ty to feel all of human history as one’s own. Some day, Nietzsche suggests, the his-
 “Ich liebe die Unwissenheit um die Zukunft und will nicht an der Ungeduld und dem Vorwegkosten
verheissener Dinge zu Grunde gehen.” (GS 287, KSA 3, 528)
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torical sense will open up the possibility of subsuming the experiences of the most
remote past together with all present hopes into one feeling. This would according to
Nietzsche result in a god-like joy:
the happiness of a god full of power and love, full of tears and laughter, a happiness that, like
the sun in the evening, continually bestows its inexhaustible riches, pouring them into the sea,
feeling richest, as the sun does, only when even the poorest fisherman is still rowing with gold-
en oars! This godlike feeling would then be called-humaneness. (Kaufmann 1974, 268–269;
GS 337, KSA 3, 565)
To fully understand what Nietzsche is up to here, it is useful to return to that other
aphorism in book four, in which Nietzsche speaks of a divine, godlike feeling; name-
ly aphorism 300, Preludes of science. There Nietzsche suggests that had not magi-
cians, alchemists, astrologists and others of their ilk promised knowledge about hid-
den and forbidden powers, the human lust for knowledge would never have grown
so strong as to enable the birth and development of science (GS 300, KSA 3, 539). Ir-
respective of whether Nietzsche is onto something on that point or not, his narrative
can be used to explain his own manner of presenting his own conception of the ex-
perimental life as desirable. Nietzsche is engaged in the same game of promising
knowledge as well as feelings of freedom and power for those who take to the
seas, who leave all certainties behind, to become who they are.
In aphorism 300, Nietzsche suggests that some day in the distant future the en-
tire history of religion might be viewed as an exercise and means so that there might
be human beings who enjoy all the self-sufficiency of a God. Here too the emphasis is
not on that high mood but on the striving for such a state and the subtle suggestion
that had not religion implanted a desire that there be gods or super-human powers,
humans would never have learned to feel hunger for oneself, to become who one is.
Nietzsche’s final question, as to whether Prometheus first had to believe that he stole
the light and pay the price for that only to finally see he had created the light and
God as well as humans through his own desire, provides the final clue for interpret-
ing the passage (GS 300, KSA 3, 539). In effect, Nietzsche radically suggests that all
desire that there be gods, all desire for God, can now be interpreted as misunder-
stood desire for one’s self. Just as feelings have a history, so too does the desire to
become who one is. In this perspective, Nietzsche is able to view the history of reli-
gion in a less hostile light,⁸⁹ as a necessary error, a comic misunderstanding that
must be abandoned to move forward. Nietzsche quite openly guides the reader in
 Arguably, Nietzsche’s elaborations do not concern monotheistic religion, and thus not the whole
history of religion. In aphorism 143, Nietzsche longs for a time when each individual can give free rein
to his self-desire [Selbstsucht], his desire to express his very own ideal. In this context he praises pol-
ytheism that at least allowed a multitude of ideals in the realm of the Gods, and harshly attacks mon-
otheistic religions as premised on the idea that there is a common human [Normalmensch] for whom
a common God [Normalgott] suffices, which in Nietzsche’s view means that monotheism is directly
opposed to the desire to become who one is (cf. GS 143, KSA 3, 490–491).
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this direction, through his promises. His promises concern the future possibilities
opened up to those who embrace the knowledge that God is dead. Again and
again, he seeks to convince the reader (and perhaps also himself) to dare to live ex-
perimentally for the sake of new or “promised” lands, to set sail for a realm that is
one’s own (GS 289, KSA 3, 529–530).
As Nietzsche himself draws attention to what he sees as the religious prehistory
of his striving, it is important to further clarify the relation between his striving and
that striving for truth which characterizes the more recent religious past. Let us there-
fore ask one last time: Is Nietzsche a seeker, perhaps really a God-seeker [Gottsu-
chender], who only misunderstands himself?⁹⁰ Nietzsche’s text answers: “What I
want is more; I am no seeker. I want to create for myself a sun of my own.” (Kauf-
mann 1974, 254; GS 320, KSA 3, 551)⁹¹ Nietzsche does not want to bask in the light
of another sun, irrespective of whether that sun is a God or a general philosophical
justification of existence, but to create an own ideal. One takes to the seas to create
an ideal for oneself, not to find a universal ideal (cf. GS 289, KSA 3, 529–530).
Nietzsche’s description of Kant in aphorism 335 illustrates Nietzsche’s rejection of
such a striving for universal truth. Nietzsche treats Kant as a failed free spirit, as a
fox who after having broken out of the cage that is metaphysical philosophy into a
new freedom, loses his way and crawls back to the cage (cf. GS 335, KSA 3, 562).⁹²
In Kant’s Categorical imperative, Nietzsche finds a trace of that desire for a self
[Selbstsucht] that he would give free rein, namely in the feeling that one’s own judge-
ment is a universal judgement. Yet, Nietzsche claims, this is a lowly form of that de-
sire, which shows that one has not come up with an own ideal.⁹³ For if one would
have an own ideal, and feel that it is one’s own, one would not think that everyone
must follow it. In other, words Nietzsche suggests that Kant did not go far enough in
self-knowledge.
This individualism, this immoralism of each pursuing an own ideal, is not the
only thing about Nietzsche’s striving that puts it into opposition to most if perhaps
not all (e.g. Satanist) religious paths of salvation known in the history of religion.
What else differentiates Nietzsche’s call to become who one is from the teachings
of founders of religions is above all its experimental character. The paradigm is
the scientific experiment, and the thirst for knowledge, the thirst for self-knowledge,
is emphatically not a thirst for wonders, reincarnations or other things that go
against reason (GS 319, KSA 3, 550–551; cf. GS 335, KSA 3, 563–564). As interpreters
of experience, the free spirits must be strict as scientists (GS 319, KSA 3, 551). When
 Though I have repeatedly suggested that the question is misdirected, I have also sought to show
that it can be useful insofar as it forces to better characterize Nietzsche’s position.
 “Ich will mehr, ich bin kein Suchender. Ich will für mich eine eigene Sonne schaffen.” (GS 320, KSA 3,
551)
 “sich wieder zu ‘Gott’, ‘Seele’, ‘Freiheit’ und ‘Unsterblichkeit’ zurückverirrte” (GS 335, KSA 3, 562).
 “sie verräth, dass du dich selber noch nicht entdeckt, dir selber noch kein eigenes, eigenstes Ideal
geschaffen hast” (GS 335, KSA 3, 562).
178 5 On the communication of mood in Nietzsche’s Gay Science
one reads these aphorisms in the light of what Nietzsche writes about high moods,
the message is clear: he insists that all his enticing visions are within the bounds of
the possible, and that precisely the experimental life can be a privileged path to
moods of joyful affirmation. When one takes this into account it is unsurprising
that he suggests a life in pursuit of knowledge need not be a life of melancholy
toil, but can, when conducted in a certain way, be a life of joy and laughter (cf.
GS 324, KSA 3, 552–553).
At the end of book four, in the second-last aphorism, the joy of the free spirit is
put to a final test. Given that GS is a book of joyful science, it is fitting that joy itself
becomes the object of experiments in the pages of the book. This last experiment is
the most radical that Nietzsche devised. What if, the narrator asks, a demon would
creep into your solitude and tell you that you have to live this very same life over and
over again, how would you then react? Nietzsche is in fact careful to distinguish the
voice of the demon from that of the narrator by quotation marks: once the demon has
whispered the thought of Eternal Recurrence, which is not named here, it is the nar-
rator who again takes over and asks the reader how he would respond. The narrator
offers three alternative responses.⁹⁴ Initially the narrator asks 1) if one would not de-
spair, rage and curse the demon who speaks thus, but then directly asks the reader 2)
if he or she has not experienced such a moment in which one would greet the de-
mon’s words with joy and proclaim: “you are a god and never have I heard anything
more divine!” After claiming that the thought of Eternal Recurrence, irrespective of
how one initially responds to the demon, would change or perhaps crush the person
over whom it gains power, i.e. the person who incorporates it, the narrator 3) pres-
ents the final alternative of responding to the demon’s challenge: “Or”, he begins,
“how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave noth-
ing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” (Kaufmann
1974, 273–274, GS 341, KSA 3, 570)
Nietzsche himself arguably emphasized this question by letting it finish the
aphorism and specifically marked out the words “to crave nothing more” in cursive.
Thus, he suggests that even if one were not fully able to accept Eternal Recurrence at
the moment that one is confronted with the thought, one need not despair, but one
can instead strive to live so that one would long for nothing as much as for the rep-
etition of one’s life. Here again, one hears his call to become who one is and again
one notes that striving for the highest possible affirmation in some sense already par-
takes of that affirmation.
GS ends with the appearance of Zarathustra. Through Zarathustra, Nietzsche
dramatizes his own striving to come to terms with his “experience” of Eternal Recur-
 So it is not the case as all too often presented that “the Daemon offers two alternatives” (Parkes
2005, xxiv) of responding, since it is the narrator and not the Demon who asks the question of how
one would respond, and there are arguably three responses.
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rence, his attempt to incorporate the idea. That one has to ask about the mood of Z is
therefore a foregone conclusion.
5.7 Conclusion and concluding excursus on the 1887 edition
The evidence surveyed supports the thesis that GS and specifically its fourth book
aim to put philosophizing in a new mood. Throughout the text Nietzsche presents
many reasons why a mood of joyful affirmation is philosophically productive, though
never explicitly as answer to such a question. He rather shows that the mood of his
book is conducive to philosophical tasks: It gives the courage to face difficult prob-
lems, to dare to question inherited assumptions, to ask questions that should or
should not remain unasked. This it does in a manner that recognizes that there
will be no final answers, no end-goal and final resting place for the philosopher.
It is a scepticism that does not despair of never reaching solid ground – rather it
is precisely in groundlessness, in the high air, that both the joy and the danger re-
sides. It gives the freedom to pursue truth; one’s own truth. In this regard, one
can go so far as to speak of a liberation of philosophy (cf. Stegmaier 2012). Of course,
Stegmaier, who has forcefully argued in favour of a joyful philosophizing, insists that
the most mature expression of this mood is to be found in book five (Stegmaier 2012,
46). This of course raises the question, in what sense the character of the mood
changes. In what sense is the mood of book five more mature?
5.7.1 The character of Nietzsche’s communication of mood in the second edition
of GS
How does the 1887 edition of GS alter the interpretation that has been advanced
about the original 1882 edition? How do the foreword and the fifth book fit into
the picture that I have drawn of Nietzsche’s communication of mood and its relation
to his criticism of religion? Do they challenge or provide further support for the read-
ing? Perhaps the most pressing question is, whether Nietzsche has become more
doubtful about communicating mood and if the answer is yes how that shapes the
work. Nietzsche’s attempt to clarify and explain himself in the foreword to the sec-
ond edition is the best place to start the examination of the evidence.
Nietzsche’s doubts about whether GS is understandable at all go a long way to-
wards explaining the specifically philosophical need for a foreword in 1887.
Nietzsche already voiced scepticism as to his ability to communicate his vision in
the period around the original publication, for example when he asked Köselitz
whether Sanctus Januarius can be understood at all. More significant than the ques-
tion itself is his admission that his doubt about the issue of understandability is huge
(Nietzsche in fact goes as far as to use the word monstrous [ungeheuer], cf. KGB III/1,
Bf. 282). This scepticism he takes to a new height in the foreword, in which he spe-
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cifically questions the communicability of the experience that grounds the joyful sci-
ence. For this is what Nietzsche basically says: if one hasn’t had such an experience
as he has one cannot begin to understand what the book is about, nor does writing a
foreword help (cf. GS Preface 1, KSA 3, 345).What is remarkable is not this scepticism
per se, but that he despite everything still tries to make his work understandable.
What Nietzsche provides is what he himself might have called a physiological de-
scription of the experience which found expression in GS. It is, however, crucial to
examine carefully what Nietzsche is in fact talking about, precisely when he seems
to be at his most “physiological”, as here. In this case his emphasis is as much on
spiritual as bodily health, as he blames an unfitting spiritual diet [geistige Diät]
(esp. romanticism) for much of his suffering, and again justifies his withdrawal
from the intellectual circles of his earlier days, a self-imposed exile into loneliness,
as an attempt to cure his condition (GS Preface 1KSA 3, 346). In this sense, he writes
of GS as resulting from the experience of suddenly being overwhelmed by hope; spe-
cifically the hope of health. In itself it is a joyful state, which he compares to a drunk-
enness [Trunkenheit der Genesung], but it is also much more as Nietzsche emphasizes
its orientation to the future: it is a feeling of future, of new mornings and open seas,
and last but not least a feeling that there are goals worth striving for (GS Preface 1,
KSA 3, 345–346). This description fits well the thesis that I have advanced about
the two levels of mood: on the one hand there is the joyful mood of the text and
on the other the vision of a supremely joyful and healthy mood. Because Nietzsche
employs the metaphor of drunkenness, one might nevertheless ask: how lasting
can this joy be?
What remains of the mood of GS now that Nietzsche has become healthy (GS
Preface 2, KSA 3, 347)?
Despite insisting that the philosopher can only ever translate his state of being
[Zustand] into philosophy (GS, KSA 3, 349), Nietzsche emphasizes the lasting value of
what he has learned from his varied experiences of sickness and health. In this re-
gard, it is not unimportant that he speaks of having acquired a distaste of the “spi-
ritual pleasures” [geistigen Genüssen] that he thinks the educated of his time seek to
induce through literature, music and alcohol [geistiger Getränke] (GS Preface 4,
KSA 3, 351), since the distinction between high moods and artificially induced ecstat-
ic states is arguably of great importance in both his mature and late thinking on
mood (see chapters 6 and 7). Even more importantly, however, he describes how
he has through his experiences found a new joy, a joy at even the most disturbing
problems that always is stronger than any anxious uncertainty (GS Preface 4,
KSA 3, 350–351).⁹⁵ That the text of the fifth book of GS does not superficially display
as much joyful playfulness as the fourth book therefore need not mean that
 “Der Reiz alles Problematischen, die Freude am X ist aber bei solchen geistigeren, vergeistigteren
Menschen zu gross, als dass diese Freude nicht immer wieder wie eine helle Gluth über alle Noth des
Problematischen, über alle Gefahr der Unsicherheit, selbst über die Eifersucht des Liebenden zusam-
menschlüge. Wir kennen ein neues Glück…” (GS Preface 3, KSA 3, 350–351)
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Nietzsche has abandoned his attempt to communicate a mood that he thinks is par-
ticularly conducive to the advancement of free spirits. It is instead best explained by
referring to Stegmaier’s suggestion that the mood of GS is expressed in its most ma-
ture form in the fifth book. Put differently, there are good reasons to assume that
Nietzsche did attempt to communicate mood in the fifth book of GS, but that this
communication is perhaps not as apparent on the surface as in the preceding
books, and instead has to be drawn out.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that similar doubts that explain the need for
the foreword can be found within the text of the fifth book. In this regard, aphor-
ism 371,We incomprehensible ones (GS 371, KSA 3, 622–623), as well as aphorism 381,
On the question of being understandable (GS 381, KSA 3, 633–635), are especially in-
structive.While Nietzsche in these passages expresses the view that his books are not
for everyone, they also express his confidence that his communication will reach
those for whom it is meant. These are of course the free spirits (of the future) and
once again they are characterized in polemical contrast with religious believers.
Thus, the opening aphorism that according to its title sets out to “explain” the spi-
ritedness [Heiterkeit] of the joyful science, explicitly addresses the free spirits and
confronts them once again with the idea that God is dead.
5.7.2 The death of God and the joy of the free spirit
In order to explain/show what the joy of the free spirit is like, Nietzsche first tries to
explain what “God is dead” means. In Nietzsche’s own words, this means nothing
else than that faith in the Christian God has become unbelievable or unworthy of be-
lief [unglaubwürdig]. Now, however, Nietzsche insists that the real significance of this
event has not yet been grasped, except perhaps by a few who have foreseen the col-
lapse of faith and with it the collapse of what hitherto was European morality. Even
while he paints his dark picture of a monstrous logic of horror [ungeheuren Logik von
Schrecken] and asks who could already know enough about what is to come in order
to act as its teacher and prophet, he turns his attention to the joy of the free spirit.
Instead of a dark future, the free spirit experiences the words that God is dead as her-
alding a new dawn and as the promise of open seas to explore. (GS 343, KSA 3, 573–
574)
The question with which Nietzsche challenges his reader is whether the free spi-
rit merely deceives himself; whether he is blinded by the immediate consequence
that the message that God is dead has for him, namely his joy, and fails to see the
horrific long-term consequences of the decline of Christian religion. In other
words, Nietzsche returns to the question how one is to react to the message that
God is dead. Within this one aphorism, he basically re-enacts the contrast between
the dark visions of the Madman and the joy of Sanctus Januarius. Thus, Nietzsche
once again tests the joy of the free spirit. In this regard, it is especially interesting
to note, how Nietzsche in the first part of aphorism 343 employs a vocabulary sug-
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gesting inevitability when describing the perspective of the few who already have
seen the vision of a future governed by a logic of horrors, whereas he in the final
part describing the perspective of the free spirits employs metaphors suggesting an
open and desirable future (e.g. open seas). Crucially, Nietzsche’s own perspective
seems to go beyond either of the two perspectives, and this again supports Steg-
maier’s thesis that the mood of GS has become more mature in the fifth book. If
the joy of the free spirit at its best truly is a joy even in the face of the most disturbing
problems, the aphorism can be viewed in a different light; not so much as a choice
between two incommensurable perspectives, but as a demonstration of a joy, which
dares to confront an uncertain future. Following this thought, the aphorism is argu-
ably itself a prime example of joy at that which is problematic and uncertain.⁹⁶
This interpretation is supported by the central content of Nietzsche’s criticism of
religion in the fifth book, which follows and builds on that of the first four books and
fits perfectly in to the general trajectory of his criticism. Once again, Nietzsche’s argu-
ment is built on the irreconcilable opposition between the free spirit and the reli-
gious, specifically Christian, type, and again he targets the supposed need for reli-
gion (cf. Stegmaier 2012, 216). On this point, Nietzsche clarifies his position.
Nietzsche concedes that in general, the Europeans of his time are not ready for
the uncertainty that leaving Christianity behind necessarily entails: “Christianity, it
seems to me, is still needed by most people in old Europe even today; therefore it
still finds believers” (Kaufmann 1974, 287; GS 347, KSA 3, 581). These men and
women he then contrasts with the idea of free spirits par excellence, who are charac-
terized precisely by their ability to dwell in a state of uncertainty and to find joy in
this uncertainty (GS 347, KSA 3, 583).
Just as in Sanctus Januarius, the joy that the text of book five is meant to exem-
plify is related to a yet higher joy. Similarly, the philosopher’s health is related to his
ideal of great health. Following this strategy, Nietzsche tempts the reader at the end
of book five with the ideal of a spirit that is supremely healthy, and therefore in
Nietzsche’s view necessarily beyond good and evil (cf. GS 382, KSA 3, 635–637).⁹⁷
Here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere in the preceding books of GS, Nietzsche
expresses the view that giving up Christian moral feelings and reorienting one’s af-
fects is a precondition for experiencing the supreme mood of affirmation that (alone)
 Stegmaier has similarly noted that Nietzsche does not really explain his joy in the aphorism, as
the title might lead one to think, but instead shows what it is like through the composition of the
aphorism (cf. Stegmaier 2012, 118– 120). How one interprets aphorism 343 depends to a great extent
on whether the focus is put on the putative “explanation” that the aphorism provides of the joy of the
free spirit or on the “exemplification” of this joyful mood in the aphorism. In this regard, I follow
Stegmaier in emphasizing Nietzsche’s exemplification. Hödl also argues that the structure of the
aphorism suggests that Nietzsche writes strategically to celebrate the perspectives open to the free
spirit (Hödl 2009, 439).
 “das Ideal eines menschlich-übermenschlichen Wohlseins und Wohlwollens, das oft genug unmens-
chlich erscheinen wird”. In Nietzsche’s words, this spirit plays with all that has been considered good,
holy and untouchable (cf. GS 382, KSA 3, 637).
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is worth striving for after religious ideals have become unbelievable. In the following
chapters, I will follow the development of Nietzsche’s thinking until a clear picture
about the nature of this new ideal emerges.
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6 Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Communication of mood
or nihilistic self-parody?
While it would be a too extreme hypothesis to claim that it is with his Thus Spoke
Zarathustra that Nietzsche rises or falls, the work is central to Nietzsche’s endeavour
as he himself repeatedly insists. In the foreword to EH, Nietzsche singles out Z as
“the real book of the mountain air” (Large 2007, 4),¹ repeatedly refers to Zarathustra
throughout the text, and finally associates what he already said through Zarathustra,
i.e. the discovery of the life-denying nature of Christian morality (“God”, “true
world” etc.), with a radical cut of history into two halves (KSA 6, 373–374).Whatever
one thinks of the hyperbolic excesses of EH, it is imperative to see the truth behind it.
For if Z is due to its poetic character ignored and Nietzsche read only for his more
accessible philosophical writings, as is the dominant practice in Anglophone philo-
sophy, then I do not see how one can avoid the view that Nietzsche should not pri-
marily be considered a philosopher at all given the weight he himself attached to the
work. Any attempt to turn Nietzsche into a “philosopher” despite this runs utterly
counter to Nietzsche’s intentions, his highest hopes as well as his laughter which
is to no small extent directed at academic philosophy (cf. Reents 2015, 236). For
my project, which is to throw light on Nietzsche’s criticism of religion through his
communication of mood, Z is an indispensable source. I have already shown that
communicating mood plays an important role in Nietzsche’s critical project in the
writings of his free spirit -period. How does Z fit into this picture?
The following engagement is not to be understood as a comprehensive commen-
tary: Z speaks for itself. The reader will find no overview of the vast scholarly liter-
ature on Z, but instead a focused discussion on the communication of mood. The
main question, through which I approach the work, is to what extent Z challenges
and/or moves further than his preceding writings when it comes to affective commu-
nication. In other words, I explicitly question to what extent Z can be used to prob-
lematize the interpretation advanced thus far in this study.
I begin by examining the two most important presuppositions for approaching Z.
The first one is to recognize the place of Z within Nietzsche’s writings and to ap-
proach the work with his critical projects in mind. The second presupposition con-
cerns the appreciation of the affective dimension of the text. After having further-
more discussed the tone of Z, I will seek to cast more light on the character of
Nietzsche’s communication of mood through a discussion of Zarathustra’s speech
Upon the Isles of the Blest, which is among his most important speeches that
touch on the theme of religion. Thereafter I will in the final sections consider if
there is self-parody in the text of Z, and if there indeed is self-parody in the text
 “das eigentliche Höhenluft-Buch” (KSA 6, 259).
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whether it is best read as an internal critique of the “use of mood” within the text or
rather as an important part of the communication of mood.
6.1 The place of Z within Nietzsche’s works
In a letter to Franz Overbeck from 7 April 1884, Nietzsche speaks of D and GS as pre-
figuring Z and that those two works can even be read as commentaries on Z (KGB III/
1, Bf. 504).² That Nietzsche singles out precisely these two works is significant; as I
have shown a strategic use of a mood of expectation plays an important role in both.
What makes Nietzsche’s use of mood special, which is specifically evident in GS, is
how playful it is, i.e. how Nietzsche exemplifies the mood. In this regard, it is also
worth noting what Nietzsche writes in a sketch for the foreword of the second edition
of GS. There, writing about the original edition of GS, he specifies one sense in which
GS can be said to prefigure Z and that is the playful approach to all that is sacred.³
However, it should be added that the first formulations of the experience of being
able to gain a philosophical freedom of being above all human things, an experience
of mountain air [Höhenluft], which eventually lead to Z, stem from the period directly
preceding the publication of HH and that aspects of the new experience are already
present in that work in embryonic form. Undoubtedly, some elements of Z can be
traced even further back. In a letter from 29 August 1886 to his then publisher
Fritzsch, Nietzsche himself states that a presupposition for understanding his Zara-
thustra is to be acquainted with all of his previous writings (KGB III/3, Bf. 740).⁴ Such
statements about the works preceding Z cement the perception that Z occupies a cen-
tral and unique position among Nietzsche’s writings. They also point to the need to
approach Z with an understanding of the concerns of the preceding texts, and then
most of all the immediately preceding ones.
 “Beim durchlesen von ‘Morgenröthe’ und ‘fröhlicher Wissenschaft’ fand ich übrigens, daß darin fast
keine Zeile steht, die nicht als Einleitung, Vorbereitung und Commentar zu genanntem Zarathustra die-
nen kann. Es ist eine Thatsache, daß ich den Commentar vor dem Text gemacht habe” (KGB III/1,
Bf. 504). Nietzsche repeats the same claim in a letter to Resa von Schirmhofer (cf. KGB III/1, Bf. 510).
 “Vorbereitung zu Zarathustras naiv-ironischer Stellung zu allen heiligen Dingen (naive Form der Über-
legenheit: das Spiel mit dem Heiligen)” (NL1885–86, 2[166], KSA 12, 150).
 “Das Wesentliche ist, daß, um die Voraussetzungen für das Verständniß des Zarathustra zu haben (–
ein Ereigniß ohne Gleichen in der Litteratur und Philosophie und Poesie und Moral usw. usw. Sie dürfen
mir’s glauben, Sie glücklicher Besitzer dieses Wunderthiers! –) alle meine früheren Schriften ernstlich
und tief verstanden sein müssen; insgleichen die Nothwendigkeit der Aufeinanderfolge dieser Schriften
und der in ihnen sich ausdrückenden Entwicklung.” (KGB III/3, Bf. 740) Of course, Nietzsche’s words to
his publisher are best understood against the background that he wanted to see all his writings pub-
lished again with new forewords. Of course, not all of Nietzsche’s writings prefigure Z to as great an
extent as D and GS. Still, it is certainly helpful, as Nietzsche suggests, to understand his philosophical
development or what should perhaps more properly be termed his development into a new kind of
philosopher.
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Against this background, and especially when one is all too aware that the dom-
inant trend in Anglophone scholarship still is to ignore context, one should applaud
Julian Young when he insists on the importance of understanding and keeping
Nietzsche’s previous texts in mind when approaching Z. Young is certainly correct
when he claims that the sayings of Zarathustra all too easily become “oracular
ink-blots on which to project one’s favourite philosophy” (Young 2006, 105). Now,
however, it is necessary to ask what is meant by approaching Z through the preced-
ing works. Is it enough to recognize continuities in the philosophical contents of Z
and the preceding writings? Or is it perhaps essential to recognize the role of affective
communication in those writings in order to understand what Z is about? With this
last question in mind, the limits of Young’s approach can be made apparent. Young
focuses only on the content of Z, and specifically on Zarathustra’s teaching. Young’s
central claim is that his procedure of interpreting Z not only helps to understand Za-
rathustra’s sayings, but that they become “in most cases, clear and unambiguous”
(Young 2006, 105). This is a very bold claim. Young wisely avoids commenting on
the central teachings of Z, the Übermensch⁵ and Eternal Recurrence, which are noto-
riously ambiguous. However, this very choice of avoiding those ideas as if they did
not exist, and instead focusing on a few sayings by Zarathustra that purportedly sup-
port a communitarian reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion, begs the ques-
tion if Young himself is not guilty of seeing in Z what he wants to see. Before advanc-
ing an interpretation of the content of Z one should therefore ask, why in the first
place it is the case that the work provokes interpretation, why it is that each philo-
sophical interpreter comes to his own conclusions about what kind of a human is an
Übermensch, what Will to Power is, and whether and in what sense Eternal Recur-
rence can be affirmed.
The central teachings of Zarathustra remain vague and unspecific. What Marie-
Luise Haase writes about the Übermensch in an oft-cited article that deservedly
has become something of a classic, namely that Zarathustra’s vision of a new kind
of human remains a surface for projection,⁶ applies as much to the rest of his vision-
ary teachings. Already in his afterword to Z, Giorgio Colli contends that Z reveals in a
particularly striking way that for Nietzsche the content is not that which is essential
about his communication (KSA 4, 411) and that one therefore seeks in vain for a theo-
ry of the Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence or Will to Power (KSA 4, 412). The conse-
quence of accepting Colli’s viewpoint is that the teachings of Zarathustra cannot
be translated into the strict language of philosophical concepts. Indeed, Colli’s
words can be read as a warning to refrain from the temptation of systematizing
the content of Zarathustra’s teaching. That most interpreters still go straight for the
content or themes of Zarathustra’s teaching, is proof enough that Colli’s contention
 As much as I like Parkes’ translation Overhuman (Parkes 2005), I leave the term Übermensch un-
translated (except in direct citations from Parkes) for the sake of clarity. This is common practice in
Anglophone scholarship.
 “Die Vision Zarathustras vom neuen Menschen bleibt für uns ein Vexierbild” (Haase 1984, 244).
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has not been taken with the gravity it deserves. This is all the more true of Anglo-
phone scholarship, which has concentrated on Zarathustra’s teaching understood
precisely as the philosophical doctrines of Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence and
Will to Power (e.g. Lampert 1987 and Rosen 1995).⁷ Undoubtedly, studies that
focus solely on this supposed “content” can be enlightening, in that they often pre-
sent intriguing interpretations. At their best, such interpretations might even be of
independent philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it is very problematic from the per-
spective of Nietzsche-scholarship when the results are presented as Nietzsche’s ideas
and not as those of the interpreter.
The alternative approach to Z that is taken here is to let Zarathustra’s teachings
remain unspecific. Young’s claim that Zarathustra’s words become unambiguous
when one takes account of Nietzsche’s writings prior to Z has to be rejected as too
bold, but also as missing the point. Young’s claim is too bold, because it is far too
easy to get lost in the labyrinth that is Z, even when one has a good grasp of the pre-
ceding writings. It also misses the point, because it does not recognize the possibility
that Zarathustra’s teachings might be ambiguous on purpose. To be absolutely clear:
To let Zarathustra’s words remain unspecific does not mean to leave them uncom-
mented. Paying attention to the affective dimension of Nietzsche’s communication
helps understand why the “teachings” are so unspecific. Here we come to the second
presupposition of approaching Z; paying attention to the affective dimension of the
text. To gain clarity about the matter, it is therefore necessary to revisit Colli’s after-
word.
6.2 Giorgio Colli on Z as communication
Firstly, it is necessary to differentiate Colli’s contention that the content is not that
which matters most in Z from an extreme view that Nietzsche ridicules in EH.
Nietzsche there mentions the author and critic Karl (Carl) Spitteler, a later Nobel-
prize recipient, who according to our philosopher treated Z as nothing more than
an exercise in style in a review in which he furthermore expressed the wish that
Nietzsche would in the future care more about the content (KSA 6, 299). Nietzsche
counters this critique by going on to explain that the book is to be understood as
speaking of and as expressing through language experiences that differ not only
from ordinary experiences but essentially from all that has been, i.e. that it is the
 The only significant exception in Anglophone scholarship that I know of is Kathleen Higgins’ mon-
ograph on Z, which pays due attention to the fictional nature of the narrative (Higgins 1987). Unfortu-
nately, those aspects of her work that are of most concern to us have had a negligible impact on An-
glophone scholarship. This is especially regrettable, because Higgins asks the right question about
the place of mood in Z; namely, whether Nietzsche’s use of mood in the work is best understood
as open-ended communication of mood or as an attempt to manipulate the reader’s mood (cf. Hig-
gins 1987, 112).
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first language for a series of new experiences (KSA 6, 300). Importantly, Nietzsche’s
explanation culminates in his discussion of good style as expression and communi-
cation of inner states (KSA 6, 304). So if we follow Nietzsche’s line of thought, the
“truth” that is brutalized in Spitteler’s review is that the style of Z is in itself
meant to express the inner experiences that Z is about. The philosophical content,
Zarathustra’s teachings, are to be understood as translations of such inner states.
As such, the philosophical value of Z would consist in knowledge in and of such
states, insofar as they are beneficial to philosophical enterprises. It follows that
the communication of such experiential knowledge depends to a great extent on
how the text embodies what it speaks of, and with this starting point in mind, we
can return to Colli.
Colli explicitly distances his contention from the view that Z would be a purely
stylistic achievement. Quite to the contrary, he treats Z as a particular attempt at
communication. As such, Colli focuses on that which Nietzsche purportedly wants
to communicate (KSA 4, 412), namely the Dionysian essence (KSA 4, 413) or simply
Dionysian immediacy (KSA 3, 414). Unremarkably, Colli is at pains to describe this
Dionysian immediacy. He associates it with spontaneity, immediacy of life beyond
consciousness; in short an experience of the primordial ground of being [Ur-
Grund]. Still, he is adamant to stress that Dionysian immediacy is not an inaccessible
mystical experience, but accessible to everyone. Between the lines of Z, he asserts,
moments of Dionysian immediacy can be glimpsed and perhaps even a complex,
lasting state of being (KSA 4, 414). This indefiniteness can of course be excused, if
one accepts Colli’s assertion that Dionysian immediacy can only be expressed as vi-
sion. In this view, Nietzsche’s attempt to communicate an experience of the Diony-
sian explains the expressive language of Zarathustra, which instead of rising to
the level of conceptual thought remains pictorial and symbolical (KSA 4, 412). At
this point one is tempted to ask about the philosophical value of Nietzsche’s commu-
nication, given that in Colli’s interpretation the experience that Z speaks of can never
be clarified. There is, however, a still more pressing question.
What evidence is there that Nietzsche intended Z to express Dionysian immedi-
acy? It is of critical importance to note at this stage that it is one thing to claim that
Nietzsche meant Z to express an extraordinary kind of experience, and another to
interpret Z as actually expressing such an experience. It is yet another thing to ac-
knowledge that Nietzsche wanted his readers to believe that Z expresses a Dionysian
experience. In EH, Nietzsche clearly leads the reader to makes this connection be-
tween Z and Dionysus, and between the Dionysian and the air of the heights. Accord-
ing to Nietzsche, Z is the result of overflowing power. It is a singular achievement
where the Dionysian became deed in the text, and where Dionysus became reality
in the type of Zarathustra (cf. KSA 6, 343–345). Here too one finds a description
of the language of Z as a return to immediate pictorial nature. Nietzsche speaks of
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a “return of language to its natural state of figurativeness” (Large 2007, 72).⁸ One can
therefore conclude that Colli’s interpretation follows Nietzsche’s own “interpreta-
tion” in EH heel to heel.
Unfortunately, there is no earlier evidence external to the text of Z that would
explicitly support or refute the interpretation that Nietzsche intended to establish
a connection between Zarathustra and Dionysus all along. There are no decisive
clues to be found in the Nachlass nor are there any in the letters. We have however
already seen, i.e. I have already shown, that it is problematic to rely exclusively on
EH when interpreting the affective dimension of Nietzsche’s writings (see section 4.2
and especially section 4.2.6). Although there are no reasons to raise any fundamental
objections against Colli’s interpretation at this point, one should nevertheless ask if
there is not more to be said of Nietzsche’s communication of mood in Z than that it is
an attempt to communicate Dionysian immediacy. This question is especially perti-
nent, when one takes account of Nietzsche’s playful use of a strategy of raising ex-
pectations in the preceding writings.
Despite concluding the discussion about the relevant evidence with such a scep-
tical question, and irrespective of the initial misgivings that can be read into the
question, Colli’s afterword is the best available starting point for a more thorough in-
vestigation of Nietzsche’s affective communication in Z, simply because of his em-
phasis that the work can fruitfully be approached as a specific attempt at communi-
cation. Colli is arguably also right to emphasize that even if Z can hardly be called a
philosophical work (KSA 4, 412), at least judged against the way philosophy has been
understood, it is in harmony with Nietzsche’s philosophical project (KSA 4, 413) and
is to be understood as an attempted renewal of philosophy (KSA 4, 414). It is a differ-
ent question if Colli’s understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophical project stands crit-
ical scrutiny, and to this question I will return in the following discussions: for now it
suffices to explore the consequences of his view. Colli suggests that Nietzsche
thought taking account of the Dionysian experience would transform the way philos-
ophy is done, but adds that it is too early to judge whether Z can achieve that pur-
pose (KSA 4, 414). To this last point, one might also add Colli’s observation that Z is
not aimed exclusively at philosophers (KSA 4, 414), but at all those who might be sus-
ceptible to its communication. The broader aim would then seem to be a general af-
fective reorientation that should enable the renewal of culture. The logical conse-
quence of accepting this picture as starting point is, as Colli suggests (KSA 4, 414),
that the ultimate value of the affective communication of Z can only be seen if
and when the reception of the work initiates or significantly contributes to a cultural
or philosophical renewal. That, however, need not mean that one has to wait, per-
haps indefinitely, for such a Nietzschean cultural renewal to happen, before one
can say anything definite about Nietzsche’s intentions regarding the communication
of Z. After all, the basic idea is familiar from the preceding works: affective reorien-
 “Rückkehr der Sprache zur Natur der Bildlichkeit” (KSA 6, 344).
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tation is a presupposition for a lasting renewal of thinking. In the case of the preced-
ing works, it has been possible to uncover significant hints about the direction in
which Nietzsche aims, so it is reasonable to assume that the same applies to Z. Pre-
cisely wherein the philosophical, as well as the broader, value of Nietzsche’s affective
communication (in Z) potentially resides can only be considered once the nature of
this communication has been discussed in more detail. I begin this task by address-
ing the tone of the work.
6.3 The tone of Z
Whatever the precise nature of the experience that Nietzsche attempts to communi-
cate, it is mediated through the tone of the work. In EH, Nietzsche emphasizes that
one must above all heed the tone of Zarathustra: “Above all you have to hear prop-
erly the tone that comes out of this mouth, this halcyon tone” (Large 2007, 4; KSA 6,
259). There, Nietzsche explicitly speaks of the supposedly slow tempo of the words
that flow through the mouth of Zarathustra, which he associates with the stillness
before a storm, and goes on to quote the beginning of the passage Upon the Isles
of the Blest as example: “The figs are falling from the trees…” (Large 2007, 5;
KSA 6, 260) That chapter is central when it comes to understanding Nietzsche’s at-
tack on religion in Z, which means that I will return to it soon enough, but what
now requires pointing out is that what Nietzsche seeks to exemplify by quoting
the passage is the joy of Zarathustra, the depth of his joy [Glückstiefe], which in
order to save the consistency of the metaphor one would have to translate as his
“height of joy”, from which his words fall like ripe fruits. In exemplifying such
joy, Zarathustra’s words must be interpreted as words of persuasion, words of exhor-
tation. It is in this context that Nietzsche himself asks,whether Zarathustra is not one
who tempts: a seducer? (KSA 6, 260; cf. Large 2007, 5) An important clue for interpret-
ing the aim of such affective communication in Z can be found in his answer. Inter-
estingly, Nietzsche does not answer his own question directly. Instead, he evades it
by merely pointing out that not only does Zarathustra’s communication differ from
that of saints, redeemers and their kind, but that he “is” different because he does
not want believers. Here again, Nietzsche reiterates the by now familiar maxim
that if one is to follow him/Zarathustra, one has to follow one’s own self. In what
sense is this answer so enlightening?
The answer shows that Zarathustra is without a doubt a seducer, one who
through his words tempts the reader by suggesting that he himself dwells in a
“high mood” of joy and that by listening to him one might perhaps gain the strength
to rise to one’s highest potential. Yet his words both explicitly and implicitly make it
clear that he is a very special kind of seducer, who cannot be followed unless one is
willing to think for oneself. How does Nietzsche accomplish the task of both tempt-
ing the reader and simultaneously keeping him/her at a distance?
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Zarathustra’s speech On Reading and Writing cannot be overlooked when trying
to answer this question (Z I 7, KSA 4, 48). It is most tempting to read this speech as
meta-commentary on Z: more than any other speech or saying it invites such a read-
ing. The speech famously begins by introducing the metaphor of writing with blood.
That writing with blood means to write out of one’s most personal experience, is evi-
dent from the way in which the speech quickly turns from the topic of reading and
writing to Zarathustra’s own experience, his way of living and life-wisdom.⁹ However,
the fact that Zarathustra is a fictional character begs the question in what sense the
text of Z can be a translation of experience: this should be a warning against a too
simplistic reading. In this regard, the last words that still directly connect to the ex-
plicit discussion of writing with one’s blood are particularly instructive, as they
would perfectly seem to fit Nietzsche’s own style as practised both in GS and Z:
“The air thin and pure, danger near, and the spirit filled with a joyful wickedness:
these things go well together.” (Parkes 2005, 35; Z I 7, KSA 4, 48) What follows is
something of a demonstration of this joyful yet mocking mood that is meant to reflect
Zarathustra’s own way of being. It is admittedly near at hand to collapse the distinc-
tion between the character Zarathustra and Nietzsche when encountering sayings
like the following one, yet it is precisely the impossibility of equating Nietzsche
and Zarathustra that creates the distance that is essential to his communication:
You look upward when you desire uplifting. And I look downward because I am uplifted.
Who among you can laugh and be uplifted at the same time?
Whoever climbs the highest mountains laughs about all tragic plays and tragic wakes.
(Parkes 2005, 36; Z I 7, KSA 4, 49)
The significance of the quoted passage is heightened by the fact that Nietzsche chose
it as motto for part three of Z (Z III, KSA 4, 192; cf.Young 2006, 107).What at first sight
might seem to be nothing more than yet another instance of Nietzsche’s off-putting
self-aggrandizement, this time through the mouth of Zarathustra, is arguably some-
thing far more complex. Indeed, one might even go as far as to suggest that the read-
er is presented with something of a joke. The perspective of which Zarathustra speaks
is one which allows him to see even himself (and his own tragic teaching) from
above. As the final words of the speech announce: “Now I am light, now I am flying,
now I see myself beneath myself, now a God dances through me.” (Parkes 2005, 36; Z
I 7, KSA 4, 50) One could of course read these words as speaking about an experience
of Dionysian immediacy following Colli, or “a habitation of the perspective of Diony-
sian pantheism” to borrow Young’s words (Young 2006, 111). Yet the fact is that the
name Dionysus does not appear in Z one single time. The same applies to the term
 This interpretation is furthermore supported by Zarathustra’s contention that it is not easy to un-
derstand another’s blood (Z I 7, KSA 4, 48), which closely resembles Nietzsche’s recurrent complaints
that no one in his time is capable of understanding those of his experiences, which matter most to
him.
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Dionysian [dionysisch].While this does not mean that the terms should under no cir-
cumstances be used to interpret Zarathustra’s words, it is important to note that he is
clearly describing a state of heightened self-awareness, which is not comparable to
the ecstatic rush [Rausch] associated with the Dionysian in his early work (e.g. in
BT).
I therefore find it far more promising to base the interpretation on the intriguing
hint within the text that Nietzsche precisely here where he has Zarathustra speak
about writing with blood, about expressing one’s inner states, lets his protagonist en-
gage in self-parody. On the one hand Zarathustra’s words express the distance be-
tween the character Zarathustra as teacher and those to whom he speaks, but on
the other hand suggests that a specifically self-parodic distance is essential to his
teaching, to his role as teacher. This vision is reflected in the tone of the work.
Throughout Z, Zarathustra teaches but simultaneously laughs at his own teaching,
which forces the recipient of his teaching to return to his own self, to make up
his/her own mind. In other words, Zarathustra cannot be followed. This initial sketch
can be fleshed out by paying careful attention to Zarathustra’s curious teaching
about the Übermensch as a replacement to the dead God.
6.4 Upon the Isles of the Blest
Zarathustra’s speech to his disciples Upon the Isles of the Blest (KSA 4, 109), seems to
rely on the communication of a mood of expectation in a manner familiar from his
preceding works. That which is expected is the Übermensch. This new hope is of
course already introduced in Zarathustra’s prologue [Vorrede] (KSA 4, 14), but the
crucial difference is that there Zarathustra speaks to the people, not to a select
group of disciples. There his teaching fails and not even the vision of the last
man, of a type of human incapable of reaching beyond its limited horizon, that Za-
rathustra conjures up to scare the people make them interested in hearing his words
about the Übermensch (KSA 4, 19). Speaking to those whom he calls his brothers
[meine Brüder] (KSA 4, 109), knowers [ihr Erkennenden] (KSA 4, 110) and friends
[ihr Freunde] (KSA 4, 110), Zarathustra employs a more sophisticated art of persua-
sion.
To his disciples Zarathustra presents his teaching as an intervention in the his-
tory of religion. In other words, Zarathustra’s directs his words at a specific kind of
hearer, who is in some significant sense bound to this religious history. Although
Nietzsche already acquaints the reader with the trope that God is dead at the very
beginning of Z, Zarathustra in fact does not explicitly mention this “event” in his
speech to the people. When speaking to his disciples, by contrast, he presupposes
that they have acknowledged that God is dead: “Once one said ‘God’ when one
looked upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say: Overhuman.” (Parkes
2005, 73; KSA 4, 109) Thus, Zarathustra begins to teach a redirection of religious de-
sire as a transformation of the highest hopes that mankind has known. Just as in GS,
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and especially in the fourth book, Nietzsche here plays with a mood of expectation
for a yet higher state of being, now named Übermensch, but this time the situation is
entirely fictional. Zarathustra is presented as trying to communicate a mood to his
disciples, which should enable joyful striving as he stresses that the Übermensch
will not appear, unless given birth to.
It is crucial that Zarathustra ascribes to his disciples the power to create the
Übermensch, as his decisive objection against religious hopes was that the highest
hope should be within reach, within the possible (KSA 4, 109). Against this back-
ground, one might present the following interpretation of why Zarathustra teases
his hearers by cautioning that they might not succeed. Thereby Zarathustra seeks
to infect his hearers with the lust to create the Übermensch by suggesting that it in-
deed is a heroic task worthy of the efforts of the most ambitious spirits, and in this
context it makes sense for him to proclaim that if they do not have the strength to
transform themselves, they can at least become fathers and forefathers of the Über-
mensch through their efforts (KSA 4, 109). However, this latter suggestion might also
be read as a suggestion that there is no such thing as an Übermensch and never will
be. This begs the question, whether the Übermensch in Zarathustra’s teaching serves
any function other than that of a replacement for God, and if not, whether this teach-
ing does not contradict the basic thrust of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, which as I
have sought to clarify is about reorienting affect in a way that does away with the
need for religion, which necessarily also entails doing without replacements.
In this regard, it is instructive to point out what role the idea of the Übermensch
plays in Z as a whole. In parts one and two of Z, the Übermensch is arguably central
to the narrative: Zarathustra’s teaching to his disciples revolves around the concept.
This changes in part three, in which the Übermensch is not explicitly mentioned until
the very end, and then only as a passing reminiscence (KSA 4, 248; cf. Haase 1984,
240). Finally, in part four it would seem that the idea is only the target of parodic
laughter (cf. Haase 1984, 241–242). Already in the first two parts there are hints
that the Übermensch is nothing more than a useful tool meant to be thrown away
when no longer needed; a metaphorical expression of the longing of the free spirit,
who is still guided by religious feelings.
In his speech to his disciples Upon the Isles of the Blest, Zarathustra mockingly
questions whether they can create a god and instead bids them to use their power to
create the Übermensch. In part one, however, Zarathustra himself speaks of how he
once directed his passion toward other worlds, and in doing so created a God for
himself (KSA 4, 35). In other words, creating a God is perhaps no task at all. Likewise,
Zarathustra teaches his disciples that all talk of Eternity is just metaphorical, just al-
legory, and adds that the poets lie too much (KSA 4, 110). Yet Zarathustra “admits”
that he himself is a poet.¹⁰ It is of no small consequence that he in this context spe-
 “die Dichter lügen zu viel” (KSA 4, 110). “Dass die Dichter zuviel lügen? – Aber auch Zarathustra ist
ein Dichter” (KSA 4, 163).
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cifically mentions both gods and overhumans [Götter und Übermenschen] as poetic
creations (KSA 4, 164), of which he has become tired (KSA 4, 165). These examples
again force us to confront the question about parody and self-parody in Z, and
how they relate to Nietzsche’s affective communication within Z as well as more
broadly.
6.5 The question concerning self-parody in Z
Is there self-parody in Z? Are Zarathustra’s teachings undermined by the self-parody
within the text? How would such self-parody fit into the picture that I have thus far
painted of Nietzsche’s affective communication? It is remarkable that the two living
scholars who take Z most seriously and have written major monographs to advance
their interpretations, Claus Zittel and Paul Loeb, present diametrically opposed an-
swers to the first two questions. While both provide strong critiques of those who
would consign Z to the dustbin and still save Nietzsche as philosopher (Loeb
2010, 207–213 and Zittel 2011, 13–20), their respective interpretations couldn’t differ
more: they are utterly irreconcilable.
Claus Zittel argues in favour of the thesis that the text of Z parodies all the doc-
trines that Zarathustra teaches and effectively all “hopes” (e.g. Zittel 2011, 104, 128,
213 and 223). In this view, there are not only occasional hints of self-deconstructive
parody scattered throughout the text, but the very design of Z ends in self-destructive
parody with nihilistic consequences. Zittel goes as far as to claim that a nihilistic in-
terpretation of Z is the only viable one; the only one that conforms with textual evi-
dence. Paul Loeb, on the other hand, bluntly denies that there is any self-parody in Z
(Loeb 2010, 242). Loeb insists that there is no evidence in Z that the kind of parody
initiated by the protagonist of the text, by Zarathustra, would involve self-parody. In
this view, the parody of Z is instead directed only at everything that had been taken
seriously until Zarathustra’s teaching, while Zarathustra’s teaching is itself a life-af-
firming counter-ideal to all ascetic tendencies.
In more recent Anglophone contributions to the discussion on Z it has become
more of a rule rather than an exception to question whether there is any significant
self-parody in the work (e.g. Seung 2005; Young 2006; Young 2010). I will therefore
begin by examining the grounds for that view. As the strongest statement of the view
is to be found in Loeb’s work, and since he articulates his reasons most clearly, I will
at first concentrate on his categorical rejection of the possibility that there might be
self-parodistic elements at work in Z.
Loeb notes that the final aphorism of GS, which is almost identical to the open-
ing of Z, is entitled Incipit Tragoedia (GS 342, KSA 3, 571; cf. Loeb 2010, 240). This title
is indeed significant, and it is certainly possible to read it, following the understand-
ing of tragedy and comedy developed in aphorism 1 (GS 1, KSA 3, 369–372), as sug-
gesting that Zarathustra is a teacher of the purpose of existence. Any naive or
straightforward interpretation in that direction is however made problematic by
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Nietzsche’s comment on “Incipit Tragoedia” in the foreword to the second edition of
GS. There Nietzsche singles out the title of the aphorism as an example of the playful,
treacherous spirit of GS and suggests that what really is about to begin is parody: in-
cipit parodia (GS Preface 1, KSA 3, 346). In order to exclude the possibility of readings
that take this to suggest that Z is at least in some significant sense a work of self-par-
ody, Loeb claims that the incipit parodia of the foreword has falsely been interpreted
to imply a practice of self-parody (Loeb 2010, 240–242). Against scholars who rely on
the foreword to justify a self-parodistic reading, Loeb points out that “nowhere in his
further explanation does Nietzsche imply that the new kind of parody begun by his
protagonist Zarathustra will be self-parody” (Loeb 2010, 242). Loeb, however, over-
looks that the foreword is not the only addition made by Nietzsche to GS that is sig-
nificant in this regard. Loeb completely ignores the more decisive addition: the
motto, which makes absolutely clear that a “Master” who cannot laugh at himself
is someone who one must laugh at (cf. GS Title page, KSA 3, 343).
Of course, it might seem possible to interpret the motto to mean that one has to
be able to laugh at one’s past self from one’s present position. So in Z the life-affirm-
ing Nietzsche would laugh at his former self who held on to ascetic ideals. Such an
interpretation, that would save Loeb’s intention, is nevertheless implausible as it is
hard to reconcile with the text of Z. There is no doubt that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
highly values the capacity to rise above tragedy and to laugh at oneself, to view one-
self from above, from a distance (cf. KSA 4, 150). In any case, the decisive evidence
about self-parody is to be found within the text, and already on the basis of the pas-
sage referred to above one cannot exclude the possibility that there are at least hints
in the texts that allow a reading emphasizing self-parodic elements. If there is no rea-
son to conclude that there is no self-parody in Z, could there be reasons to consider
the entire work self-parody?
6.6 Claus Zittel’s challenge: Nihilistic self-parody?
Claus Zittel’s thesis that the text of Z not only at times undermines the teachings of
its protagonist but culminates in nihilistic self-parody is worth interrogating, since
his reading is by far the most sophisticated and powerful attack on all interpretations
that read Z as in one way or another opening up a future to desire or at least the pos-
sibility of creating a desirable future as a free spirit. While I start by acknowledging
and emphasizing the relative merits of Zittel’s interpretation, I here seek to show that
paying careful attention to the question of Nietzsche’s communication of mood
shows the limits of his interpretation.
Zittel’s starting point is solid as a rock: he sets out from the observation that the
complex composition of Z betrays a high degree of aesthetic reflection. What is so
striking about the composition of Z, the aesthetic calculation [ästhetische Kalkül]
(cf. Zittel 2011, 11–12) that the title of his monograph alludes to? The text of Z
abounds with intertextual references (to the literary tradition; above all the Bible)
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and intratextual references (to passages within Z) (Zittel 2011, 74). With this starting
point one can hardly disagree. More controversially Zittel argues that it follows from
the parodic treatment of the literary tradition in Z that it can be identified as a “late”
work that doesn’t go beyond the tradition that it parodies but merely points toward
the end of that tradition. Similarly, and even more controversially, Zittel argues that
part four serves an analogous function within the work, in the sense that the parody
that predominates in the first three parts turns into self-parody in the fourth part,
which merely points towards the end of Zarathustra’s/Nietzsche’s philosophical proj-
ect in failure (Zittel 2011, 126– 128 and 223).
Let us for now focus on less far-reaching conclusions that can be drawn from rec-
ognizing the complexity of the composition of Z, and examine the evidence about
the more radical theses later. According to Zittel, acknowledging that the text of Z
exhibits a high level of reflection precludes treating Z as the expression of some
kind of primordial experience of immediacy (Zittel 2011, 113– 114). Zittel does not
mean to say that Nietzsche would not invite such a reading, but that the good reader
does not let him- or herself be carried away by Nietzsche’s language, his seductive
words of affirmation, but listens carefully to the cautions and warnings present in
the text (Zittel 2011, 93–94). On this point, Zittel explicitly takes to task those schol-
ars who follow the paradigmatic example of Colli and rely primarily on passages and
quotes from EH to justify their interpretations (Zittel 2011, 92–93). What immediacy
there is in Z is in this critical view a carefully crafted and illusory immediacy.¹¹ In
other words, Zittel presents his study as nothing less than an all-out attack on inter-
pretations that privilege the seductive surface of Nietzsche’s text, and particularly as
an intellectualist corrective to emotionalist readings. In this regard, he especially tar-
gets interpretations that take Zarathustra’s teachings (Übermensch, Eternal Recur-
rence) at face value, and instead seeks to show in what questionable and deceptive
manner those teachings are presented in the text.
While I agree wholeheartedly with Zittel’s critique insofar as it is highly problem-
atic to rely solely on EH as a guide to Nietzsche’s affective communication and/or to
take Zarathustra’s doctrines at face value,¹² it is necessary to ask to what extent his
critique hits its primary target. To be specific, one can question if Zittel does not mis-
read Colli at least in one important respect. After all, Colli also cautions against
thinking that Z is about the doctrines Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence and Will to
Power. Be that as it may, there is certainly a fundamental problem in Colli’s view
of Z as an expression of Dionysian immediacy. To recognize that whatever Z express-
es, the expression is mediated through reflection, is enough to reject a naive under-
standing of Nietzsche’s affective communication, as a communication of ecstatic Di-
onysian affirmation [Rausch]. Contra Zittel, it in no way follows that Nietzsche’s
 Cf. Zittel’s aptly named chapter “Fingierte Unmittelbarkeit” (Zittel 2011, 173–180).
 Such readings abound. Recently, for example, Franco has written of the Übermensch as Nietz-
sche’s “new ideal” as if that were unproblematic (Franco 2011, 162– 170).
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affective communication is nothing more than a clever deception that the good read-
er sees through. Rather than hindering a critical reading, being attuned to the joyful
and playfully treacherous mood of Z arguably makes an even further reaching cri-
tique possible. The warning signs that Zittel speaks of cannot escape the reader,
who pays attention to Nietzsche’s affective communication. So when Zittel asserts
that Zarathustra actually preaches suspicion against all doctrines (Zittel 2011, 104),
one need only ask why this would contradict the joyful affirmation that Zarathustra
nonetheless equally promotes. Is it not precisely the union of sceptical sentiment and
joy, after all, which characterizes Nietzsche’s ideal mood?
In fact, a careful reading of EH reveals that a similar manner of communication
is at work there. No passage exemplifies this better than the one which he begins by
proclaiming that he knows his privileges as author [Vorrechte als Schriftsteller]
(KSA 6, 302).While it would seem that Nietzsche only writes about his right to choose
those for whom he writes in a manner quite familiar from his other writings (e.g.
BGE 30, KSA 5, 48), he is also issuing a warning to his readers. With characteristic
hyperbole, Nietzsche proclaims that he comes from heights where no bird has ever
flown, and that only those who can rise to his heights and who are therefore related
to him can understand him. In the midst of praising his books as the proudest and
finest that there are, he suddenly and mischievously adds that his books now and
then reach “the highest thing that can be achieved on earth, cynicism” (Large
2007, 39; KSA 6, 302). Cynicism as the highest peak that can be reached? This if any-
thing is a warning and yet it is a warning told in a language of affirmation familiar
from Z.
Returning to Z, Zittel certainly does a good job in showing what he terms the de-
ceptive character of the visions that Zarathustra plays with and teases his disciples
with.¹³ The critical question is in what sense, if any, this complicates the question
concerning Nietzsche’s communication of mood. Does the deconstructive self-parody
that some interpreters find in the text necessarily work against the viability of
Nietzsche’s philosophy and the project of affective reorientation or does it paradoxi-
cally play a more constructive role within it? In seeking to answer this question the
fourth book of Z is decisive, since Nietzsche there confronts his protagonist with var-
ious challenges, above all a parody of the teachings of the Übermensch and Eternal
Recurrence,which arguably culminates in self-parody (cf. Zittel 2011, 128– 132). In the
following section, I focus solely on this most striking example of deconstructive par-
ody within book four of Z; namely the Ass Festival [Eselsfest].
 What Zittel calls the “trügerische Character des verbreiteten Verheissungsoptimismus” (Zittel 2011,
207).
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6.7 Deconstructive parody in the Ass Festival
Thus Spoke Zarathustra begins with a reminder that God is dead (KSA 4, 14) and it is
against this background that Zarathustra teaches the Übermensch (e.g. KSA 4, 109).
Zittel wryly notes that instead of being presented with the Übermensch in part four,
the reader is presented with the “enthronement” of an Ass (Zittel 2011, 195). A num-
ber of “higher men” have gathered at Zarathustra’s cave in the mountains; and they
awaken his hopes for he sees in them his own hopes. There is something about them
that bothers Zarathustra still, so he leaves his cave to converse with his animals. The
higher men are merry [fröhlich], which appears to him a sign of becoming healthy,
but although they have learned to laugh, he tells his animals that their laughter is
not akin to his (KSA 4, 386). Whatever their faults, Zarathustra seeks to shake off
his unease. He speaks to his heart that indeed the higher men are on the path to
health; that they are convalescents [Es sind Genesende!] (KSA 4, 387). Then, suddenly,
Zarathustra hears a strange commotion from his cave, which had fallen silent, and a
fragrant scent of incense reaches his nose (KSA 4, 388). Thus begins the Ass Festival,
the interpretation of which is decisive to settle the question concerning self-parody,
and therefore for the interpretation of Z as a whole (cf. Higgins 1987, 227–228).¹⁴
When Zarathustra returns to his cave he finds the higher men on their knees en-
gaged in what he later calls a play [Schauspiel] (KSA 4, 391), a parody play of reli-
gious rites. What is parodied, however, appears to be more than Christian tradition;
specifically it seems as if Zarathustra’s teaching of the Übermensch, which is indis-
sociable from his teaching of affirmation, were the main source of laughter: the high-
er men mockingly praise the wisdom of the Ass, whom they call their God. The Ass,
however, only ever answers with I-A, with affirmation.¹⁵ Zarathustra interrupts the
 While Higgins poses many of the right questions, her reading of book four and particularly the
Ass festival as “Menippean satire” modelled after Apuleius’ Golden Ass is a prime example of over-
interpretation. There is no evidence that Nietzsche primarily based his narrative on this one source,
the understanding of which would uncover the meaning of the spectacle. (Cf. Higgins 1987.)
 “Amen! Und Lob und Ehre und Weisheit und Dank und Preis und Stärke sei unserm Gott, von Ewig-
keit zu Ewigkeit!– Der Esel aber schrie dazu I-A. Er trägt unsre Last, er nahm Knechtsgestalt an, er ist
geduldsam von Herzen und redet niemals Nein; und wer seinen Gott liebt, der züchtigt ihn.– Der Esel
aber schrie dazu I-A. Er redet nicht: es sei denn, dass er zur Welt, die er Schuf, immer Ja sagt: also preist
er seine Welt. Seine Schlauheit ist es, die nicht redet: so bekommt er selten Unrecht.– Der Esel aber
schrie dazu I-A. Unscheinbar geht er durch die Welt. Grau ist die Leib-Farbe, in welche er seine Tugend
hüllt. Hat er Geist, so verbirgt er ihn; Jedermann aber glaubt an seine langen Ohren.– Der Esel aber
schrie dazu I-A. Welche verborgene Weisheit ist das, dass er lange Ohren trägt und allein ja und nimmer
Nein sagt! Hat er nicht die Welt erschaffen nach seinem Bilde, nämlich so dumm als möglich?– Der Esel
aber schrie dazu I-A. Du gehst gerade und krumme Wege; es kümmert dich wenig, was uns Menschen
gerade oder krumm dünkt. Jenseits von Gut und Böse ist dein Reich. Es ist deine Unschuld, nicht zu wis-
sen, was Unschuld ist.– Der Esel aber schrie dazu I-A. Siehe doch, wie du Niemanden von dir stössest,
die Bettler nicht, noch die Könige. Die Kindlein lässest du zu dir kommen, und wenn dich die bösen
Buben locken, so sprichst du einfältiglich I-A.– Der Esel aber schrie dazu I-A. Du liebst Eselinnen
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spectacle violently and interrogates the higher men,who only provide joking answers
to his question why they put up such a show (KSA 4, 390–392). According to one
prominent interpretation, the higher men are laughing at themselves and at their
own convictions both through their festival and in their answers (Young 2006,
115), which delights Zarathustra, who understands the necessity of periodical release
from the seriousness of living according to his teaching (Young 2006, 116). Young
goes as far as to claim that the “Ass Festival” shows that the “festival, the rebirth
of the life-affirming Greek festival, remains at the centre of Nietzsche’s thinking”
(Young 2006, 117). Such a reading fits his narrative about a communitarian, religious
Nietzsche, who was all the time mostly concerned with creating new communal fes-
tivals. Characteristically, Young completely overlooks an important part of the narra-
tive and that is Zarathustra’s initial reaction, which is certainly not one of delight.
Instead of joining in on their fun or directly praising the higher men, Zarathustra
interrupts them, screams at them and demands answers. It also seems as if he were
not pleased at all with the answers he receives as he loudly cries “Oh you buffoons,
all of you, you jesters! Why do you disguise and conceal yourselves from me!” (Parkes
2005, 276; KSA 4, 393) and claims that they really want to return to the comforts of a
childish faith. After thus castigating the higher men there is a pause, and it is highly
significant that only after this pause there is a shift in Zarathustra’s attitude toward
the higher men. It is as if he has calmed down and regained his composure. Only
now, finally, Zarathustra tells the higher men that they delight him. His words
about the need for new festivals, which follow, are specifically addressed to the high-
er men: it seems to him that they need some old Zarathustra-clown and new festivals
to cheer them up, and that such rites as the worship of an ass that he just witnessed
are really only invented by those who are on their way to health. (Cf. KSA 4, 393–
394.)
Zittel, who unlike Young builds his interpretation around Zarathustra’s initial re-
action, speculates that Zarathustra is upset at the higher men, because they not only
parody religious traditions but his own teaching (Zittel 2011, 183– 184). To put it
bluntly: the higher men laugh at Zarathustra (cf. Higgins 1987, 227–228). More spe-
cifically, it would seem that precisely those teachings meant to enhance life after
the death of God, above all the Übermensch and the associated idea of the highest
affirmation of life (i.e. Eternal Recurrence), are the target of ridicule. In other
words, the narrative returns to Zarathustra’s first attempt to communicate his teach-
ing, where the people of the city mock him. Zittel therefore concludes that Zarathus-
tra’s teaching has failed and that he himself realizes that he has no power over his
doctrines, which leads to resignation and the self-parodic characterization of himself
as just some old comic clown or jester [Zarathustra-Narr] (KSA 4, 393; Zittel 2011,
183– 184). That Zarathustra has no power over his doctrines, however, is not much
und frische Feigen, du bist kein Kostverächter. Eine Distel kitzelt dir das Herz, wenn du gerade Hunger
hast. Darin liegt eines Gottes Weisheit.– Der Esel aber schrie dazu I-A.” (KSA 4, 388–389)
200 6 Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Communication of mood or nihilistic self-parody?
of a problem, if one should take his words seriously about not wanting followers and
about following oneself. In other words, one might claim that even if Zarathustra’s
explicit teaching might have failed, Nietzsche’s narrative only gains power when
the authority of the teacher is deconstructed. Such an interpretation could point to
the fact that the narrative does not end with the Ass Festival and what else Nietzsche
recounts about that night, and that instead it ends when Zarathustra early in the
morning leaves the higher men behind in his cave, sets off on his own (guided by
a vision of “his children”), with his own work in mind (KSA 4, 408). Be that as it
may, the Ass Festival does pose a challenge to all readings that rely on Zarathustra’s
status as teacher, as he arguably fails to live up to his own words.
What is most alarming, following the interpretation developed in this chapter, is
that we initially witness a failure on Zarathustra’s part to laugh at his own doctrines.
Was not Zarathustra supposed to be able to view himself from above and to laugh at
himself? One might of course claim that Zarathustra is not seriously shocked and in-
stead only acting. This option is implausible, because the evidence that Zarathustra
has serious problems with the higher men is both clear and abundant. What is par-
ticularly interesting is that Zarathustra now and again leaves his cave, where the
higher men are gathered, in order to get fresh air, i.e. to be alone with himself
(and his animals). “Do they not smell good?” (KSA 4, 369), he asks his animals
about the higher men. In their presence he cannot breathe free air, his mountain
air. Read against this background, the narrative that leads to the Ass Festival takes
on new meaning.
Again, Zarathustra has escaped from his cave into the free air (cf. KSA 4, 378) but
this time he is lured back as he realizes no noise emerges from his cave and instead
there is a fragrant scent in the air: “his nose smelled a fragrant smoke and incense,
as if from burning pine-cones” (Parkes 2005, 273; KSA 4, 388). Both fascinated and
alarmed by this scent, he rushes back to the entrance of his cave. Whatever hopes
Zarathustra might have had turn out to be illusory. It is not the case that the higher
men smell any better than before, but that they are burning incense. It is even worse
than that; not only are they burning incense, they are worshipping an ass. Is this how
the higher men should raise themselves even higher? Has Zarathustra taught them to
rise higher through spectacle, through a kind of collective intoxication?
The word intoxication is not entirely out of place here. In the text there are even
hints that wine also plays a part in the celebrations. Firstly, we are told that some of
the higher men, the two kings to be precise, have brought a supply of wine to Zara-
thustra’s cave: as much as an Ass can carry [einen ganzen Esel voll] (KSA 4, 353–354).
Secondly, the narrative itself becomes drunk, when the celebrations begin to ap-
proach midnight. The text clearly hints that there is no certainty about what took
place that night (“as some storytellers believe”, “There are even those who say” or
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“Now it may have been this way or otherwise”, Parkes 2005, 278; KSA 4, 396).¹⁶ One
of the things that “are told” about the night is that the Ass danced (cf. “I should only
believe in a God who knew how to dance”, Parkes 2005, 36),¹⁷ because it too had
been given wine to drink (KSA 4, 396). Interestingly, though it is earlier suggested
that Zarathustra himself only drinks water (KSA 4, 353), he also appears drunken
as midnight approaches ([wie ein Trunkener]; KSA 4, 396; cf. Zittel 2011, 196). An
easy, all too easy, solution to the interpretative challenge that these references to in-
toxication pose is to associate the wine with Dionysus and the celebrations all in all
with the ecstasy [Rausch] of the birth of tragedy (cf. BT 1, KSA 1, 28–30; Colli, KSA 4,
412–413) and then to deduce that we witness the rebirth of life-affirming festival (cf.
Young 2006). Perhaps such an interpretation would be feasible, were it not for the
mature Nietzsche’s recurring critique of intoxication and artificially produced high
feelings.
Zittel summarizes Nietzsche’s key point thus: Only tired human beings, only
those who are tired of life [lebensmüde], require special means of intoxication (Zittel
2011, 196– 197). While this viewpoint also finds expression in Z (e.g. KSA 4, 353),
aphorism 86 of GS is particularly instructive in this regard, not least because one
could go as far as to extract the following exclamation as the motto of Nietzsche’s
critique: “Does he that is enthusiastic need wine?” (Kaufmann 1974, 142; GS 86,
KSA 3, 443–444).¹⁸ The importance of the aphorism for the work done here does
not derive from the fact that Zittel draws heavily on it in order to justify his interpre-
tation: Indeed, the aphorism is actually apt to problematize his entire reading. The
aphorism, Of the theater, is so important because it reveals the real reason behind
Nietzsche’s rejection of artificially induced ecstasy. There, Nietzsche openly express-
es his disgust at those artists who cater to people who would not have any idea of
higher moods [höheren Stimmungen], were it not for the existence of intoxicating
means in the shape of either art or wine. They need an art of intoxication that with-
out sufficient reason raises feeling to a higher level.When the artist lowers himself to
serve their instincts, the strongest thoughts and passions are made to serve cheap
intoxication, which is the only height that a public incapable of dwelling in high
moods can reach. Those like himself, who know high moods from their own experi-
ence, have no need of such arts and are appalled by such spectacles. (GS 86, KSA 3,
443–444).
Aphorism 86 of GS represents no rejection of the value of high moods. To the
contrary, it is a defence premised on the need to distinguish artificially induced in-
toxication from those high moods that are philosophically significant; that are an es-
sential fruit of the philosophical life. In his interpretation of Z, Zittel fails to take into
 “wie manche Erzähler meinen”, “Es gibt sogar Solche die Erzählen”, “Diess mag sich nun so verhal-
ten oder auch anders” (KSA 4, 396).
 “Ich würde nur an einen Gott glauben, der zu tanzen verstünde.” (KSA 4, 49)
 “Was braucht der Begeisterte Wein!” (GS 86, KSA 3, 443–444) See also Nietzsche’s auto-biograph-
ical advise to all spiritual natures to abstain from alcohol (KSA 6, 280–281).
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account that Nietzsche distinguishes desirable “higher states” from a kind of intox-
ication that he vehemently criticizes and rejects, and only because of this failure can
Zittel claim that Nietzsche’s communication of mood is nothing more than artful de-
ception. Still, Zittel’s misreading is valuable precisely because it raises the question
how the two can be distinguished. In this regard, it is of utmost importance to note
that it is not possible to distinguish the two on the level of the text. Whatever high
moods Nietzsche presents Zarathustra as experiencing, these cannot simply be inter-
preted as direct translations of Nietzsche’s own experiences of philosophically signif-
icant moods. It is simply not enough to point out, as Higgins does, that Zarathustra is
“presented as one who engages in honest introspection” (Higgins 1987, 114). In other
words, there is reason to reflect on the decisive role that Nietzsche leaves to the read-
er, who has no means to draw a clear line between the drunkenness of the Ass that
supposedly danced and Zarathustra’s seeming drunkenness, which is not limited to
specific visions (e.g. KSA 4, 396) but pervades his rhetoric.
6.8 Zarathustra, the Ass and nihilism
Given the role of the Ass in the fourth part of Z, it is not unreasonable to see the Ass
as an embodiment of the greatest objection to Zarathustra’s teaching. In this regard,
the most solid starting point is Jörg Salaquarda’s contention in an oft-cited article:
The Ass is the actual antipode of Zarathustra (Salaquarda 1973, 205; cf. Zittel 2011,
183 and Young 2006, 115). What matters here is as much the relation as the opposi-
tion between the two. The Ass says I-A to everything, the Ass affirms all, and is this
not exactly what Zarathustra’s Übermensch does? Zarathustra himself teaches in the
third book, in the speech On the Spirit of Heaviness, that only the Ass has learned to
say yes to everything. “Always to say Yea-haw––that only the ass has learned, and
whoever is of his spirit!” (Parkes 2005, 168; KSA 4, 244) Logically, it would then
seem that if the Übermensch is to affirm everything, he or she has to have the spirit
of an Ass. However, the very same speech by Zarathustra contains the hint that the
affirmation that he teaches is in fact first and foremost an affirmation of the individ-
ual, of personal tastes (yes-saying) and distastes (nay-saying), and only then through
this affirmation, through this specific individual perspective, an affirmation of all.¹⁹
This requires a light spirit, not the kind of heavy spirit, which he associates with the
Ass. As he states, one does not learn to fly unless one follows oneself: “This––is just
my way:––where is yours?”, he asks, and adds: “For the way––does not exist!”
(Parkes 2005, 169; KSA 4, 245) Once again, Zarathustra emphasizes the role of the
recipient of his words, and this fits the thesis that Nietzsche’s communication of
 To a great extent, my reading on this point aligns with Deleuze’s influential interpretation that the
Ass lacks the capacity to say no,which makes his yes a false yes that is akin to Christian renunciation
of the self in its acceptance of carrying the weight of the “world” or the “real” (Deleuze 1983, 178 and
180– 182; cf. Hödl 2009, 450).
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mood in Z is meant to aid the reader to return to him- or herself, in the sense that any
heightening of feeling is only possible through reflection on one’s own experience.
Against this background, one can object to the way in which Zittel tries to make
the most out of an easily overlooked self-description in book four in which Zarathus-
tra speaks of himself as the one who gives wings to asses ([Der den Eseln Flügel
giebt], KSA 4, 367). Namely, he reads the passage as a thinly veiled admission of
the character of Zarathustra’s teaching. After all, Zittel reasons, Nietzsche critically
characterizes the artist who seeks to induce intoxication as one who “gives the
mole wings” (Kaufmann 1974, 142; GS 86, KSA 3, 444), so should the image of giving
wings to asses not be read in this light? According to Zittel, Nietzsche/Zarathustra
suggests nothing else than that those who believe his teaching and allow themselves
to be carried away by his style are asses (Zittel 2011, 197).²⁰ Zittel furthermore claims
that the image of winged asses makes all the metaphors of flying in Z laughable (Zit-
tel 2011, 197).While Zittel is certainly right in his claim that Nietzsche’s use of meta-
phors of heights and flying cannot always be read as only being constructive when
one takes account of Nietzsche’s critique of intoxication (Zittel 2011, 197), this is not
enough to conclude that the playful treatment of the metaphors, which given their
centrality in the self-characterizations of Zarathustra amounts to self-parody, is en-
tirely deconstructive. Importantly, the ass-metaphor is also not as exclusively nega-
tive as Zittel portrays it. In the speech On Reading and Writing, Zarathustra answers
those who say that life is hard, that in some sense all of us are asses: “We are all of us
pretty sturdy asses and she-asses” (Parkes 2005, 36; KSA 4, 49). Turned back on Za-
rathustra, and when one adds that he then goes on to speak about how he learned to
fly, he is not only the one who gives wings to asses but was himself once an ass. The
metaphor allows one to think that one leaves the ass within behind when one grows
wings. There is of course still the possibility of thinking of Zarathustra as still primar-
ily an ass; now perhaps a flying ass (cf. Zittel 2011, 198). In this regard, one must sim-
ply ask what difference it makes and refer to Zarathustra’s “motto”: “what does it
matter!” (Parkes 2005, 278; KSA 4, 396).
Be that as it may, there is one reason above others to resist Zittel’s conclusion
that the text of Z presents the reader with the alternative of either approaching the
text emotionally and following Zarathustra into intoxication, or approaching the
text purely intellectually and revealing Nietzsche’s true message; the nihilistic de-
spair beneath the surface. I think it can be shown that Nietzsche’s communication
of mood is not meant to trick the reader into ecstatic affirmation and thus turn
the reader away from a confrontation with nihilism, and that therefore Zittel’s read-
ing is far too bound to the perspective it tries to get rid of. Indeed, Zittel’s interpre-
tation is best read as a corrective to Colli, who claimed that Z is an expression of Di-
onysian immediacy and that the character of this emotional communication of Z
 “Zum ersten meint er, daß es Esel sind, die ihm glauben und sich an seinem Stil berauschen” (Zittel
2011, 197).
204 6 Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Communication of mood or nihilistic self-parody?
makes a nihilistic interpretation of the text impossible (KSA 4, 415). In a less known
introduction to Z, Colli goes as far as to compare the effect of the book to a drug and
to a magic potion (Colli 1993, 92).²¹ Colli thus reads Z as if it were primarily crafted to
induce the kind of ecstasy celebrated in BT, i.e. as if Nietzsche’s thinking on mood
had not advanced at all in the years between the publication of that rather immature
work and Z. Thus, Colli overlooks that even in EH, where Nietzsche connects Zara-
thustra and Dionysus, he speaks of the experiences expressed in Z as “new experi-
ences”, not as experiences already known to the ancient Greeks or experiences ac-
cessible to anyone (cf. KSA 6, 299–300). Instead of marking a return to BT and to
a celebration of collective intoxication, Z is best interpreted as a sign of that devel-
opment of Nietzsche’s thinking on mood, which leads him to rethink the Dionysian
as a philosophical mood and finally to describe himself as a disciple of the philos-
opher Dionysus (see chapter 7). This is a mood, which ideally allows one to affirm
that which is problematic and questionable: it is essentially a generalization of
the joy of sceptical questioning. In other words, this ideal mood allows one to
enjoy rather than avoid “nihilism”.
What after all is nihilism for Nietzsche other than a magic word used to conjure
visions of impending catastrophes and thus to scare off certain kinds of reader? In
the end, it turns out that Zittel’s interpretation is in this regard not primarily
based on textual evidence from within Z, but on a remarkably rigid interpretation
of the death of God (Zittel 2011, 104; 134– 136; 223). Again, Zittel’s starting point is
solid enough. According to him, Nietzsche does not only have the Christian God in
mind when writing that God is dead. Rather, all the old gods are dead. All values
have become suspicious. All values have become questionable. This then is nihilism.
Thus far, it is hard to disagree with Zittel, and it is rather Zittel’s interpretation of the
psychological consequences of accepting that God is dead which is problematic as it
does not conform to the available evidence. His key claim is that since there is no
absolute truth, all new values and ideals are illusions that cannot be believed. In
other words, they cannot motivate. Zittel’s assumption, which Nietzsche does not
share, is that if there is no “absolute truth” there is no truth at all, and that my
truth, your truth and our truths do not matter. To justify his reading, according to
which the death of God inevitably leads to a cultural logic of self-destruction [Selbst-
aufhebung], Zittel relies exclusively on a simplistic reading of the opening aphorism
of book five of GS that “explains” what it means that God is dead (cf. chapter 5, sec-
tion 5.7 of this study). In this light, Zittel asserts that all passages in Nietzsche’s oeu-
vre that suggest a desirable future should be interpreted as deceptive, subjective il-
lusions.²² Zittel furthermore asserts that he can integrate all of Nietzsche’s future-
oriented statements into his interpretation, which he contrasts with the supposed in-
 “Daß dieses Buch wie eine Droge wirkt, ist eine mehr oder weniger verbreitete Tatsache, und wenn
seine Gegner dies gerne bestreiten, belügen sie sich selbst.” (Colli 1993, 92)
 “Alle Zukunfts-bejahenden Stellen lassen sich nun als lediglich subjektive Illusionen einstufen, mit
welchem z.B. ‘Der Freie Geist’ sich über den objektiven Untergang hinwegtäuscht.” (Zittel 2011, 136)
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ability of interpreters who favour an “optimistic” Nietzsche-interpretation to integrate
his warnings and pessimistic visions (Zittel 2011, 136–137).
I do not know much about “optimistic” Nietzsche-interpretations, but the inter-
pretation advanced here argues that Nietzsche counted with a radically open future.
In this view, both Nietzsche’s “optimistic” and “pessimistic” visions of the future are
understood as part of a strategy of communication.²³ Aphorism GS 343 is a good ex-
ample, as it does not present definite answers, but instead forces the reader to make
up his/her mind. Neither Nietzsche’s promises nor his warnings about future possi-
bilities should be understood as deterministic statements of what is to come.
Nietzsche time and again qualifies his visions with scepticism, e.g. by asking who
could tell what is to come (e.g. D 453, KSA 3, 274). If Nietzsche thinks “absolute
truth” died with God, as Zittel plausibly suggests in his interpretation, then there
is even less ground for deterministic claims about the future. That there is no abso-
lute truth, that God is dead, is precisely the presupposition for thinking the future as
radically open, and in this context Nietzsche’s enticing visions are meant to have an
impact on the future. Recognizing that God is dead does not make high moods im-
possible. Instead, it opens new possibilities, not least the possibility of living one’s
life as a philosophical experiment and as a result of a different mode of life reach
new heights of feeling. For Nietzsche, mood matters more than ever after the recog-
nition that God is dead. Nietzsche’s own efforts suggest that while nihilism does not
imply an end to creativity, “high moods” gain in importance as sources of motivation
when religious ideals lose their credibility. As there cannot be a universal ideal, there
must be individual ideals, some of which however might be more compelling than
others. This explains why the task of purifying feeling is so important to Nietzsche,
and why the highest hopes of mankind should be fundamentally transformed ac-
cording to the motto “become who you are”, not simply redirected. It also explains
why the distinction between (religious, Wagnerian or alcoholic) ecstasy and philo-
sophical moods is so important, since only the latter have lasting value for the phi-
losopher. In short, the death of God leads the philosopher to reflect on the question
of an ideal philosophical mood.
 Curiously, Zittel does in a footnote (Nr. 415) intended to support his thesis that Zarathustra’s doc-
trines should not be believed, mention approvingly that Marie-Luise Haase has questioned whether
Zarathustra’s talk of the death of God is a message to the reader that is meant to be understood as a
statement of fact (Zittel 2011, 204). As much as he emphasizes Nietzsche’s aesthetic strategies, Zittel
seems unable to accept that the message that God is dead might be yet another strategic test, perhaps
to lure the ones to whom he speaks to reorient their striving and/or to become who they are. After all,
it was none other than Zarathustra who was originally supposed to announce that God is dead in GS
(cf. KSA 14, 256).
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6.9 Conclusion
I have suggested that the teaching of Zarathustra aligns with the project of GS (i.e.
become who you are [werde, der du bist], cf. KSA 4, 297) and provided evidence
from within the text that Nietzsche’s communication of mood supports this project.
To conclude, I will present further support for my reading from Nietzsche’s letters,
and from a short look forward to his next books, which in no way support Zittel’s
reading about Nietzsche’s philosophical project coming to a nihilistic end in Z.
Nietzsche himself had no interest in directly explaining what he sought to accom-
plish through Z, but in his letters one can nevertheless find clues that support this
reading. Admittedly, all of these letters predate the completion of the fourth book,
but they should nevertheless be taken heed of. In an unsent letter addressed to an
admirer named Paul Lanzky, dated April 1884, provoked by the admission of Lanzky
that he does not see Nietzsche’s goals, Nietzsche rhetorically and mockingly asks if
he really has to “descend”, to lower himself, to explain his Zarathustra.²⁴ Although
Nietzsche does not quite go as far as to “explain” his Zarathustra, he does go some
way towards answering the question about the goals of Z. First he bluntly writes that
he wanted to encourage himself with the work.²⁵ Only after that does he add some-
thing more generally encouraging: that all those men and women who strive for their
own goal, will gain strength from reading Z.²⁶
Nietzsche writes to Köselitz in a similar yet even more sceptical manner in Sep-
tember the same year. In that letter Nietzsche attests that he personally considers the
value of Z to depend on its function as a book of edification and encouragement, but
adds that the book must seem obscure and pathetic to everyone (KGB III/1, Bf. 529).²⁷
That Nietzsche himself took this encouragement-effect of Z quite seriously is beyond
doubt, as he explicitly mentions it in a number of letters.²⁸ More than anything, how-
ever, these letters show Nietzsche’s recurring doubts about his ability to reach
through to his readers through his texts. Although Nietzsche’s communication of
mood arguably reaches a new height in Z, especially in the use of artistic means,
the letters still speak of the work as being only an entrance to his philosophy.
That prompts one to ask about the relation of Z to those two works that at least in
 “Wollen Sie mich reizen, Mehr zu sagen, als ich Lust habe? – – Oder soll ich zu der absurden Rolle
hinabsteigen, meinen Zarathustra (oder seine Thiere) erklären zu müssen? Dafür, denke ich, werden ir-
gendwann einmal Lehrstühle und Professoren dasein.” (KGB III/5, Bf. 506a)
 “Bemerken Sie doch: ich habe mich mit diesem übermenschlichen Bilde ermuthigen wollen.”
(KGB III/5, Bf. 506a)
 “Alle Menschen aber, die irgend einen heroischen Impuls in sich haben zu ihrem eigenen Ziele hin,
werden sich eine große Kraft aus meinem Zarathustra herausnehmen.” (KGB III/5, Bf. 506a)
 “Erbauungs- und Ermuthigungs-Buch” … “dunkel und verborgen und lächerlich für Jedermann”
(KGB III/1, Bf. 529).
 E.g. to Franz Overbeck:“Dieser Zarathustra ist nichts als eine Vorrede, Vorhalle – ich habe mir sel-
ber Muth machen müssen” (KGB III/1, Bf. 494). Cf. to Malwida von Meysenbug: “Eine Vorhalle zu mein-
er Philosophie – für mich gebaut, mir Muth zu machen” (KGB III/1, Bf. 498).
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Anglophone scholarship are considered his main works, Beyond Good and Evil and
On the Genealogy of Morals (Leiter 2002, xii; cf. Clark and Dudrick 2012, 2–3; cf. Jan-
away 2007, 1).
In EH Nietzsche himself writes that having finished Z, the yes-saying part of his
task was finished and that the works that follow have a more direct destructive intent
(KSA 6, 350). Does this mean that Nietzsche is no longer concerned with the commu-
nication of mood in his later works? Though Nietzsche’s own distinction is useful,
one should take care not to read it in a way that leads one to overlook continuities.
In other words, Nietzsche’s philosophical writing does not fundamentally change
after Z, but he does expand on it significantly. So if his project came to a nihilistic
end in that book nihilistic ends do not mean much. In this regard, a letter to
Jacob Burckhardt is particularly instructive. In 1886, Nietzsche implores Burckhardt
to read BGE even if its message is the same as that of Z.²⁹ Arguably, this also applies
to GM, which despite superficially seeming to be even further away from Z than BGE
is without a doubt a continuation of the philosophical concerns of the preceding
works. Indeed, what has changed most in these works is the form, as Nietzsche
tones down the use of artistic means in order to return to a more direct form of ex-
pression. There is therefore arguably more to be learned from Nietzsche’s discussions
about feeling-states than from his “use of mood” in these later works. That is of
course not to say that communication of mood would play no significant role in
the works, but that as Nietzsche’s playful “use” of mood is not as apparent and most-
ly follows the pattern of the preceding works it is not of as great interest to us here as
his more direct communication; and specifically his statements about an ideal mood.
A case in point is BGE, which in this regard is nothing less than a bridge to
Nietzsche’s final works.³⁰ There one can observe a by now familiar strategy of com-
munication at work: that of suggesting a high mood of affirmation (as a specifically
philosophical mood) and tempting the reader with visions of the embodiment of this
mood in a human being. Nietzsche himself suggests that his book is nourishment for
a higher type of human: a dangerous book for all except for those few higher souls
who perhaps have the strength to rise to heights above tragedy and who are therefore
able to read the book as a challenge for themselves (BGE 30, KSA 5, 48–49). Through-
out the text, Nietzsche acts as seducer [Versucher]; most notably by introducing his
 “Bitte, lesen Sie dies Buch, (ob es schon dieselben Dinge sagt, wie mein Zarathustra, aber anders,
sehr anders –).” (KGB III/3, Bf. 754; cf. KGB III/3, Bf. 768)
 I have already discussed the 1887 edition of GS,which is very much in tune with the message of
BGE.When it comes to GM, Christopher Janaway has in a boldly argued monograph study sought to
cast light on the affective dimension of the text, which he analyses in terms of “affective reorienta-
tion” (Janaway 2007). Janaway is certainly correct about the big picture; that Nietzsche also in GM
seeks to engage the reader’s emotions and to persuade the reader to reorient his or her affects.
While Janaway’s results align with mine in that respect, I do think that there are serious problems
with his study if read on its own, as he relies almost exclusively on a speculative, philosophical in-
terpretation of the text of GM.
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idea of the philosophers of the future both as a test and temptation (BGE 42, KSA 5,
59), as the only hope worth the name in a time of decadence (BGE 203, KSA 5, 126–
128).Without disregarding or in any way downplaying the fact that Nietzsche is bru-
tally honest about what he considers absolutely necessary “immoral” preconditions
for the emergence of these philosophers,³¹ above all an acute feeling of social dis-
tance [Pathos der Distanz], it is for our purposes more important to note that his
main emphasis is elsewhere. Nietzsche explicitly focuses on a by-product of the feel-
ing of social distance, a desire for ever higher states of feeling within the soul
(BGE 257, KSA 5, 205).³² In other words, the feeling of social distance is for him
not valuable in itself, but only as a means to an end; to far greater feelings of dis-
tance.
The decisive question is why Nietzsche places such emphasis on the heightening
of feeling, on high moods? One possible answer is that Nietzsche thus in fact intends
to open the way towards a new religion based on experiences of ecstasy. So even as
Nietzsche again implies that Christian moral feelings stand in the way of a higher
type of life, one might still think that Nietzsche’s ideal mood is in some significant
sense religious. Such a reading might seem tempting, because Nietzsche’s statements
about the matter in BGE are quite vague, and because he at the end of the book re-
introduces Dionysus into his philosophy (BGE 295, KSA 5, 237–239). So while this
concise excursus to BGE has provided support for my reading of Z, insofar as it
shows that Nietzsche is still very much concerned with the question of mood, it
has also raised the question about the precise nature of Nietzsche’s ideal mood. Spe-
cifically, the question is whether it is best characterized as a religious state, and that
is the question of the following chapter.
 Throughout his discussion about the philosophers of the future, Nietzsche employs a vocabulary
of breeding [Züchtung], speaking of inheritance and blood, and these ideas inform his vision of the
social preconditions of the emergence of that higher type. In this regard, he speaks of the necessity of
a strict order of rank, and consequently of some form of slavery, in the sense of people to be treated as
tools (cf. BGE 257, KSA 5, 205).
 “Distanzerweiterung innerhalb der Seele selbst”, specifically “die Herausbildung immer höherer, sel-
tener, fernerer, weitgespannterer, umfänglicherer Zustände, kurz eben die Erhöhung des Typus ‘Mensch’,
die fortgesetzte ‘Selbst-Überwindung des Menschen’, um eine moralische Formel in einem übermorali-
schen Sinne zu nehmen” (BGE 257, KSA 5, 205).
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7 Nietzsche’s final ideal
What is Nietzsche’s final ideal, as expressed in his last writings, when it comes to
moods? This is the question that remains after the discussion of mood and ecstatic
intoxication [Rausch] in Z, and examining it allows us to answer those who perceive
a pronounced religiosity in Nietzsche’s last writings, specifically in Twilight of the
Idols, The Antichrist and Ecce Homo, as well as in the notes and letters from the pe-
riod. Since Julian Young is undoubtedly the earliest and arguably the most sophisti-
cated and influential of the “revisionists”,¹ i.e. those Anglophone scholars who have
in the last decades sought to revise the canonical view that Nietzsche’s thinking is
best described as atheistic to the core, I will here focus solely on his central claim
about Nietzsche’s late religiosity as a contrast against which I present evidence for
what I take to be a more plausible interpretation that supports but also significantly
expands the canonical view of Nietzsche’s atheism. I will first introduce Young’s the-
sis and then I will provide the foundations of an alternative perspective that builds
on the opposition between the psychological types of Jesus and Zarathustra in
Nietzsche’s late works. Thereafter I will provide further evidence for my interpreta-
tion by examining 1) what Nietzsche writes about the interpretation of extraordinary
experiences in the context of his late psychology of power, and 2) by establishing
that Nietzsche’s late thinking on power and experience does not lead him to aban-
don his striving for independence. Finally, I will shortly reflect on the end of
Nietzsche’s philosophical life; Nietzsche’s very own God delusion.
To be absolutely clear, once more, I claim no radical novelty for most of the pre-
sentation insofar as it supports the canonical view, e.g. regarding the role of Jesus in
the narrative of A.² Thus, what is new is to be found in the precise manner of the ar-
gumentation.
7.1 Young’s thesis about Nietzsche’s religiosity
Already in his early work on Nietzsche, Julian Young identifies ecstasy as the ideal
state that Nietzsche personally strives for and glorifies in all his writings except
 Besides Julian Young, the most prominent revisionists are Giles Fraser (cf. Fraser 2002) and Bruce
Benson (cf. Benson 2008). More problematically than Young, both Fraser and Benson overestimate
the formative influence of Lutheran piety and theology on Nietzsche’s later thinking. For a critique
of their central claims, see Saarinen 2016.
 E.g. Andreas Sommer, who might be said to have taken historical-critical scholarship to a new
level, has also done much to show the unfeasibility of treating the portrayal of Jesus in A as in
some way expressive of Nietzsche’s ideal (e.g. Sommer 2103, 146–148). Needless to say, if I do arrive
at similar conclusions as Sommer I do so independently guided by a different approach to the texts.
As in general with this study: paying attention to mood not only transforms the discussion of oft-in-
terpreted passages, it also effectively brings new evidence to light.
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for a brief positivistic phase to which only HH is testament. Furthermore, Young is
keen to stress the religious nature of that ecstasy as this striking passage shows:
23. Why does Nietzsche believe ecstasy to be the ideal relationship to the world? Because, in a
word, he wants something to worship and is aware once again, as he was in The Birth of Tragedy
(see ch 2, sec 14), that a sense of the holy, of the sacred is a fundamental human need. If the old
God is dead then nature herself must be made divine, “perfect” (Z IV, 19). The non-ecstatic af-
firmation of life holds no interest for Nietzsche since it has no bearing on his problem; the prob-
lem of proving that God, after all, exists. Less provocatively: the problem of achieving a state of
mind, “feel[ing] oneself ’in heaven,’ … ’eternal’” (A 33), in which a naturalized object is the tar-
get of all those feelings and attitudes that used to be directed towards the (no longer believable)
transcendent. (Young 1992, 115)
In his more recent work,Young has provided no corrective to this early picture. To the
contrary, he still adamantly defends the view that Nietzsche’s philosophy culminates
in a “Dionysian pantheism”, in which ecstasy [Rausch] is celebrated as this-worldly
salvation (e.g. Young 2006, 110–111, 199, 201; cf. Young 2010, 562). Young’s claim can
fruitfully be compared to, and needs to be balanced by, the more traditional account
of Eugen Fink. With BT in mind, Young’s favourite reference, Fink writes:
Already at the start of his philosophical path the tragic pathos puts Nietzsche in an irresolvable
conflict with Christianity. Christian dogma with its necessary idea of redemption does not only
contradict Nietzsche’s instincts, it contradicts his basic sentiment, the basic mood of his life and
of his experience of reality. The tragic world does not know any redemption, any salvation of the
finite being from its finitude. (Fink 2003, 10)
While it might seem that Fink’s and Young’s claims are irreconcilable, they are per-
haps not fundamentally opposed. That they seem opposed follows from a difference
in emphasis: whereas Young has a broad view of religiosity in mind, Fink speaks spe-
cifically about Christianity as being opposed to the basic mood of Nietzsche’s life as
expressed in his writings. Indeed, Young’s argument is stronger than those of the
other revisionists precisely because it does not necessarily rely on the idea that
Nietzsche’s supposed religiosity is Christianity in disguise, and instead allows it to
be conceived of as a new religiosity; a genuine Dionysian pantheism. Admittedly,
this is an advance compared to previous scholarship about Nietzsche’s thinking
on religion since Christianity and Christian conceptions of God have either explicitly
or implicitly been the standard against which one has judged whether Nietzsche was
an atheist. Already for this reason alone, Young’s argument is worth considering
carefully.
It should still not be overlooked that Young is at his weakest when making
claims about the continuity of Nietzsche’s religiosity. His biographical narrative con-
necting the Christian religiosity of Nietzsche’s childhood with the late Dionysianism
of the philosopher rests on an untenable foundation, and more specifically a concep-
tual confusion (cf. Young 2010). It is hard to understand how a Christian need for sal-
vation could possibly turn into a Dionysian need for salvation, when one takes into
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account that the concept of salvation differs drastically in the two cases; the crucial
distinction being one between a salvation that requires a transcendent instance, or
what Nietzsche would call another world, and a salvation that is wholly this-worldly.
So if it is admissible to speak of the philosopher’s striving for salvation, one must
specify that this is not a striving for salvation from finitude, but for salvation in fin-
itude, the striving for a god-like mood. Consequently, contra Young, it is not the case
that Nietzsche’s late Dionysianism would be concerned with simply redirecting “all
those feelings and attitudes that used to be directed towards the (no longer believ-
able) transcendent” (Young 1992, 115). Instead, Nietzsche has from HH onward
been engaged in a task of purifying feeling, which not only includes leaving some
feelings behind altogether but also creating new feelings. What he aims for, the re-
sulting affective reorientation, is more profound than a mere redirection of feeling.
It is much more about opening up significantly different moods. So on the basis of
my readings of HH, D, GS and Z the thesis that there is some significant continuity,
in the sense of similarity, between Christian religious feeling and those feeling states
that Nietzsche associates with the Dionysian can be refuted. In other words, it is the
case that insofar as there is continuity between Christian and Dionysian feeling, the
Christian feeling has been purified beyond recognition. Likewise, and I will provide
further evidence for this, Nietzsche cannot in his last writings in any meaningful
sense be concerned with proving that God “after all” exists, since (the god) Dionysus
signifies something quite different from the Christian God. The interesting question is
whether Nietzsche’s late thinking nevertheless amounts to pantheism; whether his
final ideal is a kind of ecstasy that is best termed religious. Does not Nietzsche’s striv-
ing for heights of feeling seem religious? Does not Nietzsche in his own way strive to
be in heaven, as Young suggests? My answer, which I will elaborate on and argue for
in what follows, is that Young does have a point, but that it needs to be rescued from
a religionist reading.
7.2 The type of Jesus and the type of Zarathustra
Young is certainly right that Nietzsche aims for a high state of mind, and that this
aim is one of his central concerns, as his abundant metaphorical invocations of
the heights of the soul testify, but I also think it can be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that this state should not be classified as religious and does not qualify as
pantheistic. In this regard, there is no better place to start the sceptical investigation
than the passage in the Antichrist that Young refers to, when claiming that Nietz-
sche’s thinking culminates in a desire to be in heaven, to be eternal. The passage
in question is not one in which Nietzsche directly speaks about himself, but one
in which he speaks about Jesus. It is situated within a psychological discussion, in
which he characterizes what he terms the type of the redeemer [Typus des Erlösers],
though he is quick to specify that it is the type of Jesus [Typus Jesus] (A 29, KSA 6,
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199) that concerns him; the redeemer par excellence. According to Nietzsche, Jesus
had:
The deep instinct for how one must live, in order to feel oneself “in heaven,” to feel “eternal,”
while in all other behavior one decidedly does not feel oneself “in heaven” – this alone is the
psychological reality of “redemption.” A new way of life, not a new faith. (Kaufmann 1954, 607;
A 33, KSA 6, 206)
Taken out of context the passage and the following elaborations can be read as if
Nietzsche were only criticizing what he takes to be Christian and scholarly misinter-
pretations of Jesus, or even more radically as if he in fact were seeking to salvage the
truth of Jesus’ life for himself and for the future. In a seemingly sympathetic manner,
he describes Jesus as a great symbolist, for whom the only reality that counted was
the inner reality of feeling. Thus, pace Nietzsche, all Jesus’ words are parables; they
express the “truth” of his being, i.e. “being in heaven”. In this rather original view,
Jesus does not promise heaven in an afterlife as a salvation from sin, and least of all
as a reward of belief, but instead shows a way of living. The real evangelical practice
(A 33, KSA 6, 205), is simply to always act in a way that produces the feeling of bliss.
Put shortly: “The ‘kingdom of heaven’ is a state of the heart” (Kaufmann 1954, 608;
A 34, KSA 6, 207), no more no less.
It is indeed tempting to interpret Nietzsche’s words as a projection: it is hard to
avoid the impression that Nietzsche identifies with the Jesus he describes at least in
so far as both privilege the inner life of feeling in the here and now over otherworldly
or strictly moral concerns. One should, however, not overlook that the description of
the psychology of Jesus is part of more general discussion of physiological degener-
acy, which is after all the grand theme of A. Right at the beginning of his psycholog-
ical dissection, Nietzsche rejects the scholarly use of terms such as hero or genius as
applicable to Jesus and instead insists that if there is any one word that fits Jesus it is
idiot³ (A 29, KSA 6, 200). According to Nietzsche, two components mark out Jesus as a
 Ernest Renan, whom Nietzsche now and then targets as a moron in psychological matters and a
prime example of a “secular” intellectual melancholically longing for religious moods (cf. BGE 48,
KSA 5, 69–70), had used the terms hero and genius to describe Jesus (A 29, KSA 6, 199). Since
Nietzsche explicitly refers to Dostoyevski in his discussion on the psychology of Jesus (A 31,
KSA 6, 202) quite a few scholars have assumed that Nietzsche was directly influenced in his charac-
terization by the Russian author and especially his novel The Idiot. Dostoyevski’s novel centres
around Prince Myshkin,who returning to Russia from a mental institution in Switzerland causes trou-
ble in the noble social circles through his naivety and goodness, which is too good for this world.
While this coincidence allows for intriguing comparisons, there is not enough evidence to conclude
with certainty that Nietzsche directly borrowed the idea of Jesus as idiot from his presumed reading of
Dostoyevski’s novel (cf. Stellino 2007). Sommer contends that Nietzsche at least had second-hand
knowledge of the content of that novel, but this is nothing more than speculation (cf. Sommer
2013, 9 and 162). Be that as it may, irrespective of the degree of his knowledge of the The Idiot, it
is beyond doubt that Nietzsche was inspired by Dostoyevski’s example in his psychological elabora-
tions about early Christianity (see Stellino 2007) although his revaluation is what matters.
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decadent: An instinctive hatred of reality⁴ and an instinctive avoidance of conflict,⁵
that both ultimately derive from an acute sensitivity to external stimuli. As the only
goal that makes sense for such a type is the maintenance of an agreeable feeling,
Nietzsche dubs the resulting way of life a decadent development of hedonism
(A 30, KSA 6, 201). That Nietzsche calls Jesus the most interesting decadent (A 31,
KSA 6, 202), does not make Jesus any less decadent and any less dangerous as an
example to follow. Nor does the fact that Nietzsche calls himself a décadent in EH
change the picture in any way, as he is clear enough to specify that he considers him-
self that only in part [als Winkel, als Specialität] while being healthy as a whole [als
summa summarum]. As proof of his health, he lists many a characteristic, but given
his physiological description of Jesus it is of particular interest that he mentions what
I think is best described as an instinctive scepticism: reacting slowly to all stimuli,
providing resistance to them, testing them carefully, which he calls a result of a wil-
led cultivation of pride. Unsurprisingly he concludes that he is the opposite of a dé-
cadent (KSA 6, 266–267; cf. Hödl 2009, 541–547). So without even taking the possible
ironies of Nietzsche’s confession of being a décadent into account, there is a big
enough difference between his self-characterization and his description of Jesus to
rule out that Nietzsche would be describing himself as a whole or his ruling instinct
when describing Jesus.
Consequently,what little sympathy there is in Nietzsche’s characterization is best
read in the context of his polemic against Christianity. Nietzsche’s seemingly sympa-
thetic understanding of Jesus has the consequence that what he has to say about the
religion founded in the name of Christ, above all as “the Church”, is all the more
damning. To me, Nietzsche’s key point seems to be that not only have the followers
of Jesus misinterpreted the teaching of their master who they call God; they have es-
sentially failed to recognize that he was a thoroughly decadent type. That Nietzsche
prides himself with understanding Jesus better than those in the “Church” who claim
to be following him, does not imply that Jesus’ way of living is Nietzsche’s ideal.
While Nietzsche recognizes that the way of life he has described is at all times pos-
sible, and adds that there are always some for whom it is the only option (A 39,
KSA 6, 211), perhaps a physiological necessity, it is not the kind of life that he pres-
ents himself as living, nor does he hold it out as desirable in any of his writings. This
 “Der Instinkt-Hass gegen die Realität: Folge einer extremen Leid- und Reizfähigkeit, welche überhaupt
nicht mehr ‘berührt’ werden will, weil sie jede Berührung zu tief empfindet.”. (A 30, KSA 6, 200)
 “Die Instinkt-Ausschließung aller Abneigung, aller Feindschaft, aller Grenzen und Distanzen im Ge-
fühl: Folge einer extremen Leid- und Reizfähigkeit, welche jedes Widerstreben, Widerstreben-müssen be-
reits als unerträgliche Unlust (das heißt als schädlich, als vom Selbsterhaltungs-Instinkte widerrathen)
empfindet und die Seligkeit (die Lust) allein darin kennt, nicht mehr, Niemandem mehr, weder dem Übel
noch dem Bösen, Widerstand zu leisten, – die Liebe als einzige, als letzte Lebens-Möglichkeit…” (A 30,
KSA 6, 200–201) More succinctly, Nietzsche characterizes this as: “nicht sich wehren, nicht zürnen,
nicht verantwortlich-machen” (A 35, KSA 6, 208).
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is made abundantly clear in a rare passage of affirmation amidst all the destructive
criticism.
In the midst of vehemently damning Christianity, Nietzsche suddenly introduces
Zarathustra as a contrast. The key sentences ring thus: “One should not be deceived:
great spirits are sceptics. Zarathustra is a sceptic. Strength, freedom which is born of
the strength and overstrength of the spirit, proves itself by skepticism.” (Kaufmann
1954, 638; A 54, KSA 6, 236) Nietzsche’s point is to be understood physiologically,
and not as referring to any specific tradition of sceptical philosophy.⁶ Scepticism,
he here contends, is an expression of power and characteristic of great spirits.
When he speaks of the great passion that reigns in such a spirit, that guides it, it
is reasonable to assume that he speaks of an instinct that is fundamentally opposed
to the instincts of Jesus as much as to the instincts of his followers. The textual evi-
dence for such an interpretation is strong, as I will now show.Whereas Jesus’ actions
follow from his inability to resist stimuli of a certain kind, which leads him to shut
them out completely, Nietzsche associates health with finding joy in seeking out and
overcoming resistance (cf. A 2, KSA 6, 170).Whereas Nietzsche’s Jesus seeks to main-
tain peace, an inner state of bliss, at all costs, Nietzsche himself in EH claims to find
joy in what he at times (metaphorically) calls war (e.g. KSA 6, 274).⁷ When it comes to
the followers of Christ, Nietzsche opposes the independence, the freedom, of Zara-
thustra with the dependent state of the believer. Indeed, he goes as far as to write
that believers of any kind are out of necessity dependent beings: “The man of
faith, the ‘believer’ of every kind, is necessarily a dependent man – one who cannot
posit himself as an end, one who cannot posit any end at all by himself.” (Kaufmann
1954, 638; A 54, KSA 6, 236) Thus, Nietzsche affirms his notion of doubt as a sign of
inner strength, against the view of doubt as a lack (of faith). In A, this notion is the
implicit background of Nietzsche’s notorious judgement of taste that the only decent
character, the only character that deserves respect, in the New Testament is Pontius
 In other words, Nietzsche’s philosophical point is completely independent of the fact that he en-
joyed reading Victor Brochard’s Les Sceptiques Grecs, a historical work which he mentions with great
approval in EH (KSA 6, 284). Nietzsche speaks of a general character-type, not of Ancient Greek scep-
tical philosophers. While great spirits “are” sceptics in this view, i.e. beings who find joy in what is
problematic, not all those commonly labelled sceptics are necessarily great spirits. Nietzsche had val-
ued what I have termed a sceptical mood, a mood of joyful doubt, without interruption, at least since
HH, as should be clear from the evidence presented within this study. That he here explicitly uses the
term sceptic is merely a matter of wording. For a radically opposed view, that takes philological ob-
session with single words ripped out of their philosophical context to a new height, see Sommer 2013,
253–254.
 The most clear expression of this sentiment, of the agonistic spirit, is without a doubt to be found
in the 1887 foreword to GS: “Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative
definition of happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, some final state of
some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside,
Above, permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher.” (Kaufmann
1974, 34; KSA 3, 348)
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Pilatus, on account of his sceptical question: what is truth? (cf. A 46, KSA 6, 225). This
same notion is also the key to understanding Nietzsche’s words in EH about being
atheistic in instinct, by which he precisely means an instinctive questioning resisting
easy answers. Atheism, he writes, “is self-evident to me from instinct” (Large 2007,
19; KSA 6, 278), and once again he connects this instinct with an excess of pride,
with being besides too curious also “too dubious, too high-spirited to content myself
with a rough-and-ready answer” (Large 2007, 19; KSA 6, 278–279). Even if it does not
follow directly from this association of health and strength with scepticism, one can
at least cautiously surmise that Nietzsche’s ideal mood in his last writings should be
a mood that, whatever else characterizes it (pride, joy etc.), sustains doubt. There-
fore, the remaining task of this chapter is firstly to present more conclusive evidence
that to dwell in a Zarathustra-like mood is Nietzsche’s final affective ideal and sec-
ondly to give a more detailed characterization of the foundations of this vision in
Nietzsche’s late writings.
To be absolutely clear, scholarship cannot settle the question, which character
Nietzsche deep down in his (perhaps even to himself) unknown depths felt himself
to be more related to and identified himself with.What is beyond doubt, and what I
want to draw attention to here, is that his self-expression through his philosophy, in-
cluding his last writings, is more akin with the type Zarathustra than with the type
Jesus. In fact, they have little to do with the heavenly feeling he associates with Jesus
as they show open hostility and contempt. As A is essentially about what type should
be cultivated (Nietzsche uses the term to breed [züchten], cf. A 3, KSA 6, 170), Jesus
should against that background be read as representing weakness and Zarathustra
as representing strength. This characterization brings to the fore the framework
through which Nietzsche thinks in his final works: will to power. In the next section,
I will shortly show how this framework defines his late theory of religion and “reli-
gious” experience, whereafter I will in the following section examine what conclu-
sions he draws for himself from his vision of power in the specific sense of how it
shapes his own “ideal”.
7.3 Nietzsche’s late psychology of power and the interpretation
of extraordinary experiences
In Nietzsche’s late thinking, in his efforts to initiate a revaluation of all values, the
concept of power, most infamously as will to power, takes central stage (cf. Reginster
2006, 203). This can not only be seen in his plans for a major work on will to power,⁸
but also in a more general intensification of his concern with power. While the con-
 Such a work is already announced in GM, and the title reveals the intimate relation between reval-
uation and will to power: Der Wille zur Macht, Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe (GM III 27,
KSA 5, 409; cf. NL 1887–1888, 11[414], KSA 13, 192; NL1888, 14[78], KSA 13, 257).
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cept is abundant in his published work as well as in the notes from the last produc-
tive years, there is one particular note from 1888 that is especially interesting for in-
troducing his late thinking on religion and specifically on the religious interpretation
of extraordinary experiences. On its own, this note should not be considered admis-
sible evidence, but the fact is that it echoes longstanding concerns in his published
work, and those concerns are arguably more clearly expressed here than anywhere
else. What makes this note, in which Nietzsche attempts to think of religion in
terms of experiences of power, so interesting, is that the target of Nietzsche’s criti-
cism is more than just Christianity. It concerns the psychological foundations of
all religion. Having already discussed Nietzsche’s fierce rejection of Christianity,
this note provides a balancing perspective as it is as much a challenge to “panthe-
ism” as to Christianity. Since the note entitled “On the Origin of Religion” [Vom Ur-
sprung der Religion] is quite extensive, I will here only focus on the decisive final part
of it.⁹
Already in HH, Nietzsche had tackled the problem of religious experience
through a critique of the human tendency to (mis)interpret extraordinary experiences
metaphysically (see chapter 4). There, he suggested that it was ultimately fear (of na-
ture), the fear of an external power that led the intellect astray and gave rise to reli-
gious interpretations. Here, in the late note, he is more subtle: it is ultimately the fear
of one’s self, which gave and still gives birth to religious interpretations. When feel-
ings of power suddenly overwhelm the primitive self, Nietzsche claims, the power is
felt in the self, but not as one’s own. Overwhelmed by the strength of feeling, one
does not dare think of one’s self as the cause of the feeling. While Nietzsche is de-
scribing the origin of religion, what he has to say is emphatically not limited to prim-
itive man, but also applies to contemporary religiosity. Unsurprisingly, Christianity is
the main target. Although he does not fail to single out the contemporary Christian
as the most regressive type of human (NL 1888, 14[124], KSA 13, 305), it is clear that in
this view all religion is bound to primitive reasoning. Ignoring the polemical touch, it
is difficult to establish whether or not the note should be seen as a theoretical ad-
vance from his earlier thinking. In HH, Nietzsche drew heavily on Victorian anthro-
pology when trying to explain the human tendency to interpret certain experiences
religiously, but his treatment was very cursory. Here, as he adds his reflections about
 “Die psychologische Logik ist die: das Gefühl der Macht, wenn es plötzlich und überwältigend den
Menschen überzieht – und das ist in allen großen Affekten der Fall –, erregt ihm einen Zweifel an seiner
Person: er wagt sich nicht als Ursache dieses erstaunlichen Gefühls zu denken – und so setzt er eine
stärkere Person, eine Gottheit für diesen Fall an. In summa: der Ursprung der Religion liegt in den ex-
tremen Gefühlen der Macht, welche, als fremd, den Menschen überraschen: und dem Kranken gleich,
der ein Glied zu schwer und seltsam fühlt und zum Schlusse kommt, daß ein anderer Mensch über
ihm liege, legt sich der naive homo religiosus in mehrere Personen auseinander. Die Religion ist ein
Fall der ‘altération de la personnalité’. Eine Art Furcht- und Schreckgefühl vor sich selbst … Aber ebenso
ein außerordentliches Glücks- und Höhengefühl… Unter Kranken genügt das Gesundheitsgefühl, um an
Gott, an die Nähe Gottes zu glauben.” (NL 1888, 14[124], KSA 13, 306)
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power into the picture, it can be plausibly assumed that he also relies on his reading
of the anthropological, psychological and physiological literature of his time and he
still only has a rough sketch of an explanation.¹⁰ This sketch, the central claim of
which is that feelings of power can and often do impair causal reasoning, can how-
ever fruitfully be read in the light of what Nietzsche writes about experience and cau-
sality in Twilight of the Idols. There, Nietzsche describes what he takes to be a general
human tendency to seek out a cause for whatever one is feeling; an inability to sim-
ply let experiences be (KSA 6, 92). He opines that giving an explanation to one’s feel-
ing can itself increase the feeling of power (KSA 6, 93). So even while Nietzsche con-
fidently asserts that all of religion and morality should be subsumed under the
concept of imaginary causes (KSA 6, 94), it follows that any alternative way of inter-
pretation that he advances should be able to enhance power as much or preferably
more than religious reasoning.
This leads us to appreciate that the main advance of Nietzsche’s late thinking on
religion is not theoretical but practical and that it relates to the possibility of owning
one’s highest and most disturbing experiences.When Nietzsche writes that religious
persons do not dare think of themselves as the cause of their extraordinary experi-
ences, does he not also mean to suggest that one should dare to own one’s experi-
ences? Since claiming ownership of one’s experience can reasonably within this
framework be thought to increase the feeling of power, the most plausible answer
is a qualified yes. Owning one’s experience, however, cannot mean positing the
self as the ultimate cause of any given experience, since Nietzsche is very critical
of such ideas (cf. KSA 6, 90). It must rather mean to maintain a sceptical sentiment
of not jumping to conclusions regarding one’s experiences even as one accepts them
as truly one’s own. That Nietzsche personally struggled with his experiences of sick-
ness and health and that a philosophical scepticism was his answer is certainly sug-
gested by his description of the philosopher in BGE. In any case, ignoring biograph-
ical speculation, it is worth paying attention to the presentation of the philosopher in
that book, since it speaks volumes about his self-presentation. There he writes that a
philosopher is the kind of human, who constantly has extraordinary experiences,
and who therefore often “fears himself” [vor sich Furcht hat], but who nevertheless
always regains his senses, and literally returns to himself, out of curiosity
(BGE 292, KSA 5, 235). This passage, which it is hard not to think of as being
among the most significant of Nietzsche’s self-descriptions, shows that he thinks
the philosopher and the religious person are intimately related in that both have ex-
traordinary experiences, but it also shows that they are nevertheless distinct. Unlike
the religious person, the philosopher does not think that his or her experience proves
that God exists or that the universe is divine. Instead of making unwarranted as-
sumptions, the philosopher always returns to sceptical questioning. This view also
 On Nietzsche’s reading in the psychology of causal reasoning, see Sommer 2012, 202 and 329–
330.
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finds expression in EH, in Nietzsche’s description of his experiences of, as he puts it,
what used to be called inspiration: an experience of not being in control, and of nev-
ertheless having a distinct consciousness as well as a tremendous feeling of freedom,
power and divinity (KSA 6, 339–340). There he explicitly writes that if one had even
a bit of superstition left, when having such experiences as he has had, one would
think that one were nothing more than the tool of higher powers.¹¹ However, far
from encouraging such an interpretation, Nietzsche exemplifies his philosophical
scepticism through his description. Indeed, the most plausible interpretation is
that Nietzsche here presents himself as someone who has no superstition left;
whose internalized, incorporated scepticism forbids interpreting his experiences re-
ligiously (cf. Hödl 2009, 546). In other words, Nietzsche’s late thinking about “reli-
gious experiences” is in tune with his statements about his instinctive atheism (cf.
KSA 6, 278).¹² Now that it has with reasonable certainty been established that
Nietzsche even in his last writings thinks all religion relies on misinterpretation of
experience and especially of experiences of power, it has become possible to ap-
proach Nietzsche’s late philosophy of religion from a related perspective: that of
Nietzsche’s own striving for power or more accurately; the way he presents this striv-
ing in his writings.
7.4 Nietzsche’s late psychology of power and his Dionysian
ideal of independence
Already in GS and GM, one finds statements suggesting that all animals, perhaps all
living beings, are animated by will to power.¹³ There is nevertheless a notable devel-
opment in his very late thinking, a shift in emphasis from “is” to “ought”. Nietzsche
no longer stops at describing the human animal as moved by will to power, he also
praises what is perhaps best interpreted as a specific form of this striving. One exam-
ple must suffice to illustrate this change.While he was in GM careful to point out that
he speaks about an instinctive striving for power and explicitly not about a path to
joy ([Weg zum Glück], GM III 7, KSA 5, 350), he takes a more radical approach in A.
There, at the very beginning of the text, he first defines the good as that which in-
 “Mit dem geringsten Rest von Aberglauben in sich würde man in der That die Vorstellung, bloss In-
carnation, bloss Mundstück, bloss medium übermächtiger Gewalten zu sein, kaum abzuweisen wissen.”
(KSA 6, 339)
 An altogether different question is whether Nietzsche himself, as human being, was always able
to maintain such a scepticism, and this question is especially relevant when it comes to the events in
late 1888 and early 1891 that put an end to his independent philosophical life. I will return to this
question in the final section of this chapter.
 “Jedes Thier, somit auch la bête philosophe, strebt instinktiv nach einem Optimum von günstigen
Bedingungen, unter denen es seine Kraft ganz herauslassen kann und sein Maximum im Machtgefühl
erreicht” (GM III 7, KSA 5, 350; cf. GS 349, KSA 3, 585–586).
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creases the feeling of power (in the human being) and then goes on to define joy
[Glück] as the feeling that power grows, and specifies that he means the feeling of
overcoming resistance (A 2, KSA 6, 170). In fact, Nietzsche goes as far as to define
(the meaning of the term) life, for himself, as the instinct for power (A 6, KSA 6,
172). To put it simply: power equals joy in this vision.
As is to be expected, Nietzsche does not exempt himself from this picture. As a
philosopher, it follows that he cannot speak of any generally desirable goals, be-
cause what way of life generates the greatest feeling of power differs from individual
to individual. Nevertheless, the Nietzsche of the texts is not content to declare “to
each his own”, but seeks instead to tempt his readers to cultivate specific experiences
and a specific mood through his own example. So the crucial question is this: where,
in what kind of experience, does Nietzsche, the way he presents himself in his writ-
ings, find his own maximum of power? Without losing the thread, and adding a sig-
nificant layer of meaning, the question can also be formulated thus: Who or what is
Nietzsche’s Dionysus? What does the enigmatic name signify?
On the basis of the evidence provided by his last writings, I argue that Nietzsche
finds his maximum of power in a ceaseless striving for independence within the
world, and that the name Dionysus signifies his affirmation of his own way of life
(and by extension: of all life, cf. Hödl 2009, 536). In other words, I argue that once
again, as in GS, Nietzsche seeks to unite a sceptical spirit, a mood of doubt, with
joy and laughter. The critical edge of my argument is that, contra Young, put in
terms of a mental state Nietzsche’s late “ideal” is a high mood that both requires
and enhances individuation, not an ecstatic extinction of individuality (cf. Young
2010, 501–503). Furthermore I argue that as “personal” as Nietzsche’s vision is, it
is tied to his vision of new philosophers, i.e. that he considers it of importance to
the practice of philosophy understood as free thinking, as the activity of free spirits.
In other words, one can again assume that what Nietzsche presents as personal is
quite revealing of what he sought to communicate.
7.4.1 The philosopher’s independence and Dionysus
To begin to provide a more specific characterization of this ideal, and to provide a
better picture of its significance for philosophical practice, it is necessary to consult
GM and Nietzsche’s description of the independence that defines the philosopher’s
life. There, Nietzsche asks what the ascetic ideal means for a philosopher. In other
words, he asks why it exerts such a magnetic pull on the thinker. Speaking at
least as much for himself as for the great philosophers of history, Nietzsche contends
that the philosopher sees in asceticism the means to an end, specifically the means
to independence ([Brücken zur Unabhängigkeit], GM III 7, KSA 5, 351). An ascetic life
provides the optimal conditions for free thinking: freedom from coercion, disturban-
ces and duties to mention but a few of the benefits that Nietzsche associates with
withdrawing from society. The true extent to which Nietzsche’s list of the fruits prom-
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ised to the philosopher by the ascetic ideal is personally coloured is revealed by the
fact that he chooses to associate the ascetic ideal with the experience of the air of the
heights.¹⁴ So, summa summarum, for the philosopher asceticism is the opposite of a
turning away from life, the opposite of life-denial; namely, it is the affirmation of the
philosopher’s life (GM III 7, KSA 5, 351). Nietzsche, too, understands himself as a phi-
losopher, and there is every reason to think that his new philosophers are also in
some minimal sense “ascetics”, but as I will show next he is adamant that they
will have to strive for a greater freedom from morality than their predecessors in
order to reach a greater independence and with it an even higher mood of affirma-
tion.
Nietzsche takes it upon himself to show the way, and it is in this context that the
meaning of Dionysus emerges. It has been argued, and with good reason, that Dio-
nysus signifies Nietzsche’s philosophy, as a philosophy of affirmation (Hödl 2009,
534, 582 and 589). When Nietzsche for the first time calls himself a disciple of the
god Dionysus, he also breaks the news that this god is a philosopher (cf. BGE 295,
KSA 5, 238). Nietzsche himself is from the beginning acutely aware of the dissonance
he creates by conjoining the words Dionysus and philosophy, as he notes that the
idea of a god philosophizing is an idea that is apt to create suspicion precisely
among philosophers (BGE 295, KSA 5, 238). To have grounds for suspicion, one
need only remind oneself that Nietzsche’s own early celebration of the Dionysian
in BT was to a great degree a celebration of ecstasy, opposed to the spirit of rational
inquiry. The questions is whether Nietzsche in his late writings has anything substan-
tial to offer to allay the suspicion that the two do not go together, beyond simply as-
sociating Dionysus and philosophy by insisting that he is to be known as a “disciple
of the philosopher Dionysos” (KSA 6, 160; KSA 6, 258).While Nietzsche’s self-charac-
terizations seem cryptic on their own, any reader acquainted with Nietzsche’s earlier
texts is by now familiar with his ideas concerning new combinations of feeling and
world-orientation. From HH onwards, Nietzsche’s writings express the vision of a
new kind of philosopher who draws on and in this sense unites the legacies of
both science and art in order to make a yet higher way of being possible.¹⁵ So
when Nietzsche speaks of Dionysus as a philosopher there it is very reasonable to
think he has this new union in mind, which he this time expresses as a synthesis
that sums up his career, or the core of his efforts, from BT to EH.
This perspective has the advantage that one can make sense of Nietzsche’s claim
in TI that he now stands on the same ground as in BT (cf. KSA 6, 160). This is em-
phatically not a return to the project of creating a new religion to replace the old.
Having during the years following the publication of BT abandoned the hope he
 “eine gute Luft, dünn, klar frei, trocken, wie die Luft auf Höhen ist, bei der alles animalische Sein
geistiger wird und flügeln bekommt”, which makes “das Herz fremd, jenseits, zukünftig, posthum” (GM
III 8, KSA 5, 352).
 Arguably, a related vision is already suggested in BT in the image of a music-making Sokrates
[musiktreibenden Sokrates] (BT 17, KSA 1, 111).
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had placed on Wagner, and with it all hope of an artistic or religious renewal,
Nietzsche perhaps now understands himself as the one who will give birth to trage-
dy; not as an art form, nor as a religion, but as a philosophical way of life, as a phil-
osophical mood. In any case, the two cannot be thought of as separated but only in
tandem; the new way of life and the new mood. As a way of life it is one in which
artistic creation and ascetic philosophical independence are united; as creation
and destruction of values and thus of truth. As a mood, it is one in which an
acute feeling of distance, of doubt, is united with a tragic, joyful feeling of affirma-
tion. It is above all this union that he seeks to communicate in his late works.¹⁶ To be
absolutely clear, Nietzsche doesn’t give up on philosophy despite his criticism of as-
ceticism, nor does he give up on Dionysian affirmation, despite his rejection of ecsta-
sy as in itself desirable. As Nietzsche “admits” in TI, it was after all sexual ecstasy
(KSA 6, 160), which gave him the key to the concept of tragic feeling, as well as of
the Dionysian. The metaphor of the key is worth reading carefully: The key to the con-
cept is not the concept itself. Thus, Nietzsche suggests that tragic feeling, the Diony-
sian feeling of the joy of becoming, which is a joy even when becoming is terrible, is
sublimated sexual ecstasy. The feeling that Nietzsche values as the highest as philos-
opher should then not be conceptualized as a raw experience of the Dionysian but as
its sublimation into a high mood that is particularly fruitful for approaching philo-
sophical problems.
7.4.2 Interpreting Nietzsche’s late Dionysian statements
Such a reading of Nietzsche’s self-characterization as a disciple of the philosopher
Dionysus, allows one to reread his late “Dionysian” statements, statements that
can also be read as suggesting pantheism, as confirming instead of as challenging
his commitment to atheism and philosophical independence. This is even the case
with a Nachlass-note, which contains a sentence that at the surface seems to go
most against my own interpretation: “Highest state that a philosopher can reach:
to relate to Being in a Dionysian manner” (NL 1888, 16[32], KSA 13, 492).¹⁷ The critic
can point at the note and say, look, this note clearly states that the highest state is a
 Cf. the concealed self-presentation in Twilight of the Idols: “Was theilt der tragische Künstler von
sich mit? Ist es nicht gerade der Zustand ohne Furcht vor dem Furchtbaren und Fragwürdigen, das er
zeigt? – Dieser Zustand selbst ist eine hohe Wünschbarkeit; wer ihn kennt, ehrt ihn mit den höchsten
Ehren. Er theilt ihn mit, er muss ihn mittheilen, vorausgesetzt, dass er ein Künstler ist, ein Genie der Mit-
theilung.” (KSA 6, 127– 128) It is reasonable to assume that what Nietzsche here describes relates as
much if not more to Nietzsche’s own writings, as well as to the activity of the philosopher of the fu-
ture and the problems he/she confronts without fear, as to the activity of the tragic artist of Ancient
Greece.
 Own translation. Original: “Höchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreichen kann: dionysisch zum
Dasein stehn” (NL 1888,16[32], KSA 13, 492).
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Dionysian (i.e. ecstatic) state, and this should be the end of the debate. However, the
Dionysian state that the note speaks of is not best read as a state of ecstatic union
with some mythic ground of being ([Ur-Eine], cf. BT 1, KSA 1, 30), or with a natural-
ized yet divine universe, but one of facing the world from a non-moral philosophical
perspective in a mood of affirmation. There are both strong philological and philo-
sophical reasons to support such an interpretation.
The note does speak of the striving of Nietzsche’s experimental philosophy as a
striving for Dionysian affirmation of the world as a whole (NL 1888, 16[32], KSA 13,
492), but from the context it is clear that this does not mean that the activity of ex-
perimental philosophy comes to an abrupt end when an ecstatic Dionysian state is
reached. The Dionysian state is rather a state of heightened consciousness, as
Nietzsche explicitly connects it to the activity of revaluation, of viewing the world
from a non-moral perspective. Indeed, the note suggests that giving up moral feel-
ings that have their origin in suffering and/or recognition and compassion for suffer-
ing is a prerequisite for dwelling in the Dionysian state (NL 1888, 16[32], KSA 13, 493),
which implies that the Dionysian state is an at least potentially lasting perspective
and the fruit of Nietzsche’s efforts at affective reorientation. It would then seem
that the world as a whole is not worshipped in the Dionysian state, but affirmed
through self-affirmation; through a high mood attained by a distinct self that is af-
firmed in its individuality. The Dionysian state would consequently not simply be
a goal, but a further development of the activity of experimental philosophy.
The reading sketched out here can be further supported by asking the philosoph-
ical question: Why would ecstasy, in the sense of ecstatic moments, be the goal of
Nietzsche’s philosophical striving? Imagine a philosopher who lives his everyday
life, works, but gets drunk every weekend. This is a release from his everyday con-
sciousness, which allows him to affirm the world and perhaps even to return to
his life with new energy. Crucially, however, this experience does not necessarily
have any impact on his philosophizing. By contrast, I am claiming that Nietzsche
is not just advising philosophers to let go occasionally, but to incorporate a Dionysi-
an perspective into their lives, in order to become even more daring and independent
in their thinking.
The result would be a mood of affirmation or what Nietzsche himself on one oc-
casion curiously calls a faith ([Glaube], KSA 6, 152); grounded in a perspective from
which one can say yes to all of life, to all of existence as a whole. According to
Nietzsche, this Dionysian faith¹⁸ is the faith of Goethe, and while one might be tempt-
ed to think of the historical Goethe’s sympathies for pantheism, Nietzsche does not
describe his Goethe that way and instead calls him a realist. In fact, Nietzsche de-
scribes Goethe as the height of individuality; not as one who seeks either to extin-
guish or to transcend his self. Goethe, a name that here most probably stands as
 “ein solcher Glaube ist der höchste aller möglichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des Dio-
nysos getauft” (KSA 6, 152).
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much for Nietzsche, disciplined himself and thus created a whole out of himself.¹⁹
Only through this disciplining and the resulting independence does the Dionysian
mood of affirmation open itself, and there is no suggestion that it negates the inde-
pendence that is its precondition. So whatever might be said about this Goethe’s
pantheism, he is not exactly a model for a person worshipping Dionysus in ecstatic
states, nor is there any suggestion that the Dionysian state “can only be achieved
through transcendence of the ego” in some less demanding sense (cf. Young 2010,
503).²⁰ Similarly, it follows, Nietzsche can be called a pantheist only as long as
one specifies that his is a form of philosophical pantheism indistinguishable from
atheism. In other words, it is definitely not a religious pantheism that seeks transcen-
dence from finitude.
To conclude, I am willing to concede that in the late notes one can find state-
ments critical of overvaluing conscious states, or more specifically states of “rational
consciousness”. One particularly striking example is a note in which Nietzsche ex-
plicitly speaks of philosophy as decadence and the false presupposition of the
Greek philosophers that consciousness is the highest state (NL 1888, 14[129],
KSA 13, 310–311). Yet this fact is only apt to show the huge problems involved in re-
lying on single notes from the Nachlass, disconnected from the concerns of the pub-
lished works, since there is no way of knowing what use Nietzsche would have made
of them. Least of all can one conclude that Nietzsche values ecstatic or unconscious
states higher than conscious ones. Indeed, one could equally well, and with stronger
support from the published work, take ones cue from a late note which states that an
overvaluation of unconscious states is a sign of decadence.²¹ As the ambivalence of
the Nachlass does not allow any definite interpretations, the most plausible interpre-
tation is one that relies on the published work, and there the ideal of independence
reigns.
7.5 The end: Nietzsche’s final letters
With Nietzsche, the story always ends the same way. From his breakdown in Turin in
January 1889 until his death in Weimar in 1900, he did not utter anything of philo-
 “er disciplinirte sich zur Ganzheit, er schuf sich” and in his work he presented the “sich selbst im
Zaume habenden, vor sich selber ehrfürchtigen Menschen” (KSA 6, 152).
 Arguably, such a denial of any need for transcendence is precisely the point of characterizing
Goethe as someone who has shaped himself into a whole. Being a whole, he is more or less self-suf-
ficient. Thus, there is no need for him to transcend the self into a higher whole. Of course, he can and
does view the world as a whole and affirms it as such, but that happens through his individuality and
not by transcending it.
 In this note, Nietzsche lists various symptoms of decadence, the fourth of which is that “man er-
sehnt einen Zustand, wo man nicht mehr leidet: das Leben wird thatsächlich als Grund zu Übeln emp-
funden, – man taxirt die bewußtlosen, gefühllosen Zustände (Schlaf, Ohnmacht) unvergleichlich werth-
voller als die bewußten: daraus eine Methodik…” (NL1888, 17[6], KSA 13, 527–528)
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sophical significance. I personally find that there are no better words to describe his
state in that period than those of the wonderful German expression: Geistige Um-
nachtung. Although my study is not of a biographical nature, there is a need to ad-
dress Nietzsche’s final letters if not his descent into madness, since it has been sug-
gested that they reveal the true nature of his thinking on religion, even if in a
confused form (cf.Young 2010, 530). Instead of engaging in biographical speculation,
I ask to what extent if any Nietzsche’s mad identification of God with himself can be
considered a logical development of his philosophical thinking on human possibil-
ities (cf. Young 2010, 562).²²
It is remarkable that the “return of God” to the centre of Nietzsche’s concerns
coincides with his last great experience of health, given that he in his late specula-
tions on the psychology of religion claims that the experience of health can be
enough for the sick person to feel the presence of God and to believe in God
(NL 1888, 14[124], KSA 13, 306). Nietzsche’s letters testify that he felt his ailments di-
minish significantly since his arrival in Turin on 20 September (KGB III/5, Bf. 1122)
and that he consequently plunged into a frenzy of work (cf. KGB III/5, Bf. 1137). So
on 13 November, amidst praising the Turin-weather, he can report that Twilight of
the Idols is ready to be printed, that the manuscript of Ecce Homo is likewise finish-
ed, and that the first book of the re-evaluation [Umwerthung] (i.e. Antichrist) is also
completed (KGB III/5, Bf. 1143). Then, the following day, on 14 November, he writes
what he himself calls a completely senseless letter [völlig sinnlosen Brief] (KGB III/
5, Bf. 1144) to Meta von Salis, in which he jokingly suggests that the good weather
is proof that the old God is still alive (KGB III/5, Bf. 1144). Already in December of
the same year, in a sketch of a letter meant to accompany copies of EH to the
same Meta von Salis, the old God has been abolished and Nietzsche is about to
take his place.²³ What can and should the scholar make of this?
Firstly, it is worth noting that the description of that autumn in EH matches that
of the letters to a great extent: Nietzsche opines that he never experienced such an
autumn, never thought such a season possible and records that having finished the
re-evaluation (i.e. Antichrist) he felt like a god. He specifically speaks of strolling as a
God along the Po river (KSA 6, 356). Notably, however, one does not find the kind of
self-divinization in EH as in letter Nr. 1177 or as one finds in the final letters (e.g.
KGB III/5, Bf. 1239 and KGB III/5, Bf. 1246), where Nietzsche writes as if he had
taken over the attributes of God as world-ruler and creator. What self-divinization
 However, I am explicitly not concerned with vain speculations about whether Nietzsche’s philos-
ophizing was destined to end thus. I also feel I have neither the right nor the competence to weigh in
on the question whether Nietzsche’s own way of living philosophy should be considered a contribu-
ting factor in his downfall. Such speculation started immediately after Nietzsche’s mental break-
down, and has not abated to this day. One can ask if that is a scholarly endeavour at all, given
the nature of the available evidence. Be that as it may, the question is beyond the scope of this study.
 “ich sende Ihnen hiermit etwas Stupendes, aus dem Sie ungefähr errathen werden, daß der alte Gott
abgeschafft ist, und daß ich selber alsbald die Welt regieren werde.” (KGB III/5 Bf. 1177; cf. Bf. 1187)
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there is in EH can instead be read as part of Nietzsche’s play with all that is holy and
as the representation of the possibility of a god-like mood of affirmation. In other
words, there is a difference that is more than a difference of degree. Still, it is impos-
sible to deny that there is some significant continuity in Nietzsche’s thinking until
the very end.²⁴ Unlike Young, who argues that the continuity is to be sought in the
Dionysian content of the letters (cf. Young 2010, 530), I think it is more helpful to
think of the continuity in question as one of style. Therefore, I will now pay attention
to the crazed laughter that the letters exhibit. It cannot be established with any cer-
tainty, to what extent Nietzsche’s final words on the matter (about being God) should
also be read (as an elaborate joke?) in the context of the “world-historical laughter”
that he mentions in one of the final letters (KGB III/5, Bf. 1232; cf. KGB III/5, Bf. 1240).
There is no denying that Nietzsche became incapable of taking care of himself and
that he became mad, to use a vulgar expression. Still, one can in retrospect conclude
that he went into this madness with his characteristic style; turning tragedy into
comedy. This is no more apparent than in the infamous letter to Burckhardt, from
4 January 1889, which he begins by proclaiming that he’d much rather be a Basel
professor than God but has not dared to be such an egoist as to refrain from taking
care of the creation of the world (KGB III/5, Bf. 1256).²⁵ While the letter contains “Di-
onysian” statements,²⁶ the mode of presentation itself is perhaps even more signifi-
cant. Indeed, it is such that one need not be surprised that the letter found its way
into André Breton’s groundbreaking surrealist anthology of black humour (Breton
2001). There is a biting irony in it that defies the apparent madness of the message,
yet one can do no more than to note that it is there. Of course, the possibilities of
interpreting the letter from within Nietzsche’s own philosophy are abundant.²⁷ Julian
Young has suggested that one might interpret it as resulting from a “habitation of the
 In this regard, I fully agree with Young’s view of the letters when he writes: “All this of course is
madness. Yet there is method in it, a vein of fragmented sanity that runs back to his best writings”
(Young 2010, 529).
 “Lieber Herr Professor, zuletzt wäre ich sehr viel lieber Basler Professor als Gott; aber ich habe nicht
gewagt, meinen Privat-Egoismus so weit zu treiben, um seinetwegen die Schaffung der Welt zu unterlas-
sen.” (KGB III/5, Bf. 1256)
 E.g. the identification of himself with all beings, in the sense that all persons are his incarnations:
“Was unangenehm ist und meiner Bescheidenheit zusetzt, ist, daß im Grunde jeder Name in der Ge-
schichte ich bin; auch mit den Kindern, die ich in die Welt gesetzt habe, steht es so, daß ich mit einigem
Mißtrauen erwäge, ob nicht Alle, die in das ‘Reich Gottes’ kommen, auch aus Gott kommen.” (KGB III/5,
Bf. 1256)
 As is the case with Nietzsche’s late philosophy in general. When Nietzsche writes his “autobiog-
raphy” EH, and claims that he shall be known for having cut history in half (KSA 6, 373), does he not
precisely do that, which he in D claims is a sign of impending death? In the aphorism Der Philosoph
und das Alter he writes: “Indem er sich selber kanonisiert, hat er auch das Zeugnis des Todes über sich
ausgestellt: von jetzt ab darf sein Geist sich nicht weiter entwickeln, die Zeit für ihn ist um, der Zeiger
fällt. Wenn ein großer Denker aus sich eine bindende Institution für die zukünftige Menschheit machen
will, darf man sicherlich annehmen, dass er über den Gipfel seiner Kraft gegangen und sehr müde, sehr
nahe seinem Sonnenuntergange ist.” (D 542, KSA 3, 312–313)
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Dionysian state”, but in a sense that is more related to Nietzsche’s early understand-
ing of a metaphysical primal unity that creates the world as an artist-god instead of
what Young takes to be his later naturalistic interpretation of Dionysian ecstasy (cf.
Young 2010, 530 and 562). Following this logic, one might even go as far as to claim
that Nietzsche now had reached the goal of his philosophy, the Dionysian state, and
no longer had any need of philosophy. Such an interpretation, however, presupposes
that Nietzsche idealizes and strives for an ecstatic transcendence of the self, and I
have shown that such interpretations are very problematic if not impossible. To
me it seems far more plausible to deny that there is any significant continuity be-
tween Nietzsche’s philosophy and the “philosophical” content of the letters, as the
letters are evidence of an inability to maintain the scepticism that characterizes
the philosopher’s relation to extraordinary experiences. In other words, one can de-
spite what seems like self-deconstructive irony in the letters detect in them an inabil-
ity to distinguish an extreme feeling of power from actually being God.
7.6 Conclusion
In the last letters, in the inability to maintain what one might, following Jacob Go-
lomb, call a mood of doubt, we witness the end of the philosophical Nietzsche,
the end of Nietzsche as philosopher, not the (inevitable) end of Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy. Despite the laughter with which this came to pass, it was a tragedy insofar as
one can hardly claim Nietzsche was finished with his philosophizing, not to speak
of claiming that he did not dream of still accomplishing quite a few things. It can
of course be argued that I have downplayed the contradictoriness of Nietzsche’s
work, i.e. the presence of disease (and/or metaphysical interpretation) in his earlier
writings. That has not been my intention. Instead, I have sought to clarify what kind
of striving, and what kind of ideal concerning moods, is the dominant force within
Nietzsche’s writings until his final days of sanity. The interpretation of Nietzsche’s
last works advanced here supports the contention that this striving is a by its nature
atheistic questioning, and that his ideal mood is a mood of joy in doubt. Now it only
remains to be specified, how best to describe this atheism, i.e. precisely what kind of
an atheism his atheism is.
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8 Nietzsche’s radical atheism?
After having cast doubt on the religionist interpretation of Nietzsche’s words that
God is dead and of the nature of his final ideal, this chapter asks if it makes
sense to describe Nietzsche’s mature philosophical thinking as “radical atheism”. Al-
though scholars of Nietzsche’s philosophy who have emphasized his atheism often
warn not to equate his thinking with “vulgar” atheism, they seldom specify how
Nietzsche’s position actually differs as an atheism.¹ In other words, the precise char-
acter of Nietzsche’s atheism stands in question. The general trajectory of Nietzsche’s
criticism suggests that it is an atheism that goes beyond a mere intellectual rejection
of the existence of God through a questioning of the emotional sources of religion.
The investigation of mood supports the reading sketched in the introductory chapter
that Nietzsche thinks a more thoroughgoing rejection is required, specifically a fun-
damental reorientation of desire or in other words an affective reorientation. Against
this background, Martin Hägglund’s thinking appears as particularly promising for
the task of clarification, because he has advanced thinking about the question of de-
sire like no other contemporary atheistic thinker. Drawing on Hägglund’s thought ar-
guably also allows one to appreciate the contemporary relevance of the central thrust
of Nietzsche’s criticism.
Given the pivotal role of the idea of a need for religion in 19th-century debates, it
should not surprise us that precisely questions concerning the “need for God” or a
“desire for transcendence” still are central to contemporary discussions in both the-
ology and philosophical atheism.² Besides attempts to reconstruct and defend the
notion of a need for God,³ there have been plenty of attempts at deconstruction,
 Michael Skowron has similarly argued that simply labelling Nietzsche an atheist does not tell much
about the precise character of Nietzsche’s atheism (Skowron 2002, 3). However, Skowron’s attempt to
cast Nietzsche’s atheism as a specifically religious atheism is typical of attempts to deny the radical-
ity of his atheism.While Skowron is correct to point out that (at least some forms of) Buddhism can
be considered both religious and atheistic, it is precisely such analogies which are misleading, since
all forms of Buddhism that can be defined as religious still hold on to an absolute value (Enlighten-
ment/Nirvana) and consider transcendence of time desirable even if they deny that there are gods.
Only by depriving the concept religion of any meaningful content can one claim that Nietzsche’s athe-
ism is religious. (Cf. Skowron 2002.)
 Though I here emphasize the influence of 19th-century discussions, the roots of the debate arguably
go back to the distant past. Nietzsche himself was convinced that the intellectual genealogy of the
idea of the human as essentially religious went back all the way to Plato, who wanted to prove
“dass Vernunft und Instinkt von selbst auf Ein Ziel zugehen, auf das Gute, auf ‚Gott” and Nietzsche
also did not fail to add polemically that “seit Plato sind alle Theologen und Philosophen auf der glei-
chen Bahn” (BGE 191, KSA 5, 112). Judging from the frequent invocation of the name of Plato in the
contemporary discussion, Nietzsche certainly has a point, although it must be added that Plato is
nowadays at least as frequently criticized as followed on this point.
 A case in point would be the theological movement of “radical orthodoxy” (Milbank and Oliver
2009), in which the idea of a desiderium naturale (a natural desire for God) is central and which
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most of which do not go any further than Nietzsche already did in the 19th century. As
already suggested, a most remarkable exception is to be found in the work of Martin
Hägglund, who has undertaken the task of rethinking the question of desire from the
roots. Besides being at the forefront of serious atheistic thinking, his contribution to
the understanding of desire is of such significance that it alone arguably justifies the
critical attention his work has already attracted (e.g. Hägglund 2009).
8.1 Traditional and radical atheism
Hägglund bases his intervention in the philosophical discussion on atheism and re-
ligion on what he takes to be an important distinction between traditional and rad-
ical atheism. Traditional atheism questions and denies the existence of God, but does
not question the desire for God and immortality (Hägglund 2008, 1). Radical atheism
goes further as it also questions the desire for God and denies the desirability of God
and of immortality (Hägglund 2008, 1 and 8). Because this distinction seems perfect-
ly to fit the distinction between Nietzsche’s own atheism and the kind of atheism he
targets in his criticism, I will begin by questioning it critically; thereby also paying
homage to the deconstructionist spirit of Hägglund’s own efforts.
For two weighty reasons it is best to think of Hägglund’s distinction as a heuristic
construct, as a useful conceptual tool, rather than as a thesis that would apply gen-
erally to the history of atheism. First of all, it needs to be pointed out that not explic-
itly questioning the desire for God and immortality does not mean that one would
accept that all men and women feel such a desire, not to speak of personally recog-
nizing that one is driven by such a desire if asked about the matter. So unlike what
Hägglund polemically suggests, the fact that atheists traditionally have concentrated
on the question of God’s existence instead of on the question of desire does not gen-
erally mean that mortal existence is still seen by all “traditional” atheists as a lack
that it is desirable to transcend (cf. Hägglund 2008, 1). All that can be said is that
merely denying the existence of God does leave the door open for thinking of the con-
dition of the atheist as one of both denying and desiring transcendence. That would
indeed be a lamentable condition, and types of atheism that do exhibit such a self-
understanding need to be distinguished from more radical atheisms. Yet even if the
distinction between traditional and radical atheism is in this regard more than a
false dichotomy, it is in lack of unambiguous evidence simply unwarranted to ascribe
in this regard draws on earlier attempts to resuscitate that idea by Henri de Lubac (cf. Milbank 2005).
The more mainstream appeal and influence of such ideas can be seen in Charles Taylor’s influential
tome A Secular Age (Taylor 2007). Taylor’s historical excursions are all embedded in and serve to sup-
port the premise that all humans desire fullness and that perhaps only a reference to transcendence
can fully account for the human condition. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that he expresses
agreement with Milbank on this point and ends up pleading for a return to a “Plato-type” under-
standing of the human condition as a remedy to secularization (cf. Taylor 2007, 775).
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to atheist X the view that transcendence is desirable. A case in point would be Ber-
trand Russell, probably the most widely read Anglophone critic of religion in the
20th century, who in his published work on religion was very traditional and focused
on the one hand on the question of the existence of God, specifically “belief in God
and immortality”, and on the other on moral questions (Russell 2004, 2). Despite this
focus, it is not hard to find traces of an anthropological view completely at odds with
any desire for transcendence in his work; e.g. quite succinctly formulated in the con-
clusion of an essay from 1952, which remained unpublished during the lifetime of the
philosopher:
My conclusion is that there is no reason to believe any of the dogmas of traditional theology and,
further, that there is no reason to wish that they were true. Man, in so far as he is not subject to
natural forces, is free to work out his own destiny. The responsibility is his, and so is the oppor-
tunity. (Russell 1997, 548)
In other words, the difference between traditional and radical atheism must be re-
thought as a difference of focus, if it is to be of any general use in making sense
of the historical record.
Secondly, the distinction between traditional and radical atheism seems to by-
pass the fact that there is a great variety of atheistic traditions; a fact which the flow-
ering of research on atheism in recent years has done much to illuminate.⁴ The dis-
tinction conjures up the impression of a uniform tradition of atheism, which is
confronted by a radical atheism without tradition, a radical break from tradition.
It only needs to be added that Hägglund explicitly associates radical atheism with
Jacques Derrida and no one else in order to arrive at the conclusion that the distinc-
tion is nothing more than a polemical invention meant to highlight the supposed
originality and superiority of that French “master”. Although such a conclusion
would be premature, there is still reason to be sceptical of Hägglund’s portrayal of
the history of atheism. While his further elaborations do not give reason to think
of traditional atheism as one single tradition, and fortunately also do not suggest
that the story of radical atheism begins and ends with Derrida, he is far too keen
to reduce history to fit his ends, i.e. to illustrate the distinction. Hägglund himself
on one occasion speaks of three prominent models of traditional atheism: melan-
cholic, pragmatic and therapeutic (Hägglund 2009, 228–229).
Melancholic atheism denies the existence of God, but assumes that humans still
desire transcendence and are therefore doomed to disappointment. Pragmatic athe-
ism likewise agrees that religious transcendence is an illusion, but that the desire for
transcendence is nevertheless real and the question is how to channel this desire.
 For a taste of this variety, consult the Oxford Handbook of Atheism. See specifically the introductory
essay for an overview (Bullivant and Ruse 2013). There the editors promise to present atheism in its
varied manifestations (Bullivant and Ruse 2013, 4) and there is even mention of the “endless forms”
of atheism (Bullivant and Ruse 2013, 5), which is perhaps going a bit too far.
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Finally, therapeutic atheism, which Hägglund claims originates with Epicurus and
Lucretius and which he furthermore associates with psychoanalysis, tries to cure
the desire for transcendence. (Cf. Hägglund 2009, 228–229.) What is wrong with
these types of atheism, according to Hägglund, is that all simply assume that each
and every desire at its most fundamental really functions as a desire for transcen-
dence.⁵ Needless to say, all of these types of atheism can be found in 19th- and
early 20th-century history; the melancholic model is found in Ernest Renan (cf. Chad-
wick 1975, 248 and 254), the pragmatic in Ludwig Feuerbach and Auguste Comte (cf.
Watkin 2011, 2; cf. Chadwick 1975, 238), and the therapeutic in Sigmund Freud (Hägg-
lund 2012, 110– 111). The question is rather whether the 19th century with its turn to
the human was typical in this regard, and whether there were not also atheists in
that era as well as in others who simply would have denied that any such desire ex-
isted in the first place.⁶
Far from being a reason to dismiss the distinction altogether, this lack of concern
with historical detail is rather a sign that for Hägglund allusions to historical models
of atheism serve only to introduce the argument proper. Likewise, Derrida’s thinking
serves Hägglund only as a favoured example of the “logic of radical atheism”. This of
course does not mean that the strict definition of the distinction is worthless for his-
torical research. To the contrary, it is especially fruitful to understand the contrast
between certain prominent 19th-century atheisms, above all that between Schopen-
hauer’s and Nietzsche’s atheisms, which means that the distinction is also useful
to understand the history of atheism after Nietzsche. While it is hardly meaningful
to try to write a comprehensive history of radical atheism, as such an effort could
easily degenerate to a kind of cataloguing, the value of the distinction lies in its ca-
pacity to illuminate specific cases. For example, Hägglund’s distinction can be ap-
plied to understand the difference between the atheism of Jacques Lacan and that
of Jacques Derrida: Lacan acknowledges that God is an illusion, but nevertheless
thinks humans necessarily desire the impossible existence of God, whereas Derrida
denies both the existence and desirability of God (cf. Hägglund 2008, 192– 193). It has
to be explicitly pointed out, however, that this means the distinction can definitely
 “The common denominator for all these models of atheism is the assumption that the religious
desire for absolute immunity is operative. When we desire the good we desire an absolute good
that is immune from evil, and when we desire life we desire an absolute life that is immune from
death. The fundamental drama of human existence is thus seen as the conflict between the mortal
being that is our fate and the immortal being that we desire.” (Hägglund 2009, 229)
 As a historical curiosity it is also worth mentioning that it is very well possible to deny the desir-
ability of the existence of God without necessarily denying the existence of God, e.g. one might take
the Promethean view that the interests and desires of mankind conflict with those of God and that
God must be overthrown. That there have been a number of thinkers who have espoused such
views is worth recognizing, but unfortunately the recent “history” of such thinkers by Bernard Schwe-
izer, which for the most part reads more like a catalogue, is unduly sensationalistic in general and
utterly misleading in particular for its treatment of Nietzsche as someone whose criticism of religion
was above all an expression of hatred against God (cf. Schweizer 2011).
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not be used to distinguish “philosophical atheism” of the continental kind from pop-
ular kinds of humanistic and naturalistic atheism, because philosophical atheism
might just as well be traditional as radical and because most humanists who sub-
scribe to a naturalistic view of the human would deny that there really is such a
thing as a desire for transcendence.⁷
To conclude the introductory clarification of Hägglund’s distinction, it has be-
come clear that the definition of traditional atheism has to be reinterpreted if not re-
formulated if it is to apply to the history of atheism in general: if one reads the word
“question” in the sentence “traditional atheism does not question the desire for God”
(cf. Hägglund 2008, 1) in the sense of explicitly questioning (and not in the sense of
denying), everything is in order insofar that traditionally atheists have concentrated
on the question of the existence of God and not on the existential question concern-
ing the desirability of God. Nietzsche of course is one of the few thinkers critical of
religion, who were more concerned with the latter question than the former, which is
hardly of any concern to him. On account of this focus, he stands out in the history of
atheism (before the 20th century). Hägglund, however, has not thus far mentioned
Nietzsche in his major works⁸ and first masked his radically atheist theory of desire
as a reading of Derrida. Nevertheless, or rather precisely therefore, it is of great schol-
arly interest to confront Nietzsche’s thinking with Hägglund’s theory. Therefore, I will
in the following section ask in what specific sense Hägglund’s radical atheism ques-
tions the desire for God, before turning back to Nietzsche.
8.2 Hägglund’s argument: The logic of radical atheism
Hägglund’s most basic claim is that all purported desire for immortality (or God, viz.
an incorruptible instance) is preceded by an investment in survival which contradicts
it from within. Hägglund does not simply seek to replace the notion of a constitutive
desire for immortality by positing something like a more basic drive or desire for sur-
vival (cf. Hägglund 2012, 12). Rather than substituting one teleological principle with
another, i.e. a theological with an atheistic principle, he seeks to develop a theory of
desire that allows one to take account of the purported desire for transcendence
without taking the self-interpretations of those who write about such a desire for
granted as expressing the truth of desire. Consequently, he writes about the “so-
 In recent years, quite a few scholars have sought to distance the more philosophical forms of athe-
ism that they consider intellectually respectable from what they consider the naïve atheism of certain
popular authors, and have consequently emphasized the difficulty of atheism. It is therefore neces-
sary to point out that Hägglund’s distinction cannot in itself be used to serve that purpose, unless one
adds to it some theory about the lasting power of religious ideals on humanistic forms of atheism,
which I assume is only to a limited extent possible.
 However, I have been informed this will change with the publication of Hägglund’s next book, cur-
rently entitled This Life: On Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom, scheduled for release in 2019.
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called desire for immortality” (Hägglund 2008, 1), and the task he puts to himself is
to take account of how such a desire can arise within mortal life. Put in more Hägg-
lundian terms, he seeks to read the “desire for immortality/God” against itself from
within. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a short characterization of the model of
desire against which Hägglund works.
The view that Hägglund seeks to deconstruct is the view that what we really de-
sire is immortal, and the two canonical texts that he above others singles out as hav-
ing formed this view are Plato’s Symposium (Hägglund 2012, 2) and St Augustine’s
Confessions (Hägglund 2008, 107). In the platonic dialogues, though especially in
the Symposium, Socrates argues that all desire is fundamentally desire for what is
immortal; for that which cannot be lost. In Augustine’s formulation, all desire is de-
sire for God, the eternal. The logic behind the view is that one can only desire what
one does not have or what one is not. So if I truly am happy, I cannot desire to be
happy. In other words, one desires what one lacks. One strives for fullness because
one lacks fullness.When someone who is or seems happy then objects that he or she
does still desire to be happy this is because he or she is not perfectly happy since the
happiness can be lost (Hägglund 2012, 4). Only that which is eternal is perfect and
safe from corruption, wherefore the desire for happiness is really a desire for that
which is eternal. Following this logic, only that which is eternal can satisfy desire
and as all desire is fundamentally desire for the eternal it is wise to rise up from mor-
tal desires toward the immortal. In other words, Plato’s Socrates teaches an orienta-
tion of desire to the transcendent; to another world. From this view there is only a
short step to Augustine’s influential and more rigid understanding of detachment
from the mortal as a precondition for the turn to the immortal, to God (cf. Hägglund
2008, 109).
In the texts of Plato and Augustine, Hägglund nevertheless finds traces of an al-
ternative understanding of desire, in which desire is conceptualized as essentially
conditioned by time. In this alternative view, which is present in the texts and yet
suppressed by the authors in question, the reason why someone who is happy still
desires to be happy is not interpreted as suggesting a desire for perfect happiness,
which requires transcending time, but as a desire to hold onto the happiness one
has, which requires a continuation of life within time (cf. Hägglund 2012, 4–5). So
within all desire there is a desire to go on. The desire to live on, to survive, cannot
in its turn according to Hägglund aim at immortality, at transcending time, since
time is the condition of survival, and transcending time would erase the possibility
of desiring anything just as much as it would erase the frustration of desire (Hägg-
lund 2008, 2 and Hägglund 2012, 9). Hägglund explicitly cautions that this does
not mean that desire never reaches its goals, but rather that any fulfilment is neces-
sarily temporal and bound to pass away. In this sense, Hägglund finds in all desire,
or better yet: at the root of all desire, an “unconditional affirmation of survival”
(Hägglund 2008, 2), or what he later specifies as a “constitutive investment in surviv-
al” (Hägglund 2012, 13). This means nothing more than that for a living being, it is
impossible to be completely indifferent to survival; to living on in time. If life
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could not be lost, if the objects of desire could not be lost, one would not care about
anything at all. It is the bond to temporal life that opens up the possibility of both
positive and negative affective responses, the chance of life and of death. In other
words, one can seek to weaken or even destroy the bond to life instead of continuing
it, but one cannot be indifferent to it, unless one is already dead.⁹
Now, according to Hägglund, it is precisely the co-implication of desire and mor-
tality that leads religious teachers to preach detachment as the way to God or salva-
tion. Desire for the mortal, attachment to mortal life, is necessarily haunted by loss
and hence it has been reasoned that detachment is the way to God and immortality,
to a state beyond loss. By redirecting desire, it is then argued, one could transcend
the inevitable extinction of life and of all that is valuable. However, and this is the
radically atheist point, immortality is equivalent to absolute death. In a state
where there is no loss, there is also no time of survival, no time of life. Moreover,
the radically atheist logic of desire implies that the religious ideal of detachment
and the desire for immortality are born out of a preceding attachment to life. This
is because attachment to transient things and mortal beings, chronophilia, is neces-
sarily accompanied by fear of loss, chronophobia, which in its turn can generate the
idea that one could escape time into a state where nothing can be lost. For Hägglund
then, it is the very commitment to mortal life that engenders the turn away from the
mortal. The turn away from the mortal is however, if drawn to its conclusion, a turn
toward death because life, mortality and the desirability of anything are inextricably
linked. This means that the prospect of immortality, when thought through, cannot
cure the fear of loss and death, i.e. cannot cure chronophobia, since immortality/
God is death. Neither can the prospect of immortality satisfy the desire to live on
for the very same reason. There is, in other words, a contradiction in the supposed
desire for immortality, as the state where nothing can be lost is arguably undesirable
(cf. Hägglund 2008, 111). Thus, Hägglund concludes that the “desire for fullness/ab-
solute emptiness is not the truth of desire but rather a self-defeating attempt to deny
the attachment to temporal life that is the source of all care” (Hägglund 2012, 9). The
logic of the argument is admittedly elegant, but I am here not concerned with eval-
uating its truth. Instead, I seek to show what use can be made of it for understanding
Nietzsche’s criticism of religion.
In concluding that desire for absolute transcendence is desire for death, that God
is death/nothingness, Nietzsche and Hägglund are in full agreement.¹⁰ However, it is
 “I am not claiming that temporal finitude is desirable as such but that it is the condition for both
the desirable and the undesirable.” (Hägglund 2012, 14) Ergo: “finitude is not something that comes
to inhibit desire, but precipitates desire in the first place. It is because the beloved can be lost that
one seeks to keep it, and it is because the experience can be forgotten that one seeks to remember it.”
(Hägglund 2008, 111)
 Of course one can ask if this is the only possible understanding of the concept God, and Nietzsche
himself associates it most with the Christian concept of God (A 47, KSA 6, 225), whereby he seems
mostly to refer specifically to a “Platonic” concept of God, in which the attribute of immortality is
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also worth asking whether the logic of desire that Hägglund elucidates can be con-
sidered a challenge to Nietzsche, and this is the question I will pursue in the next
section, after initially showing why it is worth asking. A particularly noteworthy con-
sequence of Hägglund’s theory is that there can be no full affirmation of life. Just as
he argues that the idea of immortality cannot cure chronophobia, he also argues that
more chronophilia cannot cure chronophobia (Hägglund 2012, 111). It is rather the
case that the more one is attached to mortal things, to life, the more one will fear
loss and the greater will the desire be to keep what one loves safe from time. If
one did not fear death and loss, one would be indifferent and incapable of attach-
ment. This means that the affirmation of the human condition, or generally the con-
dition of any mortal being, is always haunted by death and that one is always moved
by both chronophilia and chronophobia. So in this perspective, “therapeutic atheism”
is misguided, if and when it seeks to cure religious desires for immortality by encour-
aging either acceptance of death or love of life. As Nietzsche seeks to reorient desire
to the earth, and seeks the highest possible affirmation of life, the question is wheth-
er his philosophy does not amount to yet another futile attempt to cure chronopho-
bia?
8.3 Nietzsche’s ideal mood: Escape from time or heightening of
experience in time?
The distinction between traditional and radical atheism allows one to read the dis-
pute between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as a dispute over desire, more than as a
dispute about epistemology and the existence of another world.¹¹ Schopenhauer
thinks that there is a metaphysical need to transcend time, to rise from becoming
into being/non-being, and teaches detachment from mortal life as the path to full-
ness/emptiness. By contrast, and as a reaction, the entire trajectory of Nietzsche’s
criticism of religion is shaped by his privileging of becoming within time, and he con-
central and is thought of in terms of being as opposed to becoming. Not least due to Augustine’s in-
fluence, such an understanding of God has been dominant in the Western tradition of religious think-
ing. Whereas Augustine’s God is where his heart finds rest beyond time, Nietzsche identifies the de-
sire for rest with disease and absolute rest with death (e.g. GS Foreword 2, KSA 3, 348; cf. NL 1887,
9[60], KSA 12, 365). There are perhaps other ways to conceptualize the final end of religious life, even
within the Christian tradition, e.g. as ever closer union (without ever coming to rest), but that is be-
yond the point here. Hägglund’s point can also be expressed thus: insofar as there is a God or are
Gods, he/she/it/they must be mortal.
 In this regard, it is particularly interesting to note that Nietzsche, in his early critique of Schopen-
hauer, concedes that there might be a metaphysical world, but argues that the desires that have led to
thinking that a metaphysical world would be valuable to us arise from self-deception and error, and
that if there was a metaphysical world it should be of no concern to us (HH I 9, KSA 2, 29–30). In his
late work, Nietzsche is very clear that it is precisely Schopenhauer’s nihilistic interpretation of desire,
i.e. of the Will, that interests him as a psychologist (cf. KSA 6, 125).
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sequently advocates a greater love of earthly life. This love of the earth is however not
a simple love of what has been and what is, but of the possibilities of becoming, and
specifically of a heightening of life. This heightening is expressed as high moods
within this life (cf. BGE 257, KSA 5, 205), and it is through such moods that one reach-
es the highest possible affirmation of life.
Basically, two options of reading Nietzsche’s thinking about the highest possible
affirmation are worth considering. One can either read it as an escape from time as
Julian Young does, i.e. as an immunization strategy, or as an enhancement of expe-
rience in time, i.e. as an optimization strategy. Just as one would expect from Hägg-
lund’s theory, Nietzsche’s statements about the affirmation of temporal life seem
contradictory, but I do think the evidence speaks stronger in favour of the latter in-
terpretation. The apparent contradictoriness is most evident in Thus Spoke Zarathus-
tra, where Zarathustra on the one hand praises the embrace of transience and all the
pain of loss as a precondition of the life he considers desirable (KSA 4, 110– 111), but
on the other speaks of how a mere acceptance of transience cannot be satisfying and
that time and all its woe have to be redeemed (KSA 4, 180– 181). The greater the at-
tachment, the greater the pain, and the temptation to deny all attachment. Nietz-
sche’s Zarathustra seems to be aware of this basic problem, and his only answer
is this: “Woe says: Now Go! Yet all joy wants Eternity” (Parkes 2005, 199; KSA 4,
404). While it is clear enough that the formula that all joy wants eternity cannot
be interpreted in terms of a traditional religious desire,¹² and that instead of pointing
to a specific human desire for what is eternal it rather expresses a desire for becom-
ing within all desire, one must ask what consequences this understanding of desire
has for the high moods that he holds out as desirable. Nietzsche’s protagonist clearly
rejects the adequacy of the solution that “not-willing” at all is the answer (cf. KSA 4,
181), that one could escape time, and instead simply emphasizes that the pain that
wants to end attachment is not as original as the joy that wants to go on in Eternity.
This suggests that Nietzsche does not seek to cure chronophobia with chronophilia,
but rather simply to point out that chronophilia is more fundamental in the same
way that he speaks of all life as fundamentally will to power (cf. GM III 7, KSA 5,
350; cf. GS 349, KSA 3, 585–586). This view has consequences for Nietzsche’s think-
ing on the heightening of life, as the question then is whether there is a way of deal-
ing with the necessary pain of life other than through detachment; without turning
away from life. What is the highest possible affirmation of life, once one recognizes
that even the fullest affirmation will be marked by pain?
 This is of course how Charles Taylor seeks to reinterpret Zarathustra’s/Nietzsche’s words that all
joy wants eternity. Taylor specifically interprets it to mean that death undermines meaning (cf. Taylor
2007, 722), whereas to me it seems that Nietzsche is far closer to Hägglund’s understanding of time,
loss and death as preconditions for meaning. Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes that if there is to be
creation, there has to be destruction; a view from which it follows that it is misguided to think that
death threatens meaning as it is far more the precondition of meaning.
236 8 Nietzsche’s radical atheism?
Nietzsche’s emphasis on becoming allows him to conceive of a distancing from
one’s own pain and from one’s own time that does not entail detachment from mor-
tal life, but rather a heightening of one’s experience in time. This distancing is ena-
bled by an orientation toward the earthly future; an orientation which, as his writ-
ings suggest, makes possible experiencing moods that are in effect moods of the
future. This is the case, because Nietzsche thinks the orientation toward the future
is indissociable from the creation of the future; it is not a real orientation unless it
informs all of one’s actions.¹³ One can thus conceive of the following scenario: As
Nietzsche through thinking and writing orients himself towards the greater inde-
pendence that characterizes his philosophers of the future, who have overcome
the religious past, he already experiences a distancing from his own era and an ap-
proximation of the desired independence. As he thinks about and works towards the
affirmation made possible by that independence, about the affirmation that charac-
terizes their relation to life, he already experiences a greater joy. That Nietzsche him-
self sought to live with his pain through such a strategy is certainly suggested in his
published writings as well as in his letters. In one particularly striking letter to his
sister from summer 1883, in which he complains about the dreadful impact of the
weather on his health, he goes as far as to state that thinking about the future of hu-
manity is his only solace.¹⁴ Whatever value one might ascribe to such biographical
speculation, one thing is clear: As Nietzsche’s thinking expressed in his texts is fun-
damentally oriented toward the earthly future and that which is possible in time, in-
stead of toward a timeless state of being, it qualifies as radically atheist.
That Nietzsche’s thinking can be considered radically atheist of course does not
mean that his thinking about the highest affirmation is unproblematic, nor that his
statements about high moods are free from contradiction. Needless to say, having
eyes only for the future necessarily has devastating ethical consequences, and in
Nietzsche’s case it is especially clear that a distancing from his own pain goes
hand in hand with a distancing from the pain of those around him. One might
seek to point out that the philosopher is but one mask of the human being, but
the philosophical Nietzsche’s emphasis on treating all of life as an experiment
speaks against any attempt to treat his thinking as harmless in this regard. When
it comes to moods, there is also a very strong tendency or drive toward wholeness,
to the idea of one dominating mood (e.g. GS 288, KSA 3, 528–529; cf. NL 1882,
1[3] 252, KSA 10, 83), and consequently, one finds justifications of such practices
as slavery for the purpose of creating or literally breeding beings capable of dwelling
in high moods (cf. BGE 257, KSA 5, 205). In the Nachlass one can of course find notes
cautioning against the idea of privileging one mood (e.g. NL 1882, 1[70], KSA 10, 28),
 E.g.when Nietzsche, in order to challenge the joy of the free spirit, introduces the thought of Eter-
nal Recurrence, the affirmation of which he considers the highest affirmation possible (cf. NL 1888,
16[32], KSA 13, 492), he specifically asks if incorporating the thought would not inform all of one’s
actions (GS 341, KSA 3, 570).
 “Die Zukunft der Menschheit – daran zu denken ist mein einziges Labsal” (KGB III/1, Bf. 453).
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and in the published works there are statements about the value of being capable of
many different affects (e.g. GM III 12, KSA 5, 365), but there is no suggestion that this
would have any ethical consequences. For example, the capacity to feel compassion
[Mitleid] is in this view certainly valuable, but that does not mean one should direct
such feelings at the weak. In other words, statements stressing an openness to differ-
ent affects and moods do not have to do with the fundamental orientation that
Nietzsche strives toward, which is perhaps best thought of as a background mood
from within which specific affects are felt and which constrains the expression of
specific feelings. Whether one can, and to what extent it makes sense to, dissociate
Nietzsche’s thinking on mood from his specific visions is ultimately a philosophical
question that should not concern us here. However, let it be said that Nietzsche’s em-
phasis on independence by necessity forces the reader to make up his or her own
mind about what is valuable in the philosopher’s thinking.¹⁵
To conclude, Nietzsche’s thinking on desire and his communication of mood do
not contradict his atheism. To the contrary, viewing Nietzsche’s criticism of religion
from this perspective allows one to specify that his atheism is a radical atheism that
not only denies the existence of God but also questions the desire for God. Nietz-
sche’s questioning of the desire for God leads him to think that a reorientation of de-
sire toward the earthly future is an opportunity that should be pursued, not least be-
cause of the promise of a higher culture of higher moods.
 Just as one can question William James’ reasons for thinking that only a religious perspective can
open up the “strenuous mood” of striving (cf. Lekan 2007) one might dispute that Nietzsche has valid
reasons for thinking that heightening moods requires deepening social hierarchy. The difficulty of
course is that Nietzsche, unlike James, is not all too clear about his reasons when it comes to this
particular issue and prefers to speak in a prophetic voice on the matter. Perhaps this preference
means that there is all the more reason to question Nietzsche’s interpretation.
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9 Conclusions
This concluding chapter consists of two parts. I will first present a summary of the
most important results of the research undertaken, and thereby answer the questions
asked in the introduction (section 9.1 and subsections). Thus, I clarify the relevance
of the study for scholarship on Nietzsche. After that, I will reflect on the implications
of the results for further research on the emotional dimensions of secularization (sec-
tion 9.2 and subsections).
9.1 The big picture: Nietzsche on the death of God and the
moods of the future
The evidence examined and the interpretations presented in the preceding chapters
support the contention, which was an important provisional starting point of this
study, that Nietzsche is at least as critical of the idea that the recognition that God
is dead necessarily results in a melancholy mood as he is critical of philosophies
that either explicitly or inadvertently replace religion with new convictions such as
a faith in the idea of an inevitable progress of humanity or in the idea that a natural
morality must be a morality of equal human rights. His most important philosophical
works are rather characterized by a sceptical play with such ideas, suggesting a gen-
uine openness towards the future.¹ Consequently, his thinking cannot, without either
abandoning or doing violence to the spirit that defines it, be used to support narra-
tives of modernization in general and of secularization in particular that exaggerate
loss just as it cannot be used to bolster optimistic narratives of progress. While the
general openness that defines his vision of the moods of the future thus works
against any rigid interpretations, his works also allow one to reconstruct more spe-
cific objections. Most importantly, Nietzsche dissects ideas of a need for God and
seeks to move beyond the kind of doubt and atheism that leaves desire for God in-
tact, and thus rejects the central premises of interpretations that contend that lack of
faith implies dwelling in a melancholy mood. For Nietzsche, the rejection of both the
idea of an ineradicable need for God and of the desirability of God necessarily also
means rejecting the need for and desirability of “secular” equivalents, i.e. replace-
ments for lost faith, “shadows of God” (cf. GS 108, KSA 3, 467). This is the case, be-
 Put simply, I have argued that neither Nietzsche’s visions of desirable futures nor his visions of
catastrophe should be read as statements about what will inevitably come to pass. A few more
words about progress seem called for, since I have not paid much attention to the issue. Already
in HH, Nietzsche rejects the idea that any kind of progress would be inevitable (HH I 24, KSA 2,
45). However, more typical expressions of Nietzsche’s play with the idea of progress and the related
idea of natural morality are to be found in the late works, where he mockingly reclaims the term
“progress” and the motto “return to nature” for his own immoralist project. (KSA 6, 150; cf. A 4,
KSA 6, 171)
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cause Nietzsche’s criticism of religion and his criticism of secular convictions both
have their roots, besides in historical criticism and language criticism, in his psycho-
logical thinking, which is arguably the most important force in his mature criticism.
Specifically, they both stem from the same psychological revaluation; namely a dis-
trust of the value of having “faith” and an associated vision of a greater health and a
greater joy in a greater scepticism; i.e. in an eminently desirable mood.
9.1.1 A reconstruction of Nietzsche’s psychology of faith
Nietzsche’s psychology of religion culminates in opposing religious faith, which he
diagnoses as a sign of weakness, to freedom from binding convictions, which he di-
agnoses as a sign of strength and associates with the psychological type that Zara-
thustra represents (cf. A 54, KSA 6, 236–237, cf. GS 347, KSA 3, 581–583). This intu-
ition that is clearly articulated in his late work is operative in all of the writings
following HH, in which he began his attack on faith. Although one can cautiously
surmise that it seems ultimately to rest on his own experience and self-interpreta-
tion,² and that his writings from HH onward can be read as attempts to communicate
this experience, one should not overlook that philosophical argumentation is essen-
tial to his communication. After all, he can only through argument transmit a sense
of why he does what he does. Thus, Nietzsche argues for his view throughout his
works, e.g. by trying to show that binding convictions can be harmful to science
and to life (e.g. D 19, KSA 3, 32) and that freeing oneself from such convictions
opens up possibilities of heightening life. Against this background, one can begin
to see why Nietzsche besides questioning religion and religious believers also,
though not as frequently, questions atheism and those who understand themselves
as having moved beyond religion. Instead of merely assuming that the joy of those
who deem themselves free spirits is a strong joy he questions it. In other words,
 As might be claimed of what is most important in Nietzsche’s psychological thinking in general,
namely his revaluations. Although defending Nietzsche is not my task, it needs to be explicitly point-
ed out that his critical reflection on the nature of experience is best interpreted as more than an “ap-
peal to experience” that has no value other than for the understanding of Nietzsche’s eccentric char-
acter. In other words, at least some of his claims can be intersubjectively verified, and the logic
behind them can be clarified. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Wilhelm Dilthey, whose phil-
osophical thinking differs markedly from that of Nietzsche yet was also above all a continuous reflec-
tion on experience, came to similar conclusions about the potentials of freeing oneself from convic-
tions in a work originally published in 1910: “Das historische Bewusstsein von der Endlichkeit jeder
geschichtlichen Erscheinung, jedes menschlichen oder gesellschaftlichen Zustandes, von der Relativität
jeder Art von Glauben ist der letzte Schritt zur Befreiung des Menschen. Mit ihm erreicht der Mensch die
Souveränität, jedem Erlebnis seinen Gehalt abzugewinnen, sich ihm ganz hinzugeben, unbefangen, als
wäre kein System von Philosophie oder Glauben, das Menschen binden könnte.” (Dilthey 1979, 290)
Needless to say, Dilthey did not see that such a view could have the kind of moral implications
Nietzsche associated with it.
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he challenges it, for instance with imagery familiar from narratives of loss (cf. GS 125,
KSA 3, 480–482), to test their mood. His questioning is not meant to deny that living
a joyful life without religion is possible, as might be assumed. To the contrary, it is
meant to point to the possibility of heightening life. The logic behind this procedure
can be reconstructed thus: because life is full of uncertainty, only a joy that needs no
convictions, that plays with convictions and finds joy in doubt and uncertainty, is a
sure sign of a truly life-affirming spirit.³ The consequences for the understanding of
atheism might sound paradoxical: for atheism to be viable and to rest on a secure
foundation, it must be of a radical kind that can deal with ambiguity that thrives
in uncertainty. Yet it is arguably precisely this intuition, which makes Nietzsche
such a perceptive diagnostician not only of religion but also of atheism. For it pro-
vokes the questions: Is this the kind of atheism that we know from history and ex-
perience? If not, might that not be problematic as one can hardly think of a more
atheistic position than such a radical scepticism toward belief?⁴ While I already
noted that Nietzsche’s work is characterized by a general openness toward the fu-
ture, a specific kind of openness is thus essential to his vision of the moods of the
future in an even more significant sense. His reflections on what would most height-
en experience, and especially on what moods are most desirable, thus circle around
fostering and maintaining a life-affirming scepticism. Above all, Nietzsche seeks to
present this specific kind of atheism in his writings, perhaps even to prove that
such an atheism is possible, and this can be established through paying attention
to Nietzsche’s communication of mood.
9.1.2 Nietzsche’s communication of a mood of joyful doubt
Nietzsche’s writings are rich in affects but the results of this study suggests that a
vision of a specific mood plays a central role for him. From HH onward, Nietzsche
seeks to communicate a philosophical mood, a mood conducive to living a philo-
sophical life that unites scepticism and joy. While his emphasis shifts from the
one to the other, both aspects are present in all of his mature writings. So while
 In this spirit, Nietzsche at times positively suggests the free spirits should seek out danger and
challenges in order to become stronger and to reach a higher joy. An extreme example is to be
found in GS: “The secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoy-
ment is – to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into un-
charted seas!” (Kaufmann 1974, 228; GS 283, KSA 3, 526–527)
 In other words, the question is how atheistic the most common forms of atheism are, in compar-
ison with Nietzsche’s vision. In a recent article, Simon During asks whether absolute secularity is
conceivable, and ends up with the view that it is to be found only in a position which “appeals to
limitless enquiry, limitless questioning openness to future contingencies” and therefore has no
fixed identity, i.e. it “can never secure its own endpoint” (During 2017, 166). During mentions
Nietzsche as a possible example of such absolute secularity, but also notes that this is contested
by some scholars who view him as a religious thinker (During 2017, 159).
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some scholars have emphasized the mood of doubt in HH, and the mood of joy in GS,
both works are best read as seeking to communicate both doubt and joy, i.e. of joyful
doubt.⁵ From the nature of this mood it follows that Nietzsche’s communication of
mood, from HH onward, is best not grasped in terms suggesting manipulation,
e.g. as “use of mood”. Following my interpretation, what Nietzsche demands of
his readers (e.g. in EH, cf. KSA 6, 303 and 304), is not to have precisely the same
particular experiences as he has, nor to have the same ideas, but instead to have
a similar independence (as what he claims to have). This independence can of course
be put in terms of experience; as the experience of doubt as a joyful state instead of
as a negative condition. Nietzsche is well aware that he cannot simply transmit this
experience to the reader (e.g. GS 286, KSA 3, 528),⁶ but can communicate it by show-
ing it in his writings. With this in mind, we can return to Stefan Zweig’s contention
that if Nietzsche “teaches” anything he teaches freedom (Zweig 1925, 322), and con-
clude that Zweig’s judgement hits the spot; it is not only intriguing but also basically
correct. Such a teaching cannot be direct, it cannot be uttered as a command to do
this or that, for such an approach would be contrary to the spirit out of which the
teaching grows and would therefore undermine its own credibility. It can also not
be forced on the recipient through manipulation of mood for the same reason. So
against Friederike Reents’ suggestion that Nietzsche’s “privileging” [Fundamentier-
ung] of mood might explain his adoption by the National Socialists (Reents 2015,
242–243), one must note that while Nietzsche recognized the power of mood and
the possibility to manipulate mood, the mood that Nietzsche sought to communicate
was one that would rather make the recipient more instead of less sceptical of au-
thority.⁷ This understanding of Nietzsche’s communication of mood also allows us
to see why Karl Jaspers is wrong to conclude from the observation that Nietzsche
does not directly show the way toward an ideal mood that he does not have such
an ideal at all and does not intend to communicate any such ideal (cf. Jaspers
 One can of course ask, in what work this mood is best expressed or when this mood finds its most
mature expression, but answering such questions would require a different kind of evaluative study
(cf. Stegmaier 2012).
 See also Nietzsche’s contention that nothing is as misunderstood in his time than philosophical
states of mind (BGE 213, KSA 5, 147). Nietzsche specifically targets the view that the philosophical ex-
perience of thinking must be heavy, slow and utterly serious, to which he opposes the joyful doubt
that is more akin to dancing.
 It is also worth reminding that the one and only comment by Nietzsche on the manipulation of
mood by power-hungry men was highly critical (D 29, KSA 3, 38–39). In other words, I think that
the appropriation of Nietzsche by the National Socialists is still best explained by referring to
what use could be made of certain citations from his texts and notes. There is certainly no lack of
passages that can be used in service of certain ideologies, which is evident in the original German
e.g. “Die Schwachen und Missrathnen sollen zu Grunde gehen” (A 2, KSA 6, 170) or in EH: “Jene
neue Partei des Lebens, welche die grösste aller Aufgaben, die Höherzüchtung der Menschheit in die
Hände nimmt, eingerechnet die schonungslose Vernichtung alles Entartenden und Parasitischen…”
(KSA 6, 313)
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1981, 336–338). For Nietzsche’s communication is in this regard out of necessity pri-
marily an example of what he himself termed exhortatio indirecta, i.e. indirect per-
suasion.
9.1.3 Nietzsche’s communication of mood is anti-religious
Furthermore, the mood that Nietzsche sought to communicate can – following this
line of reasoning – hardly be described as religious. I have accordingly argued
that Nietzsche’s atheism is expressed in the style of his writings, in the mood he
seeks to communicate. Nietzsche himself provides the foundation for such an inter-
pretation when he in his early work describes the style of the religious person. He
insists that the style of communication that the priest employs should directly
allow one to identify the author or speaker as a religious person (HH II, WS 79,
KSA 2, 588). In this regard, it is telling that his own writings exhibit precisely
those affects that he forbids the style of the religious person, namely irony, arro-
gance, mischievousness, hate, as well as rapid changes in emotional tone. Does
not such a style provoke doubt? Arguably it does, and precisely in this sense, I
have suggested that the playful mood, that sceptical joy in the destruction of convic-
tions that characterizes Nietzsche’s writings, is profoundly irreligious. It effectively
provides resistance to any discourse that claims eternal and transcendent authority;
a defining feature of religious discourse (cf. Lincoln 2012, 1). In this regard, it is final-
ly worth noting that since Nietzsche started using the metaphor of mountain air to
characterize his philosophy in the period around the publication of HH, i.e. in the
late 1870s, he regularly opposes it to the stink of Churches, Christianity and Wagne-
rianism. This is of course most apparent in Z but one finds such statements scattered
throughout his texts.⁸ It is precisely the idea that style is an expression of mood that
similarly leads Nietzsche to call for an architecture that reflects the inner life of the
free spirit (GS 280, KSA 3, 524–525).⁹ Although Nietzsche’s attack is primarily direct-
ed against Christianity, the evidence reviewed in chapter 7 strongly suggests that his
criticism is directed against religion more generally, and that he only plays with that
which is considered holy.Without acknowledging that such play is an expression of a
sceptical mood, as an expression of freedom over and against religious interpreta-
tions, one easily misreads Nietzsche’s use of religious terminology, and especially
his “Dionysian” statements in the late works.
 Zarathustra is presented as an incarnation of the fresh air of the heights (e.g. KSA 4, 375). Unsur-
prisingly, he therefore bemoans the “air” of priestly architecture: “Churches they call their sweet-
smelling caves. ‘Oh what falsified light, what musty air! Here the soul to its heights may –– not fly
up!” (Parkes 2005, 78; KSA 4, 118; cf. BGE 30, KSA 5, 49)
 In EH, Nietzsche goes as far as to talk about founding a city that would reflect his nature, and com-
pares this plan to the efforts of the supposedly atheistic and therefore intimately related Emperor
Frederick II to build the city of Aquila as a bulwark against the Church (KSA 6, 340).
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The examination of Nietzsche’s statements about extraordinary states and desir-
able moods has shown that his ideal mood is evidently not an ecstatic state that ex-
tinguishes individual, temporal consciousness. The high mood that he has in sight is
an individual, philosophical state, reached through living an experimental, philo-
sophical life. Put differently, Nietzsche’s scepticism is not provisional; it is not a
tool abandoned when a higher state is reached, but informs his thinking about
what an ideal mood is like. Nietzsche explicitly voices his disgust at collective intox-
ication (e.g. GS 86, KSA 3, 443–444), which means that he can also hardly be
thought of as intending a renewal of Dionysian religion when he invokes the name
of Dionysus. Instead, my reading has provided further support for the thesis that
the name Dionysus signifies Nietzsche’s own philosophy, considered as a philosophy
that affirms life as uncertain, as problem, as a question mark. In this specific way,
the study has been a contribution to reinstating Nietzsche as a disciple of a philo-
sophical Dionysus (cf. Hödl 2009).
9.1.4 Concluding remarks on the role of mood in Nietzsche’s thinking
Whatever one might think of the finer details of the interpretation presented here,
one should at least admit that the study has proven that Nietzsche was preoccupied
with questions concerning mood, not least concerning moods of the future, and that
the study has therefore shown mood to be a significant issue in Nietzsche-scholar-
ship. Indeed, my study strongly suggests that mood is of such importance to the phi-
losopher that he should be counted among those few thinkers (e.g. Emerson and
Heidegger), for whom mood is a key to understanding existence. Consequently, inter-
pretations that seek to clarify Nietzsche’s thinking but wholly ignore the question of
mood must be deemed incomplete if not outright problematic. I have thus repeatedly
suggested that there are limits to what purely historical-critical scholarship on sour-
ces can reveal, and that clarification must be aided by other strategies of reading. To
put it bluntly: if the sources were so important for determining Nietzsche’s philo-
sophical intention, he himself would have given transparent citations and added de-
tailed bibliographies to his works. In this sense,what is truly new and valuable about
this work for scholarship on Nietzsche is not to be found primarily in the finer details
concerning historical-critical evidence about sources but rather in the attempt to rec-
ognize the role of mood in a rigorous manner and then to re-examine traditions of
scholarship. I have argued that such a procedure is especially important when it
comes to Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion and nowhere more so than when it
comes to the interpretation of the words that God is dead. In this regard, to reiterate,
the results of my study support the argument of Hödl that Nietzsche’s manner of pre-
senting the message that God is dead is meant to point to possibilities of being
human (Hödl 2009, 361–362), and specifies that what concerned Nietzsche most
were the possibilities of dwelling in the world that different moods open up. Even
more specifically, my study strongly suggests that one can conclude that Nietzsche’s
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challenge to the coming generations is the call for a radical atheism that bears a life-
affirming mood.
9.2 On the significance of the study for research on
secularization
Now that the most important results of the work done here have been discussed, I
will finally present the case that the significance of this study is not limited to
Nietzsche-scholarship, nor even to philosophy in a strict sense. Specifically, I
argue that the clarification of Nietzsche’s criticism of religion, and above all of the
psychological vision that guides it, might yet contribute to the interdisciplinary dis-
course on secularization. That the discourse on secularization itself is quite impor-
tant hardly needs to be defended. Indeed, it is a massive understatement to say
that the discussion is important. The narrative of the decline of religion in modernity,
the narrative that explains why it might be said that we live in a secular age (cf. Tay-
lor 2007), is central to the self-understanding of the modern West, and therefore un-
surprisingly also in the academic study of religion. What then could a specialized
study about the philosopher Nietzsche, even if focused on his thinking about the cri-
sis of faith, possibly contribute to the academic discussion on secularization that was
until recently mostly associated with historical and empirical research in sociology?¹⁰
It is precisely what might be termed the crisis of sociological theories of secula-
rization, and the philosophical interventions that have followed in its wake, which
justify a turn to the resources that can be found in Nietzsche’s thinking. Next I
will provide a brief sketch of the crisis in question, and then I will clear up a misun-
derstanding that has hitherto prevented the wider reception of Nietzsche’s ideas
among non-philosophers doing research on religion and secularization. After that,
I will through a discussion of some vexing problems in the new dialogue between
sociology and philosophy, demonstrated by the work of Charles Taylor, move on to
show how Nietzsche’s psychological intuitions can be made fruitful. I can of course
here only suggest avenues that might be worth pursuing further, but I will provide
reasons for the pursuit.
 From the 1960s to the early 2000s, sociological research on secularization was without a doubt
dominant. One might even claim that secularization was first and foremost a topic of the sociology of
religion. Thus, to give but one prominent example, the intellectual historian Owen Chadwick felt the
need to provide a thorough justification why one should at all pay any attention to intellectuals and
their ideas when narrating secularization, instead of simply focusing on more general social changes
(cf. Chadwick 1975, 11–14).
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9.2.1 The crisis in the discourse on secularization
The crisis of the sociological discourse can be illustrated by the example of Peter
Berger, who used to be known as one of the foremost proponents of secularization
theory (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2004, 4) due to his early work (Berger 1967), in
which he argued that modernization inevitably leads to a marked decline of both in-
stitutional religion, due to the differentiation of social spheres, and individual reli-
giosity, due to the rationalization of worldviews. In the 1990s, Berger became con-
vinced that the empirical evidence, not least about the vibrant religiosity of the
USA,¹¹ did not match the basic assumptions of his theory nor his predictions
about the future and therefore recanted much of his earlier work. Berger has now re-
verted to the speculative idea that there is such a thing as a “religious impulse”,
which “has been a perennial feature of humanity”, and on account of this he has
even suggested that there is something to the critique of resurgent religious move-
ments that claim life without reference to transcendence is necessarily shallow
and impoverished (cf. Berger 1999, 13). It is indeed noteworthy that the idea of a met-
aphysical need has returned to the scholarly discussion on religion through the dis-
course on secularization, as an explanation of why religiosity persists even in the
modern West, since theories of secularization once played no small role in margin-
alizing that idea within academia.¹²
This return is apt to draw attention to what is at stake in current discussions;
such is the extent of the crisis of secularization theory that the most basic founda-
tions of earlier research are questioned. This questioning is concerned with nothing
less than the nature of religiosity, the nature of rationality and the self-understanding
of modernity. It is in this context that the discussion has become more philosophical,
and open to philosophical interventions: for whenever an academic discipline
doubts its own basic theoretical assumptions philosophy has its feast. Notably, how-
ever, the question about need is at the centre of the discussion. Arguably, adopting
 I am not suggesting that the debate would have focused solely on the USA, e.g. the resurgence of
fundamentalist Islam and the spread of evangelicalism in Africa and Latin America certainly contrib-
uted to a change in scholarly perceptions. But pointing to these cases is not really a challenge to clas-
sical theories of secularization that focus on the West, i.e. on countries whose modernity does not
stand in question. The religiosity of the USA has therefore been the most serious objection to the
idea that modernization and secularization go hand in hand (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 83), and
this justifies granting it a special place as example.
 While the idea that the human being is by its nature homo religiosus was influential in the early
development of the study of religion (cf. Lang 1993, 164– 172), the sociology of religion and particu-
larly theories of secularization showed that research could do better without it. The most cited classic
works on secularization either paid no heed to the assumption (Berger 1967) or explicitly rejected it
(Wilson 1966, xv-xvii), on the grounds that it is hardly helpful for understanding the very real changes
in religiosity that they were concerned with. Thus, the idea fell out of favour among serious scholars
of religion during the latter part of the 20th century, only to return to the centre of the debate at the
onset of the 21st as critics attacked the fundamental premises of secularization theory.
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the idea of a universal and perennial need for religion is as problematic as not to
speak of religious needs at all, for one is then confronted with the task of taking ac-
count of the reality of atheism and all that secularization that has in fact taken place.
In other words, it is hardly helpful to replace one crude theory with another that is
just as crude. In the following, I will therefore argue that Nietzsche’s thinking about
the matter is still relevant precisely because of his dissection of the metaphysical
need and because of the richness of the resulting understanding of the emotional di-
mension of secularization. First of all, however, one can and must correct a rather
trivial yet fatal misconception, which has more recently hindered the reception of
Nietzsche in non-philosophical research on religion.
9.2.2 Nietzsche in contemporary research on religiosity
There is this idea among a number of contemporary researchers that Nietzsche was a
proponent of a simplistic story of the inevitable and total disappearance of religion,
and that since such narratives of secularization have been refuted, Nietzsche would
have been refuted. The argument can be presented thus: Nietzsche said that God is
dead, but globally religious belief is as strong if not stronger than ever; so therefore
Nietzsche was wrong. Irritatingly, even some of the brightest researchers on contem-
porary religiosity repeat this nonsense (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2004, 240 and 2011,
281; cf. Vail et al. 2010, 84). As I already suggested in the introduction, mentioning
Nietzsche and quoting the words that God is dead does not say much about the in-
fluence of the philosopher, since it can evidently be done without ever acquainting
oneself with his writings. In fact, Nietzsche noted that even most Europeans of his
time still needed religion or some functional equivalent (e.g. GS 347, KSA 3, 581–
582), and that this was unlikely to change much for quite some time if ever (cf.
GS 108, KSA 3, 468), as not everyone would be up to the required emotional change.
My study has furthermore strongly suggested that Nietzsche thinks the future is gen-
uinely open, and that his criticism of religion is meant to point to possibilities of
change.¹³ Consequently, what Nietzsche actually thought about religion and atheism
might still be relevant to the discussion on secularization. I do not mean to deny that
much of what Nietzsche wrote rests on outdated 19th-century scholarship and sci-
ence, but rather to point out that some of his psychological intuitions might yet
be of value and give new impetus for research. If Nietzsche is the pre-eminent diag-
nostician of 19th-century unbelief, and this study has contributed to making that
case, it of course follows that his writings are at least valuable for research on the
 In this regard, the results of my study are fully compatible with the conclusions of Johann Figl
and Michael Skowron, who mostly on the basis of Nachlass-notes argue that Nietzsche thinks it is
very well possible that new gods will be born, and that even the old God might be reborn (Figl
2000, 101 and Skowron 2002, 3 and 37). What I cannot emphasize enough, however, is the fact
that if Nietzsche holds such a thing possible, it does not mean that he thinks it is desirable.
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19th century. However, one need not accept Taylor’s exaggerated claim that the “deep-
er, more anchored forms of unbelief arising in the nineteenth century are basically
the same as those which are held today” (Taylor 2007, 369) in order to assume
that Nietzsche’s diagnosis might be of relevance to the discussion about the contem-
porary situation as well. It is enough to note that the idea of a universal need for re-
ligion, viz. a metaphysical need, is back; for the return of that idea certainly suggests
that it might be profitable to reconsider the philosopher who more than any other
questioned such ideas. At this point it is necessary to mention that the introduction
of philosophical speculation into the discussion has not gone unquestioned; i.e. that
the new dialogue between sociology and philosophy has caused some unease among
sociologists, who used to dominate the discussion. Therefore, for fairness sake, I will
consider what can be gained from the sociological critique of philosophy before mov-
ing on.
9.2.3 The dialogue between philosophy and sociology
The sociologist Bryan S. Turner has noted that philosophers, not sociologists of reli-
gion, have in recent years set the terms of the debates about secularization and the
future of religion (Turner 2010, 649). This is obviously true in the sense that philos-
ophers, above all Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, have profoundly influenced
the direction of both historical and empirical research,¹⁴ but Turner goes further by
claiming that the voice of philosophy has overpowered that of the sociology of reli-
gion in the public debate. One is tempted to add that there are other disciplines that
are relevant to the debate but receive even less attention, e.g. anthropology and psy-
chology. A sense of why the dominance of philosophy might be problematic can be
drawn from Turner’s pointed formulation: “Philosophical discussions of the crisis of
religious belief and authority all too frequently ignore social science empirical inves-
tigations and findings. Their abstract speculations rarely refer to any actual findings
of social science.” (Turner 2010, 650) While the philosopher might in turn point out
that the sociological discourse on secularization has been philosophically naive, as
illustrated above by the recent eagerness to “refute” Nietzsche’s words that God is
dead, and has traditionally rested on problematic assumptions about rationality, re-
ligiosity and modernity,¹⁵ and that only because of such deficits have philosophers
 Habermas is often credited with having made the term post-secular common (see Calhoun, Men-
dieta and VanAntwerpen 2013). The influence of his own thinking is nevertheless far overshadowed
by that of Charles Taylor, whose work (Taylor 2007) has spawned an entire industry of interdiscipli-
nary commentary that is vibrant to this day (for an exemplary work that contains a detailed bibliog-
raphy, see: Zemmin, Jager and Vanheeswijck 2016). Put simply, Taylor’s work cannot be ignored, if
one values intellectual integrity.
 Typically, rationality is associated with modernity, and religiosity with irrationality, and thus one
ends up with the view of the incompatibility of any form of religiosity with modernity (e.g. Berger
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been able to take the role they now have in the interdisciplinary discussion, there is
still more than a grain of truth in Turner’s polemic. His statement should neverthe-
less be qualified or one needs to note that he himself already qualifies it (“all too
frequently”, “rarely”). Firstly, it is not philosophy per se, which is problematic, but
a kind of philosophy that does not take specialized research seriously and instead
escapes into abstractions. Secondly, it is of course not the case that sociology or
other relevant disciplines would be entirely absent from the philosophical discourse,
but it certainly seems as if a few classics were cited only in order to allow a retreat
into abstract speculation (cf. Turner 2010, 650). Insofar as the philosophical debate
ignores more recent empirical and historical research, it must necessarily rest on a
questionable foundation, especially as there have been advances relevant to the un-
derstanding of secularization.¹⁶ In this regard, Turner specifically criticizes the ne-
glect of the body and emotions in the philosophical debate.¹⁷ While this criticism cer-
tainly hits the target in Habermas, in whose work feeling plays a subordinate role
compared to a very problematic ideal of rationality,¹⁸ it might seem particularly
1967). It needs explicitly to be pointed out that more recent sociological research has abandoned the
idea that rationalization is the driving force of secularization (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2004, 8–9).
 E.g. if the story of secularization is told as a story of loss, one should take account of empirical
research on responses to loss (e.g. Bonanno 2004). Relying solely on outdated theories of loss, such
as can be found in the classic works of Freud, is problematic to say the least. Arguably, one then
bases one’s philosophical thought on a perspective that not only necessarily distorts the historical
record, but also clouds one’s vision of the future.
 Having referred to the general disregard of the body and feelings, Turner specifically mentions
that the “sociology of the emotions has in recent years developed as an important field of contem-
porary research” and adds “but it has not played a significant part in recent philosophical debate”
(Turner 2010, 650). The same could be said about the history of emotions (cf. Plamper 2015) and
the increased interest in emotions and moods by scholars of literature (cf. Reents 2015). A common
denominator is that all of these disciplines promote and provide evidence for a view of emotional life
as to a great extent historically constructed and malleable, instead of thinking of it as an expression
of perennial and unchanging impulses of human nature. It is finally worth noting that an aversion
towards research on emotions can not only be found in philosophy, but that certain currents within
the study of religion also explicitly rule out taking emotions seriously other than as “discourse” (e.g.
Stuckrad 2003; cf. Turner 2010, 650).
 Habermas built much of his work on a simplifying narrative of modernization as rationalization =
secularization, in which rationality replaces religion and thus functions as a “substitute for lost faith”
(cf. Milbank 2013, 322). Having understood that anything like that does not seem to be happening, he
has more recently developed an “awareness of what is missing”, i.e. a respect for emotional resources
that he now thinks have only been preserved in religious practice (cf. Milbank 2013, 324). That not-
withstanding, he still thinks that rationality can and should transcend not only religious feeling but
all feeling in general, as if feeling were a primitive rest to be overcome by pure reason. In other words,
he still holds on to an untenable, unrealistic ideal of rationality. I therefore fully agree with the gen-
eral thrust of John Milbank’s scathing critique of Habermas’ idea of translating the archaic impulses
of religion into rational language, in the sense that the idea is based on an erroneous dichotomy be-
tween feeling and rational thought that does not acknowledge that feeling mediates thought (cf. Mil-
bank 2013, 332). The title of Milbank’s article hits the spot: “What Lacks is Feeling” (Milbank 2013).
Needless to say, there is also much that can be questioned in Milbank’s critique, not least as it is
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odd when directed at Taylor. After all, Taylor has contributed to a shift in the discus-
sion away from the theme of rationalization to that of lived experience (cf. Taylor
2007, 4–5). Nevertheless, I do think that one can charge Taylor with a neglect of a
wealth of more recent historical and empirical research that bears on the matter,
not to mention a neglect of philosophical objections, which make his most funda-
mental anthropological assumptions untenable. Taylor’s work is worth questioning,
since it is symptomatic of the return to notions of religion as an expression of a fun-
damental impulse in human nature, and since his articulation of the idea has been
widely influential.
9.2.4 Charles Taylor, metaphysical need, and the nature of experience
Despite his talk of subtle languages, the model that Taylor bases his discussion of
experience on is anything but subtle; in fact, it is irritatingly unsubtle. A very tradi-
tional prejudice, namely the idea that all desire stems from a fundamental lack,
shapes his entire work and allows him to fit all experience into a preconceived
scheme. The most problematic thing about Taylor’s assumption that it is this lack
which leads all of us to strive for some kind of fullness, is how he conceives of full-
ness as a place. While he himself is well aware that this might be considered prob-
lematic, and a particularly Christian understanding of fullness, he seeks to justify it
through a “structural analogy” (cf. Taylor 2007, 6–7). To simplify, his argument runs
thus: Just as the believer strives for heaven, the atheist, the “unbeliever”, wants to
find his or her life fully satisfying. In other words, the atheist is also always striving
toward a place of fullness, but thinks that the place can be here on earth. The main
problem with this analogy is of course the spatial metaphor and particularly the stat-
ic picture that it evokes. Needless to say, Taylor does not draw on any evidence to
support his understanding of the direction of the unbeliever’s striving, nor does he
provide any reasons for the conspicuous absence of time in his picture. The atheist
who supposedly hasn’t reached the place of fullness and always strives onwards
might for example be interpreted as not striving for a place at all but for (experiences
in) time (cf. Hägglund 2008). A full recognition of the temporality of all experience,
that time both animates and haunts all striving, would of course break Taylor’s
framework, since fullness could then not be thought of as a place. This preliminary
conclusion suggests that Taylor’s image serves a specific purpose. Indeed, Taylor
frames his discussion the way he does in order to keep open the possibility that
the unbeliever really strives towards something else than what he thinks he strives
for; namely transcendence. So even as there are atheists and might always have
been, they are on the same path as the believer and only fail to recognize the true
premised on the idea that religion grows naturally as a response to a fundamental human lack and
that it is this lack that prevents secularization.
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nature of their striving. Unsurprisingly, this is precisely what Taylor suggests in his
final chapter detailing examples of conversions where one “recognizes” desire as de-
sire for transcendence (Taylor 2007, 728). Thus, Taylor’s narrative of secularization
seeks to identify the “conditions” that in the modern world prevent people from rec-
ognizing their desire for what it really is. The specifics of Taylor’s narrative are of no
concern here, since however strong these conditions might be, human nature will in
his view nevertheless prevent anyone from becoming fully secular. To conclude, this
is yet another formulation of the idea of a metaphysical need. As Simon During puts
it:
his notion of an elemental spiritual lack belongs to philosophical anthropology not to history,
and it is this a-historical condition of human nature that means that secularization will always
meet resistance. Of course, this is not a new idea: the notion that human nature longs for full-
ness is traditional to Christian apologetics. (During 2017, 155)
It is of course not enough to point out that the idea has certain theological uses to
discredit it. That it does not do justice to the self-understanding of the non-religious
is rather obvious, but that should in itself not be considered an objection.¹⁹ As Peter
Berger also states, it should be accepted that the idea itself is not a theological one,
in the sense of requiring faith, but an anthropological one (Berger 1999, 13) that
might play a constructive role in scholarship. In other words, it should be criticized
on philosophical and evidential grounds. Arguably, such an understanding of expe-
rience as Taylor’s covers up far more than it reveals about the emotional dimension
of religion and atheism. One can especially question whether it does justice to what
the historical record as well as empirical research tell about secularization. It is pre-
cisely what During terms the a-historical that is problematic about most articulations
of a religious or metaphysical need, and this is where Nietzsche with his emphasis on
historical philosophizing comes into play. In the following concluding sections, I 1)
briefly present a Nietzschean interpretation of empirical research that can be used to
challenge Taylor’s anthropological assumptions and 2) present the case that accept-
 Just as the self-understanding of the religious need not be allowed to have the last word in the
study of religions. It is, however, worth mentioning that Phil Zuckerman’s qualitative research
among non-religious Scandinavians suggests to the author that he is concerned with genuine existen-
tial positions instead of a denial of a fundamental aspect of being human (i.e. an ontological lack or
a perennial need for religion, cf. Zuckerman 2010, 5). Far from supporting ideas of homo religiosus,
the fact that those of his research subjects who explicitly affirmed that life is ultimately meaningless
lived satisfying lives (Zuckerman 2010, 5) leads the author to conclude that the rest of the world might
learn something about contentment by getting to know more about secular Scandinavian culture. Of
course, one might question whether Zuckerman’s method of conducting 150 in-depth interviews
(Zuckerman 2010, 3) can in itself provide any decisive answers as his results ultimately rest on
what his subjects report. In other words, the philosophical interpretation of the results is decisive.
Needless to say, more comparative empirical research into existential positions and interpretations
of desire is called for, both among members of different religions and among those who adhere to
no religion, to provide a more solid foundation for philosophical interpretation.
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ing Taylor’s perspective leads to a distorted view of history,which can be corrected by
a perspective inspired by Nietzsche.
9.2.5 The existential security thesis and the need for religion
Empirical scholarship can in itself perhaps not disprove such a fundamental philo-
sophical framework as guides Charles Taylor’s notion of experience, but with a little
help from a Nietzschean perspective, it can certainly cast doubt on it. The main prob-
lem that one faces if one assumes that there is a perennial need for religion, or a de-
sire for transcendence that grows out of a fundamental lack, is that one has to pro-
vide an explanation for the very real variation in the intensity of religiosity that can
be observed historically between periods, geographically between societies such as
the USA and the UK, and between different groups (e.g. gender, class etc.) within
any given society.²⁰ Research on secularization has therefore traditionally suggested
that there is no such thing as a single need for religion, nor an ineradicable desire for
transcendence, and that whatever needs are met by religion vary and change over
time, but this has been more of a presupposition taken for granted than the main
focus of investigation. Due to the shifts in the discussion alluded to in section 9.2.1,
empirical research has more and more turned to explain variations in demand for
religion. Psychological research has long suggested that religion grows out of fear.
Put more diplomatically, it has been argued that the main function of religion is
to allay anxiety in the face of the troubling aspects of life; above all in the face of
death. A number of studies in psychology, i.e. a “large body of research”, tends to
support the idea that religious worldviews can provide a sense of existential security
(Vail et al. 2010, 85). All this fits very well with Nietzsche’s basic assumptions about
the role of fear in producing religious interpretations, but this research has most
often been used to support the notion of a perennial need for religion, not least
since death and destruction are not about to disappear from our world (cf. Vail et
al. 2010, 84 and 91). Building on yet modifying such research, the existential security
thesis (Norris and Inglehart 2004 and 2011) suggests that most of the variation in re-
ligiosity worldwide can be explained by differences in felt security. To put it simply,
religion can strengthen the sense of existential security, but this presupposes that the
basic conditions of life are sufficiently insecure.While this idea is not unproblematic
if read as a theory of religion,²¹ it is particularly interesting that the empirical evi-
 Taylor’s own historical narrative, which focuses on changes in understandings of the self, is par-
ticularly unhelpful to understand the divergence between Western Europe and the USA, as they are
culturally very similar when it comes to conceptions of the modern self. As Taylor himself admits “a
fully satisfactory account of this difference, which is in a sense the crucial question for secularization
theory, escapes me” (Taylor 2007, 530).
 The theory would have to be considered extremely reductionistic. The crude yet elegantly simple
idea is that experiences of danger, of the risk of not surviving and of not having one’s basic needs
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dence suggests there is a strong correlation between societal development and de-
creasing demand for religion (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 219–220 and 2011, 281).
It would certainly seem to be the case, as Norris and Inglehart suggest, that increased
basic security also translates into felt existential security, which in its turn increases
acceptance of risk, ambiguity and all the troubling aspects of life (cf. Norris and In-
glehart 2004, 19), and therefore has a negative impact on demand for both rigid
moral rules and religious promises of otherworldly rewards.
It is important to note, however, that taken as such these findings presents no
challenge to Taylor’s model, as they can easily be reinterpreted into a language
less reductionistic than that of Norris and Inglehart.²² Besides, nowhere do these re-
searchers suggest that it would be possible for an individual to be completely un-
touched by those forces that create the need for religious faith, not to speak of sug-
gesting that societal developments strengthening existential security could
completely eradicate demand for religion in society as a whole. Nevertheless, one
can interpret the results as suggesting that not feeling a need for religion, or a
need for binding convictions, might be a sign of a heightened feeling of existential
security. This proposition can in its turn be disconnected from any assumptions
about societal development; there might after all be individuals, in any time and
place, who for one reason or another have a particularly strong feeling of existential
security. Here we enter the territory of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and his idea that a cer-
tain form of atheism that does without binding convictions, that is free to play with
convictions, is an instinctive expression of health. One need not accept Nietzsche’s
polemical association of faith with disease, in order to acknowledge that there
met, especially when growing up, produce stress, and the experience of stress in its turn leads to a
demand for rigid moral rules and strict predictability (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 19). Such are best
provided by religions that can invoke a transcendent authority, wherefore religiosity should thrive in
adverse circumstances, such as in the “developing world”. Indeed, this happens to be the case (Norris
and Inglehart 2004, 220). Importantly, the existential security thesis also predicts much of the varia-
tion within developed societies, e.g. the poor are generally almost twice as religious as the rich and
even in the USA the poor are significantly more religious than the rich (Norris and Inglehart 2004,
108). Still, the theory is best not read as a comprehensive theory of religion, but as a strong critique
of the idea that there is a perennial religious need and that demand for religion does not change. For
example, the theory is incapable of fully explaining the vibrant religiosity of the USA: even the au-
thors admit it is not possible to explain the case simply by referring to the fact that the country lacks
functioning social security as in Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2004, 226 and 240). An approach more
sensitive to historical factors could certainly provide a more complete picture.
 I am explicitly referring to Taylor’s understanding of experience here, not to Taylor’s historical
narrative. In other words, I am not disputing that the results of Norris and Inglehart provide the
most serious challenge to Taylor’s narrative as a whole, as they clearly show that there are factors
that influence demand for religion that he does not take account of at all. It would certainly seem,
contra Taylor, that the philosophical idea of the autonomous self is rather insignificant in comparison
with actual experiences of self-sufficiency, i.e. of existential security. My point is rather that challeng-
ing Taylor’s most basic assumptions requires a philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence
in question.
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might be some truth in his idea that atheism (too), or at least a certain kind of athe-
ism, can be a sign of a strong affirmation of life. It is enough to note that such an
atheism can be conceived. Crucially, even acknowledging this possibility contradicts
the most fundamental assumptions of Taylor’s thinking on experience, in which the
atheist’s life is defined as lacking in an even more significant sense than the life of
the believer. The atheist is in this vision driven by the same fundamental lack as the
believer, but can only strive onward toward a place he or she can never fully reach,
whereas the believer at least has some hope of contact with a transcendent source of
fullness. If, on the other hand, human experience, and specifically the experience of
the atheist, need not be thought of as fundamentally shaped by an ontological lack,
the picture is shattered. To simplify, the thought of radical atheism is a direct chal-
lenge to the logic of lack (cf. Hägglund 2008).²³ While Nietzsche’s psychological dis-
section of the metaphysical need uncovers this potential union of existential health
and scepticism, which parallels the findings of empirical research on religiosity, one
can of course ask if any free spirit ever, Nietzsche included, fully experienced life as
such an overflow of power as Nietzsche speaks of. This question is certainly worth
asking, but it is of no concern to us here, because even an approximation of such
self-sufficiency, just as the mere possibility that such a supremely healthy type
can in due time emerge, is enough to cast doubt on Taylor’s most basic assumptions
about human nature. Whereas Taylor’s assumption about a fundamental lack is a-
historical, a historically sensitive view would suggest that under certain conditions
human experience can be more fundamentally shaped by feelings of power than
of lack. Minimally, Taylor’s model would have to be corrected to acknowledge that
a sole focus on lack as fundamentally defining the experience of being human is in-
adequate. Any more definitive answers would naturally require a thorough philo-
sophical study of its own, wherefore I will now focus on how a Taylorian perspective
approaches the historical experience of the 19th-century crisis of faith, and contrast it
with a more Nietzschean perspective.
9.2.6 The 19th-century crisis of faith and the question of mood revisited
Charles Taylor’s understanding of experience necessarily leads to an emphasis on
the loss in loss of faith (cf. Taylor 2007, 307). Although Taylor himself seeks to em-
phasize that modernity does not make faith impossible, and that melancholy is
only one part of the story of our time, he nevertheless cannot avoid thinking of a sec-
ular age as an age defined by the possibility (and reality) of a malaise or melancholy
unknown in earlier times: the experience of total meaninglessness (Taylor 2007, 302–
 If a life-affirming religion or interpretation of Christianity is truly possible (cf. Figl 2002, 160), then
this might also be considered a challenge to Taylor’s model, as such a religion could hardly be bound
to the idea of a fundamental lack that requires salvation and would perhaps rather be an expression
of gratitude for life.
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303). Unfortunately, it is precisely this aspect of his work that has been influential in
historical scholarship. How this might be problematic can be illustrated by the work
of the literary theorist Colin Jager. Just like Taylor, Jager is convinced that under-
standing the 19th-century situation is essential to understanding our own time
(Jager 2014, 4–7). Jager conceives of the “modern secular” as a kind of background
mood shaping experience. Following Taylor, he associates it with a shallow “celebra-
tion of ordinary life” (Jager 2014, 9) to which he contrasts the disquiet of romantic
authors.While Jager is to be commended for paying attention to mood in his discus-
sion of secularization, and while it is certainly the case that a melancholy mood was
widespread among intellectuals in the Romantic era, his take on the issue is deeply
problematic insofar as he suggests the romantic criticism revealed the truth about
“the secular”, i.e. that “its characteristic mood is melancholy” (Jager 2014, 23).
Jager is decent enough to admit that in this regard his work aligns to a great extent
with a tradition of histories that “tend to construe the secular as a form of loss”
(Jager 2014, 182), but his stated intention to expand on this view is half-hearted to
say the least, since his definition of “the secular” as melancholic leads him to
treat any non-melancholic way of dwelling in the modern world as some kind of
breakthrough to a position “after the secular”, “after atheism” (cf. Jager 2014, 179
and 224), that has first had to overcome melancholy.²⁴ This is not merely a conceptual
matter, because the language chosen by Jager would make no sense if the conscious-
ness that God is dead were not essentially melancholic. This, however, is exactly
what Nietzsche’s criticism suggests is nothing more than a specific interpretation. In-
stead, Nietzsche counts with a variety of possible responses to modernity in general
and secularization in particular; with a variety of moods of dwelling in the world.
Nietzsche does, however, recognize the power of historical forces over most of us,
such as the emotional legacy of Christianity, and therefore a perspective inspired
by his philosophy would also pay careful attention to expressions of melancholy.
In this regard, the distinction between traditional and radical atheism is extremely
valuable, since it provides the grounding for a more fitting language than that
which by necessity must associate atheism with lack. A study of 19th-century litera-
ture and intellectual culture that would take the striving for such a language as a
starting point, might thus provide quite a different perspective on the emotional cul-
ture of the time, since not only the focus might be less exclusively on laments and
loss, but the texts that do speak of loss might be read in a different light. Above
 Though I focus here on Jager’s work, he is by no means alone in this interpretation. To mention
another example, Theodore Ziolkowski similarly links secular modernity with melancholy, noting
about the 19th-century crisis of faith that “the poets were among the first to sense the mood of the
age” (Ziolkowski 2007, 10). However, Ziolkowski focuses on what he takes to be secular surrogates
of lost faith (in the 1920s), attempts to overcome the melancholy of secular life; and explicitly affirms
that they grow out of a perennial need for faith (cf. Ziolkowski 2007). Here one can again witness the
connection between the idea of a perennial need for religion/faith/God and the idea that life that
seeks to do without religion is necessarily melancholic.
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all, they would not be used to derive perennial truths, as if generalizing from the ex-
perience of a few rather morbid poets were unproblematic. While one can without
reservation agree with Taylor’s view about modernity insofar as modernity arguably
makes new forms of melancholy possible, the question is whether a specific form of
melancholy should be taken to define secular modernity, or whether it is not rather
the case that modernity also makes joyful moods possible that were unknown and
unfelt in earlier times, and that this is of no small significance. In this sense, a per-
spective closer to that of Nietzsche is a precondition for more fruitful historical re-
search on secularization and moods. Needless to say, it is also a precondition for
more constructive thought about the moods of the future.
256 9 Conclusions
10 Literature
10.1 Works by Nietzsche, translations and abbreviations
In this work, I basically follow the practice of citing Nietzsche’s works established in German-
language scholarship, in the sense that all references to Nietzsche’s works are primarily to:
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1980): Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA). 15 vols. Ed. Giorgio
Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Munich: dtv/De Gruyter.
Letters sent by or to Nietzsche are cited according to:
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1975ff.): Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel (KGB). 24 vols. Ed. Giorgio
Colli, Mazzino Montinari, Norbert Miller and Annemarie Pieper. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
However, for the sake of readability all direct quotations of Nietzsche’s works in the main text are
from English translations. As there is still no complete direct translation of the Colli-Montinari edition
(KSA) into English, and since the quality of translations varies a lot, the choice of translation might
seem eclectic. The translations chosen reflect my personal judgement about the quality of transla-
tion. In order to highlight that the translations at best are an approximation of the original text,
I have employed the following solution in the case of direct quotations: I first cite the translation
and only then mention the abbreviation of the Nietzsche-work that contains the cited passage as
well as the place of the work and the passage in the KSA (e.g. Handwerk 1997, 88; HH I 110,
KSA 2, 110). The following translations have been used:
Clark, Maudemarie and Brian Leiter (eds.)
1997. Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Transl. by R.J. Hollingdale.
(Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Handwerk, Gary
1997. Human All Too Human I. Transl. with an afterword by Gary Handwerk. Vol. 3 of the
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
2012. Human All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too
Human II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879). Transl. with an afterword by Gary Handwerk. Vol. 4 of the
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kaufmann, Walter
1954. The Portable Nietzsche. Ed. and transl. by Walter Kaufmann. London: Penguin.
1974. The Gay Science. Transl. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage.
Large, Duncan
2007. Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is. Transl. with an introduction by Duncan
Large. (Oxford World’s Classics). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parkes, Graham
2005. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Transl. with an introduction by Graham Parkes. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
The following works are cited using these abbreviations:
A The Antichrist
BGE Beyond Good and Evil
BT The Birth of Tragedy
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D Daybreak
EH Ecce Homo
GM On the Geneaology of Morals
GS The Gay Science
HH Human, All Too Human
RWB Richard Wagner in Bayreuth
TI Twilight of the Idols
TL On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense
Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra
HH I refers only to the original publication of 1876, while HH II refers to all of HH as presented in the
KSA, including The Wanderer and his Shadow (WS) as well as Mixed Opinions and Maxims (MOM).
WNB refers to the Weimarer Nietzsche-Bibliographie, ed. Stiftung Weimarer Klassik, Herzogin Anna
Amalia Bibliothek. Susanne Jung, Frank Simon-Ritz, Clemens Wahle, Erdmann von Wilamowitz-Moel-
lendorff and Wolfram Wojtecki (eds.). Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler. Cited volumes:
2002a. Vol. 3: Sekundärliteratur 1867– 1998: Nietzsches geistige und geschichtlich-kulturelle
Lebensbeziehungen, sein Denken und Schaffen.
2002b. Vol. 5: Sekundärliteratur 1867–1998: Wirkungs- und Forschungsgeschichte. Register zu
den Bänden 2–5.
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